What would constitute evidence that God does exist?

[McCulloch]

The problem with that position in logical terms is that they are unable to specify what they mean by evidence which would convince them that GOD exists.

Rather they demand that those who do believe that GOD exists, should show them the evidence as to WHY those who believe so, say so.

And when those who believe so say so, the common response is to say 'that is not evidence' and through that, argue that the theist should become atheist.

What would constitute evidence that God does exist?

[William]

[Replying to post 40 by benchwarmer]

I think you forgot to add "in my humble opinion" or something along those lines. It seems everyone has a different definition. Seems odd for such an important concept that so many are quite convinced about.

While it is clear that there are many different ideas about GOD, I have not seen any which don't fit the criteria which I gave. It is not my opinion but a general understanding related to the concept of GOD, that GOD at least has to be conscious, self aware, intelligent, and creative.

Lots of interesting claims, but rather short on any convincing evidence.

I would say that any convincing evidence you want might well come to the fore when you die. Apart from that, any evidence I have access to, you also have access to. That we interpret the evidence differently is besides the point really. It convinces me but not you. So what?

You're right, no conundrum. The universe has always existed in one form or another of energy. No god required. Problem solved.

It is an interesting theory you have that the universe has always existed, but have not presented evidence to support the claim re the 'other forms' it has taken on.
Understandably enough. What evidence could you have which would show this to being the case?
Even if you are correct about the theory, you cannot say from that, that GOD is not involved in its recreation of form through use of the energy.

If you were correct about the universe being eternal, and I am correct about GOD being eternal, all that it suggests is that neither created the other, but that one (the conscious self aware intelligent creative one) is able to shape the other.

If there's no need to explain a god's existence, there shouldn't be a need to explain the universe's existence either. Why add a layer of complexity?

What is so complex about the possibility of GOD existing? The fact that we know that consciousness exists within this universe allows for me to speculate that it exists throughout the universe and uses the universe as Its plaything.

It isn't some addition complexity which needn't be added. It is giving reason and mindfulness to an otherwise mindless process of the thing. We can see for ourselves that in relation to lifeforms on this planet, there is intelligent design involved, and one does not get intelligent process from mindlessness. nothing complex about that observation.

And you have completely missed the point. Same answer as above. No need for a god if the universe always existed.

See my rebuttal (in green above) to that claim and get back to me.

eta
We have had this conversation before:

On the theory of the universe having always existed and will always exist.

[Mithrae]

So is the criterion of lab testing suggested by Bust Nak, which is not even met by all scientific knowledge, let alone historical, current affairs etc.; does we likewise demand lab testing for the existence of quasars?

For the record, yes, I do demand lab testing for the existence of quasars.

And since that is impossible, do you therefore disbelieve in them? More to the point, do you demand lab testing before you'll believe a claim of Alexander the Great's conquest of Persia, or Kim Jong Un's sabre-rattling?

Intentionally or not, the obvious outcome of these lines of faulty reasoning/special pleading is to define a standard of 'evidence' which only a very few things we believe ever reach and thereby exclude anything which contradicts your existing worldview.

How exactly does that amount to special pleading or faulty reasoning? Does the phrase "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" mean anything to you? Things don't get much more extraordinary than things that contradicts one's worldview.

Because it is a criterion of evidence which one's worldview is not justified by to begin with, whether that's an ontological worldview which contradicts theism (eg. the materialism/physicalism which seems to be widely presupposed) or an epistemic worldview used to selectively exclude theism.

Do you have lab tested evidence supporting the position that all beliefs (or certain selected beliefs) should be lab tested?

Of course not, because it's an epistemic value judgement, which I think is the key point which we're seeing brought out in this thread. Different people can and do propose different standards of 'evidence' they'd like; Benchwarmer and Kenisaw wanted personal verification initially (though they seem to have backed down to something more like a presumption of 'I could get personal verification if I wanted to'), while you want lab-tested evidence. This is therefore obviously a subjective criterion that we're talking about.

Now that's okay - it's unavoidable in fact - but the point I'm trying to get at is that even though there is going to be considerable subjectivity in each of our responses to "What would constitute evidence that God does exist?," we should at least each try to ensure consistency in our chosen criteria. Disbelieving a proposition on the basis of an epistemic approach which itself is unjustifiable by its own merits is wildly illogical.

Likewise with considering a theory 'extraordinary' and thus requiring an exceptionally high standard of evidence, purely because it contradicts one's existing theory which itself hasn't met those standards of evidence. These are forms of presuppositionalism, not evidence-based enquiry.

[Willum]

[Replying to post 42 by Mithrae]

I am sure you will agree that God is the most profound thing in the world, if not the cosmos or universe?

We can find atoms, neutrinos, nay, we can find our own Sun and even Stars in other galaxies.

All far less profound than your deity is required to be.
Yet we can't find God.

God is not a dead conqueror, but supposedly, here and everywhere among us.

I can understand your analogy with Alexander and quasars... of course God is not separated from us by history and time is he? But here among us now?

God is not separated from us by light years, is he?
But all around us?

So, since God is here, now, everywhere, everywhen this means God should be easy to prove, not requiring the false analogies of believing or disbelieving in dead men or fallen stars, right?

So proof should be easy.
However, all of God's properties prove his non-existence, or that he shares the same characteristics as unicorns and dragons.

Proof enough?

[Mithrae]

[Replying to post 43 by Willum]

How easy do you think it would be to prove that materialism/physicalism is correct, rather than idealism?

Things that are "here, now, everywhere, everywhen" are often the most difficult to distinctly comprehend and apprehend. Air was not 'discovered' until the iron age. The fact that the sky is 'blue' was not widely recognized until much later. And gravity, electromagnetism, atoms...?

Apprehending the things which are so 'profound' that they underlie our whole experience of reality is like trying to see our own optic nerves. It's not impossible of course, and we've made a lot of progress, but still with the recognition of a long way to go even in already-outlined fields of scientific research.

In the case of 'god' we're not just talking about something underlying our experience of reality, but underlying or identical to reality itself. It can be shown to be the more reasonable hypothesis accounting for what we know so far, as I suggested earlier in the thread: But the biggest issue isn't really 'evidence' (that is, the available facts and information providing context for the evaluation of hypotheses' plausibility), it's trying to frame the question correctly and understand the subjective constraints of our epistemic and ontological presuppositions.

[Willum]

[Replying to post 44 by Mithrae]

Prove three abstracts? If you are saying God is an abstract, I agree, and we're done.
If you are asking me to prove abstracts, you are ralfing me.

Next challenge:
Air was discovered about the same time wine bladders were made, that and wind.
Atoms, Democritus.
Gravity was the first thing discovered.

Show reality is true. Done. No God required. Everything is as observed.

Do you have a single challenge?

Now, I would like you to show demonstratively the observed differences between God and unicorns.

But the biggest issue isn't really 'evidence'...

Yes, the biggest issue is lack of evidence.

and Ontological arguments have only defined relevance to reality. In short, unlike atoms, ontological and epistemic are just words.

Or do you disagree that God should be the most profound thing in the universe, and therefore EASILY discovered.

If not, say why.

(Incidentally, Egyptians sure used a lot of blue in the art-work that remains with us today.)

[Bust Nak]

And since that is impossible, do you therefore disbelieve in them?

Loaded question cannot be answered. The premise that it is impossible to scientifically test for the existence of quasars in a lab environment is false.

More to the point, do you demand lab testing before you'll believe a claim of Alexander the Great's conquest of Persia, or Kim Jong Un's sabre-rattling?

No, those claims are not at all extraordinary.

Because it is a criterion of evidence which one's worldview is not justified by to begin with, whether that's an ontological worldview which contradicts theism (eg. the materialism/physicalism which seems to be widely presupposed) or an epistemic worldview used to selectively exclude theism.

Do you have lab tested evidence supporting the position that all beliefs (or certain selected beliefs) should be lab tested?

In general, no, nor would you expect such a thing. Fundamental philosophical position are taken for granted, that's exactly what presupposition mean to me. What does the term "presupposition" mean to you?

*I do have lab tested evidence supporting the position that certain selected beliefs should be lab tested though. Things like the data relating the unreliability of memory springs to mind.

Of course not... This is therefore obviously a subjective criterion that we're talking about.

... we should at least each try to ensure consistency in our chosen criteria. Disbelieving a proposition on the basis of an epistemic approach which itself is unjustifiable by its own merits is wildly illogical...

Same objection above applies here for the accusation of "unjustifiable by its own merits." But how is it inconsistent though?

Likewise with considering a theory 'extraordinary' and thus requiring an exceptionally high standard of evidence, purely because it contradicts one's existing theory which itself hasn't met those standards of evidence. These are forms of presuppositionalism, not evidence-based enquiry.

Why is that worth pointing out, when you've already acknowledge that it's both "okay" and "unavoidable?"

[Mithrae]

[Replying to post 45 by Willum]

As is often the case in discussions with you, there seem to be some rather insurmountable communication problems going on. I hope it's not a failure on my part

#####

And since that is impossible, do you therefore disbelieve in them?

Loaded question cannot be answered. The premise that it is impossible to scientifically test for the existence of quasars in a lab environment is false.

There must be some confusion here. You might be thinking of quarks or something else, but I'm referring to quasars: "A quasar (/kwezr/) (also quasi-stellar object or QSO) is an active galactic nucleus of very high luminosity. A quasar is believed to consist of a supermassive black hole surrounded by a visible, orbiting accretion disk of gas." Possibly not the best example - I've probably been watching too much Red Dwarf.

More to the point, do you demand lab testing before you'll believe a claim of Alexander the Great's conquest of Persia, or Kim Jong Un's sabre-rattling?

No, those claims are not at all extraordinary.

Alexander's accomplishments were very extraordinary; possibly unique in human history, conquering half the known world by the age of thirty. But either way, again we're just up against the notion that theism should be categorized as 'extraordinary' purely because it conflicts with some prior worldview.

Because it is a criterion of evidence which one's worldview is not justified by to begin with, whether that's an ontological worldview which contradicts theism (eg. the materialism/physicalism which seems to be widely presupposed) or an epistemic worldview used to selectively exclude theism.

Do you have lab tested evidence supporting the position that all beliefs (or certain selected beliefs) should be lab tested?

In general, no, nor would you expect such a thing. Fundamental philosophical position are taken for granted, that's exactly what presupposition mean to me. What does the term "presupposition" mean to you?

*I do have lab tested evidence supporting the position that certain selected beliefs should be lab tested though. Things like the data relating the unreliability of memory springs to mind.

I prefer to avoid taking things for granted whenever possible; I am criticizing the presuppositionalist approach.

Of course not... This is therefore obviously a subjective criterion that we're talking about.

... we should at least each try to ensure consistency in our chosen criteria. Disbelieving a proposition on the basis of an epistemic approach which itself is unjustifiable by its own merits is wildly illogical...

Same objection above applies here for the accusation of "unjustifiable by its own merits." But how is it inconsistent though?

How is it inconsistent to take for granted a fairly extreme rejection of taking things for granted? That should be obvious.

Likewise with considering a theory 'extraordinary' and thus requiring an exceptionally high standard of evidence, purely because it contradicts one's existing theory which itself hasn't met those standards of evidence. These are forms of presuppositionalism, not evidence-based enquiry.

Why is that worth pointing out, when you've already acknowledge that it's both "okay" and "unavoidable?"

I didn't say that presuppositionalism is okay or unavoidable: I said that it's unavoidable that there'll be some subjectivity in different people's epistemic approaches.

If I've read your comments correctly, you seem to adopt as presuppositions a) a worldview which contradicts theism and b) an epistemic approach which deems anything contrary to (a) to be 'extraordinary' and thus requiring the very highest standards of 'evidence' while some other beliefs (like a and b themselves) are simply taken for granted or (like history and current affairs) are held to much lower standards.

I'll readily concede that it's difficult if not impossible to reason against presuppositions if they're not based on reason. For what that's worth

[Bust Nak]

There must be some confusion here...

I know what quasars are, they are testable in a lab environment.

Alexander's accomplishments were very extraordinary; possibly unique in human history, conquering half the known world by the age of thirty. But either way, again we're just up against the notion that theism should be categorized as 'extraordinary' purely because it conflicts with some prior worldview.

Exactly, Alexander's accomplishments are not extraordinary when there are theistic claims to contrast them with.

I prefer to avoid taking things for granted whenever possible; I am criticizing the presuppositionalist approach.

All but the most extreme solipsist presuppose certain philosophical stance. The most supportive thing I can say is I presuppose fewer things than my opponents.

How is it inconsistent to take for granted a fairly extreme rejection of taking things for granted? That should be obvious.

But that's not what I asked, instead I asked you how is it inconsistent to disbelieving a proposition on the basis of an epistemic approach which itself is unjustifiable by its own merits - the "things" to take for granted, are not the same "things" that are rejected for not taking for granted.

I didn't say that presuppositionalism is okay or unavoidable: I said that it's unavoidable that there'll be some subjectivity in different people's epistemic approaches.

If I've read your comments correctly, you seem to adopt as presuppositions a) a worldview which contradicts theism and b) an epistemic approach which deems anything contrary to (a) to be 'extraordinary' and thus requiring the very highest standards of 'evidence' while some other beliefs (like a and b themselves) are simply taken for granted or (like history and current affairs) are held to much lower standards.

I'll readily concede that it's difficult if not impossible to reason against presuppositions if they're not based on reason. For what that's worth

Let me suggest that we compare our presuppositions? My presuppositions that I take for granted are:
1) There is an external world, with other minds.
2) Said world can be understood.
3) My mind is rational.
4) My senses are somewhat accurate.

These things I take for granted. What do you take for granted?

[Mithrae]

There must be some confusion here...

I know what quasars are, they are testable in a lab environment.

Well it's a tangential point, so we'll just stick a pin in that one. Maybe 'god' is also testable in whatever sense you mean there

Let me suggest that we compare our presuppositions? My presuppositions that I take for granted are:
1) There is an external world, with other minds.

While that cannot be proved with 100% certainty, that isn't something that I myself have accepted as a presupposition for quite some time. From a 2012 post:

• 2> There are things outside my mind
  The first option is to simply assume it - call it an epistemic axiom, if you choose. Most folk don't ever bother trying to justify this belief, it's just taken for granted. No doubt that's partly because it's so very hard to justify even in part, let alone fully. I'm not a philosopher, but as far as I've yet encountered the only justification I can come up with is this: When I think, when I write or when I remember my dreams and so on, I almost always notice limitations on the speed, scope, depth and creativity of what my mind can do. But as I encounter more and more books, music, films and philosophy throughout my life, there seems to be far more than I could have even imagined previously. And what little I've learned about biology, chemistry, astronomy and physics seems to dwarf even those products of human creativity! This discrepancy between what I consciously recognise as products of my mind and what I encounter without knowing to be a product of my mind seems so vast and insurmountable as to cast serious doubt on any notion that it's all produced by my mind. . . .
  
  3> There are other minds
  Belief in other people's minds is inferred by analogy, from observation of structure and behaviour. For example I'm told that my brother came into existence in a very similar fashion to me, right down to the same hospital and caesarian delivery, and I can see that his body is similar to mine - arms, legs, face and so on. Along with similarities of structure, both during childhood and in recent years of living with him I've seen that his behaviour is often quite similar to mine - complaining of hunger then eating, mentioning tiredness then sleeping, displaying signs of humour, anger and so on. From all of this I conclude that he experiences these things in the same way that I do, that he has a mind even though I cannot see it. . . .
  
  But with that in mind, it seems to me that many people - theists and non-theists alike - hold to a particularly curious view which as far as I know is neither necessary nor validated by any evidence or justification:
  4? Most things outside my mind are not other minds, nor direct products of other minds
  The word 'physical' is often used to describe this new type or state of being.

2) Said world can be understood.

I don't particularly share that opinion, least of all as a presupposition. Through experience and learning I feel that I have come to understand a fair bit of the stuff that goes on in my own experience: But I'm also keenly aware of how much I personally don't understand, and even how many unanswered questions and unproven conflicting theories the world's combined scientists still have, even within already-outlined fields of research. I've found no reason to accept any assumption that we are nearly there, or that those are the only remaining frontiers of discovery, or that we will ever understand it all even millennia from now.

3) My mind is rational.

I agree, but it's not a presupposition, it's simply the word which we have chosen to use in describing the way healthy human minds tend to work. That's how they've evolved to work in dealing with day to day survival, finding food and security, coping with changing environments and our in-group social interactions, and how we've trained them to work in not directly related applications. It's a good tool, the best one we've got, but there is no reason to suppose that it is a perfect tool - and in fact we already have ample proof of how flawed and limited our minds can be.

4) My senses are somewhat accurate.

Again I agree, but again it's not a presupposition: Our senses can be tested both against other humans' perceptions, to some extent against other animals' perceptions, and against instrumental recording of related phenomena. And again, we have ample evidence that for example what we see (eg. a solid green table) bears only the vaguest and most tenuous resemblance to mostly-empty-space-particle-field-superpositions-bonded-by-nuclear-forces-reflecting-electromagnetic-radiation-in-various-wavelengths-of-which-a-tiny-fraction-are-interpeted-as-colour-by-our-optic-equipment. 'Accurate' or even 'somewhat accurate' is obviously a very relative term here... even before we start considering the fact that there is also potentially four or five tables worth of dark matter occupying the same space that even our instruments can't detect except by gravitational effects, and God-only-knows what else that doesn't even interact with gravity

These things I take for granted. What do you take for granted?

As little as possible; rather, I try to recognize and remember the uncertainties inherent in all the things that I 'know' or 'believe,' from the existence of an external world upwards. So for example while I have 100% certainty of my own existence, I might have only somewhere in the neighbourhood of 99.99% confidence that Tehran exists, 99% confidence that Washington was the first US President, 90% confidence that Socrates existed and, as explained earlier in this thread or in that 2012 one, 60 or 70% confidence that 'god' exists (being the best available hypothesis as to the nature of reality).

In any case I can't help but noticing that none of these things which you take for granted suggest or imply in any way that theism is 'extraordinary,' unless you have committed that fallacy of assuming that external world=non-mental world. And nor do any of your presuppositions say anything about lab testing for some claims, or why you do not advocate such stringent requirements in most other cases.

[Bust Nak]

Well it's a tangential point, so we'll just stick a pin in that one. Maybe 'god' is also testable in whatever sense you mean there

Maybe, if and when god test out positive in a lab, I will believe.

The first option is to simply assume it - call it an epistemic axiom, if you choose. Most folk don't ever bother trying to justify this belief, it's just taken for granted. No doubt that's partly because it's so very hard to justify even in part, let alone fully. I'm not a philosopher, but as far as I've yet encountered the only justification I can come up with is this: When I think, when I write or when I remember my dreams and so on, I almost always notice limitations on the speed, scope, depth and creativity of what my mind can do...

Well those books, music, theories and so on that you merely think is beyond you, could be your own imagination that you do not consciously recognize, there is no way to verify that. That is not a way out of solipsism, best to just kick it aside as not useful.

Belief in other people's minds is inferred by analogy, from observation of structure and behaviour...

So when one day we can make a convincing robot, you would automatically accept that it has a mind?

But with that in mind, it seems to me that many people - theists and non-theists alike - hold to a particularly curious view which as far as I know is neither necessary nor validated by any evidence or justification:
Most things outside my mind are not other minds, nor direct products of other minds
The word 'physical' is often used to describe this new type or state of being.

That's where the other presupposition comes in.

I don't particularly share that opinion, least of all as a presupposition. Through experience and learning I feel that I have come to understand a fair bit of the stuff that goes on in my own experience: But I'm also keenly aware of how much I personally don't understand, and even how many unanswered questions and unproven conflicting theories the world's combined scientists still have, even within already-outlined fields of research. I've found no reason to accept any assumption that we are nearly there, or that those are the only remaining frontiers of discovery, or that we will ever understand it all even millennia from now.

If the world is not fundamentally understandable, all your understand of the stuff is meaningless and even worse, false.

I agree, but it's not a presupposition, it's simply the word which we have chosen to use in describing the way healthy human minds tend to work.

If your mind is not ration, then your neither are the words you use to describe things, be it human minds or any other entity. Your understanding of human evolution of a rational mind for survival goes out of the window as irrational thoughts.

Again I agree, but again it's not a presupposition: Our senses can be tested both against other humans' perceptions, to some extent against other animals' perceptions, and against instrumental recording of related phenomena...

That's circular reasoning. Other perceptions and instrumental recording are perceived through your own senses. The most you can say is everything you sense is consistent.

These things I take for granted. What do you take for granted?

As little as possible; rather, I try to recognize and remember the uncertainties inherent in all the things that I 'know' or 'believe,' from the existence of an external world upwards.

How exactly are you going to recognize anything, if your senses are not at least somewhat accurate, how exactly are you going to remember anything, if your mind is not rational?

So for example while I have 100% certainty of my own existence, I might have only somewhere in the neighbourhood of 99.99% confidence that Tehran exists, 99% confidence that Washington was the first US President, 90% confidence that Socrates existed and, as explained earlier in the thread, 60 or 70% confidence that 'god' exists (being the best available hypothesis as to the nature of reality).

That's all well and good, given your senses are accurate and you are rational.

In any case I can't help but noticing that none of these things which you take for granted suggest or imply in any way that theism is 'extraordinary,' unless you have committed that fallacy of assuming that external world=non-mental world. And nor do any of your presuppositions say anything about lab testing for some claims, or why you do not advocate such stringent requirements in most other cases.

That's the point - the claim that theism is extraordinary is not a presupposition, but a conclusion based on real word data. Other than the 4 points I mentioned, I do not take my worldview for granted, but is the result of rational observation of the world.