The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

[jgh7]

I disagree with the first bolded section as I hold P1 to be true (I have conceived of a possible world with a MGB) and have still conceived of a possible world without a MGB.

The problem is, all propositions that are possibly necessarily true must be actually true. There is no such thing as a proposition that can be possibly necessarily true, but actually false...because if it is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true in the first place.

Because of this, I hold P3 to be false. I don't believe a MGB needs to exist in all possible worlds for it to have maximal greatness.

That would hold true if the being was contingent as opposed to necessary in its existence.

Saying that it must exist in a possible world in which one chose to conceive that it does not exist, is the same as saying a square circle must exist.

I don't follow.

The second bolded section makes me wonder. You must have a different definition of conception than I do for you to assert it. What is your definition of conception.

Conception: 2. the way in which something is perceived or regarded.

Thank you for the reply. I see that according to the rules, I was conceiving of a contingent being previously for P1. But the best I can do is conceive of a contingent being. The reason for this is that for any being that I conceive of that I believe to be maximally great, it follows that I can conceive of a possible world without said being. So the being must have been contingent from the start.

But I have a different argument.

A conceived world is made up of thoughts. These thoughts are not in and of themselves a MGB. It follows that a MGB does not exist in a conceived world (the different thoughts that compose the conceived world are not a MGB by themselves or combined in any way, they are nothing more than thoughts). Since a MGB can not exist in a conceived world (only a conception of a MGB can exist in these worlds), then the only possible world where a MGB's existence comes into question is the actual world.

So P2 is false. The MGB does not exist in the possible world produced from P1 via conception.

[rikuoamero]

But his being can't be present in every possible world since a world without beings at all is perfectly logically possible and present no logical contradiction.

Um, no a "world without beings at all" isn't perfectly logical. False premises only lead to false conclusions.

Explain this. From science, we are aware that the Earth existed for millions of years before the first lifeform did, that the universe existed for billions of years before the first lifeform. Thus, it is logical to imagine a world with no beings on/in it.

[rikuoamero]

We can perfectly well imagine worlds without any beings at all without running into any logical contradictions so by defining his being as present everywhere he gave his being a property that is logically contradictory.

If you can imagine a possible world without a MGB, then you are not imagining the being as defined in the MOA, but rather a contingent being...but the being as defined in the MOA is a NECESSARY being...and the only way such a being can conceived as nonexistent is if P1 is false and the being is deduced to a contingent being rather than the necessary being as it is defined in the argument.

This, to me, is somewhat like saying to Artie "See this room? It has a bed in it" and Artie replying back "No, I don't see a bed. What I perceive of this room is a room that is empty" and you stamping your feet and demanding that he 'admit' there is a bed.
Again, this is a cheat. You're not allowing for the possibility of failure, for someone else to say "I can conceive of a world that has no beings in it"...because that would make P1 false. (In fact, didn't you say just that?). Rather than allow Artie's argument to stand, you refuse to, and with no counter-argument that makes sense.
If Artie can imagine a MGB-less world, this means that the MGB as you defined it results in a logical paradox, and thus your MGB cannot exist, along with the MGB-less world .
At this point, you'll have to redefine the MGB to try and save it.

[Artie]

If you can imagine a possible world without a MGB, then you are not imagining the being as defined in the MOA, but rather a contingent being...but the being as defined in the MOA is a NECESSARY being...and the only way such a being can conceived as nonexistent is if P1 is false and the being is deduced to a contingent being rather than the necessary being as it is defined in the argument.

Since we can conceive of worlds with no beings in them and there's nothing logically contradictory about those worlds that means that your being can't be necessary. It doesn't matter if you try to define your being into existence by giving it certain properties and claiming it's a necessary being. It just isn't.

[Furrowed Brow]

[Replying to post 393 by Furrowed Brow]

For_The_Kingdom has a lot on his plate defending the MOA against multiple critics it is understandable they have not be able to get to my last post. In the meantime here is an alternative to the MOA which shows up why the claim the implied existence is nonsense.

A maximally great nation believes in its own greatness and its right to rule and dominate everything, it controls every political process, has the largest military and most pervasive surveillance systems, the most advanced technologies including time travel, and faster than light travel, it has explored and surveyed and exploited everything to its advantage to prevent any other nation rising to supplant it as the maximally greatest nation, and it has the most stirring national anthem. The maximally greater nation has eradicated all other nations.

• 1. It is possible that a maximally great nation exists
  2. If it is possible that a maximally great nation exists, then a maximally great nation exists at some moment in history.
  3. If a maximally great nation exists at some moment in history, then it exists at every moment in history.
  4. If a maximally great nation exists in every moment in history, then it exists in the actual world (our world).
  5. If a maximally great nation exists in the actual world, then a maximally great nation exists.
  6. Therefore, a maximally great nation exists.

Of course the average reader may detect a problem with claiming the maximally greatest nation exists.

[Artie]

Um, no a "world without beings at all" isn't perfectly logical. False premises only lead to false conclusions.

Again:

"Some versions of the ontological argument rely in some way on the claim that God possesses necessary existence, meaning it is not possible that God could have failed to exist. But this cannot be true. For something to exist necessarily means that a logical contradiction inevitably follows if one tries to imagine otherwise. (In Plantingas formulation, something exists necessarily if it exists in all possible worlds.) It is not possible, for example, to conceive of a triangle with any more or less than three sides, or a prime number that is greater than all other prime numbers, or a married bachelor. However, it is possible to conceive of a world where God does not exist " the existence of atheists proves that. No contradiction is entailed by this proposition. Therefore, Gods existence cannot be necessary."
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/daylightat ... cal:modern

[marco]

If it is possible that a maximally great nation exists, then a maximally great nation exists at some moment in history.

The philosophers will redirect you to what they understand by "world".

In your premise here "nation" is not an entity and this introduces other logical problems to muddy your statement.

But one could use your parody of the argument effectively to argue for a maximally evil entity and deduce he's as necessary as God, which would bring us into one of the old heresies of moral dualism.

I don't believe we can deduce the existence of God by using semantics even if St. Anselm thought his ontological brainwave was sound.

[Artie]

Thank you for the reply. I see that according to the rules, I was conceiving of a contingent being previously for P1. But the best I can do is conceive of a contingent being. The reason for this is that for any being that I conceive of that I believe to be maximally great, it follows that I can conceive of a possible world without said being.

But Kingdom can't do that because he has made the logical error of conceiving his MGB to be present everywhere, that is existing everywhere as if existence was a great-making property. But it isn't. http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/th ... predicate/ So all the rest of his reasoning is based on a logical error.

[Bust Nak]

It was explained before the premises were even presented. No excuses.

Not my problem, never felt the need to excuse them, it's your gloating I was commenting on.

It isn't irrelevant. They granted the P1..and once it was explained to them the implications of doing such, now they want a "do over"...or a "time-out". Like I said, it was cool to grant P1 until the implications hit home.

Like I said, gloating. Well they have since denied P1, where does that leave the MOA? Enough to impress believers, not enough to convince skeptics, that's where.

Here is another one, for simplicity...if it is possible for 2+2=4, how can it ever be disproved? Do you get it now?

No, I am asking you to prove it is possible for 2+2=4, why are you enquiring about disproving it?

Oh, your point is granted...now are you admitting that you can't disprove P1?

Nop. I said "even if."

And my response to that is what I've been maintaining from jump street; it is based on the fact that I can conceive of a MGB, and if you can conceive of it, then it is possible...

A fact that you can conceive it? Prove it.

But we can conceive of rational, coherent concepts which do not defy any laws of logic...and a MGB fits the bill.

So you'd like us to believe. Prove it like I asked you.

Now, that is the official reason as to why P1 is true. There, you have it.

Your assertions are not good enough.

Assertion.

Assertion backed by deductive proof.

Your proof? LOL.

Yep. The one I kept repeating for you.

Right, so the God as you defined, cannot exist.

Exactly the point - whether god can exist or not, depends on how one defined it. Are you forgetting that it was you who claimed "how God was defined has NOTHING to do with whether or not it is possible for God to exist?" You were wrong.

But you cannot (or as yet) to do the same for the MGB as described in the MOA.

Incorrect. I did that pages ago, which in turn, was a repeat of the same proof presented a year ago in that old thread. And I would point out once again the point that you granted: it's not up to us to disprove it, you have to prove it.

Bruh, the argument from evil is an epic failure.

Save that for another thread. I have repeatedly told you, the point was that we have long denied the possibility of God, despite your postulation that we only changed our stance after you brought the MOA to our attention.

I am not saying that every single atheist in existence would have granted P1...I am saying that MOST of you are intellectually honest enough to admit that the God, as defined in Christian theism; it is possible for such a being to exist.

I am not saying all of you, but rather, most of you....of course, this is all my opinion.

There goes that same implication again: those of us who deny the possibility of God are not intellectually honest enough. Back that up or retract it.

Also note the bait and switch from the God as defined in the MOA, to the one as defined in Christian theism.

Yeah, but a non-existent God whose existence is still possible would not be a God that is defined in the MOA.

Exactly. Hence 40 pages worth of attacks on said definition.

Still conflating concepts of contingency and necessity, are we?

No, just pointing out the obvious: The god that people can actually conceive of, is contingent; where as the one defined in the preamble is necessary. It's not me who is conflating the two, but those who presented the MOA.

I wouldn't pray to a being that I cannot conceive. I am telling you; I can conceive of a MGB.

At best that mere tells us you can convenience of a prayer answering god, not the one that is defined in the MOA. Prove the being you are praying to, is not merely contingent. What would happen if the god you are praying to didn't exist?

At worse that on the same level of some hypothetical crazy guy who sets up a shrine in his basement to worship square circles. That doesn't mean square circles are possible now, does it?

I did just that, above.

Well, tried and failed anyway. Try again?

If you have any problems with that explanation, then I'd like for you to conceive of a one-sided stick, and when you do, draw it for me and post it into the forum.

If you can pull off this stunt, then you will have proven me wrong that a one-sided stick CAN be conceived...but if you can't pull it off, then you've proven my point that if it can't be conceived, it is impossible as a physical entity or a conceptual construct.

That's a red herring. I already know that it is logical impossibilities cannot be conceived. You just need to prove a necessary god is conceivable, with something more than your assertion.

Then you will have to ask yourself the following question; why is it that I can't conceive of a one-sided stick, but I can conceive of a MGB as defined in the MOA.

Simple, because you've mistaken a contingent god with a necessary one. I stated that ages ago.

And to answer the question I will give you a hint; could it be because one of those concepts are possible, and one of those concepts ISN'T possible? Could that be why?

No, because both are impossible.

Looks to me like I already did.

Well, lets just say your standard is rather low. I was expecting something more than your insistence that you can conceive it.

Please explain why the existence of a necessary God is inconceivable...

P2 is false. If the MGB is defined as omnipresent, then there is no possible world at which the MGB cannot exist, whether this is a possible world with sentient beings or not.

That doesn't make P2 false, it just means no beings match the definition. Besides, you are still affirming P2 with the part I bolded, when you acknowledges a possible world without sentient beings.

Also, I would like to point out you previously accepted P2 when you didn't know what "for all X" meant, I just love the sweet irony re: "cool to grant P2 until the implications hit home."

So let me see if I get this straight: First, you define this MGB as necessary, then you proceed to give a possible world at which such a being doesn't exist in..which, by definition, would make the being's existence NOT necessary.

So you've changed the beings existence from necessary, to contingent, and then concluded in P3 that the being isn't necessary?

Not sure what "change" you are seeing, the definition of MGB is consistent through out. The point is, a being defined as necessary leads to a logical contradiction. i.e. impossible, inconceivable.

Wow. And then you claim victory?

You say that like I haven't already won back on page 3. Of course I claim victory.

No, but then again, me and you are both similarly here. Artie and God are not similarly here..one began to exist, and one has existed forever...one exists contingently, and the other exists necessarily. That is a big difference, and it is something that I keep trying to separate, yet it is all too easy for many of you to conflate.

Pointing out difference doesn't make the similarities disappear - my analogy refers only to their similarity - both are defined as necessary.

Ok, then simply answer this this;

P3 is: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

How true can P3 be, if P1 is false? Just tell me that, please.

It can be 100% true.

i.e. The same way "if a chair is human, then the chair is mortal" is 100% true, even when we all know chairs are not human. I already give you an example, did that not make sense to you? Do you know what "conditional" mean in logic? Would it be fair to say you have no formal training in logic and all you know about the MOA came from apologetics?

From my understanding, it doesn't.

Well, I aim to fix that.

*But on the possibility of God existing as a necessary being.

No, it doesn't. P3 depends SOLELY on the definition presented in your preamble.

One can define something anyway that he wants, whether or not the definition reflects reality...that is the question...and whether or not it is POSSIBLE for the definition to reflect reality, that is also the question.

Right, which is why I kept telling you: You cannot define God into existence.

I haven't see anything from you regarding the mere definition of the MGB. Nothing. Again, the definition of God is also in the OP...and you've never challenged the definition. Why now? Need new ground to fight on?

My challenge was literally the first thing I posted in this thread. What do you think "you cannot define God into existence" is, if not a challenge on the definition?

LOL. If I prove that I can conceive of a MGB, will you admit that a MGB's existence is possible?

That's trivial, what is conceivable is possible, the two terms are synonymous. However, proving you can conceive such a thing would be quite a different matter.

"I am guessing there is a typo there".

Quite right.

That's a big "if".

Not so big when all you have is back P3 is a definition you provided.

[Furrowed Brow]

If it is possible that a maximally great nation exists, then a maximally great nation exists at some moment in history.

The philosophers will redirect you to what they understand by "world".

A moment in time is a possible world.

In your premise here "nation" is not an entity and this introduces other logical problems to muddy your statement.

I don't think it introduces any new mud, only stirs up what is there already. A nation is an organisation of real things, with real technologies etcetera. Instead of a maximal being the argument invokes a maximal civilisation and one that wants to be in control of everything.

But one could use your parody of the argument

It is not a parody. The logic is the same as the OP, the difficulty in defining terms and defining an idea into existence is the same problem. If For_The-Kingdom's confidence in the MOA is well placed we should also expect to be citizens of the universal empire. The difference between the Moa and the this example is that we really should expect to see some real evidence of the invasion.

I don't believe we can deduce the existence of God by using semantics ...

Quite right. Of course you can't. But the the objective is to try and get the author of the OP to understand why that is so.