Aristotle's Unmoved Mover

[liamconnor]

Never mind religion, let alone Abrahamic religions. Aristotle knew nothing of Christianity or Islam and probably knew nothing of Judaism. He also did not believe in an transcendent being which deserved or required worship.

Yet he did believe in a transcendent being, on strictly logical grounds. The argument runs:

1) Characteristic of reality is change: nothing is permanent: even stones can be moved.

2) Every change has a cause: that is, there is a cause/effect relationship that underlies all changes and therefore all reality which we perceive.

3) An infinite regress of causation is a contradiction; a non-entity, like describing a three sided rectangle. We might talk about such, but conceptually, it is nonsensical, like asking whether a square is as blue as a circle is rectangular.

4) Thus (and this is Aristotle's most sophisticated move) there must be a cause behind this whole cause/effect chain that is itself UnCaused: that is, something to which the "cause/effect" relation does not logically apply; something that lies outside this realm of cause/effect.

Points to remember:

Aristotle is not arguing for a Creator. He thought the world eternal, i.e., no Big Bang, no Genesis.

Aristotle did not think his Unmoved Mover a being interested in mankind. It wasn't.

Aristotle did think this Unmoved Mover was supernatural: thus Aristotle would perhaps have been a modern Deist (with a few differences), but not a Naturalist or materialist.

Aristotle's argument had nothing to do with Time. The relation between Causation and Effect is not (for him) temporal, though causes and effects do happen in time. But that was irrelevant to him: hence, he had no problem thinking the cosmos was eternal (i.e. had no beginning).

Q for D: is his argument sound?

[liamconnor]

[Replying to post 27 by rikuoamero]

I say no, because soundness requires evidence and purely logical arguments do not deal with evidence.

An argument is valid if, given the premises, the conclusion follows.

An argument is sound if both, all the premises are true, and the conclusion follows.

An argument can be valid but not sound; an argument cannot be sound yet invalid.

If you disagree that this is a sound argument, which premise do you disagree with?

Do you disagree that all empirical reality is contingent? That is, you have found something within nature that is itself 'immune to alteration'?

Do you disagree with Aristotle's position that an infinite regress of change cannot occur?

[Bust Nak]

A cycle has to be started.

Does it? Prove it.

If I have a circle of train cars, nothing will occur.

You presume the circle is static to begin with. This is not the case with circular regression.

[rikuoamero]

[Replying to post 31 by liamconnor]

An argument is valid if, given the premises, the conclusion follows.

An argument is sound if both, all the premises are true, and the conclusion follows.

In order to determine if the premises are true, you need evidence. This is how we give the label 'sound' to certain arguments.

Aristotle's Unmoved Mover does not deal in evidence. He does not give us any facts to deal with. It's purely conceptual, in the mind.
Therefore, your Q for D: is his argument sound?
can only be answered No.

If you disagree that this is a sound argument, which premise do you disagree with?

It's not that I disagree with a premise, it's that no evidence has been presented to support ANY of the premises!

Do you disagree that all empirical reality is contingent? That is, you have found something within nature that is itself 'immune to alteration'?

Do you disagree with Aristotle's position that an infinite regress of change cannot occur?

Not going to answer these. You asked a question for debate, is Aristotle sound, and the answer is no, because at no point are any of the premises actually shown to be true (via evidence).

Now, if you want to ask is his argument valid...I believe someone else has already answered that?

[Mithrae]

[Replying to post 22 by Mithrae]

And as I pointed out, we can conceptualize a third option - an eternal cycle of causation

I find that option to be no more than a rearrangement of an infinite regress.

So? If you assume (on the basis of extremely limited observations) that everything has a prior cause, the natural inference is an infinite regress. If you find a problem with an infinite regress (eventual logical inconsistencies, which are potentially a limitation of our brains rather than of reality itself) you'll have to modify that inference.

A cycle has to be started. Where/when is the start? If I have a circle of train cars, nothing will occur. I need a locomotive: something which is 'self-motivating'.

Where/when is the start of the theist/first cause concept? You might say it has no start, that it's "eternal": But if there is no time, nothing occurs. That would be a static, immutable, unchanging and hence uncausing thing. And I use the term 'thing' in its loosest possible sense

I mentioned a cyclic concept merely as a third possibility, but really I'm starting to think that it's by far the most sensible. Both an infinite regress and a 'first cause' outside of time suffer logical incoherencies. A cyclic model faces conceptual difficulties, but if you're pretending to think about the fundamental nature of reality without conceptual challenges, you're probably deluding yourself. At least in the case of a cyclic model, they are only conceptual difficulties. A cycle is the only way to even pretend to imagine something which is always in motion, always causative, but not actually infinite.




Edit: Though come to think of it, there's a fourth possibility too Imagining something which is not a result of a 'prior' cause, but also not eternal or otherwise 'outside time.' Something spontaneous, random, that just happened to 'be.'

[Willum]

[Replying to post 30 by liamconnor]

A cycle needs to be started?
When did the Earth start cycling around the Sun?
When did an electron start cycling around the proton?

Feel free to ignore these questions and start a new topic, I can't wait to see what dichotomy you use for planetary orbits.

[iosua]

I'm surprised there's been no discussion of the "principle of sufficient reason" which is somewhat related to the unmoved mover but moves into 100% purely logical territory. Basically, for any contingent truth, there needs to be a sufficient reason for its truth. That's ultimately the definition of contingency - if something is not necessarily true (ie you could imagine a situation in which it were not true), then there exists some reason why it is true anyway.

This really creates a problem for the "cyclical" alternative to the unmoved mover. Even if we had an infinite regress of causality, the mere existence of this infinite regress does not provide sufficiency or necessity to its existence. You can easily postulate a situation where the infinite regress simply didn't exist. Thus even an infinite universe with an infinite history of causality is still a contingent universe. Even if we can explain every event by a prior event, infinitely back into the future, we never arrive at a necessary or sufficient reason for why the infinite regress exists in the first place. There could just as easily be no infinite regress and no universe.

[Willum]

[Replying to post 36 by iosua]

A very interesting observation.
Another possibility of infinite regression is that each iteration is diminished, recursing to nothingness.

Just to get mathematical:

1st iteration: 1
2nd iteration: ½ x 1 = ½
3rd iteration: ½ x ½ x 1 = ¼
4th iteration: ½ x ½ x ½ x 1 = ⅛
etc.

an infinite regression that leads to a finite result.

So, intuitively, an open-ended regression must be considered to have equivalent cause, which is a reflection of an immature rationality, such as Aristotle had - not because he wasn't great, but because of something like Xeno's Paradoxes.

It is rather irrational, with modern philosophy, to conclude and infinite regression with yield an infinite result.

Thank you for this inspiration.

[liamconnor]

[Replying to post 34 by Mithrae]

So? If you assume (on the basis of extremely limited observations) that everything has a prior cause,.

First of all, I am simply trying to represent Aristotle.

Second of all, I do not think we have 'extremely limited observations' that every change (a word you left out) has a prior cause.

the natural inference is an infinite regress

This is precisely what Aristotle does not accept--the 'natural' (for him, logical) inference is that this infinite regress is impossible: there must be a 'first cause' which stands in a class of its own.

Where/when is the start of the theist/first cause concept? You might say it has no start, that it's "eternal": But if there is no time, nothing occurs.

First, we are talking about 'change'; time really has nothing to do with it (at least, it does not for Aristotle, or Aquinas).

Second, we are focused on THIS mutable world and attempting to account for IT. Aristotle was not terribly interested in the supernatural entity which his logic required to account for this fluid world. Thus the attempt to jump from this mutable world into the immutable, and drag into that world logical categories from this world, is illegitimate.

It is of course difficult, because we have a difficult time separating the imagination from pure logic; thus we end up with an image of a timeless God 'acting'--that is, changing, and thus not really timeless, in order to create and influence this changing world.

Thus the important point is to realize that as for God, the attributes are negative (what theologians call 'negative theology'). To say that God is 'infinite' tells us nothing about what he is, only what he isn't. It helps us no more (well, I am exaggerating for the purpose of explanation) than saying that a cat does not have a long neck--we may never be able to identify a cat; but if we should ever meet a giraffe, we know it isn't a cat.

So, I take issue with this statement regarding a cyclic chain of cause/effect

Where/when is the start of the theist/first cause concept?

You have just exited the realm in which Aristotle is truly operating, and dragging into the other realm categories that don't imply. To ask when an infinite entity does anything is like asking 'whether a cat is as blue as a square is round'. It is nonsense.

The point is to account for the given universe: according to Aristotle, it cannot account for itself.


Perhaps the better question for the OP should have been: how do we account for a world in which change is the most prominent aspect (pain, pleasure, birth, growth, death, movement, all change) and, according to experience and logic, is contingent upon other changes...without relapsing into an infinite regress of cause/effect.

A cycle is the only way to even pretend to imagine something which is always in motion,

Perhaps imagine, but imagination is not always logical.

Causation/Effect means that the energy of one thing is transferred to another: that is, energy which a thing did not possess, suddenly possesses and passes it on to another. But in a cycle, this would mean that A is both the cause of B's movement, while B is equally the cause of A's movement. Two entities have equal claims to the cause of each other's alterations. This (to me) is preposterous. Am I the cause of my parent's existence just as equally as they are the cause of mine?

(note: the term existence perhaps is misleading: we can say, the 'alterations of matter which resulted in the existence).

[liamconnor]

[Replying to post 33 by rikuoamero]

In order to determine if the premises are true, you need evidence. This is how we give the label 'sound' to certain arguments.

Aristotle's Unmoved Mover does not deal in evidence. He does not give us any facts to deal with. It's purely conceptual, in the mind.
Therefore, your Q for D: is his argument sound?
can only be answered No.

The evidence for premise one: all matter is subject to change: is overwhelming not only in experience as well as logic.

If you disagree, please present evidence of something in your reality which is not subject to change.


As for the premise that an infinite regress is impossible, I will admit that this is not empirically demonstrable: but I will say that you misunderstand logic and evidence.

For instance: Please verify that every concrete instance of 'the shortest distance between two points is a straight line'. This will require you to analyze an infinite number of specimens as 'evidence'. Again, verify every concrete example of the syllogism 'if A = B, and B = C. then A = C'. Again, an infinite number of variables to be filled in.


But, given this

Quote:
Do you disagree that all empirical reality is contingent? That is, you have found something within nature that is itself 'immune to alteration'?

Do you disagree with Aristotle's position that an infinite regress of change cannot occur?

Not going to answer these. You asked a question for debate, is Aristotle sound, and the answer is no, because at no point are any of the premises actually shown to be true (via evidence).

I think my point has been made. What 'evidence' means here has eluded you.

[Mithrae]

[Replying to post 34 by Mithrae]

So? If you assume (on the basis of extremely limited observations) that everything has a prior cause,.

First of all, I am simply trying to represent Aristotle.

Second of all, I do not think we have 'extremely limited observations' that every change (a word you left out) has a prior cause.

Of course we do: Even over the past ten thousand years on the surface of this particular planet - less than a millionth of the duration a tiny fraction of a trillionth of the extent of the currently known universe - our observations are extremely limited. Hell, from all the unsolved murders, unconfirmed miracle reports and so on which still occur to this very day, our reliable observations are pretty limited even within the narrow scope of populated land surface areas of this planet in the year 2017!

We have inferred a little bit about the universe as a whole - ordinary matter and energy constitute almost 5% of the estimated total mass-energy of the universe, after all, so that's pretty darn impressive - but to quantify our actual observations in the scope of all things that have been and occurred we'd need billions upon trillions of zeros after the decimal place.

But sure... every change has a prior cause

Where/when is the start of the theist/first cause concept? You might say it has no start, that it's "eternal": But if there is no time, nothing occurs.

First, we are talking about 'change'; time really has nothing to do with it (at least, it does not for Aristotle, or Aquinas).

Second, we are focused on THIS mutable world and attempting to account for IT. Aristotle was not terribly interested in the supernatural entity which his logic required to account for this fluid world. Thus the attempt to jump from this mutable world into the immutable, and drag into that world logical categories from this world, is illegitimate.

Sure, it's just asserting that there's all these rules we can somehow use to 'know' something about the fundamental nature of reality... and concluding that the fundamental nature of reality is something which violates all those rules. You can see why I began by saying that this argument invokes "the biggest absurdity; that is, asserting something supposedly so grand and special that it somehow avoids the absurdity by default."

It is of course difficult, because we have a difficult time separating the imagination from pure logic; thus we end up with an image of a timeless God 'acting'--that is, changing, and thus not really timeless, in order to create and influence this changing world.

That's what a Christian view of an active, intervening and especially personal God entails, yes. Aristotle might have conceptualized an ultimate entity like a book or DVD disc if he lived today, providing the supposedly necessary substrate for a 'changing' world while itself unchanging. But that thing could never be called intelligent or loving. That thing is nothing like the Christian view of God.

Causation/Effect means that the energy of one thing is transferred to another: that is, energy which a thing did not possess, suddenly possesses and passes it on to another. But in a cycle, this would mean that A is both the cause of B's movement, while B is equally the cause of A's movement. Two entities have equal claims to the cause of each other's alterations. This (to me) is preposterous. Am I the cause of my parent's existence just as equally as they are the cause of mine?

The scenario of a person going back in time and becoming their own ancestor involves no logical contradictions.

When you think about it, while neither model is a perfect match for all the adjectives applied to Him by theologians over the millennia, the Christian view of a loving personal God would fit a lot better into a cyclic model than the inanimate thing required of an unmoving mover.