The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a “possible world� (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be false…or a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isn’t President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, it’s possible.

That being said; let’s turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, I’d like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)…an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying “It is possible for a necessary being to exist�.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because God’s existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, God’s existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, you’ve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting “The argument is not valid� or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I don’t think that you can, can you?

[Danmark]

I call MGBs, All-Powerful Entities (APEs).

I would like to call your attention to the Marvel Comic Book "Beyonder," who was an APE, but tucked himself into another Universe because he wanted to, and was still an APE. So, with #3 safely out of the way, we can talk about #1.

I can think of a being that is greater than "Beyonder", therefore, "Beyonder" isn't a MGB.

Only a fool would assume #1 was possible. That would be an Entity that could do anything, anywhere, anytime.

I can imagine a being that "could do anything, anywhere, anytime". I call such a being "God".

I can imagine there is no god so there is no god.
I can imagine a 3 headed purple giant 10,000 meters tall with reptillian skin able to fly without wings. Does that mean such a thing exists?

[Blastcat]

From Post 35:

The fact that you think this is some "it is possible for God to exist, and it is also possible for God to NOT exist" situation...lets me know that you fail to understand the argument.

That you fail to understand the failure of "it's possible so therefore it is" lets us all know you fail to understand your own argument.

That something's possible does not mean it's real.

It's possible I'm Teddy Roosevelt, but I ain't.

There is a POSSIBLE world in which you ARE.

[Divine Insight]

1. It is possible that a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists, then a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists.

This is every bit as valid as the argument in the OP, which is to say it is invalid.
Saint Anselm, or whoever first came up with this bit of nonsense, should be ashamed.

The ontological argument is essentially an argument a priori:
God exists because I say he does.

The 'cheat' in the argument is that one can easily propose that there is something that is 'the greatest,' and be correct. That 'greatest' need not be a god and cannot be something imaginary.

This is exactly true. The argument of the OP necessarily must be logically flawed. I think some of the posters have already addressed why it is logically flawed.

However, you are right, all you need to do is replace "Maximally Great Being" with a blank, and anything you fill into that blank must then exist.


Here's the general argument, and if valid, then it must be valid for ANYTHING we place in the blank:


1. It is possible that a _____________ exists.

2. If it is possible that a _____________ exists, then a _____________ exists in some possible world.

3. If a _____________ exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a _____________ exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a _____________ exists in the actual world, then a _____________ exists.

6. Therefore, a _____________ exists.

This is obviously a flawed logical reasoning, becasue then anything we fill into the blank must necessarily exist IN OUR WORLD!

Pink Flying Magical Unicorns must necessarily exist IN OUR WORLD if this argument is to be logically valid because we can write this into the blanks.

This is clearly a logical "word salad" that has absolutely no validity in any real system of formal logic. For it if had validity then ANYTHING GOES!

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 35:

The fact that you think this is some "it is possible for God to exist, and it is also possible for God to NOT exist" situation...lets me know that you fail to understand the argument.

That you fail to understand the failure of "it's possible so therefore it is" lets us all know you fail to understand your own argument.

That something's possible does not mean it's real.

It's possible I'm Teddy Roosevelt, but I ain't.

There is a POSSIBLE world in which you ARE.

Well don't that beat all, here I just so happen to be in the one in which I ain't

Just like God.

[Divine Insight]

Just replace Maximally Great Being, with "no God" and we have:

The Atheist's Version of the Modal Ontological Argument that no God exists:

1. It is possible that no God exists.

2. If it is possible that no God exists, then no God exists in some possible world.

3. If no God exists in some possible world, then no God exists in every possible world.

4. If no God exists in every possible world, then no God exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If no God exists in the actual world, then no God exists.

6. Therefore, no God exists.

[Blastcat]

[Replying to post 43 by Divine Insight]

1. It is possible that a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists, then a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great Flying Spaghetti Monster exists.

This is every bit as valid as the argument in the OP, which is to say it is invalid.
Saint Anselm, or whoever first came up with this bit of nonsense, should be ashamed.

The ontological argument is essentially an argument a priori:
God exists because I say he does.

The 'cheat' in the argument is that one can easily propose that there is something that is 'the greatest,' and be correct. That 'greatest' need not be a god and cannot be something imaginary.

This is exactly true. The argument of the OP necessarily must be logically flawed. I think some of the posters have already addressed why it is logically flawed.

However, you are right, all you need to do is replace "Maximally Great Being" with a blank, and anything you fill into that blank must then exist.


Here's the general argument, and if valid, then it must be valid for ANYTHING we place in the blank:


1. It is possible that a _____________ exists.

2. If it is possible that a _____________ exists, then a _____________ exists in some possible world.

3. If a _____________ exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a _____________ exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a _____________ exists in the actual world, then a _____________ exists.

6. Therefore, a _____________ exists.

This is obviously a flawed logical reasoning, becasue then anything we fill into the blank must necessarily exist IN OUR WORLD!

Pink Flying Magical Unicorns must necessarily exist IN OUR WORLD if this argument is to be logically valid because we can write this into the blanks.

This is clearly a logical "word salad" that has absolutely no validity in any real system of formal logic. For it if had validity then ANYTHING GOES!

I'm not sure that premise ( 3 ) would work with just anything. Something might exist in most possible worlds, but if it's not MAXIMALLY GREAT... then it doesn't HAVE to exist in all possible worlds.

We have to define the "anything" AS a maximally great thing, or "necessary".

So, you forgot to add 'maximally great" ahead of your "____________". That's an important part of the argument, in my opinion.

[Bust Nak]

Basically, let say you are rolling a die and there are only six possible out come, a 1 to 6 equal possibility. Think of this as six possible world, one where you rolled a 1, another where you rolled a 2 and so one. That's how a mere chance "becomes a reality" of a possible world, it's just looking at the same thing from a different perspective.

Ok, I think I follow you. However, in the above example you are assuming an equal probability. For a six sided die this is reasonable based on my experience with them (though if you want to be technical there is also some slim possibility the die could land on an edge and stay there in the perfect conditions).

Doesn't matter if the possibility is equal or not, as long as it is possible at all, no matter how remote the chance, then it is the case that you rolled it in a possible world, one world out of a vast sea of possible worlds.

Bringing this back to the OP I think what is being said is that there is a possible world where a MGB does exist. Ok, the possibility of that world existing is still between 0 and 100 percent. So haven't we just shifted which thing is possible? i.e. what's been created is a wrapper. First we had a thing that might be possible. Then we said that the thing exists, but put it in a wrapper that only has a possibility of existing. If the wrapper doesn't exist, neither does what is inside it.

The OP goes beyond "might be possible," it is saying it is possible. i.e the chance is non-zero, the premise is that the chance is 0.00....00001% to 100%.

So just by granting in one possible world (where the possibility could be 0) something is true, we have to grant that in all other possible worlds?

If the possibility of the world where the truth is being defined does not exist, then doesn't the truth go away too? See wrapper explanation above.

By granting one possible world, the possibility cannot be 0. If the possibility is 0, it would be impossible. i.e. there are no possible world where it is true.

So how does God existing in one possible world means he exists in all possible worlds? That's where the definition of God comes in. The OP defined God as a necessary being, i.e. he has to exist in all possible world. Basically there is a hidden premise that if the possibility is non-zero then the possibility is 100%. There is no reason to think God has to have this feature to qualify as a god, this feature is introduced just to make the argument work.

[For_The_Kingdom]

My head almost exploded (in a good way) trying to follow this. So before I go any further, thank you for all the effort you put into your definitions and argument. You definitely made me put my thinking cap on

No doubt. Man, it took me about 3 or 4 days to grasp the concept of the argument. It is a tough cookie.

Thanks for entertaining the thread.

Yes, I agree with this. In so much that I think just about anything is possible until proven otherwise.

But a necessary truth cannot be possibly true, but actually false. If something is merely possible, yet false, then there should be a set of circumstances which will allow the now false proposition to become true.

For example...

Can I bench press 300lbs? No. Is it possible for me to bench press 300 lbs? Yes. Now, how can I make that possibility a reality? By going to the gym frequently, and building up my muscle strength.

So, this is an example of something that is possibly true, but actually false. Yet, there are a set of circumstances that will allow the statement to be possibly true, but also, actually true.

In the case with a MGB...you admitted that the existence of a MGB is possible...well, if the existence of a MGB is possibly true, but actually false....can you articulate a set of circumstances that will allow a MGB's existence to be possibly true, and actually true (in the same sense of the bench pressing example)?

More than likely, you can't. Because all necessary truths that are possible, are actual. If the existence of God is possible, it can't be possible based on contingent circumstances, because necessary truths are INDEPENDENT of contingent circumstances.

This is where you really lost me. To me, possible means there is also the chance that it is impossible.

Not when it comes to NECESSARY truths. Remember, we have to differentiate between necessary truths and contingent truths.

2+2 = 4, right? So, it is possible for 2+2 to equal 4? So, how is it also impossible?

It isn't, is it?

That is why we use the word possible and not fact or truth. Mathematically, the chance is between 0 and 100 percent with 0 being valid. So I don't get the leap to 'then a maximally great being exists'. Haven't you just assumed 100% somewhere? I'm sure a real mathematician will straighten me (and/or you) out.

If it is possible for God to exist, then God must 100% exist!! How can God not exist, but it be possible for God to exist?

Again, I ask; what are the set of circumstances which will allow God to exist, if his existence is possible?

[Divine Insight]

We have to define the "anything" AS a maximally great thing, or "necessary".

So, you forgot to add 'maximally great" ahead of your "____________". That's an important part of the argument, in my opinion.

In that case we would need a very precise formal definition for what is meant by "great".

Until then the argument would be meaningless.

[Blastcat]

[Replying to post 49 by Divine Insight]

We have to define the "anything" AS a maximally great thing, or "necessary".

So, you forgot to add 'maximally great" ahead of your "____________". That's an important part of the argument, in my opinion.

In that case we would need a very precise formal definition for what is meant by "great".

Until then the argument would be meaningless.

I think that by MGB they mean a necessary being.. it just HAS to exist.

So, as in all ontological arguments, they just DEFINE the god into existence by a bit of word play. Bingo boingo.. University tenure.

Pretty good gig, if you can get it.