Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?
A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.
Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.
If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.
So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.
That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).
Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.
Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).
The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.
Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.
Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.
On to the argument..
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.
Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).
Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.
And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.
Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.
You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?
The Modal Ontological Argument
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For_The_Kingdom
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Post #222
I've already addressed this, countless times.Kenisaw wrote: No you didn't. From the OP: "Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist. This is where you run amok. Nowhere have you shown that a MGB is necessary. You go from a premise that a MGB is possible to a claim that it is necessary. That it is possible (which it actually isn't per post 110) doesn't make it necessary. There is no evidence that it is necessary. You still haven't rectified this dilemma...
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For_The_Kingdom
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Post #223
Actually, it doesn't...but lets see what ya got, nevertheless..rikuoamero wrote: While working today, I realized that no-one else has yet to make this point.
The fact that the MOA is an invalid logical argument, in that it sneaks its conclusion into its premises.
rikuoamero wrote: Here's how it goes. In the theist's mind, the person who is proposing the argument, arguing in favour of it, there is one and precisely only one 'God'. There can be no other. This god has characteristics it shares with no-one else.
Since you guys are so good at going back and looking at prior posts on this thread, how about you go back and look for the post where I specifically stated that the MOA makes a case for a MGB, thats it...a MGB...it doesn't state which MGB, but rather, a MGB, in general.rikuoamero wrote: The phrase 'Maximally Great Being' is nothing more than a mask for God, specifically the God of the theist who is proposing this argument.
But your point is granted, in that it is ultimately an argument for God, no one is denying that. Of course, a Christian will argue that this is their God, a Muslim will argue that it is their God...and so on and so forth...but at that point, we are just playing the guessing game, because we don't know which God it is...all we know is that A God exists!! And that is the point of the argument...no more, no less.
You can call the Being whatever you want. That is completely irrelevant to the argument.rikuoamero wrote: Notice how in this thread, the name God, with a capital G, was used more than once. Notice how often, when other entities were proposed using the exact same argument, they were rejected.
The reason why it is unwise to "collapse" the argument down, is because some gods can be said to be contingent, such as any of the gods of Greek mythology, who were "born" from "god-parents", and therefore not necessary in their existence, but since we want to differentiate between contingency and necessity, we want to make that distinction from jump street, which is what I did.rikuoamero wrote: I like to collapse this down to
1. It is possible God exists
2. Therefore, God exists.
or God, Therefore God. The conclusion is in the premise, which last I checked is a no-no for logical arguments.
Even tho, theoretically, you are correct, only if the "God" in P1 is necessary.
Re: The Modal Ontological Argument
Post #224[Replying to post 203 by For_The_Kingdom]
For_The_Kingdom
MGB, God, and Santa possibly exist.
Maybe yes, and maybe no.
In our universe, before we get any data concerning the existence of MGB, there is a possible world where MGB exists, AND there is a possible world where it doesn't.
Possibly yes, and possibly no.
With two actual worlds, in an ACTUAL universe, it would be quite inconsistent to say that MGB exists and MGB doesn't exist. But we are talking about POSSIBLE worlds.
The world possibly exists, or possibly doesn't, just as well.
It's possible that either case is true in a possible world.
In this universe, there is a possible world where MGB exists, and in this universe, there is a possible world where MGB just happens to not exist.
I THINK that possible worlds are merely HYPOTHETICAL.. they are "possible" only.
MGB in the argument is NOT actual, but merely "possible". Another word for that is hypothetical.
A hypothetical being can be said to exist quite as possibly as to not exist. Both cases are possible when it comes to hypothetical beings. The hypothetical world where MGB exist doesn't ACTUALLY exist. It only POSSIBLY exists.
Possibly YES and possibly NO.
Saying that MGB exists in a possible world is just a clever way to say that it's possible that God exists.
And so does Santa.
Big deal.

For_The_Kingdom
MGB, God, and Santa possibly exist.
Maybe yes, and maybe no.
Blastcat wrote:
But agreeing that P1 is true doesn't DO much if we can ALSO agree that the OPPOSITE of P1 is true.
There is a possible world where MGB exists
There is a possible world where MGB doesn't exist.
Sorry, we are talking about POSSIBLE worlds, not actual worlds.For_The_Kingdom wrote:Do you not see how the truth value of one of those propositions excludes the other one, necessarily? If there is a possible world where a MGB DOES exist, then the second proposition above is necessarily false...and vice versa.
In our universe, before we get any data concerning the existence of MGB, there is a possible world where MGB exists, AND there is a possible world where it doesn't.
Possibly yes, and possibly no.
With two actual worlds, in an ACTUAL universe, it would be quite inconsistent to say that MGB exists and MGB doesn't exist. But we are talking about POSSIBLE worlds.
The world possibly exists, or possibly doesn't, just as well.
No, YOU think you know what it is. I can't possibly know what it is.For_The_Kingdom wrote:One of those propositions is necessarily false, and we both know which one it is.
It's possible that either case is true in a possible world.
In this universe, there is a possible world where MGB exists, and in this universe, there is a possible world where MGB just happens to not exist.
I THINK that possible worlds are merely HYPOTHETICAL.. they are "possible" only.
MGB in the argument is NOT actual, but merely "possible". Another word for that is hypothetical.
A hypothetical being can be said to exist quite as possibly as to not exist. Both cases are possible when it comes to hypothetical beings. The hypothetical world where MGB exist doesn't ACTUALLY exist. It only POSSIBLY exists.
Possibly YES and possibly NO.
Saying that MGB exists in a possible world is just a clever way to say that it's possible that God exists.
And so does Santa.
Big deal.
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For_The_Kingdom
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Post #225
These questions will be answered in the KCA thread. Existence is absolutely positively necessary, and I will prove just that.Inigo Montoya wrote: Straightforward, direct question.
Why is the conclusion (God) necessary besides you defining it to be such?
Where is it demonstrated its existence is necessary apart from you just saying so?
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Inigo Montoya
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Post #226
[Replying to post 223 by For_The_Kingdom]
That's all fine and well, but you defined it as necessary in THIS argument, and I've asked on what grounds is that justified?
That's all fine and well, but you defined it as necessary in THIS argument, and I've asked on what grounds is that justified?
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Inigo Montoya
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Re: The Modal Ontological Argument
Post #227 Bust Nak
Oh good, it's not me then. It really is stupid.
Define X to be both maximally great and necessary and the Cascade does the dirty work.
How is this a justifiable definition again?
Oh good, it's not me then. It really is stupid.
Define X to be both maximally great and necessary and the Cascade does the dirty work.
How is this a justifiable definition again?
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Post #228
.
If there was sound, convincing, verifiable evidence that a god did exist, proponents would not need to argue or attempt to convince others that it is POSSIBLE.
No one needs argue or convince others to agree that it is "possible" that the Earth is a planet orbiting a star.
Of course, anything imaginable is "possible" (if not proved impossible) -- emphasis on imagination. It can be difficult to convince some people that imaginary entities exist.
If there was sound, convincing, verifiable evidence that a god did exist, proponents would not need to argue or attempt to convince others that it is POSSIBLE.
No one needs argue or convince others to agree that it is "possible" that the Earth is a planet orbiting a star.
Of course, anything imaginable is "possible" (if not proved impossible) -- emphasis on imagination. It can be difficult to convince some people that imaginary entities exist.
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Non-Theist
ANY of the thousands of "gods" proposed, imagined, worshiped, loved, feared, and/or fought over by humans MAY exist -- awaiting verifiable evidence
Non-Theist
ANY of the thousands of "gods" proposed, imagined, worshiped, loved, feared, and/or fought over by humans MAY exist -- awaiting verifiable evidence
Re: The Modal Ontological Argument
Post #229Look in the OP. Kingdom defines existence as a "great making property" which it isn't. He says that a MGB is present everywhere at any given time. On the other end of the scale if you say a being is present nowhere and is never present it's the same as saying the being doesn't exist. So Kingdom claims that existing is greater than not existing. But it has already been demonstrated by among others Kant that existence is not a predicate and that invalidates the onthological argument.Inigo Montoya wrote:If God is being defined as necessary, at what point does its potential to exist (possibility) translate to actually existing?
http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/th ... predicate/.


