The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

[For_The_Kingdom]

You can't use other logical arguments in this argument, at least not by just giving their initials.

Who is "using" other arguments?

If you're going to constantly refer to the KCA, at least name it and at least lay it out and talk about it.

Kalam Cosmological Argument.

In this thread, the KCA has NOT been talked about

And it doesn't need to be, at least not on a MOA thread.

thus we have no reason to accept this claim.

Yet.

Where is it, by the way?

Patience is bitter, but its fruit is sweet.

You haven't shut up about it for about a week now and so far...no thread about it.

Small steps, not leaps and bounds.

[Inigo Montoya]

It is relevant. You have defined the being as necessary without justification or support.

On what grounds do you justify or support this being as being defined "necessary?"

Not relevant? It's your entire linchpin and remains unsupported..

The truth value of P1 is holds regardless of the question of "Why".

Of course it does. You've defined it that way. What I want to know is how that definition is in any way justified. Until you justify your definition, all you've shown is you can define a thing to have certain attributes and plug it into a syllogism that spits out what's necessary.

This is the 5th time you've been asked to answer a simple question. What is the justification for defining God as necessary? Why can't you answer this?

[For_The_Kingdom]

How do you know? For all you know, he's all powerful, thus he's able to make himself invisible, fly all over the world and deposit those presents

Hmm, that sounds an awful like...God.

...but he has nothing at all to do with the claims of a Jew man who got nailed to a pole 2,000 years ago.

I agree, Santa Claus has nothing to do with Jesus Christ.

You've granted your all powerful god the ability to resurrect the dead. Why don't you grant an all powerful Santa the ability to fly all over the world undetected in a single night?

I am granting that Santa Claus is able to do that...but I wouldn't call him "Santa Claus", as you do...I call him....God.

Or is it as I called it before - you only accept MGB if it pertains to the god you believe exists, and not any other proposed entity?

You are taking the attributes of the being that I call "God" and applying it to other entities, when they are all the same person.

I am not surprised, though, as that is the typical tactic that is used by those who don't quite understand the significance of what they are saying.

[Inigo Montoya]

Did we just demonstrate Santa = YHVH?

[Danmark]

It is relevant. You have defined the being as necessary without justification or support.

On what grounds do you justify or support this being as being defined "necessary?"

Not relevant? It's your entire linchpin and remains unsupported..

The truth value of P1 is holds regardless of the question of "Why".

The "truth value" of "1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists" is the equivalent of the 'truth value" of "1. It is possible that ANYTHING exists." This renders the entire argument meaningless and of ZERO value. "Anything is possible," is a far cry from "X is probable."

[Bust Nak]

The truth value of P1 is holds regardless of the question of "Why".

That's a red herring. The truth value of P1 depends on the definition of you use. A trivial example: Define God as a married bachelor, then P1 is false.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Logical arguments don't just contain a P1 with no conclusion (or is P1 here the conclusion...so what I said before is true, you're putting the conclusion into the premise?)

If P1 is false, then the conclusion is false.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Since Kingdom likes to throw in 2+2=4 i.e. mathematics, I'd like to counter with a bit of mathematics as well.

Ever hear of Goldbach's Theorem? It states that "every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of 2 primes".
Now here's the kicker. We don't know if that's true or not.

Kingdom has expressed himself as saying (in a nutshell) that mathematical truths are necessary truths (by challenging us several times to showing a world where 2+2=/= 4).
Well if we plug in Goldbach's Theorem in the MOA, one can make it a necessary truth...even though we haven't proven it.

The argument is definitely working...when you have to try that hard. SMH.

[Bust Nak]

If P1 is false, then the conclusion is false.

That is a denying the antecedent fallacy. If P1 is false, then the argument is unsound, quite a different thing to the conclusion being false.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Yes. That would be a world which the first world cannot access. That is how Kripke semantics works. Necessity is not naively defined as being true in every world.

Right, and that is why there is a word that we use to define truths that are true in some possible worlds, but not others...we call that contingent truths. So, when you say "necessity is not naively defined as being true in every world", then that would would be under the realm of contingent truths, right? Because that is what contingent truths are.

I've made that distinction in the argument, and those are the only two games in town.

You are taking one definition of necessity and assuming that is the only definition. But as Bertrand Russell originally pointed out at the beginning of the 20th century the concept of necessity is so difficult to define and has so many meanings it should not be regarded as a logical property.

Kripke semantics however gave us a means to define the alternative semantic for many different meanings, and Russells complaint was laregly ignored as a result.

Notice you haven't given ANY other definition of necessity, have you? Any definition that you give for necessity that doesn't mean "true in all possible worlds" will fall under the realm of contingency.

No other way around it.

So in light of that background and to repeat the point: the MOA relies on just one specific definition of necessity BUT it is not the only one.

I challenge you to give me a definition of necessity (as it relates to this argument) that doesn't in turn fall under the realm of contingency.

Here is an alternative example of how possible worlds are related or not related.

• In world w it may be necessary that the speed of light is a constant.

Not if the light itself is contingent.

That means in every world accessible from w the speed of light is a constant and if we start with w we never find a falsifying world in which the speed of light is not a constant.

So are we going to pretend as if the speed of light is constant in all possible worlds?

Now imagine another world v in which the speed of light is variable. What makes the speed of light necessarily constant in world w is not that the speed must be constant in world v - that would be the naive assumption. for C to be necessarily constant in w then world v cannot be accessible form w.Which is to say from the point of view of w the alternative world v is not possible. Meaning it is not possible to access that world. But v is still classed as a possible world. We can do that because we do not make any metaphysical commitments that there has to be one actual world, or universes of worlds, or if we make a commitment and we are realists about worlds then we admit w and v are parallel worlds that never interact, or if there is some god-like being able to flip between worlds they are still bound by the rules of the world they are in. In other words a local law in one world can be necessarily the case i.e. never open for revision, but that law not apply elsewhere.[/list] You may not like this use of the necessity but it that is because you are sticking to a limited definition of necessity. The mistake you making as pointed out several times now is mistaking one definition for necessity as per system S5 and your are ignoring literally hundreds of alternative also available in the field of modal logic. In light of the plethora of established alternatives - all well known in the field of modal logic - it is not down to the critic to explain and defend the alternatives to overcome your incredulity. It is down to you to to disprove them. It is you who introduced a thread based on modal logic - you cannot then edit out 99% of the field as somehow off limits for consideration unless proven otherwise by the skeptic.

I am not going to pretend like I understand this...

Here is one more example:

• If Abraham Lincoln is dead in world w then any other world v in which Lincoln is alive is not accessible.

It depends on how you define "dead"...and I think you know where I am going with that..

We may say Lincoln is necessarily dead because he is an historical figure and it impossible for a human being to live over 200 hundred years. but then there is the world of 1855 when Lincoln is alive.

But see, I don't believe he is necessarily dead...he is contingently dead. See how you are conflating the two terms?

Is that world possible? If it is possible then what is necessarily true in 2016 i.e. Lincoln must be dead, is false in the world of 1809. [/list]

See, your premise of "Lincoln is necessarily dead in 2016" is false, therefore, any conclusion that you draw from that conclusion is also false.

To be true the last example is slippery and involves an arrow of time, but the point is that there are some versions of possible worlds for which S5 and the true in every world definition you are using is not an appropriate definition of necessity.

The above quote is a remnant of a false conclusion from a premise.