The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

[For_The_Kingdom]

Your error is in giving any substance or value to P1. Saying you can conceive of something does not make it so.

Who said it was? No one is saying "because I can conceive of it, it is true"...I am saying "because I can conceive of it, it is possibly true".

P1: "It is possible that a maximally great being exists."
The burden of proof lies on you to prove it is even possible a "maximally great" being actually exists.

No, the burden of proof lies on me to demonstrate why the existence of God is POSSIBLE. I don't need to go beyond what it takes to prove the premises.

If you had termed it as the "greatest possible being" or simply the "greatest being" I might agree. But you are claiming it is possible for a MAXIMALLY great being to exist.

Isn't the "greatest being" the same as the "greatest possible being"?

Tho' you haven't defined what this means

I didn't?

[For_The_Kingdom]

Loaded question cannot be answered. The existence of a necessary God is inconceivable. Therefore you are unable to conceive of it. Simple really.

Please explain why the existence of a necessary God is inconceivable.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Exactly and I did not make that claim. You may have missed the point. I asserted that defining a being as a "possibility" cannot will him into existence, which is what your MOA attempts to do.

That would be a good point, if it wasn't for the fact that all possible necessarily truths must be actually true.

I've also pointed out you have not even demonstrated P1. You have not demonstrated it is possible a "maximally great" being exists. That's why your argument has been dead in the water even before you get to P2.

I gave reasons for P1 many times. Follow along.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Anti-Modal Ontological Argument:

P1) It is possible a maximally great being does not exist

Then the concept of a MGB is inconceivable, as it must defy logic and reasoning. Can you demonstrate that to be the case? If not, then you have no basis for P1. Just something to say that is contrary to the argument.

That's all it is.

[For_The_Kingdom]

From Post 433:

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I understand why you would want to believe that...but you of all people have yet to demonstrate why P1 is false.
...

...
it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever
...

Hypocrisy's a-comin', y'all look busy!

"but you of all people have yet to demonstrate why P1 is false".

[jgh7]

A universe without a maximally great being is also possible to be conceived.

Therefore number 3 is false.

[rikuoamero]

[Replying to post 435 by For_The_Kingdom]

But we can conceive of rational, coherent concepts which do not defy any laws of logic...and a MGB fits the bill.
Now, that is the official reason as to why P1 is true. There, you have it.

So there we have it. P1 (the possibility that a MGB exists, where possibility = necessary existence) is true because he can imagine it.

I am saying that MOST of you are intellectually honest enough to admit that the God, as defined in Christian theism; it is possible for such a being to exist.

And those of us who say so, say so in contingent terms. NOT in terms where possibility = necessary existence.

then I'd like for you to conceive of a one-sided stick, and when you do, draw it for me and post it into the forum.

So when it comes to conceiving of things, you want physical evidence from your debate opponents...but you won't provide the same when it comes to the things you claim you can conceive of?

P2 is false. If the MGB is defined as omnipresent, then there is no possible world at which the MGB cannot exist, whether this is a possible world with sentient beings or not.

No, you have a contradiction. You say you have a being that is everywhere in all possible worlds, yet there are some worlds that do not have sentient beings. Which one wins out?

First, you define this MGB as necessary, then you proceed to give a possible world at which such a being doesn't exist in..which, by definition, would make the being's existence NOT necessary.

Resolve the contradiction/paradox. Which one wins? Are there worlds with no sentient beings...or is your MGB everywhere, in all possible worlds?

No one is saying "because I can conceive of it, it is true"...I am saying "because I can conceive of it, it is possibly true".

*coughs*. Need I remind you of what you said up above?
Here it is again

But we can conceive of rational, coherent concepts which do not defy any laws of logic...and a MGB fits the bill.
Now, that is the official reason as to why P1 is true. There, you have it.

Then the concept of a MGB is inconceivable,

How is you can't conceive of the MGB in the 'no MGB exists' argument? I can imagine and conceive of a great many things that do not exist. Dragons don't exist, and I am able to conceive of them.

[wiploc]

No, not difficult at all.

A necessary god exists in all possible worlds, by definition.

But some possible worlds don't have gods.

You are contradicting yourself. First you grant the notion that a necessary god exists in all possible worlds...then you say "but some possible worlds don't have gods".

If some "possible worlds don't have gods", then "a necessary god doesn't exist in all possible worlds, by definition".

Blatant and obvious contradiction.

Yes, if we assume that there is a necessary god, we get contradiction. That's how we know that necessary gods don't exist.

Which is how we know that P1 is false. Because necessary gods can't exist in every possible world, we know that they don't exist in any possible world.

[Artie]

I can conceive of a MGB, and if you can conceive of it, then it is possible. And we know this is true because there are some concepts that CAN'T be conceived, like a one-sided stick or a squared circle...concepts like those are internally contradictory, and they cannot be conceived because we can't conceive of logical absurdities.

And I can conceive of worlds with no beings in them and those worlds aren't the least bit internally contradictory and present no logical absurdities. Hence your necessary being isn't necessary at all.

[For_The_Kingdom]

A universe without a maximally great being is also possible to be conceived.

Yeah, and that conception is only based upon P1 being false, and I will agree; if a MGB's existence was impossible, then it will be easy to see conceive of such a being's nonexistence.

But if P1 is true, then you can't conceive of a possible world at which an omnipresent/necessary being will fail to exist.