Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?

[Jashwell]

"Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?"

Doesn't seem like much preamble is needed, but expect this largely to be filled (if at all) with arguments in favour of the existence of a God and counter-arguments. (Because the question is not "Are there good reasons to believe that a god does not exist?"). Though if you do think you have a good argument that shows it is reasonable to believe God does not exist, that is also valid.

This question comes up a lot in other threads where various classical arguments (e.g. ontological, axiological, cosmological) have been given in those threads.

If possible, try not to shotgun debate by raising lots of arguments at once. One sound argument should be sufficient.

[Jashwell]

[Replying to post 655 by instantc]

Of course the moral sense does not justify belief in objective morality.
Seeing something doesn't justify it as objectively existing. There are more criteria to meet.

But, for example, seeing and touching something does? You keep asserting this but haven't given me any justification.

Seeing and touching means it's more likely that there is something external.
Just seeing doesn't.

(Tbh it can get very complicated, esp when you have to take into account past memories, knowledge of the world, etc - and existing trust of senses)

It is a logical fact that without other presuppositions, one cannot inherently jump from subjective morality to objective morality. Not to mention the other reasons (i.e. inconsistency, differing morality in other animals)

That's not the question though. The question is whether the belief in moral reality can be justified by virtue of moral sense to the same extent than the belief in physical reality can.

Does objective morality exist?
That is very much the question.

Not to mention that a person's morality can change. Therefore, it cannot reflect something unchanging, and there's no convincing reason to believe that it's reflecting anything in reality

For the sake of the conversation, I'll limit my argument to concern one single moral proposition, namely that torturing children for fun is wrong. I doubt that one's perception regarding the truth about this proposition is going to change any more than their perception of physical reality is.

In older times, not everyone thought this. Esp. monarchs, many whom were considered divined by a god and presumably some of which effectively considered it their right to do what they want. And the concept of rights for everyone, inviolable or otherwise, isn't that old.

But consider this - if there is objective morality, someone's opinion can be objectively wrong, correct? Not just that, but everyone's opinion could be objectively wrong. (I'm sure you'd agree most if not all were wrong in older times)
So it might be the case that torturing children for fun is not only objectively right, but the most moral thing possible.

It is just the best explanation of our shared sensory experience.

Then moral reality is also the best explanation of our shared moral experience. Again, I am limiting my argument to concern the aforementioned moral proposition that, I take it, nearly everyone agrees with.

It's not shared. Not only does one's moral opinion change, not only does the moral opinion of society change (including that one), but it's not shared across more than one sense.
I should probably rephrase this in a different way, because in a way, we're discussing whether or not morality is a sense (or just a personal experience).
In ancient times, many superstitions and supernatural beliefs lead to unique 'senses'. For instance, divining. Why don't we a-priori trust a stick to be able to tell the richness of nearby minerals? Because we can test it against other senses and it comes up short.

You might think of that differently because it's an external instrument.

Why don't we trust whether or not we have a headache or a migraine to be a sense that determines personal demon possession? Because there's no other sense that reflects it. There's nothing we can test it against.

We naturally have to experience through our subjective POV. I don't know if 'no reality' actually means anything.

'No physical reality' means that physical things do not exist.

Reality exists by definition. If it didn't, it wouldn't be reality in the first place.
This is a much deeper philosophical question, and I'm unaware of any serious philosophy that advocates literally trusting senses a priori.

There are philosophers who hold the view that it is just a faith belief that reality exists, and those who think it's simply a matter of pragmatic necessity to act as if there is reality (not that there'd be a difference).

At best, you're seem to be trying to show that we can't trust any sense to any degree. Especially when you deal with such a deep aspect of philosophy where the above is seriously considered.

Solipsism is certainly not more parsimonious. You are still expecting the same sensory input only this time you are getting unquantifiable amounts of order from complete chaos. It's not about the sheer quantity of "objectively existing" things, under Solipsism you are still getting the same sensory data, only this time you are not wrapping it into objects and rules but treating it as random.

I have no idea what you are trying to say here, what do you mean by 'treating it as random'? As far as I can see, only your mind existing is more parsimonious than your mind existing in addition to a physical reality. This is also the opinion of every scholar I have ever heard of. Even wikipedia agrees with me about the minimality advantage of solipsism. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism

So far you haven't provided any justification for your central claim that five converging sense provide a justification to believe in reality but one sense does not. I've expressly challenged it in two aspects, and you haven't taken up either challenge.

Once again, far more than five senses (and even then, does each eye count as a different sense? One eye can be faulty with the other being reliable. Same for many other things)

Multiple senses allows you to establish reliability for detecting a continuous and consistent experience.
An 'undetectable ulterior reality' (of which solipsism would factor in) is less parsimonious as it assumes the exact same things as an extant reality, plus other things, for no benefit in explanatory power.

As I've already said, there may well be cases (e.g. no prior memory/&a consistent experience) in which one would be entirely justified in believing a dream to be real, even with their normal mental capability.

[instantc]

[Replying to post 660 by Jashwell]

Apparently you are uninterested in defending your central claim that I've challenged in two aspects.

You keep repeating that many converging senses provide a justification for the belief in physical reality while one sense does not. Yet, despite the many opportunities that I have given you, you haven't even tried to substantiate your claim.

It wouldn't even be enough for you to show that we are simply more justified in trusting in a number of converging senses than a single sense alone. For your claim to hold up any weight, you would have to show that we are properly justified in trusting in a number of converging senses and yet not at all justified in trusting in a single sense alone.

You bring about the argument about how morality changes over time. I don't see any reason to think that, as long as humans with rational capabilities have existed, there hasn't always been a wide consensus regarding the truth value of my sample proposition. Single exceptions, such as the past 'divine' rulers that you mention, are of no help for you here, as I could easily point out that mental institutions, for example, are full of people who have a differing perception of physical reality as well.

[Jashwell]

[Replying to post 660 by Jashwell]

Apparently you are uninterested in defending your central claim that I've challenged in two aspects.

You keep repeating that many converging senses provide a justification for the belief in physical reality while one sense does not. Yet, despite the many opportunities that I have given you, you haven't even tried to substantiate your claim.

I'm not sure what you mean.

It wouldn't even be enough for you to show that we are simply more justified in trusting in a number of converging senses than a single sense alone. For your claim to hold up any weight, you would have to show that we are properly justified in trusting in a number of converging senses and yet not at all justified in trusting in a single sense alone.

I gave examples. I could give more. Illusions, disabled senses, false positives such as phantom limbs in proprioception & touch, etc.

How could we tell that one sense is faulty if we only had one sense?

You bring about the argument about how morality changes over time. I don't see any reason to think that, as long as humans with rational capabilities have existed, there hasn't always been a wide consensus regarding the truth value of my sample proposition.

Single exceptions, such as the past 'divine' rulers that you mention, are of no help for you here, as I could easily point out that mental institutions, for example, are full of people who have a differing perception of physical reality as well.

Except that these people had no visible mental problems.
And that many of the actual population, esp. in ideologically and religiously motivated societies, are likely to have agreed on the basis of belief. There are many cases in modern society where even victims of injustice believe the victimisers were in the right.

Could you give any evidence that people believed torturing children for fun was widely considered wrong throughout the past?
Was torturing children for fun wrong before torture was invented?

Not to mention that the widespread approval of a single moral is hardly a justification for objective morality. There are significantly better explanations for the moral experience than it being a sense.
As I said before, do you consider hatred to exist objectively? Independent of any and all personal experience and opinion? If not, why not? Why shouldn't we consider hatred a sense?

[instantc]

This is a much deeper philosophical question, and I'm unaware of any serious philosophy that advocates literally trusting senses a priori.

Many forms of foundationalism do exactly that. John Locke, for example, believed that experience is the foundation of reality. In other words, he believed that we are prima facie justified in trusting our experience, unless we are given reasons not to. It's a rebuttable presumption so to say. If something directly and clearly appears to be the case, then we are at least to some extent justified in trusting it in the absence of a defeater.

At best, you're seem to be trying to show that we can't trust any sense to any degree. Especially when you deal with such a deep aspect of philosophy where the above is seriously considered.

No, my claim is that we are equally justified in trusting our moral experience and our experience of the physical world. At no point have I claimed that we are justified in doing either one.

[instantc]

How could we tell that one sense is faulty if we only had one sense?

It seems to me that there's no way to verify our sensory experience. I don't see how having a thousand different senses is any different from having one single sense in this regard. It seems wholly irrelevant, the mind could make up five different converging streams of sensory data just as easily as one such stream. What has bearing here would be the consistency of the sensory experience. So I agree that in principle you are on the right path trying to show that our moral perception has changed through time.

Could you give any evidence that people believed torturing children for fun was widely considered wrong throughout the past?
Was torturing children for fun wrong before torture was invented?

I think that it is obvious that as far as moral scholarship has existed, there has been a wide consensus regarding this particular proposition.

You have the burden of proof here, as you attempted to undermine my argument for moral realism by claiming that morality has changed through time. Since my argument concerns only one particular moral proposition, you would need to show that the consensus regarding that proposition has changed somewhere in the past.

[Jashwell]

How could we tell that one sense is faulty if we only had one sense?

It seems to me that there's no way to verify our sensory experience. I don't see how having a thousand different senses is any different from having one single sense in this regard. It seems wholly irrelevant, the mind could make up five different converging streams of sensory data just as easily as one such stream. What has bearing here would be the consistency of the sensory experience. So I agree that in principle you are on the right path trying to show that our moral perception has changed through time.

When you hear something, and you look at the area the noise originated and see nothing, do you consider what you have heard to have been nothing more than the wind or something else? Isn't this comparing senses to verify?

When you think you see something, but you check a camera or video and it isn't there, and conclude that you must have imagined it, isn't this comparing senses?

Could you give any evidence that people believed torturing children for fun was widely considered wrong throughout the past?
Was torturing children for fun wrong before torture was invented?

I think that it is obvious that as far as moral scholarship has existed, there has been a wide consensus regarding this particular proposition.

You have the burden of proof here, as you attempted to undermine my argument for moral realism by claiming that morality has changed through time. Since my argument concerns only one particular moral proposition, you would need to show that the consensus regarding that proposition has changed somewhere in the past.

[/quote]
I don't see why we should accept them as accurate if they haven't been shown to be consistent in this regard while my view holds the burden of proof, the view that undermines your argument (in general, not my more specific belief) does not.

You say you "consider it obvious"
Do you also consider it obvious that slavery was always thought of as immoral by the majority?
Do you also consider it obvious that human sacrifice was always thought of as immoral by the majority?

Morality at large has changed, this is an undeniable fact.
Not only has morality changed over history (I "consider it obvious", and you should too from general historical facts) but we know it changes over age.
(You can always google "morality in history")
People aren't born with developed morality.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_development
We also know it changes across evolution.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution_of_morality

This is a much deeper philosophical question, and I'm unaware of any serious philosophy that advocates literally trusting senses a priori.

Many forms of foundationalism do exactly that. John Locke, for example, believed that experience is the foundation of reality. In other words, he believed that we are prima facie justified in trusting our experience, unless we are given reasons not to. It's a rebuttable presumption so to say. If something directly and clearly appears to be the case, then we are at least to some extent justified in trusting it in the absence of a defeater.

We may be justified as humans but not logically.
This is the reason we don't use divining rods any more.

At best, you're seem to be trying to show that we can't trust any sense to any degree. Especially when you deal with such a deep aspect of philosophy where the above is seriously considered.

No, my claim is that we are equally justified in trusting our moral experience and our experience of the physical world. At no point have I claimed that we are justified in doing either one.

Though we aren't.
We know different senses have different accuracies.
We can't distinguish the "external objective existence" of morals any more than hatred or other emotions.

[instantc]

When you hear something, and you look at the area the noise originated and see nothing, do you consider what you have heard to have been nothing more than the wind or something else? Isn't this comparing senses to verify?

When you think you see something, but you check a camera or video and it isn't there, and conclude that you must have imagined it, isn't this comparing senses?

This kind of comparison does not help at all when we are trying to determine whether there is a physical reality in the first place, and here's why.

In order for this kind of comparison to carry any value, we must presuppose that our senses are at least somewhat reliable. If we are in fact not getting sensory data from physical reality at all but imagining everything, then the fact that multiple senses provide converging results does not mean anything.

Morality at large has changed, this is an undeniable fact.

Yes, but my argument only concerns one particular moral proposition, can you show that the consensus regarding that proposition has changed?

We may be justified as humans but not logically.
This is the reason we don't use divining rods any more.

The reason that we don't use divining rods is because we know through experience that they do not work. Foundationalism only says that you are justified in trusting your senses in the absence of a defeater.

[Jashwell]

When you hear something, and you look at the area the noise originated and see nothing, do you consider what you have heard to have been nothing more than the wind or something else? Isn't this comparing senses to verify?

When you think you see something, but you check a camera or video and it isn't there, and conclude that you must have imagined it, isn't this comparing senses?

This kind of comparison does not help at all when we are trying to determine whether there is a physical reality in the first place, and here's why.

In order for this kind of comparison to carry any value, we must presuppose that our senses are at least somewhat reliable. If we are in fact not getting sensory data from physical reality at all but imagining everything, then the fact that multiple senses provide converging results does not mean anything.

And what I'm saying is, either physical reality involves the senses by definition, or you can't distinguish between ulterior realities AT ALL.
An ulterior reality would be something like "everything in your life was a dream", "you're living in the matrix", "everything is in your mind", etc.

Something that is invented to be indistinguishable.

I've also added that it doesn't really matter, we can't act as if there is an ulterior reality we should only act according to the greatest scope of reality to which we are aware.

Not to mention that you're saying that morality exists in objective reality and comparing it to the physical, and that you haven't addressed any of my analogies to other internal experiences to which we could just say "obviously this exists objectively".

We know that our senses can be ENTIRELY unreliable. I.e. we can know that nothing they show is representative of 'reality'.

Morality at large has changed, this is an undeniable fact.

Yes, but my argument only concerns one particular moral proposition, can you show that the consensus regarding that proposition has changed?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_human_rights
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torture#History

Their wasn't a moral consensus on torture prior to it's existence.
Though the plausibility that some moral consensus may have existed and survived does not counter the point that morality has changed.
If you've taken psychotic drugs and you hallucinate, and all except one thing you see is inconsistent and changing unrealistically, that one thing (which still may be a hallucination) doesn't let you claim your vision is descriptive of reality.

We may be justified as humans but not logically.
This is the reason we don't use divining rods any more.

The reason that we don't use divining rods is because we know through experience that they do not work. Foundationalism only says that you are justified in trusting your senses in the absence of a defeater.

Experience through what? Other senses.

Other analogy still stands.
How do we know headaches aren't a way of detecting demon possession?

Not to mention that under a system in which your senses are considered to be descriptive of reality, how does one tell what they are senses of?

You have to further believe that your sensory interpretation of each of your experiences is correct.

[instantc]

I've also added that it doesn't really matter, we can't act as if there is an ulterior reality we should only act according to the greatest scope of reality to which we are aware.

I don't follow you, maybe you could try to rephrase.

Not to mention that you're saying that morality exists in objective reality and comparing it to the physical, and that you haven't addressed any of my analogies to other internal experiences to which we could just say "obviously this exists objectively".

I haven't seen any such analogies. Could you state them again.

We know that our senses can be ENTIRELY unreliable. I.e. we can know that nothing they show is representative of 'reality'.

What does this mean? Are you suggesting that all our sensory data is unreal, or are you suggesting that if it were we would know about it?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_human_rights
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torture#History

What I am supposed to make of these?

Their wasn't a moral consensus on torture prior to it's existence.

Obviously the consensus hasn't existed forever. The question is whether the consensus has changed somewhere in the past.

We may be justified as humans but not logically.
This is the reason we don't use divining rods any more.

The reason that we don't use divining rods is because we know through experience that they do not work. Foundationalism only says that you are justified in trusting your senses in the absence of a defeater.

Experience through what? Other senses.

Other analogy still stands.

As I said, for this kind of comparison to work, we must already presuppose that our senses are at least somewhat reliable. Indeed, we know that divining rods don't work only given the foundational ground-assumption that our experience of the physical world is generally real.

[Jashwell]

I've also added that it doesn't really matter, we can't act as if there is an ulterior reality we should only act according to the greatest scope of reality to which we are aware.

I don't follow you, maybe you could try to rephrase.

It would make no difference if we were in the matrix, for instance.
The matrix and up (ie a matrix within a matrix) wouldn't matter as far as we are concerned. It'd just be useless antiparsimony.

Not to mention that you're saying that morality exists in objective reality and comparing it to the physical, and that you haven't addressed any of my analogies to other internal experiences to which we could just say "obviously this exists objectively".

I haven't seen any such analogies. Could you state them again.

Like emotions for instance. Is there such a thing as objective hatred? Why not?
How do we know that our internal experiences aren't senses that we're not paying attention to?
(e.g. the headache/demon possession)

We know that our senses can be ENTIRELY unreliable. I.e. we can know that nothing they show is representative of 'reality'.

What does this mean? Are you suggesting that all our sensory data is unreal, or are you suggesting that if it were we would know about it?

We know that, for instance, our sense of pain, touch and proprioception for one arm can be entirely illusory - many patients who lose arms suffer phantom limbs.
We can have psychotic delusions.
We can lose eyes.

There are many instances in which we do say "yes, this sense (or, all the time, a specific sensation) has no basis in reality"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_human_rights
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torture#History

What I am supposed to make of these?

Much of morality changed.
Torture isn't as old as human history (following)

Their wasn't a moral consensus on torture prior to it's existence.

Obviously the consensus hasn't existed forever. The question is whether the consensus has changed somewhere in the past.

It changed from a consensus of "what?" (then) to "bad" (today), and may well have been considered amoral in the past. As I've said before, even if there were one constant it wouldn't make it a justified sense.

We may be justified as humans but not logically.
This is the reason we don't use divining rods any more.

The reason that we don't use divining rods is because we know through experience that they do not work. Foundationalism only says that you are justified in trusting your senses in the absence of a defeater.

Experience through what? Other senses.

Other analogy still stands.

As I said, for this kind of comparison to work, we must already presuppose that our senses are at least somewhat reliable. Indeed, we know that divining rods don't work only given the foundational ground-assumption that our experience of the physical world is generally real.

I don't think you're getting what I'm saying.
Regardless of whether there is some ulterior reality (e.g. matrix, all a dream, or solipsism), we can talk about how reliably something can address the 'current' reality without presuming it does.

We don't need to presume that an instrument (metric/scientific) will work, we can test it against others.
How do we check whether or not our own senses are faulty? We compare against other senses, i.e. another person's eyes, our own touch, logic, etc.