The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

[Artie]

[Replying to Artie]

Excellent Artie, but on a point of order:
He didn't magically define it into existence.
He logically defined it into existence.

V/R

It isn't logical that an imagined non-existent being with some imagined properties can be made to exist in the physical world using logic.

[Willum]

[Replying to Artie]

And yet, this is a classic logical argument.

Conspiracies abound!

[Artie]

[Replying to Artie]

And yet, this is a classic logical argument.

Conspiracies abound!

I can imagine a being that is present everywhere, that is existing everywhere. However, if that being existed in the real world it would have to occupy the space my head is in now and my brain wouldn't exist to imagine the being. Hence this being can't logically exist in the real world.

[Blastcat]

[Replying to post 285 by For_The_Kingdom]

Hi, For_The_Kingdom

It must be true if it's true, but if it's not true then it must not be true

A necessary truth would not be true if and only if it wasn't possible for it to be true...but the existence of a MGB IS possible...and all possible necessary truths must be true.

How do you know that a MGB is actually possible?... I don't.
What if it isn't possible, then what happens to your argument?

[Kenisaw]

[Replying to Artie]

Salient point, Artie. What people tend to either forget or not realize in the first place is that proving something true in a logical argument does not actually make it true in reality. You can get a true statement in logic/philosophy that is completely false in the real world. Even if the Modal argument was shown to be true, it still doesn't mean there actually is such a creature as an MGB...

[For_The_Kingdom]

2 + 2 = 4 is a tautology, thus 2 + 2= 7 fails to understand the meaning of each term.

Red herring. 2+2=4 is a necessary truth, just like any other mathematical proposition. There is nothing that you said or CAN say that will change this fact.

But premise 1 is not a tautology and neither is the S5 axiom <>p -> []<>p (possibly implies necessarily possible), or the S5 theorem <>p => <>[]p. If you keep seeing the implication as tautological that is because you only see one definition of necessity.

And if you can't see that all possible necessarily true propositions must be actually true, that is because you fail to understand the nature of necessity.

False. Please take time to appreciate there are different modal systems, why they have different axioms and different set of theorems. I should not have to justify them to you as they already exist in the field of modal logic and it is you who are invoking modal logic whilst ignoring what is already well accepted.

Sure, you can appeal to any modal system you want..the problem is, none of it negates the truth value of what I am arguing. All possible necessarily true propositions must be true.

A proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false. It aint happening..and nothing you've said can negate that fact.

You claim the truth of the MOA is unassailable despite it being pointed out several times that that positions goes way beyond Plantinga and that modal logic is not confined to the definition you are using. You have been given counter examples but you breeze past them.

When you can explain how a proposition can be possibly necessarily true, but actually false...I will concede your point. But you can't. I know you can't, and you know you can't.

I'll try again. What counts as necessity in modern modal logics is defined by the accessibility relationship and what may be accessed or not accessed between worlds. Here is a simplified example. Imagine there are only a million alternative worlds. In one world we shall call w it is only possible to access half of all the worlds and half a million are inaccessible i.e. half contain something not possible in w. Let's say the speed of light is variable in half the worlds and world w cannot access the half which have a variable speed of light because the speed of light has to be constant in w. In this scenario the speed of light is constant in w the speed limit is necessarily the case because it is not open to revision, yet the speed of light is not constant in all worlds. Those other worlds with a variable speed of light may not be possible from the perspective of w but that does not mean they are not possible worlds. They may be fully consistent and possible by a set of laws and principles not compatible with w. Under the definition of necessity you are sticking to the constant speed of light in w is not necessarily true despite no other speed being allowed, and no world accessible form w having a different speed of light. To be consistent you must be lead to conclude the alternative worlds with variables speed limits are not just inaccessible to w but impossible worlds full stop. The history of modal logic has found the definition of necessity you are insisting on inadequate to explain the kinds of counter examples, and that is why the definition you stick to does not account for all the nuances if what might be meant by necessity.

Please stop with the analogies until you directly address my contention; in the argument, P1 is that it is possible for a MGB (necessary being) to exist.

Now, I'd like for you to explain to me how P1 can be possibly necessarily true, but actually false. While you are at it, again, using whatever form of modal logic you like, explain to me what form of modal logic negates the proposition of "2+2=4 in all possible worlds, making it a necessary truth".

When you do that, we can discuss whatever analogy you want..until then, I refused to get suckered into any counter-examples or analogies before my original points are addressed.

[For_The_Kingdom]

A God that is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent cannot simultaneously be omnibenevolent in any world where every action is not a benevolent action. So this would rule out your God from existing in any world where there were non-benevolent actions. Therefore your God, by your definition, cannot exist in our world, unless you want to argue that every action in our world is a benevolent action.

So basically, you are saying that "Because being X is omnibenevolent, everything around being X must be benevolent".

Non sequitur.

[Kenisaw]

When you do that, we can discuss whatever analogy you want..until then, I refused to get suckered into any counter-examples or analogies before my original points are addressed.

Says the guy who wouldn't address some of my points until I answered a question about atheists viewpoint on free will. Do as I say, not as I do, eh?

[For_The_Kingdom]

It's a done deal actually. The being you describe can't exist, period. The dilemmas you created are unsolvable.

God is a living reality, bruh. I know that is a tough pill to swallow for someone with your worldview...but hey.

Right, and your god being able to have free will defies logic and reason. Your god being all good defies logic and reason since evil exists and your god created it.

There is no way someone with your worldview can claim that evil exists, unless you are presupposing a standard of goodness that isn't being held to...but on natuarlism, that is begging the question, isn't it?

Your god being maximally great defies logic and reason since it created imperfection.

That is arbitrary. If God chooses to miss a free throw, the miss is a result of a choice, not ability. If God chooses to make something imperfect, then that thing is imperfect, that has nothing to do with God's perfection or his ability to make something perfect.

If God is racing against the superhero Flash, and God choices to lose the race, does that make God imperfect? No, because the goal was to lose, and God accomplished that goal.

But if God tried with all of his power and might to win the race, yet, he lOSES the race, thennnn that would be imperfect, wouldn't it.

It is all arbitrary.

Your god existing eternally yet reaching a point in its existence where it created the universe defies logic and reason, which means it can't have created us.

Save this for the KCA thread.

This isn't just about choosing to miss a free throw, Kingdom. Your being can't do much of anything.

Yes it is. It is simple, can a perfect being choose to miss a free throw if that is what he wanted to do? The answer is a simple and obvious yes.

It is impotent and irrational.

I can't point out being that does any of it, your particular flavor of god included.

Yeah, because it can't be done. Just like you can't think of a man that is able to draw a squared circle...because it can't be done. You can't conceive of something that is impossible to conceive.

There isn't any empirical evidence or data that supports any god claim in the history of mankind. None. Zilch. Zero. Nada.

There is empirical evidence and data that supports a finite universe. But, lets save that for the KCA thread.

Hmm, but then again, there isn't any empirical evidence or data that supports the idea that the natural world is all there is, and there isn't anything beyond it, is there? Hmmm.

But this conceivable nonsense is a true non sequitur. We can conceive of beings that can defy logic, can't we? So that would make them greater than a divine entity that can't defy logic. The logic defying being can't pass through your modal nonsense, but that doesn't mean we can't conceive of it. I'll explain for a third time that what we can conceive has NOTHING to do with what we can prove. Imagination is not a substitution for reality...

The bottom line is; is it possible for God to exist? The answer is "yes", it is possible. You've done nothing to negate P1, therefore, it still stands. You can say what you want, yet P1 is still sitting there unscathed.

If your MGB is all knowing than it cannot have free will.

Since I am an agnostic atheist this is a useless question because I am not constrained by MGBs or gods, so have no logic issues to avoid as you do.

I didn't know the concept of "free will" had anything to do with what one labels himself. It doesn't matter if you are an ant, do you have free will, or not?

But since you asked, I will tell you that I don't know for sure. There is research on both sides of the matter, and it is not conclusive if free will does exist, or if everything we do is just a matter of chemical reactions and quantum fluctuations that are really responsible for the so called "choices" we make.

Oh, so now all of a sudden you don't know whether or not you have free will? LOL.

So you don't know if you are FREELY choosing to disbelieve in God, or if the chemical reactions in your brain is making that choice for you. Okkk.

But again, this has nothing to do with your MGB not being able to have free will.

Yes it does.

Your god can't seem to do much of anything given all its omni powers...

We will see about that. Please answer the above questions.

Please solve the dilemmas you've created. Oh wait you can't, nevermind. This thread is over...

No, you put the MGB in this scenario. The Bible puts the MGB (your god) in this scenario. I didn't list what this thing can do, you did and the bible did. The claims being made about the properties and abilities of the MGB are logically absurd. The MGB/god creature cannot possibly exist.

The scenario is a MGB possessing the attribute of omniscient. There isn't anything wrong with that. The issue is when the objector places God's omniscient into logically absurd paradoxes, which is what you've done.

There are no internal contradictions regarding the attributes of God.

Omniscience with the other "attributes of god" IS the paradox Kingdom. Not certain situations involving it. The very claim of that ability is logically absurd, as my examples have attested to. It's ridiculous that you think that a god being could still be omniscient when all it takes is one example to show how it cannot be true with the other attributes. You think a god is all knowing except when it can't be all knowing? LOL!

And, naturally, your bible claims these things true, which is impossible.

Except as I already explained the MGB can't have free will and therefore can't choose to do anything. Free will must be a logical absurdity, eh?

Please explain, why in the free throw shooting scenario, does God not have the freedom to freely choose to miss a shot?

If the god MGB critter knows all (as you claim), then it already knows before it starts shooting free throws with you what shots it will make and which shots it won't. It can't "choose" to miss a shot that it already knows it will make. If it could then it can't be all knowing, because it didn't already know that the outcome would change. Your critter can only do what it already knows, or else it isn't all knowing. So there is no free will, no ability to choose, for anything it does for it's entire existence because it "knows all". I hope I gave you a better explanation here.

Ahh, but we all notice you fail to describe, in technicolorly detail, what it is I fail to understand. Please explain to us how something maximally great can exist everywhere in something that is no longer maximally great. I'm all ears...

You said "If it exists everywhere then part of its existence isn't maximally great now"...and I basically said that based on that quote, you apparently don't know what maximal greatness means.

The quote doesn't even make sense.

Try reading the whole thing instead of removing part of one sentence out of it and trying to understand it that way. That's like going straight to page 4 of the instructions to build a swing set and then wonder why nothing makes sense...

Except it had to miss that free throw, because it already knew it was going to miss that free throw. No choice there. Solve the dilemma.

This is related to the questions I asked above. Please answer those questions.

Done, please be sure to solve the dilemma next time.

Except for all the illogical contradiction of it, which I have detailed out for you multiple times above and in previous posts, which you have not rectified.

I will rectify once you answer the questions.

Wonderful.

I've also explained to you that just because something is conceivable doesn't make it possible

And I've also explained to you that the above statement is true only with contingent propositions, not necessary propositions. We are almost 30 pages into the thread and you still aren't differentiating between contingent propositions, and necessary propositions, DESPITE the fact that over and over again, I've explained why the distinction needs to be made (also in the OP).

Which has nothing to do with your conceivable angle, because your conceivable angle is all wrong (explained earlier in this post again). Since you are in the necessary mood, maybe you could finally get around to telling me why a MGB is necessary...

Yet, below you said pointed out that I am "repeating" myself. Well, that is why I have to.

You have to because you keep dodging questions and avoiding dilemmas that your own claims have created. It's like a merry-go-round and dodge ball at the same...

, and gave an example of that (it was either a square circle or an unstoppable force meets an immovable object, maybe even both now that I think about it).
It appears you are repeating yourself and running around in a circle a little bit.

I am repeating myself, because I am talking to different people and saying the same things over and over again. Glad you noticed.

Just talking about our conversation, Kingdom. I appreciate that you are replying to so many different people however. I do credit you for that.

And I did address your unstoppable force/immovable object...I addressed it by saying that it may not be possible for a MGB to create such things, due to the logical impossibility of it...and that was an easy response to what you thought was a difficult objection.

But the list of things it can't possibly create includes the universe, free will, evil (and a whole range of other non-good emotions), imperfection, and so on. So it is not possible for it to be the creator of this universe and all it contains.

The premise is rejected.

That was not my point. If there is an all good god creature that exists everywhere all the time, how can evil exist in its existence?

I don't believe the existence of evil is incompatible with a omnibenovelent being.

Is there a logical reason for this belief, or are you just avoiding another dilemma?

(Not to mention how a maximally great all good being even makes something that can be evil (us) when it changed its perfect existence by creating an imperfect world)...

I don't believe it is possible for God to create human beings with free will and there not be the potential for evil. God could have created humans perfect, but if he did, there would be no free will.

God can't create free will remember, it is all knowing! God can't create imperfection as a perfect being, and it can't exist everywhere all at once as a perfect being if there is imperfection in part of its "everywhere"! Your belief doesn't really matter at this point...

If the goal was to allow free human beings to live, then the potential for evil was always there. There is no way to have one without the other.

Now you are slipping a little Christian dogma in here, because you assume humans with free will has to mean evil will happen (not that that the all knowing can hand out free will let's not forget).

I don't envy the work you've got ahead of you....

Light work.

Well, when you skip all the hard parts like you did I'm not surprised that you don't feel very expended. Dodging doesn't use a lot of brain energy...

[Furrowed Brow]

A proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false.

This is true in S5 and without checking every alternative it is very likely possibly necessarily true but actually false is not a theorem in any plausible modal logic. However, for its denials to not be a general theorem there need only be one set of conditions on which possible necessarily true but actually false plausibly holds true. It does not matter how obscure, it only matters that there is some condition on which the proposition is a plausible interpretation.

Here is a counter example: right this moment Fred's future is possibly necessary, but right this moment Fred future is not actually true.

As pointed out previously there are examples involving cause and effect and time, and irreversibility for which modal logic S5 is not very plausible. There are many conditions which make the proposition you choose as an example true, a few condition on which it is false. The false conditions tend to reveal the problem with the Euclidean properties of S5.

Another example: a cure for cancer on some random future date is possibly necessarily true, and a cure for cancer on some random future date is actually false.