Shadow thread for MOA H2H Debate

[rikuoamero]

As the title says, this is a shadow thread for the Head-to-Head debate currently in progress here
viewtopic.php?t=32046

Other than this post, I will NOT interact with this thread. I merely wanted to provide a set space for discussion on the debate for other users.

[wiploc]

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists. (False Premise.)

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. (By definition, the definition of "possible" in modal-speak.)

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. (From S5, or from the definition of maximally great, depending whose version of the argument we're reading. Often, they aren't themselves clear on which way they are supporting 3.)

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world). (Incontestable unless you want to argue that the real world is not possible. That dog won't hunt.)

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists. (Incontestable. A truism.)

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists. (From 4 and 5.)

You can attack 1 or 3, but there's no point in attacking the others. If you let them get unchallenged as far as 4, then you'll have to conclude that gods actually exist.

You can point out that, because of the problem of evil, we know the standard Christian god doesn't exist. Therefore, 6 is false, so therefore 1 or 3 must be false. But that's going the long way around, plus it invites them to point out that they never really gave a coherent definition of the MGB, so their argument isn't undermined by some other god's nonexistence. (How likely is it that Plantinga and William Lane Craig believe in the standard Christian god anyway?)

So, since 1 is false (and/or an equivocation on the word "possible") and three is muddy, those are the places to attack.

[Divine Insight]

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists. (False Premise.)

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. (By definition, the definition of "possible" in modal-speak.)

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. (From S5, or from the definition of maximally great, depending whose version of the argument we're reading. Often, they aren't themselves clear on which way they are supporting 3.)

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world). (Incontestable unless you want to argue that the real world is not possible. That dog won't hunt.)

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists. (Incontestable. A truism.)

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists. (From 4 and 5.)

You can attack 1 or 3, but there's no point in attacking the others. If you let them get unchallenged as far as 4, then you'll have to conclude that gods actually exist.

You can point out that, because of the problem of evil, we know the standard Christian god doesn't exist. Therefore, 6 is false, so therefore 1 or 3 must be false. But that's going the long way around, plus it invites them to point out that they never really gave a coherent definition of the MGB, so their argument isn't undermined by some other god's nonexistence. (How likely is it that Plantinga and William Lane Craig believe in the standard Christian god anyway?)

So, since 1 is false (and/or an equivocation on the word "possible") and three is muddy, those are the places to attack.

But you can't just proclaim #1 to be false without good reason.

#4 actually proves that #1 is false.

And #6 is non sequitur no matter what. There is simply no justification for the conclusion being made in #6 .

Even if you got down as far as #5 without a problem the BEST you could do is say that you haven't yet come up with a reason to rule out this proposed MGB. But you certainly couldn't conclude that it must then exist.

You say:

If you let them get unchallenged as far as 4, then you'll have to conclude that gods actually exist.

That's totally false.

#4 is actually proof that their original proposed MGB cannot exist as defined.

And even if you could find a way past #4 you could never justify #6. At best all you could do is end with #5 stating that IF this MGB exists then it exists. But that hardly proves that it exists.

In fact, you can't even rebuke the argument prior to step #4. So you really don't have any choice but to let them get to step #4.

You can't just proclaim that their premise of the MGB is false without giving sound reasons for why you believe it to be false.

You can say that you don't accept it. But that's not the same as proving it to be false.

[wiploc]

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists. (False Premise.)

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. (By definition, the definition of "possible" in modal-speak.)

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. (From S5, or from the definition of maximally great, depending whose version of the argument we're reading. Often, they aren't themselves clear on which way they are supporting 3.)

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world). (Incontestable unless you want to argue that the real world is not possible. That dog won't hunt.)

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists. (Incontestable. A truism.)

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists. (From 4 and 5.)

You can attack 1 or 3, but there's no point in attacking the others. If you let them get unchallenged as far as 4, then you'll have to conclude that gods actually exist.

You can point out that, because of the problem of evil, we know the standard Christian god doesn't exist. Therefore, 6 is false, so therefore 1 or 3 must be false. But that's going the long way around, plus it invites them to point out that they never really gave a coherent definition of the MGB, so their argument isn't undermined by some other god's nonexistence. (How likely is it that Plantinga and William Lane Craig believe in the standard Christian god anyway?)

So, since 1 is false (and/or an equivocation on the word "possible") and three is muddy, those are the places to attack.

But you can't just proclaim #1 to be false without good reason.

Yes, that would be as irresponsible as saying that 1 is true without good reason.

#4 actually proves that #1 is false.

How do you figure? Is it your position that the real world is not possible?

And #6 is non sequitur no matter what. There is simply no justification for the conclusion being made in #6 .

If you grant 1 and 3, then the rest follows. If 1 and 3 are true, then 6 is true.

Even if you got down as far as #5 without a problem the BEST you could do is say that you haven't yet come up with a reason to rule out this proposed MGB. But you certainly couldn't conclude that it must then exist.

I'm trying to figure out why you're saying that. I've come up with a theory. Let's have a simple example:

P1: If a then b.
P2: a
C: Therefore, b.

And your objection is that because P1 has an "if" in it, the strongest possible conclusion will be something like, "C: Maybe b."

I can't tell. I hate putting words in people's mouths, because often I am wrong. But sometimes it is useful because it gives the person a chance to correct my misunderstanding.

So please tell me if I have this right: You are thinking that because 5 has an "if" in it, thusly ...

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

... then the strongest claim that 6 can make is that maybe a MGB exists.

Does that sound right?

If so, then what if it were proven that a maximally great being exists in the actual world?

P1: If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then X.
P2: A maximally great being exists in the actual world.
C: Therefore, X

Does that work? Do we get to conclude X rather than just maybe X?

You say:

If you let them get unchallenged as far as 4, then you'll have to conclude that gods actually exist.

That's totally false.

#4 is actually proof that their original proposed MGB cannot exist as defined.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

There's nothing wrong with 4. How could 4 prove that 1 is false without being itself true?

And even if you could find a way past #4 you could never justify #6. At best all you could do is end with #5 stating that IF this MGB exists then it exists. But that hardly proves that it exists.

In fact, you can't even rebuke the argument prior to step #4. So you really don't have any choice but to let them get to step #4.

1, 3, and the meaning of "possible world" are incompatible. They never get to 4.

The whole trick is to put 1 before 3. If they put 3 first, nobody would accede to 1.

You can't just proclaim that their premise of the MGB is false without giving sound reasons for why you believe it to be false.

True that.

You can say that you don't accept it. But that's not the same as proving it to be false.

I was kinda hoping for a debate. I challenged somebody above, but got no response. Maybe FtK will debate me after the current debate.

You wouldn't want me to do spoilers, would you?

[wiploc]

Consider the following argument:

Definition of our omnipresent Jolly Green Giant

Omnipresent: Presence is manifested, whether physically or spiritually, everywhere, at any given time


We can assume that the above entity can exist at least in our imagination (i.e. in the world of pure unrestrained thought)

So now let's start our Jolly Green Giant argument:

1. It is possible that an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant exists

2. If it is possible that an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant exists, then an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant exists in some possible world.

3. If an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant exists in the actual world, then an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant exists.

6. Therefore, an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant exists.

~~~~~~

Is the above a valid logical argument?

It's not a sound argument.

Validity depends on whether 3 is supposed to be a premise. If it's a premise then the argument is valid.

If so, the an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant must necessarily exist.

If it were valid and had true premises, then the OJGG would exist.

But it's not a valid argument. We could complain about #4 in this case stating that no one has ever seen this Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant.

That's not a complaint about 4.

But we could argue that it's not only green, but it's also invisible. Although that's actually a logical contradiction anyway.

But let's assume that we couldn't argue against #4 for some reason,

Whew!

would then the rest of the argument be valid?

If 3 is a premise, yes.

Well, no, it wouldn't. Because even though #5 would be true IF an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant exists, that doesn't mean that an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant necessarily does exist in our universe.

So conclusion #6 is still non sequitur and unjustified.

Nuh uh.

This argument doesn't prove that an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant exists, it merely follows that the "logic" that if it did exist then it would need to exist in all possible worlds including ours.

If the OJGG does not exist in the real world, then 1 and 3 are not both true.

But that doesn't justify conclusion #6 that concludes that an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant must then exist.

This argument fails to establish the existence of an Omnipresent Jolly Green Giant.

It will if you grant 1 and 3.

And that's even letting the objections to #4 SLIDE!

I still can't imagine what those objections are supposed to be.

We could even make it a Jolly Invisible Giant to explain why we can't use #4 to rule it out, and we STILL wouldn't have any justification for concluding #6.

Still not with you.

This is just bad logic period. We'd still have to stop and #5 and say, yes IF it exist then it exist. But that's hardly proof that it exists.

P1: If a then b.
P2: If b then c.
P3: If c then d.
P4: If d then e.
P5: a.
C: Therefore, e.

The argument is valid. If you grant the premises, you must grant the conclusion.

[Divine Insight]

P1: If a then b.
P2: If b then c.
P3: If c then d.
P4: If d then e.
P5: a.
C: Therefore, e.

The argument is valid. If you grant the premises, you must grant the conclusion.

But you are treating EVERY SINGLE LINE of the argument as a premise!

That, my friend is utterly absurd.

Of course you would be correct if every single line of your argument had to be accepted as a premise. But that's not what the MOA is doing. And if it did do that then it would be an utterly meaningless joke anyway.

The only premises given in the MOA are the definition of the MGB.

P1. Omniscient: All knowing, knowing the truth value of all propositions.
P2. Omnipotent: Can do anything that is logically possible.
P3. Omnipresent: Presence is manifested, whether physically or spiritually, everywhere, at any given time
P4. Omnibenevolent: The ultimate source of goodness, morally perfect.

That's it. That's the end of the premises.

Now you START your logical reasoning. What follows are NOT premises. They are simply logical reasoning that has already accepted that the premises are TRUE for the sake of this argument.

(see the proof by contradiction for the square root of 2) In that argument you assume that it is TRUE that there exists a rational number that is the square root of 2. Then as you continue to reason your way through the argument you eventually discover that your assumption that the premise was true cannot be so, thus it must have been false.

Now getting back to the MOA:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

Unless you can SHOW that the four previous premises that were used to define the MGB are self-contradictory then you have no choice but to accept that argument #1 is valid.

(note: If you believe that you can argue that the previous four premises that were used to define the MGB are self-contradictory then you have valid reasons to reject argument #1. Otherwise, you have no choice but to agree that the MGB is at least possible in the sense that it does not constitute a logical contradiction in and of itself.

So your stuck with accepting argument #1 that the MGB is at least "possible" in theory.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

Actually #2 is already flawed. It's not true that just because it's possible that the MGB exists then it necessarily exists in some possible world. So #2 is already wrong anyway.

Just because something is possible doesn't mean that it necessarily has to exist. So #2 is already flawed. But this is not a "premise" this is just an argument. And it's a very flawed argument to boot.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

Well, this would necessarily be true because the MGB was defined in the premises to be omniscient. Therefore if it exists in any possible world it would need to exist in every possible world in order to be consistent with it's definition (i.e. P3)

So thus far you need to accept argument #1, reject argument #2, and accept argument #3.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

Yes, this argument would need to be TRUE if the MGB exists!

But is it true?

Remember this is NOT a premise! This is an argument! So you can evaluate this argument and see if you have any reasons to reject it. I look around and recognize that we live in a world that is not omnibenevolent thus our world violates P4!

Therefore the MGB cannot exist precisely because our world exists and is not omnibenevolent.

So we're done right here. We have shown that the MGB cannot exist as it has been defined in premises P1 through P4.

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

This would certainly be true! But we have already shown that the MGB cannot exist in our world. So #5 is a moot argument.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

And finally #6 is a totally unwarranted conclusion that has never had any merit in any case. It also is not a premise. To the contrary it's supposed to be a concluding argument. But there is absolutely no justification for it.

~~~~~

You are looking at every step of the argument as though its a premise. That's utterly absurd. It wouldn't even be an argument then, all it would be is a list of unproven premises. That would be utterly meaningless.


~~~~~~~

By the way, go back and watch the video I posted on the proof by contradiction of the irrationality of the square root of 2. They ACCEPTED a lot of false things along the way before they were finally able to PROVE that they were ALL necessarily false, clear back to the initial assumption that the square root of two was rational.

But just because those steps were false doesn't mean that you didn't need to accept them along the way. You couldn't "prove" they were false until the end of the argument.

In the MOA argument step #4 of the argument is the ultimate proof that the MGB cannot exist as defined by premises P1 through P4.

And then YES, at that point you can go back and say, hey even step #1 has to be false too! It's not even possible for the MGB to exist at all because our world already exists.

So argument #1 was false after all. But you couldn't tell until you got to argument #4.

[benchwarmer]

P1: If a then b.
P2: a
C: Therefore, b.

Yes, but this argument defines in the first premise that 'b' is contingent on 'if a'. Therefore, your P2 and C are simply restating P1. If there is no evidence for P2, then you have simply defined 'a' into existence and thus defined 'b' into existence as well.

The argument is logically sound, but doesn't prove anything.

Maybe that's what you are trying to say, but the MOA advocates don't seem to care that they are defining something into existence and then proclaiming that the something therefore exists in the real world. It shows great imagination, but no basis in reality.

[wiploc]

P1: If a then b.
P2: a
C: Therefore, b.

Yes, but this argument defines in the first premise that 'b' is contingent on 'if a'.

If you wanted b contingent on a, then you'd say, "If not a then not b."

Therefore, your P2 and C are simply restating P1.

P1: All men are mortal.
P2: Socrates is a man.
C: Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

And your point is that since the conclusion of a valid syllogism follows logically from the premises, it is "simply restating" the premises? To the extent that that is true, it is true of every valid argument.

If there is no evidence for P2, then you have simply defined 'a' into existence and thus defined 'b' into existence as well.

I posited P1 and P2. I showed that if P1 and P2, then C. That's how syllogisms work.

It is inappropriate to claim that I "defined something into existence." If that claim applied here, then it would apply to every syllogism. Did I define Socrates into existence?

The modal ontological argument does indeed try to define god into existence. That's a real problem. We shouldn't throw that terminology around as if all other arguments had the same problem.

The argument is logically sound, but doesn't prove anything.

When an argument is logically sound is exactly when it does prove something.

And my argument ...

P1: If a then b.
P2: a
C: Therefore, b.

... is valid, not sound. We have no idea whether a. We have no idea whether if a then b. We don't even know what a and b stand for. An argument couldn't be more abstract. Soundness doesn't come into it.

[Divine Insight]

P1: If a then b.
P2: a
C: Therefore, b.

Yes, but this argument defines in the first premise that 'b' is contingent on 'if a'. Therefore, your P2 and C are simply restating P1. If there is no evidence for P2, then you have simply defined 'a' into existence and thus defined 'b' into existence as well.

The argument is logically sound, but doesn't prove anything.

Maybe that's what you are trying to say, but the MOA advocates don't seem to care that they are defining something into existence and then proclaiming that the something therefore exists in the real world. It shows great imagination, but no basis in reality.

Not only that but If-Then statements in logic are conditional statement. They aren't automatically true. They are typically written generically as "If P then Q" or "P implies Q" where P is the hypothesis and Q is the conclusion. Notice in the truth table for If P then Q that this statement is not always true:



It's actually false when P is true and Q is false. So it can indeed be a false statement.

Let's look at argument #2 from the MOA.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

In this argument P = it is possible that a maximally great being exists

And Q = a maximally great being exists in some possible world

P being true doesn't automatically make Q true. It's just a conditional statement, it could be either true or false.

The MOA has never established the truth of Q, therefore even if we accept P as being true it doesn't automatically imply that Q must also be true. Yet the MOA argument is attempting to make it look like as if P being true forces Q to also be true.

That is a misuse of a conditional statement.

A conditional statement can be either true or false over all. And the MOA argument never establishes that the conditional statement of step #2 in their argument is true. All they have done is make this conditional statement and assume that its true without demonstrating that it is true.

There is no reason why Q has to be true in this statement. P being true does not force Q to be true.

So this is the first logical flaw in this MOA argument. They have never established the truth of the conditional statement they toss out in step #2. They just toss it out as though it has to be true. And many people fall for this.

In fact, many people don't understand how conditional statements work in logic. Many people think that a statement If P then Q means that if P is true then Q must also be true. But that's NOT how conditional statements work in logic.

Look at the truth table



If P is true and Q is false then the overall statement if indeed false. So P being true does not mean that Q must also be true.

This is a flaw in the MOA as well. If the MOA was created by someone who thinks that statement #2 establishes that the MGB must exist just because its possible that it could exist, then the creator of this argument does not understand how logic works.

[Divine Insight]

When an argument is logically sound is exactly when it does prove something.

And my argument ...

P1: If a then b.
P2: a
C: Therefore, b.

... is valid, not sound. We have no idea whether a. We have no idea whether if a then b. We don't even know what a and b stand for. An argument couldn't be more abstract. Soundness doesn't come into it.

But that's not really a valid argument of any sort.

In P1 you are stating as a PREMISE If a then b. But that's just a conditional statement. You haven't even stated whether it's true or false!

That being the case you can't conclude C after stating in P2 that "a" is true. "a" being true doesn't force b to be true!

All you did in P1 was state If a then b.

That alone does not imply that this statement overall is TRUE. Look at the truth table in my previous post. This statement could be FALSE.

So you haven't even shown that If a then b is TRUE.

You haven't even stated that its true. All you did was write out the CONDITIONAL statement which could be either true or false.

So your conclusion C is unwarranted in your argument actually.

You appear to be ASSUMING the statement "If a then b" is TRUE overall. But you haven't even stated that to be the case. Nor have you SHOWN that to be the case.

So you are not using logic properly at all.

If a then b DOES not mean that if a is true then b MUST be true. That's just outright WRONG.

That's now how conditional statements work. Look at the truth table:



"a" could be true and "b" could be false!

So your argument given in your quote above is invalid. You can't conclude that b must be true also until you show that if a then b is overall true, which you haven't done.

[Divine Insight]

When an argument is logically sound is exactly when it does prove something.

And my argument ...

P1: If a then b.
P2: a
C: Therefore, b.

... is valid, not sound. We have no idea whether a. We have no idea whether if a then b. We don't even know what a and b stand for. An argument couldn't be more abstract. Soundness doesn't come into it.

In fact, you could actually do the following:

P1: If a then b.
P2: a is false
C: Therefore, P1 must be true!

Just look at the truth table, anytime "a" is false "If a then b" is necessarily TRUE.



You CAN say:

P1: If a then b is true
P2: a is true
C: Therefore, b must also be true.

That would be ok. That's just stating line #1 in the truth table.

But your original argument never even stated that "If a then b" is TRUE much less made a case for it.

If you want to state as a premise that "If a then b" is TRUE then you need to justify why you are assuming that to be the case.