The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

[Danmark]

Excellent summary! "Well I defined God as necessary in the preamble" provides a great example of circular reasoning: simply defining something in a way to make it 'true,' then acting as if such silliness has an effect on reality.

Nonsense. How a being is defined is independent as to whether or not such a being exists, or can exist.

Exactly and I did not make that claim. You may have missed the point. I asserted that defining a being as a "possibility" cannot will him into existence, which is what your MOA attempts to do.

I've also pointed out you have not even demonstrated P1. You have not demonstrated it is possible a "maximally great" being exists. That's why your argument has been dead in the water even before you get to P2.

[Danmark]

I propose a more accurate summary.

A: I agree the existence of God is possible, but that doesn't mean that God exists.

You: If the existence of God is possible, then God must exist.

A: That doesn't follow. A contingent God only need to exist in one possible world.

You: Well I defined God as necessary in the preamble.

A: The existence of that sort of gods isn't possible.

Me: Oh, then the existence of a necessary God is inconceivable. Well, why am I able to conceive of it, then?

Loaded question cannot be answered. The existence of a necessary God is inconceivable. Therefore you are unable to conceive of it. Simple really.

The 'MOA' is being exposed as hilariously wrong. It could be used to prove anything, IF IT HAD ANY LOGICAL VALIDITY.

P1 it is possible there is no "maximally great" being.
I certainly can conceive it is possible there is no god... or for that matter that there IS an invisible unicorn which if made visible would be pink.

[rikuoamero]

I know it's been bandied about before on this thread, but let's do it again. Instead of the Christian idea of an MGB being an all good god, let's go with the MGB being an all evil demon.
Before I do the argument, I just want to lay out here in my preface that the MGB is omni-present, omni-potent, and omni-malevolent. Oh, it also cannot fail to exist. It's necessary in it's existence (wait, isn't this what I'm supposed to be proving in the actual argument? Why am I saying that here?)

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

What do you know...I didn't change a single word of the argument and, if I borrow Kingdom's mode of thinking, it still works out the exact same.
Except...now we have a problem. Now we have an all good God and an all evil demon, both omni-present and omni-potent existing (at least, according to this argument). What one tries to do, the other counters.
Wouldn't this mean they cancel each other out, sorta like matter and anti-matter? Or at the very least, end up neutralizing each other, rendering each other impotent?
Either way, we end up with the real world as it is, completely untouched by the machinations of a god.

[jgh7]

Anti-Modal Ontological Argument:

P1) It is possible a maximally great being does not exist
P2) If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.
P3) If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it doesn't exist in any possible world. (If it existed in one possible world but not another, then it wouldn't be maximally great.)
P4) If a maximally great being does not exist in any possible worlds, then it doesn't exist in our world.
P5) If a maximally great being doesn't exist in our possible world, then it doesn't exist.
P6) Therefore a maximally great being doesn't exist.

Please refute this. It is just as easy to conceptualize a possible world without a maximally great being as it is to conceptualize one with. Both the MOA and this anti-MOA start with opposing acceptable conceptions.

[JoeyKnothead]

Anti-Modal Ontological Argument:

P1) It is possible a maximally great being does not exist
P2) If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.
P3) If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it doesn't exist in any possible world. (If it existed in one possible world but not another, then it wouldn't be maximally great.)
P4) If a maximally great being does not exist in any possible worlds, then it doesn't exist in our world.
P5) If a maximally great being doesn't exist in our possible world, then it doesn't exist.
P6) Therefore a maximally great being doesn't exist.

Please refute this. It is just as easy to conceptualize a possible world without a maximally great being as it is to conceptualize one with. Both the MOA and this anti-MOA start with opposing acceptable conceptions.

Ya did good. I'd think if one came along and did refute it, they'd be the elusive "maximally great being" we've all been a-carryin' on about.

[For_The_Kingdom]

No, not difficult at all.

A necessary god exists in all possible worlds, by definition.

But some possible worlds don't have gods.

You are contradicting yourself. First you grant the notion that a necessary god exists in all possible worlds...then you say "but some possible worlds don't have gods".

If some "possible worlds don't have gods", then "a necessary god doesn't exist in all possible worlds, by definition".

Blatant and obvious contradiction.

[For_The_Kingdom]

[Replying to post 396 by For_The_Kingdom]

Keyword: "Anymore".

So you realized that by admitting that the existence of God is possible (P1), you are thereby granting the actual existence of God...so to negate that, you simply deny the possibility of God altogether.

FtK, I hope you realise that (in my eyes and in the eyes of others) this might as well be you admitting that the strength of P1 rests entirely on the atheist who agrees with you either not paying attention to your definition of possible or you not having defined it.
Most of us here are used to thinking of the word 'possible' in contingent terms. Most people are, I would imagine. So if someone like yourself comes along and uses the word 'possible' to mean 'necessarily existing/cannot fail to exist', we have to be paying very close attention, otherwise we'd be agreeing with something that ordinarily we'd never agree to.
Your entire argument rests on a 'Gotcha' moment. This makes you look dishonest. Now I'll grant that you laid out what you were doing in the preface of the OP, but it's still a sleight of hand even if you show us what you are doing.

So answer me this.
How is what you are doing here ANY different to saying
"A loser says what"
"Sorry ,what?
"Aha! You said what, therefore you're a loser!"?

Dude, you said you were thru with the thread...

[For_The_Kingdom]

i.e. That's what Christians believe. Not good enough.

Forgive us Christians for believing in true propositions.

That is just a personal comment that fails to advance the argument.

Right, and that particular comment wasn't meant to "advance the argument". Straw man.

It is a overly broad and ultimately false comment. There is nothing 'true' about your ontological argument or its propositions.

I understand why you would want to believe that...but you of all people have yet to demonstrate why P1 is false.

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 433:

...
I understand why you would want to believe that...but you of all people have yet to demonstrate why P1 is false.
...

...
it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever
...

Hypocrisy's a-comin', y'all look busy!

[For_The_Kingdom]

I'll give you that much. People needs to be more careful before granting premises.

It was explained before the premises were even presented. No excuses.

Great, so it is irrelevant how many atheists granted P1.

It isn't irrelevant. They granted the P1..and once it was explained to them the implications of doing such, now they want a "do over"...or a "time-out". Like I said, it was cool to grant P1 until the implications hit home.

Assume the opposite then demonstrate that it leads necessarily to a contradiction? Not exactly sure what you are implying here.

Here is another one, for simplicity...if it is possible for 2+2=4, how can it ever be disproved? Do you get it now?

No, that is not what I am doing, I am informing you that even if I couldn't prove P1 false, it still doesn't make P1 true.

Oh, your point is granted...now are you admitting that you can't disprove P1?

Your reason for believe P1 is true is that the concept of a necessary God is coherent, therefore possible. The assertion I am asking you to support, is the part in bold.

And my response to that is what I've been maintaining from jump street; it is based on the fact that I can conceive of a MGB, and if you can conceive of it, then it is possible. And we know this is true because there are some concepts that CAN'T be conceived, like a one-sided stick or a squared circle...concepts like those are internally contradictory, and they cannot be conceived because we can't conceive of logical absurdities.

But we can conceive of rational, coherent concepts which do not defy any laws of logic...and a MGB fits the bill.

Now, that is the official reason as to why P1 is true. There, you have it.

So does God.

Assertion.

It's up to you to prove God pass P1, not for me to demonstrate otherwise. Besides, I did exactly that with my proof.

Your proof? LOL.

Same applies to God.

Mere assertion.

Loaded question cannot be answered.

Nonsense.

Incorrect. Recall my counter-example if you will, I defined God as a married bachelor, that definition made it impossible for such a god to exist, trivially so.

Right, so the God as you defined, cannot exist. That has nothing to do with the MGB as defined in the MOA. So, the God that you defined in your counter-example, if you were to place such a being in the MOA and presented it to me..I would be able to explain to you WHY P1 is false.

But you cannot (or as yet) to do the same for the MGB as described in the MOA.

And we know God is not a necessary being based on a proof against him being a necessary being.

So you wish lol.

What do you mean until...? Save your trash talk and deal with my proof.

LOL.

The answer is yes.

Bruh, the argument from evil is an epic failure.

That wasn't my accusation. I accused you of claiming we wouldn't have denied God's possibility before you brought the MOA to our attention.

I am not saying that every single atheist in existence would have granted P1...I am saying that MOST of you are intellectually honest enough to admit that the God, as defined in Christian theism; it is possible for such a being to exist.

I am not saying all of you, but rather, most of you....of course, this is all my opinion.

That's to do with God's actual existence in this world, not the same thing as God's possibility. God can be non-existent and still be possible, this should be pretty trivial for someone who understands modal logic.

Yeah, but a non-existent God whose existence is still possible would not be a God that is defined in the MOA. Still conflating concepts of contingency and necessity, are we?

That's classic question begging fallacy. You are just moving it one step back, now you have to prove a MGB can be conceived.

I wouldn't pray to a being that I cannot conceive. I am telling you; I can conceive of a MGB.

No, the point is you cannot prove that a necessary God is possible, it is not up to us to prove that a necessary God is impossible.

I did just that, above. If you have any problems with that explanation, then I'd like for you to conceive of a one-sided stick, and when you do, draw it for me and post it into the forum.

If you can pull off this stunt, then you will have proven me wrong that a one-sided stick CAN be conceived...but if you can't pull it off, then you've proven my point that if it can't be conceived, it is impossible as a physical entity or a conceptual construct.

Then you will have to ask yourself the following question; why is it that I can't conceive of a one-sided stick, but I can conceive of a MGB as defined in the MOA.

And to answer the question I will give you a hint; could it be because one of those concepts are possible, and one of those concepts ISN'T possible? Could that be why?

I am guessing there is a typo there.

Hecks yeah.

Again loaded question cannot be answered.

Nonsense.

Apart from the most important bit. Proving that a necessary God is possible.

Looks to me like I already did.

A placeholder, you can swap any for X. I suggest you substitute X for MGB to get:

1) If there is a possible world where MGB does not exist then MGB does not have necessary existence.

True.

2) A world that has no sentient beings is one such possible world where MGB does not exist.

P2 is false. If the MGB is defined as omnipresent, then there is no possible world at which the MGB cannot exist, whether this is a possible world with sentient beings or not.

3) Therefore MGB does not have necessary existence.

P3 is false because you cannot draw a true conclusion based upon false premises.

Hence my bolded statement: Your MGB, if one exists at all, cannot be a necessary being.

So let me see if I get this straight: First, you define this MGB as necessary, then you proceed to give a possible world at which such a being doesn't exist in..which, by definition, would make the being's existence NOT necessary.

So you've changed the beings existence from necessary, to contingent, and then concluded in P3 that the being isn't necessary?

Wow. And then you claim victory?

Right, but using the right term is very important. I mean the MOA hinges on the term "necessary" after all.

Sure does.

If you understand why apples are fruits, you will also see why oranges are also fruits... Apples and oranges are similar in a way that is relevant to the argument, just as Artie and God is similar in a way that is relevant to my proof, despite them not being equal.

Ok..

There is no conflating, look at your own example, you said: If I exist, then I am here. If you exist, then you are here. In stating that, have you in any way conflated Bust Nak with For_The_Kingdom?

No, but then again, me and you are both similarly here. Artie and God are not similarly here..one began to exist, and one has existed forever...one exists contingently, and the other exists necessarily. That is a big difference, and it is something that I keep trying to separate, yet it is all too easy for many of you to conflate.

Incorrect. The truth value of P3 depends solely on your definition, you could have swap the order of P1 with P3 and the argument would be just as valid (and just as unsound.)

Ok, then simply answer this this;

P3 is: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

How true can P3 be, if P1 is false? Just tell me that, please.

That just plain wrong, but I think we are finally making real progress. This misconception must be why you are so confident in the MOA.

LOL.

Fix this misconception and you would understanding why the MOA fails, fix this and you will understand why "Artie!!!" applies to God.

From my understanding, it doesn't.

If you choose to answer just one thing in my post, this would be it - The truth value of P3 does not depends on the truth value of P1, but on God as a necessary being.

*But on the possibility of God existing as a necessary being.

Exactly, which is why the argument fails. You CANNOT definite God into a necessary existence, that's what the argument tries to do.

One can define something anyway that he wants, whether or not the definition reflects reality...that is the question...and whether or not it is POSSIBLE for the definition to reflect reality, that is also the question.

Isn't that the same thing? To blame a faulty definition is to blame the truth value of said definition.

I haven't see anything from you regarding the mere definition of the MGB. Nothing. Again, the definition of God is also in the OP...and you've never challenged the definition. Why now? Need new ground to fight on?

Same as above. Prove you can conceive of a MGB.

LOL. If I prove that I can conceive of a MGB, will you admit that a MGB's existence is possible?

I am afraid you have to do more, because the reason you did give isn't question begging.

"I am guessing there is a typo there".

P3 depends on it. If God is not necessary, P3 is false.

That's a big "if".