The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

[Bust Nak]

Ok, so before this thread was posted, how many of you can honestly say that prior to this thread, your contention was that "God cannot possibly exist?"

That depends on how "God" is being defined. A necessary being? *Rise hand* Me, I can honestly say that piror to this thread, my contention was that "God cannot possibly exist."

Most of you had no problem at least accepting that it is POSSIBLE for God to exist...

A generic god? Sure, I have no problem accepting the possibly for such beings. And that's the trick isn't it? Slipping a necessary being past when someone isn't paying enough attention, thinking it a mere contingent god. It's a "gotcha!" with zero chance of actually converting anyone.

but now, since you realize the implications of such a statement, now it is cool to just deny the possibility altogether, which means that the argument is definitely working...and that is obvious that it is working if you have to adjust to it, as opposed to the argument adjusting to you.

I will take that as conceding that the modal ontological argument hinges on tricking your audience into agreeing to something that they would not agree to if they knew what it fully entails. Bravo, you might have tricked some atheists, but all you've achieved is that they will now be watching out the next time someone tries to pull the same thing on them.

I've already supported the notion that all possible necessary truths must be actually true, and I haven't see anything that has under-minded that FACT as of yet.

You got that much right, I don't expect anything that could under-mind that fact. But that wasn't what I asked you now, was it? What you haven't done, is provide justification for defining God as a necessary being, other than to say that's what Christians believe. Without that, the modal ontological argument is nothing more than an attempt to define God into existence.

Once you admit that God possibly exists, you are stuck like chuck, with no way out.

No way out, eh? Spoken like a guy out to trap people with gotchas.

Having said all that, credit where it is due, you did make it abundant clear that the God in P1 is defined as a necessary being. So I cannot say you have mislead anyone.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Yes, thats about it. We do not accept premise 1 is true and are ready to substitute the term contingent for possible, or the phrase it is not possible.

Of course not, because if you accept premise 1, you open up a can or worms for yourself, and you don't like worms, do you?

As I keep stating; you people know full well that before the creation of this thread, you had no problem accepting the possibility that God may very well exist. Now since you are aware of such implications, you had to make an "adjustment". Now, "God cannot possibly exist", right?

Such an adjustment is rather obvious...and if you have to make an adjustment because of the power/truth value of the argument, then the argument is working...because if the argument isn't valid/sound, you wouldn't have to make any adjustment, would you?

Not only that, but as I stated before, one can systematically deny anything...but you haven't given any reasons why P1 is false. None. You are just rejecting P1 because you know that is where the argument takes off...everything after that just logically follows whether we like it or not.

Clearly the length of this thread is evidence of a dispute, and, most of us do not agree this point.

Actually, the length of this thread is based upon the false notion that most of you think that you can grant the possibility of God actually existing, but you also equally grant the possibility of God not existing...and the bulk of the thread is geared towards me explaining to you guys that both possibilities aren't equal...either one is necessarily true, and the other one is necessarily false.

That is why the distinction between contingent truths and necessary truths were made in the first place...and that is the bulk of the thread.

If you had stated that most of us would accept that it is possibly the case or it is possible it is not the case that a MGB exists there would be no bone of contention here. But then the MOA would not work to the ends it is intended to.

From the very beginning of the thread, I saw on at least 3 or 4 occasions that it was admitted that it is possible for God to exist...no one was really explicitly stating "It is not possible for God to exist" (at least that I recall)...it wasn't until the thread really took off and it was explained to you guys the implications of possible necessary truths that you guys began to make these apparent/obvious adjustments...and now we are 20 pages into the thread, and the tune is changing to "God cannot possibly exist" at all.

Cmon now.

Yes..ok. to a pointbut you are insisting on a formal definition of the word possible. Which is finebut if you are going to tie down terms you have to also allow the opponents of the MOA clarify their opposition. This has been done in spades. We mean an MGB is moot, it is uncertain, it is doubtful, it is possibly not the case, or it is not possible. As to the stance any given commentator takes you will have to take it up with each individual. But to keep insisting an MGB is possible does not get us over the doubts and proves nothing.

All possible necessary truths must be actually true. That is a brute fact, buddy.

Only in modal system S5 and similar systems. There are hundreds of modal logics. The point you claim as true is a theorem of S5. It is not a theorem of many more logics. It is not a theorem of system S4 for example. You seem to be mistaking a truth in one system for a general truth of modal logic.

Ok, and I anxiously await for you or anyone else to explain to me how can a possible necessary truth be possibly true in one world, and not all worlds...

If you can give me a possible world at which a proposition is possibly necessarily true in one world, but the same proposition is possibly necessarily false in another world, then your point will be granted.

But you can't. So I am well within my rational right to accept S5 because I put it out on the table, and unless you can somehow undercut it, then just simply grant it.

In S5, not in S4.

See above, because the same thing applies.

There are hundreds of modal logics that each define necessity slightly differently, and many of these gives us a way around it.

So what? The argument is the argument...and will rise or fall on its own merit.

Actually the formulation I gave was

• it is contingent that a maximally great being exists

Grammatically that makes sense, but yes you are right something cannot both be contingent and a necessity, which means if a maximally great being is contingent then it is not a necessity. It is easy to show your proof of the necessity of an MGB relies on point 3 which is only true in S5. But the implication is not safe in all modal logics thus it is not safe to say an MGB necessarily exists unless you restrict the discourse to within the limits of the definitions of S5. But outside of S5 the revised version of Premise 1 makes sense so long as it is understood an MGB is not a necessity.

A proposition is either contingent in its nature, or necessary in its nature. No matter what modal form you appeal to, everything will fall under the realms of either contingency, or necessity.

In the argument, I am using the word "necessary" in the sense that it isn't possible for the given proposition to be otherwise. In this context, a necessary being one whose existence is not dependent upon anything else...this "kind" of existence is distinct from contingent existences because as we look around, everything that we see owes its existence to something else.

But a necessary existence doesn't. So, take this definition of "necessary" and apply it to a MGB. Any existence that is less than the definition of "necessary" in this context will fall under the realms of contingent.

So, the argument, as it is formulated, stands on its own two feet.

If I dont know I can only formally admit this within epistemic logic. I dont know is not an alethic modality. Within the limits of alethic logic Id say it is contingent (possibly the case and possible not the case) or it is not possible. By standard modal definitions that is equivalent to saying it is not necessary. More succinctly: the existence of an MGB is not necessary. And I can prove that in the limited sense your premise 3 is not true for all modal logics. Thus the argument is not a general truth of modal logic. If it is not generally true then the existence of an MGB may not be necessary, and if it may not be necessary it is not necessary.

See above; because again, the same thing applies. Give me a possible world at which a proposition is possibly necessarily true in one world, but equally possibly false in other worlds.

Go ahead.

This is tautological and thus true of anything not just an MGB. But you have not proved an MGB is a necessity because point 3 in the argument relies on modal system S5, and as pointed out there are many alternatives to S5 in which 3 is not true.

See above.

You keep repeating the same mistake. This is true for modal logic S5 and similar systems that have this as a theorem. Not all modal logics have this theorem. Check out S4. It is not true in S4.

Right, so using S4 or whatever you need to use, and answer the question; Give me a possible world at which a proposition is possibly necessarily true in one world, but actually false in other worlds.

Dude, if you can do that, then that would completely DESTROY the entire argument. But I don't think you can do that. You can appeal to WHATEVER you need to appeal to in order to answer the question.

Necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE worlds...unless you can tell me how 2+2=4 on earth, but on Mars 2+2=17.....or unless you can tell me how is it possible that 7 can be divided evenly into 294848884848383838383 on earth, but on Jupiter, it can't.

I anxiously await your response.

[rikuoamero]

[Replying to post 210 by For_The_Kingdom]

From the very beginning of the thread, I saw on at least 3 or 4 occasions that it was admitted that it is possible for God to exist...no one was really explicitly stating "It is not possible for God to exist" (at least that I recall)...it wasn't until the thread really took off and it was explained to you guys the implications of possible necessary truths that you guys began to make these apparent/obvious adjustments...

Is this an admission to the 'gotcha' accusation? That you got several people to say "It's possible for God to exist", only to explain AFTERWARD what exactly you meant by 'possible'?
Because if so, then the adjustments are justified, since those people thought you meant one thing, but apparently you didn't.

[Inigo Montoya]

[Replying to Bust Nak]

Bust, you seem to have a grasp on things here. Explain something to me.

If God is being defined as necessary, at what point does its potential to exist (possibility) translate to actually existing?

And why all the blather about what's in the mind versus whats real and which is greater?

In my mind, even if you get to define a god as necessary, then say it possibly exists, there's a disconnect between that possibility and the sudden logic that makes it exist by acknowledgement of said possibility.

Either the argument is stupid or I continue to be.

[For_The_Kingdom]

I'm sorry it is well known Plantinga's MOA is only valid in modal system S5. There are hundred of different modal logics. One of the most important alongside S5 is S4. S4 has a different definition of necessity and a smaller set of theorems.

The implication on which you rely and which you are asserting can't be rebutted is not true in S4, along with many buy other alternative modal logics.

Ok, so you shouldn't have any problem giving me a possible world at which a proposition is possibly necessarily true in one world, but possibly/actually false in other words.

I am 100% confident that you cannot do that...because the truth cannot be rebutted.

These are just red herrings.

[For_The_Kingdom]

And even if he doesn't agree with the argument...so what? What does that have to do with me?

Did you read the whole article?

If you can confirm that this specific formulation of the argument is addressed, then I will read it.

[Bust Nak]

As I keep stating; you people know full well that before the creation of this thread, you had no problem accepting the possibility that God may very well exist. Now since you are aware of such implications, you had to make an "adjustment". Now, "God cannot possibly exist", right?

Has it occured to you that a) some of us are familar with modal logic and understood what a "necessary being" implies without it having it explained in an argument? Or b) those of us aren't so familar with modal logic, might still have seen the argument before, and understood that the kind of gods that we accept might exist, are the contingent kind?

Such an adjustment is rather obvious...and if you have to make an adjustment because of the power/truth value of the argument, then the argument is working...because if the argument isn't valid/sound, you wouldn't have to make any adjustment, would you?

Why assume we had to adjust? Is it so suprising that atheists find the omni-X beings impossible? Anyone who have used the problem of evil, and variations there of, have in fact argued against the possibility of such beings.

Not only that, but as I stated before, one can systematically deny anything...but you haven't given any reasons why P1 is false. None. You are just rejecting P1 because you know that is where the argument takes off...everything after that just logically follows whether we like it or not.

Even had we been unable to give you reasons why P1 is false, it is up to you to support it. What justification have you given for defining God as necessary? That Christians believe it. Do you think that is sufficient?

Actually, the length of this thread is based upon the false notion that most of you think that you can grant the possibility of God actually existing, but you also equally grant the possibility of God not existing...and the bulk of the thread is geared towards me explaining to you guys that both possibilities aren't equal...either one is necessarily true, and the other one is necessarily false.

Those can't both be true, if and only if God is a necessary being, a claim you have not supported.

More importantly, if someone was saying God possibly exist, and also possibly not exist, then that should have told you that they don't actually accept the definition of God as a necessary being. They aren't really "adjusting" if they never accepted your definition in the first place, at least not in my book.

That is why the distinction between contingent truths and necessary truths were made in the first place...and that is the bulk of the thread.

Which is not good enough on its own, without also assuming God's existence is not contingent.

From the very beginning of the thread, I saw on at least 3 or 4 occasions that it was admitted that it is possible for God to exist...no one was really explicitly stating "It is not possible for God to exist" (at least that I recall)...it wasn't until the thread really took off and it was explained to you guys the implications of possible necessary truths that you guys began to make these apparent/obvious adjustments...and now we are 20 pages into the thread, and the tune is changing to "God cannot possibly exist" at all.

Cmon now.

For the record, I stated God, when defined as necessary, cannot possibly exist on multiple occasion, long before you even joined this forum. As did many others.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Not if he's defined as being present in all places at all times.

Exactly.

New International Version Matthew 19:26 Jesus looked at them and said, "With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible." Does Jesus mention anything about logical impossibilities or are you just trying to limit what God can do?

He didn't mention it, probably because he assumed that any person with common sense would know that logical impossibilities was excluded from the statement.

Well, then he's not omnipotent. The definition I quoted says "having unlimited power and able to do anything" and it doesn't go on to say "except those things Kingdom says is logically impossible."

Well, the definition you gave is logically incoherent. The MGB, as defined in the argument, is within the bounds of logical and reason...and will stay there.

If you have to step beyond rationality and resort to absurd notions to prove your point, you are actually, in effect, proving my point.

Either he's omnipotent and can decide to not be in some places, or he must be omnipresent, that is present everywhere at all times.

He can "decide" not to be in some places in the sense that his physical/spiritual manifestation may not be in any given place...but his knowledge of what is going on at the place, or what WILL go on at that place is there...and it is based on that knowledge that he is "there", and cannot fail to be there.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Well, we've destroyed the premise of the argument, and all you've done is ignore or deny it. We are all getting rather desperate to show you the MOA is a fallacy.

Perhaps our next step is to invoke "Alice in Wonderland," verses to convince you. Use fire to fight fire as it were.

Trying to figure out who "we" is in this context.

[Bust Nak]

[Replying to post 212 by Inigo Montoya]

Firstly understand the three kinds of propositions modal logic deals with. Things with 0% possibility, the impossibles; things with 100% possibility, the necessaries; and everything else in between, the contingents. Consider yourself rolling a dice. 100% chance rolling a number between 1 to 6, 0% rolling a 7, and everything else in between. Lets say you rolled a 6.

Any possibilities translate to actually in a possible world. In one possible world, this one, you rolled a 6; in another you rolled a 5 and so on; in no world did you roll a 7; in every world you rolled between 1 to 6.

That much is easy enough to understand I hope. This is where the definition comes in, it is saying God is non-contingent, i.e either a necessary, or an impossibility. If it is not impossible, then it has to be a necessary, and trivally what is necessary, exist in this world. That's where step 3 of the argument does the heavy lifting. If God exists in any worlds, then he exists in all worlds.