The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

[Blastcat]

[Replying to post 339 by For_The_Kingdom]


Hi, FTK.

"Come on people now
Smile on your brother
Everybody get together
Try to love one another
Right now"

THE YOUNGBLOODS
"Get Together"

Then why can't we just say, "The rest of the universe (the non-god part) exists by the necessity of it's own nature"?

Because the universe began to exist...and nothing that begins to exist can exist due to the necessity of its own nature.

Cmon now, people.

I don't feel like being talked down to. That's what I feel when I read "Cmon, now, people". I'm not IN your seminar. I didn't PAY YOU to lead me. If you want me to COME ON, you will have to CONVINCE ME TO COME ON.

I'm not feeling like being LED today without REASON.

Now, as to that fine bit of assertion above, you would have to GIVE ME A REASON to believe it. COME ON isn't a reason.

COME ON is an expression of frustration that you aren't being as CONVINCING to us as you are to yourself. That happens in here.

"nothing that begins to exist can exist due to the necessity of its own nature"

What kind of word salad is THAT?
I don't even know what you mean.

How does ANYTHING exist "due to the necessity of it's own nature"?
Do you propose a MECHANISM by which that can happen?

Or a religious belief?

[Furrowed Brow]

However, for its denials to not be a general theorem there need only be one set of conditions on which possible necessarily true but actually false plausibly holds true. It does not matter how obscure, it only matters that there is some condition on which the proposition is a plausible interpretation.

Ok, so whatever point you are attempting to get across,

You repeatedly made a claim upon which you seemed to be hanging the validity of your argument. This was the point form the previous post....

A proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false. It aint happening..and nothing you've said can negate that fact.

So I am pointing out that to meet your challenge there only need be an example in which your assertion may be false. To that end I gave two counter examples. In these examples it is possible that the proposition is possibly necessary true but actually false. Exactly what you said could never happen.

Here is a counter example: right this moment Fred's future is possibly necessary, but right this moment Fred future is not actually true.

Another example: a cure for cancer on some random future date is possibly necessarily true, and a cure for cancer on some random future date is actually false.

As these examples show there are propositions that may be necessarily true but not actually true you've been proved wrong.

Fred can die at any moment, can't he? Therefore, the premise that "Fred's future is possibly necessary" is not a necessary truth...it is contingent.

As I said before, any proposition will fall under the realm of necessity, or contingency. There is not middle ground here.

The two examples I gave make no claim to being necessary truths. However they may well be true and the fact they are logical propositions that may be true is all that is needed to falsify your claim - a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false. It aint happening..and nothing you've said can negate that fact. The counter examples demonstrate why your extolling of the MOA is based on a rudimentary understanding of what may be meant by necessity. Things are more complex than you let on.

*Sigh*...these are contingent truths, bruh. It is the same thing, post after post....smh.

Thank you for acknowledging the counter examples as contingent truths. This means your claim - a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false. It aint happening..and nothing you've said can negate that fact - is not true.

To sustain your original position you have to demonstrate how the counter examples can never be true.

[wiploc]

On atheism, evil is subjective and therefore has no relevance whatsoever in any discussion on the question of how things ought to be..

That is not a defensible claim. Atheist definitions of good and evil can be just as objective as theist definitions. Theist definitions can be just as subjective as atheist definitions. I don't see how gods come into it.

KCA thread.

Link please.

[wiploc]

... There is the original call; which is that the MOA is a logically sound/valid argument.

You can only call it valid if you agree that this is valid too:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then it does not exist in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world, then a maximally great being does not exist.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist.


As for soundness, the MOA is patently not sound. Godless worlds are possible. They aren't impossible; therefore, they are possible. Any world without contradiction is a possible world, and there is nothing contradictory about godless worlds.

Therefore, godless worlds are possible. Therefore, no god exists in every possible world is possible. Therefore, the MOA--which assumes the possibility of necessary gods--is not sound.

[wiploc]

But then again, when I defined Artie as a necessary being...come to find out, he is not necessary at all (no offense, Artie lol).

That argument applies equally to your god.

[wiploc]

There cannot be a "problem" of evil without assuming or rather presupposing a standard of morality that ought to be, but isn't.

Morality doesn't come into it.

If a god is were
able to prevent all evil, and
smart enough to prevent all evil, and
determined to prevent all evil,
then that god would prevent all evil.

Therefore, if evil exists, no such god exists.

That's only a "problem" for those who believe evil exists, and also believe in a god who would--if it existed--prevent evil.

You can try to work some hypothetical morality into the argument, but you aren't going to change the fact that gods of that description do not coexist with evil in any possible world.

[rikuoamero]

[Replying to post 336 by For_The_Kingdom]

Because the truth value of P1 is independent of any questions of "why". As I told someone else, even if I don't know why such a being is necessary, that has NOTHING to do with whether it is POSSIBLE for a being to exist necessarily...which is the contention of P1.

Since the truth value of P1 is irrelevant to "why", I am under no obligation to answer it.

There we have it folks. The one thing that is the linchpin of his argument, P1, we ask why we should accept it, why it is 'true'...and FTK says he is under no obligation to answer it. It is just plainly a truth apparently, something that is true, something that somehow needs no explanation.

I think we're done here, aren't we folks? There's nothing more to be discussed about the MOA, at least not in my eyes. We've got its proponent down to the point of saying that the linchpin of his argument does not need to be justified, it's just true for literally no reason.

------
FTK, the MOA is an invalid argument, at the very least your usage of it is. You're trying to convince someone else that this being you believe exists, exists. However, what you did is invalid. You had the thing you believe exists as not failing to exist in the preface BEFORE you laid out the premises. In other words, it was rigged to give the result you want, and not any other result. When asked why we should accept P1, you refuse to answer it.

[wiploc]

We know that Jake doesn't exist because there are possible worlds in which Jake doesn't exist. Therefore, since Jake is defined as necessary, he cannot exist in any possible world.

If you understand that about Jake, why don't you understand it about your necessary god? The logic is exactly the same. It is exactly as easy to defeat your argument as it is to defeat mine, because they both fall to the same refutation.

No, they are not the same, because your argument is self-defeating...mines isn't.

You proved that Jake the necessary gumdrop doesn't exist.
I proved that Jehovah the necessary god doesn't exist.

The two arguments have exactly the same defeat.

[wiploc]

Then why can't we just say, "The rest of the universe (the non-god part) exists by the necessity of it's own nature"?

Because the universe began to exist...and nothing that begins to exist can exist due to the necessity of its own nature.

Cmon now, people.

1. Who made that rule? Why should anybody accept it?

2. I'm not sure that "can exist due to the necessity of its own nature" isn't gibberish. How would that work? Is it just a circular argument, like, "God is necessary, therefore god exists."

3. This argument is based on equivocation, on surreptitiously two-stepping between two incompatible definitions. "A specious argument, the like of which would prove a horse chestnut to be a chestnut horse." There is no single definition of "began" or "begins" that will allow your god to be unbegun while the rest of the universe is begun. If you stick with any one meaning of "begun," then both (god and the rest of the universe) will be begun or both will be unbegun.

[wiploc]

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

Since none of us possesses the infinite knowledge required to know all ultimate possibilities, this is not an unreasonable assessment. It is NOT a proven fact however. It's a possibility which is unprovable.

P2 is true by definition. If something is "possible" then it is "true in at least one possible world." That's how "possible" is defined in possible-world speak.

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

Okay, fair enough. Emphasis on the word possible.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

And this, I am afraid, is simply stupid. It's nothing more than claiming, for example, that if it's possible that Popeye exists in some world, therefore Popeye exists in every world.

If we stipulate to 3, then 1 is false. If we stipulate to 1, then 3 is false.

In some versions of this argument, god is defined, and then a lame attempt to derive 3 is made. But I believe that Kingdom defined his MGB as necessary. (Like possible means "exists in at least one possible world," necessary means "exists in every possible world.")

Given that definition, it follows that--in this version of the argument--3 is true by definition.

And it further follows that 1 is false. A necessary god has to exist in every possible world in order to exist at all. By the definition of "necessary." Therefore, if godless worlds are possible, no gods are necessary.

And godless worlds are possible. This is true, again, by definition. A possible world is any world that doesn't contradict itself. There is nothing contradictory about godless worlds. Therefore, godless worlds are possible.

Since a god cannot exist in a godless world (that would be a contradiction!) it follows that no gods are necessary. Phrased differently: no necessary gods exist. Phrased differently yet: P1 is false.

The argument opens with P1 because "possible" is an ambiguous word. Some people will grant that P1 is true because they don't know whether gods exist. That is, for some people, "possible" means the same as "I don't know."
But in the language of this argument, it has to mean "exists in at least one possible world."

So it is not possible that a necessary god exists.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

A maximally great being exists in our world in EXACTLY the same way that Popeye exists in our world. We all possess a concept of Popeye. The concept has no physical reality however.

4 is true by definition. It is not vulnerable to attack. Don't waste your time on it.

The actual world is a possible world. Therefore, if something exists in every possible world, it also exists in the actual world.

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

A maximally great being clearly exists as a concept. As do Popeye and the Flying Spaghetti Monster. These things can NOT be shown to have any physical reality however. You are essentially claiming that anything one can imagine in their head not only has some potential reality, but has actual physical reality. And that is the very definition of foolish.

5 is a trueism; it cannot be false; it is just one thing stated in two different ways. Our focus has to be on 1 and 3. Since, in this version of the argument, 3 is true by definition, our focus has to be on 1.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

The entire exercise above is an example of watching someone chasing their tail and getting exactly nowhere.

[/quote]

Okay, 6 is false. But the way to prove that is to prove that 1 is false.