Argument from Cosmological Necessity

[Metacrock]

(1) The Universe is contingent upon "prior" conditions (conditions that existed "prior" to our understanding of space/time:



(a) Prior condition being space/time, or gravitational field.

Matter, energy, all physical phenomena stem from 'gravitational field' the prior condition of which is he big bang, the prior condition of which is the singularity, the prior condition of which is...we do not know.


(b)All naturalistic phenomena are empirically derived, thus they are contingent by their very nature.


As Karl Popper said, empirical facts are facts which might not have been. Everything that belongs to space time is a contingent truth because it could have been otherwise, it is dependent upon the existence of something else for its' existence going all the way back to the Big Bang, which is itself contingent upon something.(Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242.)


(2) By definition the "ultimate" origin cannot be contingent, since it would reuqire the explaination of still prior conditions (a string of infinite contingencies with no necessity is logical nonsense;the existence of contingent conditions requires the existence of necessary conditions).

(3) Therefore, the universe must have emerged from some prior condition which always existed, is self sufficient, and not dependent upon anything "higher."


(4) Naturalistic assumptions of determinism, and the arbitrary nature of naturalistic cosmology creates an arbitrary necessity; if the UEO has to produce existents automatically and/or deterministically due to naturalistic forces, the congtingencies function as necessities

(5) Therefore, since arbitrary necessities are impossible by nature of their absurdity, thus we should attribute creation to an act of the will; the eternal existent must be possessed of some ability to create at will; and thus must possess will.

Corollary:


(6) An eternal existent which creates all things and chooses to do so is compatible with the definition of "God" found in any major world religion, and therefore, can be regarded as God. Thus God must exist QED!


Hidden premise:

Premise A: It is not possible for nothing to exist.

Premise B: The opposite of nothing is something (at least one thing).

Conclusion 1: Therefore, at least one thing must exist.

Premise C: If anything exists, then any necessary things/beings exist.

Conclusion 2: Therefore, at least one necessary thing/being exists.

Premise D: A necessary thing/being must exist eternally.

Conclusion 3: Therefore, at least one necessary thing exists eternally.





--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analysis:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


The state of understanding most Christian apologists use for the cosmological argument is very bad. Most of us are still back in the enlightenment, or even earlier. In fact if one reads the Boyle Lectures (that's 1690's) one sees all the issues of a modern apologetics message board, with very little real advance by the Christian apologists.

The problem revolves around the notion of causality. Causality requires linear direction and time. A causes B, it follows that a precedes B in a sequential effect. No Time means no sequential order, thus no cause. Time begins sequentially simultaneously with the Big Bang. So there is no way to speak of "before" the big bang because there can't be a "before time." Since time is the beginning of sequences there can be no scenic before the beginning of sequences; without sequences there is no begging and no "before." So the problem is that it is meaningless to say things like "everything that begins requires a cause." This is meaningless because we can't really speak of "the beginning" of the universe since the begging of the universe is also the beginning of time, and causality requires time. Thus there is no cause before the beginning of causes. Thus the whole idea of a final cause beginning the sequence that eventually leads to sequences is a lame idea. Yet most Christian Apologists use the Kalam argument (made so poplar by William Lane Craig) which begins "everything that begins requires a cause." The statement itself is self contradictory.

Of course the atheists muck things up even worse with their notions of Quantum theory (AKA "QM"). It seems that everything that begins doesn't require a cause. QM particles pop into exist seemingly out of nothing with no prior casual agent that can be decreed and thus, it seems something could come from nothing. Now it gets tricky at this point, because this not really what's happening, but the best that can come out of this observation is a big muddle.

It seems that we really don't find QM particles "popping" out of "nothing." They emerge from something called "vacuum flux." This is just a fancy name for more QM particles, that doesn't' matter, because it really is not actual nothingness. The problem is that physicists speak of VC as "nothing." So while one finds physicist speaking of QM being something from nothing, they know quite well its not. Now the tricky part is, the Christian apologist suspects, but we cannot prove, that there is a cause in there somewhere. But the skeptic can always elude the obvious implication of a cause since we don't have a direct observational proof of the need for a final cause. Our assumptions about final causes are pinned upon logic and not upon empirical observation (and this is of necessity, since we can't observe final cause since we can't observe "before" the begging of sequential ordering in time).

It seems that the skeptic has a built-in fail-safe to create a stalemate without he CA (cosmological argument) because our thinking as Christian apologists is often rooted in the thinking of the Robert Boil and the 1690's. We still think in terms of cause and effect, things begging, things needing causes and beginnings and logic proving this rather than empirical observation; although a large part of this argument is merely psychological, since in all fairness the skeptic can't prove anything either and we know darn well there has to be a cause back there somewhere.

I have developed an approach which I feel resolves this dilemma and lends a positive presumptive appeal to the CA. I feel that my approach changes the burden of proof in the debate because lends the apologist presumption, by meeting the prima facie burden of proof. This approach works in two phases:

(1) Sets up a "comfort zone" for the argument, or in other words, establishes criteria through which the bar is lowered for the standard of proof and the lower standard can be met; lower standard meaning "rational warrant for belief" rather than "proof."

We are not out to prove the existence of God. We are out to prove only that it is rational to construe the universe as the creation of God.

The outcome of a prima facie argument is that the burden of proof is reversed. Now it becomes the other side's burden to show that the PF case has not been made. What is it in my version of the CA that swings this point over from burden of proof to PF case? It's the way I deal with the notion need for causality.

The standard Christian apologetics approach is usually to say "everything we observe needs a cause, so the universe must need a cause." This leaves the skeptics cold and they just keep harping on their QM stuff. My approach is to move away from the need causes. I no longer call my argument "first cause." I use the term "cosmological" but not "first cause" or "final cause." I don't speak of causes and I never claim "everything that begins to exist recks a cause." Most skeptics will be expecting this, usually they are thrown into a state of total confusion when they learn that I don't bother with this.

My approach is to use the scholastic model of necessity and contingency rather than cause and effect. Now one might think this is so old fashioned and pre modern that it would be untenable. But no, it's the basis of model logic. One can easily argue, what with the return to the impotence of the model aspects from Hartshorne and Platinga, and with Godell's OA being based firmly upon necessity/contingency, that category is alive and well. Now skeptics will remain incredulous of course, but the category can be defended easily with Spinoza's chart of modalities. The categories are there in logic and cannot be denied.

Moreover, move on from that point to speak of "prior conditions," rather than causes. The idea of prior conditions is tricky, since we all there is a cause lurking somewhere behind it. But the skeptic is lambasting us for speaking of causes, and with this approach we need not speak of them. That way the obvious need for one is enthemimatic; that is the skeptic will pick it out himself, but he can't really say anything about it we aren't claiming it as part of the argument. If the skeptic brings it up, well it's a straw man argument, even though it's really there in the background.

Prior conditions is a tricky category and I have the following analogy. In QM theory we face the concept of the VC and the particle emerge from it. We know from observation that this slows way down the closer one gets to the singularity, and we know that we have no observations whatsoever from timeless state (how could we)? Three conditions obtain in which Amp's emerge: (1) the emerge amid physical law. Even though they seem to contradict our previous understanding of law, they are not opposed to it and QM theory is the business of showing how we can assume their harmonious existence with physical law; (2) They emerge in time; since we have no counter observation we must assume so; (3) They emerge from VF. Skeptics have howled and said "that must means more particles." But so what? that's still something. It means they aren't coming form real nothingness. As long as something exits prior to the "first" existent, that existent is not first and what prior to it must be accounted for. IF we don't wish to end up in an infinite causal regress, then we have to assume that there is some prior conditions which is the basic condition of all existence.

Analogy:

It's like fish. Fish are not caused by water. You can't say "water = fish." But, fish are always found in or near bodies of water. You dot' find fish living in the sand in the desert. There are fish which are native to the North American desert, but they live in water deep in caverns and have actually lost eyes because they live in total darkness. But again, the one prior condition we have for fish is water. Now someone will say "but there is causal relationship there." Yes, but my argument doesn't require that there be no causal relation, but I don't have to push the causal relation to win the argument; all I have to do is demonstrate that there must be some eternal prior condition that is necessary for all contingent conditions to be; and of course we construe this "eternally prior condition" as God.

Another important aspect of this argument is to get away form time. We must get over the simplistic idea that BB is the moment of creation and "before" that (which there is no "before") is God in eternity. That treats time like a place that one could go, where God is. Time may be running eternally, it has a "reassert" with the Big Bang but it doesn't' have to be a "place" one could go to visit. Thus it may not be that we can think of the timeless void as a realm beyond the natural realm.

In this argument I set up the contingency of the universe as the predication of an ultimate prior condition. Anything naturalistic is automatically contingent (this can be backed up by Carol Popper and many others). Thus the ontological necessity which predicates these contingencies is a priori some from of prior condition which must be understood as eternal and boundless, otherwise the idea of a contingent universe filled with individual contingencies makes no sense.

From there the argument that this eternal prior condition is equivalent to or can be construed as an object of religious devotion is easy. Of course atheists will fight tooth and nail to keep from accepting the notion that the universe is contingent. They will charge that this is the fallacy of composition. Don't let them! The fallacy of composition only works when the parts are different. In other words, if a brick wall is made up of all bricks then it is not a fallacy of composition to say "this is a wall of bricks." Thus, one case say "this is a universe of contingencies, thus, it is a contingent universe." Moreover, Dr. Kooks (Univ. Texas--our fine main branch in our Glorious UT system) uses memeology (a funky kind of math stuff) to argue that wholly contingent parts make for a wholly contingent situation. In other words, a universe made up of all contingent parts is a contingent universe. Establishing this point will be the hardest part of the debate, but the skeptic will be scratching his head and asking "what's mermology?"

From there one directs them to Dr. Koons' Website.

I think this approach offers some unique features that get us way from the 1690s and put Christian apologetics in the 21st century.

[Metacrock]

Well lets compare

"Conclusion 2: Therefore existence is a physical/ontological necessity."

He simply claims that something must exist necessarily

Ok this could be a subtle difference or the two conclusions amount to the same thing. For the moment I'd say that if something exists necessarily, then existence is a neccesity; if that is the implication of "something must exist necessarily" is meant to be anything stronger than a tautological necessity in the way already analysed. So yeah if Metacrock wants to save his argument he has to do some work to show how and why conclusion 2 does not follow.

The actual argument is what is used to show that this necessary thing is God. If your conclusion 2 was in reference to the final conclusion of "God exist QED", then that's not right either, cause your modus ponens does not work when applied to the actual argument, as I'm sure you're aware of.

Well yep. I'm going to agree that. But why did I go to all that effort of criticizing what metacrok calls his hidden or minor argument? Well if it is a hidden argument then I would say the implication that though hidden it is still mean to support the major argument. If it does not support the major argument then what is it doing there? It is a diversion and a confusion introduced by Metacrock.

The objective for me was to formally separate the hidden argument from the major argument. So if you are saying you cannot get from conclusion 2 to "God exists QED" then that would be my point. If you are saying that the hidden argument is a different argument then I think Metacrock needs to retract it and argue for it somewhere else. And that is also my point. If you are saying conclusion 2 has mis-analysed the hidden argument, then that might be the case, but only I think if it is a separate argument with no ontological/existential commitment.

FB

What I'm stating is that it's bad form to not include your premises. Which is why they are labeled "hidden." So yes they are apart of the argument, but only b/c they have to be. He's not trying to prove God via his hidden premises, he's just inlcuded them b/c of etiquette. Example:

1. All presidents are at least 35 years old.
2. G. W. is the president.
3. G. W. is at least 35 years old.

Hidden premise:

1. The age of 35 applies to US presidency laws.

There is no need to seperate the hidden argument from the actual, b/c it's already done for you.

As I stated before, the point of his argument is to show that 'necessity' is God and not abstract ideas. He could remove his hidden premises and it still would not affect his argument at all.

His hidden premise then is not arguing for only ontological necessity, but ontological necessity as an option along with abstracts.

I have removed it. I could go through the log history of how it came to be that I had a thing there saying "hidden premise" it had to od with a discussion another board along time agao and an apologist friend who taught loigc at a community college who tried to re-write the argument to avoid certain things that atheists were hitting on. But I just think those guys would try to muddle any argument and you can't have an argument that is structured not to be muddled by them.

[Furrowed Brow]

Hi Metacrock

Remeber? you didn't deal with the proper use of nothingness as a putative state of affairs.

Ok Metacrock. Putative def = generally considered or reputed to be: supposed.

Who is doing the considering? And what do they consider nothing to be as a supposed state of affairs. Please elaborate. I can't address your point until I understand it.

FB

[Furrowed Brow]

Hi syhtchi

As I stated before, the point of his argument is to show that 'necessity' is God and not abstract ideas. He could remove his hidden premises and it still would not affect his argument at all.

His hidden premise then is not arguing for only ontological necessity, but ontological necessity as an option along with abstracts.

OK. Abstracts are not bothering me at present, but ontological necessity is. I take your point about the Hidden argument not being necessary to the main argument. However I have a quibble that I shall draw out later when we get on to the main argument. (If that is your willing to stick around).

anyway. Lets look at conclusion 2 and 3.

Conclusion 2: Therefore, at least one necessary thing/being exists.

Conclusion 3: Therefore, at least one necessary thing exists eternally.

I think by the time conclusion 3 arrives the existential commitment at 2 is turned into an ontological commitment. Or at least on the surface that is what the argument appears to be doing.

The analysis already given shows that conclusion 2 is a tautology of the kind "things necessarily have the attribute of existence" just as it is not possible for nothing to have the attribute of existence. When read that way then no problem. This is how that argument looks.

Premise A: It is not possible for nothing to have existence.

Premise B: The opposite of nothing not having existence is something having existence

Conclusion 1: Therefore, at least one thing must have existence, if it exists.

Before Metacrock cries foul and says that is not his argument. Well, At least as far as conclusion 1 it is the argument in this form that is the the form that lies behind the arguments general validity, until further proof of Premise A in the form "nothing is not possible" or better "non existence is not possible" is demonstrated.

The whole thrust of this criticisms perhaps mirrors the philosophical problems with modal logic which have meant it is only regarded as adding new tools to standard logic, but is not an improvement upon standard logic. If Plantinga had original been able to prove the existence of God with standard logic, that would have counted as a universal proof no logician can deny. He didn't. He used modal logic. So the proof can be denied and debated, and generally regarded by non modal logicans as a bit crook.

Premise C: If anything has existence if it exists, then any necessary things/beings have existence if they exist.

Conclusion 2: Therefore, at least one necessary thing/being has existence, if it exists..

Premise D: A necessary thing/being must exist eternally, if it exists..

Conclusion 3: Therefore, at least one necessary thing exists eternally, if it exists..

Bingo!. Valid argument in its explicit form without existential or ontological commitment.

Metacrock might wish to argue I have not got to grips with putative nothing. And we can thrash that out. But that is exactly the part of the argument that needs to be demonstrated to put the whole argument back on track to being a sound existential/ontological claim. And so far I've seen no proof, only an assumption turned into a premise. So, at present the Hidden argument does not say anymore than how I have rewritten it without being invalid. I'm gonna suggest it is not a failing in my understanding of nothing as a putative state is at fault, but that concept has not been clearly drawn, and that "it is not possible that nothing as a putative state exists" is not proved.

[Metacrock]

Hi Metacrock

Remeber? you didn't deal with the proper use of nothingness as a putative state of affairs.

Ok Metacrock. Putative def = generally considered or reputed to be: supposed.

Who is doing the considering? And what do they consider nothing to be as a supposed state of affairs. Please elaborate. I can't address your point until I understand it.

FB

where did you get your definition? The definition I am using, thus the way the term is used in my argument, is for the begining, the state in which the universe originates. This is the context of the word in terms of this argument.

Thus we are not concerned with nothingness per se, but with nothingness as the original state of affairs out of which the rest of relaity evovles.

the conclusion is that nothingness cannot be such a starting point for the universe.

[Metacrock]

Hi syhtchi

As I stated before, the point of his argument is to show that 'necessity' is God and not abstract ideas. He could remove his hidden premises and it still would not affect his argument at all.

His hidden premise then is not arguing for only ontological necessity, but ontological necessity as an option along with abstracts.

OK. Abstracts are not bothering me at present, but ontological necessity is. I take your point about the Hidden argument not being necessary to the main argument. However I have a quibble that I shall draw out later when we get on to the main argument. (If that is your willing to stick around).

anyway. Lets look at conclusion 2 and 3.

Conclusion 2: Therefore, at least one necessary thing/being exists.

Conclusion 3: Therefore, at least one necessary thing exists eternally.

I think by the time conclusion 3 arrives the existential commitment at 2 is turned into an ontological commitment. Or at least on the surface that is what the argument appears to be doing.

The analysis already given shows that conclusion 2 is a tautology of the kind "things necessarily have the attribute of existence" just as it is not possible for nothing to have the attribute of existence. When read that way then no problem. This is how that argument looks.

Premise A: It is not possible for nothing to have existence.

Premise B: The opposite of nothing not having existence is something having existence

Conclusion 1: Therefore, at least one thing must have existence, if it exists.

Before Metacrock cries foul and says that is not his argument. Well, At least as far as conclusion 1 it is the argument in this form that is the the form that lies behind the arguments general validity, until further proof of Premise A in the form "nothing is not possible" or better "non existence is not possible" is demonstrated.

The whole thrust of this criticisms perhaps mirrors the philosophical problems with modal logic which have meant it is only regarded as adding new tools to standard logic, but is not an improvement upon standard logic. If Plantinga had original been able to prove the existence of God with standard logic, that would have counted as a universal proof no logician can deny. He didn't. He used modal logic. So the proof can be denied and debated, and generally regarded by non modal logicans as a bit crook.

Premise C: If anything has existence if it exists, then any necessary things/beings have existence if they exist.

Conclusion 2: Therefore, at least one necessary thing/being has existence, if it exists..

Premise D: A necessary thing/being must exist eternally, if it exists..

Conclusion 3: Therefore, at least one necessary thing exists eternally, if it exists..

Bingo!. Valid argument in its explicit form without existential or ontological commitment.

Metacrock might wish to argue I have not got to grips with putative nothing. And we can thrash that out. But that is exactly the part of the argument that needs to be demonstrated to put the whole argument back on track to being a sound existential/ontological claim. And so far I've seen no proof, only an assumption turned into a premise. So, at present the Hidden argument does not say anymore than how I have rewritten it without being invalid. I'm gonna suggest it is not a failing in my understanding of nothing as a putative state is at fault, but that concept has not been clearly drawn, and that "it is not possible that nothing as a putative state exists" is not proved.

stop this now! you are not dealing with my argument at all. you are dealing with a footnote, a side issue, you have distracted us form the argument long enough.

[Metacrock]

If Plantinga had original been able to prove the existence of God with standard logic, that would have counted as a universal proof no logician can deny. He didn't. He used modal logic. So the proof can be denied and debated, and generally regarded by non modal logicans as a bit crook.

that is a totally absurd thing to say. First, you are assuming that propositional logic outranks modal logic and that somehow if an argument is modal it's not as good, other logicians do not assume this.

Secondly, it was Hartshorne who developed the modal logic that Plantinga uses, and he has been accepted as great, and was called the greatest living metaphysicisan before his death (2002) and he is seen as making making major contributions to logic.

[Furrowed Brow]

Hi Metacrock

Remeber? you didn't deal with the proper use of nothingness as a putative state of affairs.

Ok Metacrock. Putative def = generally considered or reputed to be: supposed.

Who is doing the considering? And what do they consider nothing to be as a supposed state of affairs. Please elaborate. I can't address your point until I understand it.

FB

Wdid you get your definition? The definition I am using, thus the way the term is used in my argument, is for the begining, the state in which the universe originates. This is the context of the word in terms of this argument.

Thus we are not concerned with nothingness per se, but with nothingness as the original state of affairs out of which the rest of relaity evovles.

the conclusion is that nothingness cannot be such a starting point for the universe.

The definition came from Reader's Digest Word Power Dictionary, which is a 1000 page door stop. So take up the definition with readers digest.

Here is another definition from an online dictionary Putative def = Commonly thought or deemed; supposed; reputed.

http://dictionary.reference.com/wordoft ... 05/02.html

OK. You elaboration has helped. So your premise A should really have said

Premise A: the nothing supposed to be the original state of affairs out of which the rest of reality evolves is not possible.

That premise requires an argument in itself. And I take it your reason for saying it is impossible is because an infinite regress is nonsense. Well I'll come back on that point when I post a criticism of your main argument.

However in the meantime you might want to check out http://debatingchristianity.com/forum/v ... php?t=4090

I've already started a thread about nothing. You might like to contribute. You'll find I'm coming from a whole different direction.

stopthis now! you are not dealing with my argument at all. you are dealing with a footnote, a side issue, you have distracted us form the argument long enough.

Sorry Metacrock. Stop telling me what I can and cannot argue about. If you don't want to explore and defend your own argument that appears in the opening post of this thread - Then fine. I'll chat to syhtchi, or anyone else. Anyway the argument is now turning towards this issue of putative nothing. Which as I'll get on to when I criticize your main argument is a concept you need to save if both your hidden argument and your main argument are to work.

If Plantinga had original been able to prove the existence of God with standard logic, that would have counted as a universal proof no logician can deny. He didn't. He used modal logic. So the proof can be denied and debated, and generally regarded by non modal logicans as a bit crook.

That is a totally absurd thing to say. First, you are assuming that propositional logic outranks modal logic and that somehow if an argument is modal it's not as good, other logicians do not assume this.

Secondly, it was Hartshorne who developed the modal logic that Plantinga uses, and he has been accepted as great, and was called the greatest living metaphysician before his death (2002) and he is seen as making making major contributions to logic.

Sorry Metacrock. propositional logic as far as generally accepted validity goes does outrank modal logic. No question. Fact. You need to go back over your history of logic. Modal logic is and has only ever been accepted as an addition to and not an improvement upon standard logic. It is also the favorite logic of theists and god provers. The ontological commitment derived by way of modal logic are keenly debated and criticized.


But even before God proofs arrived modal logic was not accepted as an improvement because it adds logical relationships that are not accepted as generally valid, as the rules of standard logic are accepted. Only proofs in standard logic are accepted as general proofs. A modal logician has to accept the arguments of standard logic, but standard logic does not have to accept the ontological commitment of modal logic. A proof in modal logic is just a proof in modal logic, self consistent within its own set of axioms and rules, but lacking the same general validity. As for Harthorne, well when you want to talk about logic then Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, then Tarski, Godel are the big guys. Harthorne by comparison is a minnow. He may have been very good at logic, but if he was doing modal logic then his results are not accepted as generally valid as the results of propositional logic are accepted. That is the bottom line. So don't over sell modal logic. It has its place in field of logic, but it is not the pinnacle, nor even on an equal footing. It is more a sideline.

OK. As said I'm getting around to posting a criticism of you main argument. Watch this space

[Furrowed Brow]

Hi Metacrock.

I've now taken a full look at your main argument and here are some thoughts.

1) The Universe is contingent upon "prior" conditions (conditions that existed "prior" to our understanding of space/time:

(a) Prior condition being space/time, or gravitational field.[/

For the moment Im going to accept your phrasing of "prior condition". From what you have written elsewhere I take it you mean ontologically prior. Ill run with that for a while. But is it sensible to talk about conditions that existed prior to our understanding of space/time? The universe could have been a dead universe. With no understanding it but there still be space time. Do you just mean "conditions prior to space time"?

Whichever way you want to ask that last question. Why the assumption at all? Maybe space time has no prior conditions? Please demonstrate they do to prove your point.

You need energy/mass for their to be a gravitational field. So how do you know that space/time is a prioir condition to energy/mass, how do you prove it does not just come with energy/mass? There are subtle questions you are leapfrogging with some coarse assumptions.

Again our best gravity theory - Einsteins - describes how energy/mass curves space time. But the implication of your point is that space time must be ontologically prior to the existence of things. And that is just an assumption.

Worse: the threat of a conceptual fallacy eludes you. If space time cannot subist without things existing then it is not ontologically prior in anyway. You first need to address this point to demonstrate you are steering your argument away from an ontological fallacy, and then you need to prove that space time can subsist without the existence of things.

(b)All naturalistic phenomena are empirically derived, thus they are contingent by their very nature.

All? How about the magnetic moment of an electron, the mass of an electron relative to the proton (1/1836.1526...), the strength of electric charge relative to its mass etc.

OK some of these may turn out to be contingencies, some may not. At the moment some are numbers we plugged into our theories, because we dont know how they are arrived at, the magnetic moment of an electron is a paradigm case of where predictive theory meets empirical observation.

Moreover the contingency is derived from our empirical method, not the nature of something in itself. Put another way: conclusions derived from our observations are contingent, we do not know whether everything is itself contingent per se.
Here you are guilty of a subtle leap in your logic that leads you into another fallacy. The nature of how we derive something empirically being a different nature to the nature of something in itself.

As Karl Popper said, empirical facts are facts which might not have been. Everything that belongs to space time is a contingent truth because it could have been otherwise, it is dependent upon the existence of something else for its' existence going all the way back to the Big Bang, which is itself contingent upon something.(Antony Flew, Philosophical Dictionary New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979, 242.)

In big bang theory, if there is no bang then there are no electrons and protons etc. So that makes the bang temporally prior to protons and electrons. So there is a temporal contingency. And for electrons and protons to be generated temperatures how to come down, and I think physicist talk about stuff like symmetry breaking. However the mass, spin, charge of protons and atoms might be and can be argued as existing in a universe of a particular temperature range. As long as certain conditions such as right temperature arise then you get protons and electrons etc. But then you could also argue that those conditions are dependent on the universe being a proton/electron universe. Viz., you cannot have the temperature range without protons and electrons etc. So you get a biconditional relationship where there are conditions necessary for protons and where there being protons are necessary for the conditions. OK so the big bang came first, but for there to be a bang there has to be a change of conditions, and without the emergence of protons there can be no change of conditions, so there could never have been a big bang without the emergence of the building blocks of things. So we could just as easily say protons are are ontologically prioir to the big bang. This ontological fallacy is a very easy fallacy to make, it looks like Popper steers close to it too, viz., mistaking temporal priority with ontological priority. In a nutshell: the methodology of ascribing ontological priority is fatuous.

(2) By definition the "ultimate" origin cannot be contingent, since it would require the explanation of still prior conditions (a string of infinite contingencies with no necessity is logical nonsense;the existence of contingent conditions requires the existence of necessary conditions).

OK there is another jump in the logic going on here. Reading what you have written elsewhere I think you will want to say that an infinite regress is nonsense so there has to be an ultimate origin. Well you cant have an ultimate origin and an infinite regress, that would be a contradiction and nonsense. And is difficult to see how the universe got started with an infinite regress. But the big bang universe as we understand it seems to have a possible beginning, but how do we know that all the temporal conditions that went together to make the state - whatever that was -prior to the big bang do not fall into an infinite regress. OK that idea is difficult to make sense of, but it does not form a contradiction..

Have you not considered that the conditions prior to the big bang will never make sense and will always appear to us to be nonsense. Our best mathematics form singularities because the math falls into infinities, but have you stopped to consider that might not be a weakness in our mathematical theories, but that just the way the universe is. The fact we only see infinities and that make no sense to us does not change the ontology as it is in itself. Maybe to us puny humans the origins of the universe will always appear infinite and thus make no sense.

So your argument relies on dismissing an infinite regress as nonsense, without showing that the regress forms a formal contradiction, unless you assume an ultimate origin. But you only assume an origin because you cant make sense of an infinite regress. But that tactic fails to recognise the difference between ones inability to comprehend an infinite regress, and the regress being nonsense in itself. To prove the latter requires you demonstrate how an infinite regress forms a formal contradiction. And you cant do that without assuming an origin....and around and around in circles this goes.

(2) also relies on the hidden premise A to be true. Which I have been criticising above. If you want to steer an argument away from an infinite regress, then you also have to prove you cannot get something from nothing. I have already introduced another topic that explores that idea. We can argue it out but the point is, if you follow that topic, you cannot prove we cannot get something from nothing from an ontological argument or logical definition.Try here

(3) Therefore, the universe must have emerged from some prior condition which always existed, is self sufficient, and not dependent upon anything "higher."

Well given everything just said (3) is a another jump in the argument, as well as threatening to continue a conceptual confusion. OK I dont like an infinite regress either. But you have not contended or even seem to have contemplated the alternative (Alternative)that the universe might have emerged from an absence of any ontological necessary conditions. The fact you argument makes no room for such counters means (3) takes an invalid step with its insistence on "must have".

(4) Naturalistic assumptions of determinism, and the arbitrary nature of naturalistic cosmology creates an arbitrary necessity; if the UEO has to produce existents automatically and/or deterministically due to naturalistic forces, the congtingencies function as necessities

Whoooaaah!! Say again. I cant criticise this as Im pretty sure it is incoherent, and it is certainty impenetrable. Maybe Id spend the time to unpack this. But given the criticisms against everything that has gone before I dont think that is necessary at present.

(5) Therefore, since arbitrary necessities are impossible by nature of their absurdity, thus we should attribute creation to an act of the will; the eternal existent must be possessed of some ability to create at will; and thus must possess will.

Whatever you think an arbitrary necessity is, and even if it is an absurdity, we come back to the point that because we cannot think something, and we end up blinking before an absurdity, unless you demonstrate a logical contradiction, we have no sound method for rejecting the absurdity other than the limitation of our own inability to grasp the absurdity.

Id say it is a reasonable tactic to avoid absurdities in our arguments, but if our argument inexorably lead us to the door of an absurdity, should we not be asking whether the weakness in our ability to conceptually grasp the full workings of the universe, and not the conclusion?

Even if we follow your route and arrive at an absurdity, how and why do you make the leap to an act of will? This is another non seqituir, heaped upon an argument that does not reflect on the leaps in its logic, conceptual confusion, and fallacious assumptions.

Time to get forensic Metacrock

[Cathar1950]

If Plantinga had original been able to prove the existence of God with standard logic, that would have counted as a universal proof no logician can deny. He didn't. He used modal logic. So the proof can be denied and debated, and generally regarded by non modal logicans as a bit crook.

that is a totally absurd thing to say. First, you are assuming that propositional logic outranks modal logic and that somehow if an argument is modal it's not as good, other logicians do not assume this.

Secondly, it was Hartshorn who developed the modal logic that Plantinga uses, and he has been accepted as great, and was called the greatest living metaphysicisan before his death (2002) and he is seen as making making major contributions to logic.

He died in Oct. 9th 2000. Model logic is an extension of propositional logic. It is also limited.
There are also critisms and problems with both Hartshorne's and Plantinga's arguments that you seem to ignore. Personally, Hartshorne like Whitehead is one of my favorites.
His ontological argument is not as good as some of his other insights. In my opinion His ideas of sympathy and natural theology are much more interesting.
I also share his views on the Ebonite views.

With the cosmological arguments comes all the objections to the arguments.

I have answered everyone of them. the resistence is meidocre at best. I've been challenged by better atheist respones than any I've gotten here and made those who advanced them admit defeat.

No you have not answered every one of him or her or every living philosopher would have acclaimed you. Largely the reason is they cannot be answered. The objections are many and varied. I will include some later.

http://apologetics.johndepoe.com/cosmo.html

Since it is possible that nothing could exist, we can ask why something, rather than nothing, does exist.

How is it possible for nothing to exist? What is existence that it would have no attributes and not "be" to call it existence and nothing?
It sounds nuts to me. Maybe it is not possible for nothing or I should say it is not possible for there to be nothing. "Not to be" does not exist and we have no experience or knowledge of anything other. Even if we look at time we are not better off. What was I before I was born? Was it nothing? The concept would not make any sense if I did not exist at some point. What about what when I am gone? Unless I am here I cannot be gone in the future. Nothingness is not a meaningful concept.
Nothing seems to be relevant only to what exists and we could know no other.

I will have to get back later because it is tieme for lunch and I am lost in your threads do to you repeating arguments.

[Cathar1950]

o so clever. you are clutching at straws because you know you have recieved a terrible humiliating thrashing. so let's summarize the argument agin.

I dont feel thrashed or beaten. I hardly feel humiliated. You do have a very funny imagination.

n a nut shell:

Priceless.

(1) Naturalistic phenomena is by defition contingent. Naturalism means cause and effect, therefore, a naturlistic phenomenon has to be an effect of a cause and it has to be in turn a cause of another effect. that means anything naturlaistic is a prori contigent

Your unoriginal argument is called the "first cause" argument. Your above definition is just being wordy and confusing.

first cause
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_cause
The cosmological argument is an argument for the existence of God, traditionally known as an "argument from universal causation," an "argument from first cause," and also as the "uncaused cause" argument. Whichever term is used, there are three basic variants of this argument, each with subtle but important distinctions: the argument from causation in esse, the argument from causation in fieri, and the argument from contingency. The cosmological argument does not attempt to prove anything about the first cause or about God, except to argue that such a cause must exist. This cause is known in latin as "causa sui".

(2) A contingency cannot be the ultimate origin.this is true we know by a priori means becasue if it is contingent then it must be dependent upon something else,thus it cannot be ultiamte

Contingency also means that it exists. It may also mean dependent. You also fail to show any reason for anything being ultimate or eternal. But I will return to that later.

(3) that means that there must be an eternally necessary cause behind all the naturlistic contingencies.

No it doesnt. By your definition "naturalistic contingencies" would be redundant.
You write like a first year philosophy student that doesnt understand the terminology yet. It is sophomoric and insulting.

(5) since this eternally necessary cause cannot be contingent it can't be naturalistic.

is that like redundant redundancy? There are many good arguments that the first cause may not necessarily be eternal, God or supernatural.

(6) if it can't be naturalistic then it must be supernaturlistic.

That does not follow. It is an unsupported statement not an argument.

(7) this is synonimous with the defition of God:

Etenral
Necessary
first cause

See the redundancy again? You are saying the first cause is God the first cause. Leave out God and you are saying the first cause is the first cause. I just wonder why you bother using "first cause" because you only want to prove God anyway and it seems you will say anything.

This may be synonymous with some definitions of God but that would be by definition and not by experience, proof or argument. You may want to move on to the ontological argument. Hartshorne would say it is only necessary to show God to be possible. Many forcefully argue that a "first cause" does not need any of those attributes. By excluding naturalistic explanations you have demanded some dualistic explanation, you are now asking for an exception, not proving there is an exception. Do you see the difference? Your argument has idea of contingency and cause demands you explain because of the lack of explanation you present. You do not show a need for a first cause as much as a need to explain contingency, causality and existence. You want us to believe in God to make up for your shortcomings. That is not an argument; it is a cry for help.