Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?

[Jashwell]

"Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?"

Doesn't seem like much preamble is needed, but expect this largely to be filled (if at all) with arguments in favour of the existence of a God and counter-arguments. (Because the question is not "Are there good reasons to believe that a god does not exist?"). Though if you do think you have a good argument that shows it is reasonable to believe God does not exist, that is also valid.

This question comes up a lot in other threads where various classical arguments (e.g. ontological, axiological, cosmological) have been given in those threads.

If possible, try not to shotgun debate by raising lots of arguments at once. One sound argument should be sufficient.

[instantc]

It would make no difference if we were in the matrix, for instance.
The matrix and up (ie a matrix within a matrix) wouldn't matter as far as we are concerned. It'd just be useless antiparsimony.

I didn't say it makes a difference, did I? It's not a part of my argument to make a case for solipsism. I am drawing an analogy between solipsism and moral relativism and their epistemological justifications. Any pragmatic arguments for rejecting solipsism are irrelevant to my case.

Is there such a thing as objective hatred? Why not?

I don't know, could be.

As I've said before, even if there were one constant it wouldn't make it a justified sense.

I know that you have said it and utterly failed to substantiate your claim, which I find prima facie preposterous.

[Jashwell]

[Replying to post 670 by instantc]

I'm sure that in some time people will find it preposterous that people believed slavery wasn't wrong. That it's so clearly wrong that obviously people would find it so.

The idea you put forward that we can just trust our senses to be justified and objective doesn't allow us to trust any sense. What do we trust our senses to do? Which experiences are senses? Is hatred a sense? Is approval a sense? What does each sense do? How can we trust our interpretation of our senses?

All of these questions, that require more presuppositions. It's not just belief that senses are reliable, it's belief that this specific set X of experiences are all senses (reliable ones) and that this other set of interpretations of X are also reliable.


You are trying to say that objective morality exists because we have a moral sense. You need to justify the claim that morality is actually a sense, is descriptive of reality.

Saying that you find it preposterous that in different times, thousands of years ago, people might not have considered it morally wrong to torture children for fun doesn't do this. Even if it were true that this was not the case.
Saying that you consider it a true belief doesn't help either.

"Objective morality exists because morality tells us about reality" is circular.

(and the other issues I raised when I brought up the moral argument still stand)

[instantc]

You are trying to say that objective morality exists because we have a moral sense.

But I am not saying that. Could you please try to internalize the following sentence, we are justified in trusting our moral experience TO THE SAME EXTENT that we are justified in trusting our experience of the physical world. If you accept that we have no justification in trusting our moral experience, then you have to accept that we have no justification in trusting our experience of the physical world either.

Solipsism and moral relativism stand on equal grounds. You have not showed any reason to doubt this thesis. The only remark you made was that we have many converging senses providing information about the physical world, but you failed to show how the number of the senses is relevant in determining whether they correspond to reality in the first place.

"Objective morality exists because morality tells us about reality" is circular.

Then "objective physical reality exists because our senses tell us about reality" is circular too.

(and the other issues I raised when I brought up the moral argument still stand)

Sure, why not. I am not endorsing the moral argument, I am making an argument against moral relativism.

[Jashwell]

You are trying to say that objective morality exists because we have a moral sense.

But I am not saying that. Could you please try to internalize the following sentence, we are justified in trusting our moral experience TO THE SAME EXTENT that we are justified in trusting our experience of the physical world. If you accept that we have no justification in trusting our moral experience, then you have to accept that we have no justification in trusting our experience of the physical world either.

Solipsism and moral relativism stand on equal grounds. You have not showed any reason to doubt this thesis. The only remark you made was that we have many converging senses providing information about the physical world, but you failed to show how the number of the senses is relevant in determining whether they correspond to reality in the first place.

I think you've entirely misunderstood what I've said, and that you haven't given any reason to believe your thesis. Conversely, I have given reasons to doubt solipsism and to doubt the idea that we have an objective moral sense.

I.e that assuming an ulterior reality is uselessly anti-parsimonius, that there are many accepted flaws with our moral sense, and that multiple converging senses give us an idea of this reality.

"Objective morality exists because morality tells us about reality" is circular.

Then "objective physical reality exists because our senses tell us about reality" is circular too.

I didn't say that.
I said an 'ulterior reality' doesn't matter, this is still our reality. If we lived in a matrix, while we're in it, the matrix would still be our reality. There's no way at all of knowing if we were in one. It's just an unparsimonious faith assumption.

It's better to believe this reality is real than that this isn't reality because it's seemingly more parsimonius.

(and the other issues I raised when I brought up the moral argument still stand)

Sure, why not. I am not endorsing the moral argument, I am making an argument against moral relativism.

I'm a moral universalist... I just don't believe that we can prima facie accept the moral sense as indicative of objective morality.
Though I can kind of see a reason to (if and only if you consider objective morality to = universal morality) because morality generally benefits common interest for evolutionary reasons.
(Not that our sense of morality isn't a good rule of thumb - it's just too easily malleable)

[instantc]

[Replying to post 673 by Jashwell]

I have already responded to everything, and I don't see any new points being made. Honestly, at this point I don't see the point in continuing.

If you actually believe that you have made a consistent case against both moral objectivism and solipsism, then so be it.

[Wordleymaster1]

"Are there good reasons to believe that a god exists?"

Doesn't seem like much preamble is needed, but expect this largely to be filled (if at all) with arguments in favour of the existence of a God and counter-arguments. (Because the question is not "Are there good reasons to believe that a god does not exist?"). Though if you do think you have a good argument that shows it is reasonable to believe God does not exist, that is also valid.

This question comes up a lot in other threads where various classical arguments (e.g. ontological, axiological, cosmological) have been given in those threads.

If possible, try not to shotgun debate by raising lots of arguments at once. One sound argument should be sufficient.

"Good" seems to be a vague term here. Some people believe because they're told to believe - that's all they've known or been taught. To me, that's not a good reason but it might be to them.
For me, there's no good reason to believe except for 'because' and 'I like the way it makes me feel'. Those might work for some, but not for me. But I'm not responsible for anyone else. If it feels good, and it doesn't hurt me, do it!

[Willum]

No good reasons, but plenty of great emotions!

[Danmark]

No good reasons, but plenty of great emotions!

Moderator Comment
This 'one-liner' contributes nothing to the debate.
Please review the Rules.


______________

Moderator comments do not count as a strike against any posters. They only serve as an acknowledgment that a post report has been received, but has not been judged to warrant a moderator warning against a particular poster. Any challenges or replies to moderator postings should be made via Private Message to avoid derailing topics.

[/b]

[Willum]

No good reasons, but plenty of good emotions.

Sorry-I will expand on it:
So, any scientific approach to finding god results in nothing. Having god doesn't explain anything, there is no causal evidence to believe in a god.
Physics/Chemistry: There are no properties by which any definition of god can be discovered. If you say god is everywhere, then there should be mass or energy to detect. If you say all powerful then the energy must be there, an Electromotive Force, or potential Energy, again which, if in any way relevant, we should be able to find. If god is remote, then, he is limited by the speed of light and information. Saying he is above these laws is pointless. Why would he go through the trouble of hiding, faith?
Biology: There are arguments about evolution, etc., but there are no reasons to assume that life can not spontaneously arise. It is a matter of probability. Consider, clouds, simple water take on very realistic shapes without intelligence. Why can't chemicals take on self-replicating patterns, given time. No reason, and once they do, they just get better.
Psychologically-the belief in god fulfills many needs. The need to be loved, especially by a father figure. Revenge on the unjust. Justification that "I" am better than someone else for the reason, "I" believe a truth that someone less intelligent, less morale, etc. doesn't. We all has a tendency to believe how we do things ourselves is somehow better or more right than others, believing in religion allows us to excuse this delusion.

Refuting these are very little. You can quote a religious book. But thee is no reason for anyone to believe the book if they did not grow up with it. Most of these books have demonstrably false origins. The old testament for example, is an agglomerate of stories interpolated into a book that really holds multiple systems in it. Adam has the same story in many cultures. Noah was stolen from Utnapishtim, Moses was Mises and he didn't save any Jews, and so on. And so on with other books.

It lets us think, that somehow, the injustices we suffer in this world will be rewarded in the next. But there is no reason to believe it, except hope. The same hope children have in seeing unicorns and even, appropriately, monsters.

Not a single good reason. But much to hope for...

[David the apologist]

No good reasons, but plenty of good emotions.

Sorry-I will expand on it:
So, any scientific approach to finding god results in nothing.

What do you mean by "scientific approach"? If you mean the scientific method as conceived by physics, then what you say here is merely a truism. After all, you can fit God in a test tube, you can't put Him on a scale, and you can't model Him using mathematics (unless you're a Trinitarian, and you count the number "3" as a "model"). As such, it's no surprise that God doesn't show up in our scientific theories. By abstracting away the non-mathematical, we've stripped our model of everything that could have anything to do with God.

Having god doesn't explain anything, there is no causal evidence to believe in a god.

On the contrary, the very existence of causes at all proves that God, or something like Him, must exist.

A brief cosmological argument in the spirit of that presented by the St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica sections I.2.3, I.3.4, I.4.1, I.4.2, and I.11.3.

Everything that exists has its existence either through its own nature or from some external cause. Not everything can have its existence from an external cause. For nothing can give what it does not have, but a cause that must itself be caused has nothing to give but the metaphysical equivalent of an IOU. Therefore, something exists that has its existence through its own nature.

Now, whatever a thing has through its own nature either is the nature itself or else it comes from the nature. But if a thing's existence were to come from its own nature, the thing would be its own cause, which is absurd. Thus, there is a thing in which nature and existence are the same. In short, there exists a thing that is perfectly simple (ie, doesn't have any component parts, physical or metaphysical).

Further, while existence considered as an abstraction covering all of reality is empty as a concept, existence considered as a constitutive principle of any particular thing exhausts the positive content of the thing itself. The natures of things in our experience are not and cannot be anything positive added to existence, making it more positive or in some way completing it, for the only thing outside of existence is non-existence. It follows, then, that when a thing's nature is distinct from its act of existence, the nature is a restrictive principle, a limiting principle. But for a perfectly simple being, there is no distinct nature to serve as a limiting principle. As such, this first cause must be absolute and transcendent. Any attribute that doesn't entail limitation and the lack of which would be a limitation may truly be predicated of this thing in some sense or other. Thus, since time, space, and energy are limiting principles, this first cause immaterial, eternal, and omnipresent. However, since evil, ignorance, and weakness all entail limitation, this being must be good, wise, and powerful to an infinite degree.

This in turn entails that there can only be one such being. For there to be more than one such being, there would have to be some real difference between them. But both are already infinite, so there's "no room" for anything else to be added to either of them. Nor can there be anything that either of them lack, because that would contradict the established fact of their transcendence.

If the argument succeeds, it brings us to the conclusion that there exists a single self-existent cause of the universe that is itself perfectly simple, transcendent, immaterial, eternal, omnipresent, infinitely good, infinitely wise, and infinitely powerful. In the immortal words of the Angelic Doctor, "et hoc dicimus Deum."

The cosmological argument is thus a four-step argument. The first step is from the existence of caused or conditioned beings to a self-existent and absolute one. The second step is from a self-existent being to a perfectly simple one. The third step is from a perfectly simple being to an infinite one. And the fourth step is from an infinite being to an absolutely unique one. If you'd like to discuss any of these steps in greater detail, I'd be glad to provide it.

Moreover, causation isn't the only thing that has prompted theists to produce arguments for the existence of God. The implications of modern cosmology with respect to the beginning of existence of the universe, the uncanny way that abstractions (such as mathematics) seem to control the universe, the co-ordination of the natures of things such that they produce an intelligible and elegant universe, the existence of consciousness, the veridicality of human reason, the existence of an objective moral law, and the innate desire man has for "something more" than what the world has to offer... all of these have been appealed to by theists to argue for the existence of God. Now, admittedly there are counterarguments, and counterarguments to those counterarguments, and so on ad infinitum. But taken together, the argument for God as a principle of unification in the world of experience becomes overwhelming.

Now, it is true that the argument from evil would appear to provide a contrary datum. However, it is 1) ultimately inconclusive (like all the other arguments), and 2) parasitic on either objective moral values or on the existence of consciousness, depending on how it is phrased. Thus, even the existence of evil (as typically urged by the atheist) presupposes chunks of the evidence for theism.

These are all claims that would require entire threads of their own for me to do them justice. If you want more detail, I would be glad to provide it. But be warned: I'm quite verbose.

Physics/Chemistry: There are no properties by which any definition of god can be discovered.

Expecting physics and chemistry to ascertain God's properties is like studying tomatoes with a magnifying glass in order to determine the temperament of their farmer.

If you say god is everywhere, then there should be mass or energy to detect.

Why? Surely, we wouldn't expect to be able to put a transcendent being on a scale and weigh it, or detect it in a calorimeter?

If you say all powerful then the energy must be there, an Electromotive Force, or potential Energy, again which, if in any way relevant, we should be able to find.

This may just be a further development of the previous point. Or it may be an inquiry as to the mechanism by which God interacts with the world. If it is the latter, then I would contend that asking for the mechanism by which God interacts with the world is similar to asking for the mechanism by which an electron absorbs or emits a photon. It's a category error, some interactions are ontologically immediate and fundamental.

If god is remote, then, he is limited by the speed of light and information.

God's "remoteness" has nothing to do with physical distance. Rather, it has to do with how different He is from us. It's sort of like saying "this argument is far from over!" One simply isn't referring to physical space.

Saying he is above these laws is pointless.

If a transcendent being exists, then what could it be other than "above the laws"?

Why would he go through the trouble of hiding, faith?

What more should we expect to see than caused things everywhere, a temporally finite universe, a universe ruled by mathematics and other abstractions, an elegant universe, conscious beings, beings capable of discovery, an objective moral law, a desire for something beyond the world, and what appear to be religious experiences amongst those who dare to seek Him out?

Biology: There are arguments about evolution, etc., but there are no reasons to assume that life can not spontaneously arise. It is a matter of probability. Consider, clouds, simple water take on very realistic shapes without intelligence. Why can't chemicals take on self-replicating patterns, given time. No reason, and once they do, they just get better.

But isn't that sort of situation marvelous in its own right? Aren't chemical and ecological processes that effectively force the development of complex life even more remarkably teleological than any particular biological organ could ever be?

I freely admit that there are more subjective factors involved in the assessment of purpose in these processes than there are in the assessment of purpose in biological organs. But, in the final analysis, the organs could have been made by aliens of a simpler construction than earth life, whereas only a supernatural being could shape the laws of chemistry and ecology themselves, rendering the former sort of argument (and, by extension, all teleological arguments based on the arrangement of particular material things as opposed to their very natures) useless for the purposes of natural theology.

Psychologically-the belief in god fulfills many needs. The need to be loved, especially by a father figure.

Is the notion of hell wishful thinking too?

Revenge on the unjust. Justification that "I" am better than someone else for the reason, "I" believe a truth that someone less intelligent, less morale, etc. doesn't.

Biblical Christianity, at least, doesn't have much positive to say about a self-inflating attitude. Christ Himself was (we are told) a man who was friends with "sinners," and all of us are told that we need His sacrifice to even come close to being "moral."

Refuting these are very little. You can quote a religious book. But thee is no reason for anyone to believe the book if they did not grow up with it. Most of these books have demonstrably false origins. The old testament for example, is an agglomerate of stories interpolated into a book that really holds multiple systems in it. Adam has the same story in many cultures. Noah was stolen from Utnapishtim,

If, of course, there was a sort of "fall of man," and if a very large (but by no means planet-wide) flood associated with communication from God wiped out some substantial portion of a human population, wouldn't we expect echoes of those events to reverberate through all the myths of humanity? In other words, isn't it at least possible that the connection between the two stories is in some series of real events (now spiritualized and allegorized and mixed with legends) that inspired both? Obviously, you wouldn't have any reason to believe this sort of thing unless you actually were a Christian. These are the sorts of things that can't be supported by reason alone, but that are quite defensible if Christianity is really true.

Moses was Mises and he didn't save any Jews, and so on.

Now this, I cannot concede. Utnapishtim can be found in the epic of Gilgamesh, and appears to be involved in a real counterpart of the Biblical deluge. This Mises fellow, by contrast, appears to have been invented by militant atheists for the sole reason of attacking the Bible. In the scanty pages that turn up on a google search, I find no references beyond the Zeitgeist or other works that make up the irreligious person's counterpart to "Answers in Genesis." There are no references to the work in which Mises' story can be found (something like the Iliad, Gilgamesh, or the Ugaritic Baal Cycle), nor even to serious scholars who even mention this Mises' existence! However legendary Moses may have been, at least the existence of myths about him is something more than a mere myth!

Of course, if you can provide evidence that this Mises is a real mythical figure, I will gladly admit to being wrong on this point. [/img]