Reasons for 'belief'

[Mithrae]

Discussions on religion often result in folk talking past each other and each 'side' adopting seemingly dogmatic positions, in part because of uncommunicated and often unexamined epistemic assumptions or approaches to belief and knowledge.

For example we often see atheists making the claim that there is "no evidence" for the views they reject. Sometimes this is without clarifying (or even refusing point-blank to answer even when asked about very specific examples) what is meant by 'evidence,' perhaps because testimonial evidence - on which we all depend every time we watch the news or weather report or read about some scientific breakthrough - would shatter the "no evidence" rhetoric if it were acknowledged as a modest but valid form of evidence. But even more fundamentally than that, the demand for evidence or boasting that there is "not a shred" of it reflects a particular approach to belief, roughly described by A or B below, which in itself may not be justified by the critics' own standards... and often isn't even recognized as such!

Conversely, many theists make claims and arguments which really seem persuasive to them, but likewise seem to depend on underlying assumptions which critics just don't share. For example in the case of apologetics around Jesus' resurrection it's roughly described by C below - they just try to knock down alternative scenarios to claim that resurrection is the best explanation. Or in the case of the 'moral argument' or variations on Pascal's wager it would be something more like E below.

In one thread a while back I outlined what I think are the main types of epistemic approaches:

• Principled - Belief as an intellectual stance, which should be measured by specific criteria
  A > Accepting only what is proven with certainty
  B > Accepting only that for which we have 'sufficient evidence' or justification
  C > Accepting the most reasonable theory/s of any given question/s or data
  
  Pragmatic - Belief as a normal process, which should be questioned and refined
  D > Accepting what we start out believing, unless and until we find reason to change those beliefs
  E > Accepting whatever seems most beneficial to ourselves or our community

Personally, I find that some combination of C and D is both what comes most naturally to me and seems most reasonable and easily-justified; with the important caveat that accepting something as the most reasonable view often still leaves plenty of room for uncertainty!

Of course there's worthy criticisms of all approaches. For example, A is usually impossible. B can be entirely arbitrary. C fails in cases of (or fails to account for) big uncertainties or lacking data. D is somewhat arbitrary, in the big picture. E is subjective.



So what about everyone else:
Which epistemic approach/es do you adopt? Do you profess a lack of belief and demand 'sufficient evidence' before accepting something (B), or cling to your existing views unless and until they're disproven (D), or something else? Have I missed some important approach?

Whatever approach you take, how do you justify it? Perhaps you even simply take it as axiomatic, unjustified but necessary?

And what potential problems or weaknesses do you see in the approach you take?

[Divine Insight]

Before I begin to address your questions I would like to voice a concern about the forum venue in which your questions have been posted.

This was not posted in "Philosophy". This was posted in "Christianity and Apolgetics". Therefore how should I respond? Allowing for a purely unadulterated philosophical view of these questions? Or a view that address the subject matter of the venue in which these questions are being posed?

Because of the venue I feel a need to address Christianity and its Apologetics in my answers. Something that I would not need to do if these questions were being asked from a purely philosophical perspective.

With the above said I'd like to address the questions you've raised because I find them to be both interesting and important.

~~~~~~~~

Principled - Belief as an intellectual stance, which should be measured by specific criteria
A > Accepting only what is proven with certainty
B > Accepting only that for which we have 'sufficient evidence' or justification
C > Accepting the most reasonable theory/s of any given question/s or data

I accept some things based on A. And I also accept that some things can be proven with certainty.

I accept some things based on B. And these things I accept based on the same level of justification that is known about them. In other words, I understand that they may not be carved in stone truth. But I accept that they are reasonable conclusions to live by given the 'sufficient evidence' that justifies having accepted them.

I also accept some things may be reasonable C. And I reserve the right to make the decision on whether or not I see these things as being reasonable. For example, while many physicists have accepted that String Theory seems reasonable to them, I don't feel that I necessarily need to agree with them that String Theory is reasonable. And, of course, when it comes to theology, I often reject things that theologians consider to be "reasonable" as I do not agree that those conclusions are reasonable.

So by the time we get down to C things have already become highly subjective and opinionated.

Pragmatic - Belief as a normal process, which should be questioned and refined
D > Accepting what we start out believing, unless and until we find reason to change those beliefs
E > Accepting whatever seems most beneficial to ourselves or our community

I have always lived by D, and I have changed my views as new information became available. In fact, theologically speaking I started out believing in Christianity because I was indoctrinated into the religion as a child. It wasn't until I became a mature independent thinker that I learned that everything I has been taught was in fact false.

I can see value in pretending to accept E for the sake of peace in some situations. As the old saying goes, "When it Rome, do as the Roman do". That's good advice you want to blend in and not be seen as a trouble maker.

But if you are going to be living out your entire life as a member of a society or culture I think you'd be far better off standing up for what you see as truth rather than just cowering down to whatever the culture does.

So E can have some short-term value, but can ultimately lead to a life of pretentious submission to things that you may not even agree with. In other words, in the long haul I value the saying, "Be true to thy self". And if that requires challenging social norms, then so be it.

So what about everyone else:
Which epistemic approach/es do you adopt? Do you profess a lack of belief and demand 'sufficient evidence' before accepting something (B), or cling to your existing views unless and until they're disproven (D), or something else? Have I missed some important approach?

I think I've already addressed your epistemic questions in general. And this is where we get into the forum venue specifics:

If we're talking about Christianity and Apologetics, I don't merely profess a lack of belief. I profess that the doctrines that Christianity is based upon (i.e. the Christian Bible) is provably false as it is written.

In other words, as far as I'm concerned we can apply A here. As far as I'm concerned Christianity is provably false with certainty. Period.

Whatever approach you take, how do you justify it? Perhaps you even simply take it as axiomatic, unjustified but necessary?

I justify my claim that the Bible is provably false with certainty as it is written by simply demonstrating this fact using the Bible itself.

And what potential problems or weaknesses do you see in the approach you take?

Again, I'm answering this question with respect to the venue in which it has been asked, "Christianity and Apologetics".

I see no potential problems or weakness in my approach. As far as I'm concerned I can, and have repeatedly, demonstrated why the Christian Bible cannot be true as it is written. It clearly contradicts its own premises and claims.

So there are no potential problems or weaknesses in my approach to Christianity and the Bible upon which it depends.

~~~~~~

The only "Christian Apology" that I can see that can see that can refute my position is the apology that the Bible does not say what it means, and does not mean what it says. Or that it needs to be "interpreted" in utterly absurd ways that clearly refute what it literally has to say.

And the problem I see with that apology is that this apology actually appears to be in total agreement with my position anyway (i.e. the Bible cannot be true as it is written). The apology is a claim that the Bible actually means something entirely different from what it actually says.

I don't see where that is a viable apology. That apology appears to me to reject the Bible just as much as I do. Any "God" that apology claims to have left after having literally rejected the Bible cannot be called "The Biblical God" anyway at that point. So it's not even a viable apology for "The Biblical God"

~~~~~

So yeah, if you want to move over to "Pure Philosophy" instead of "Christianity and Apologetics" then we can discuss other possible questions, such as:

What's the true nature of reality?

Could their be some sort of abstract notion of a "God" that isn't dependent upon ancient myths written up by male-chauvinistic slave-owning barbarians?

There are a lot of questions we could discuss.

But in this venue, I feel that I can safely rule out Christianity as already having proven itself false via its very own foundational dogma.

[wiploc]

Discussions on religion often result in folk talking past each other and each 'side' adopting seemingly dogmatic positions, in part because of uncommunicated and often unexamined epistemic assumptions or approaches to belief and knowledge.

For example we often see atheists making the claim that there is "no evidence" for the views they reject.

Guilty!

Sometimes this is without clarifying (or even refusing point-blank to answer even when asked about very specific examples) what is meant by 'evidence,'

I don't know how to address it in the abstract. I'm sure we're willing to address specific examples.

perhaps because testimonial evidence -

That's specific enough. Thank you.

Suppose that Joe says Jehovah came to him in a dream and said that he is Allah, one and the same. Suppose further that Sara says that Allah came to her while she was awake, and explained that Jehovah is an impostor, and he, Allah, is the only true god. Suppose Mike then reveals that there are no gods. And suppose that thousands or millions of other people gave similarly contradictory claims of revelation.

What then are we to conclude?

I conclude that such claims are unreliable. Individually, and as a group, they weigh zero in the scales of persuasion.

on which we all depend every time we watch the news or weather report or read about some scientific breakthrough - would shatter the "no evidence" rhetoric if it were acknowledged as a modest but valid form of evidence.

I think that's uncharitable. A friend of mine says she was filled with the spirit of god, and that's when she realized that he is just one person, not a trinity.

Do you give that any weight at all?

If not, do you reject it because accepting it would shatter your epistemological theories, or because it really isn't persuasive?

But even more fundamentally than that, the demand for evidence or boasting that there is "not a shred" of it reflects a particular approach to belief, roughly described by A or B below, which in itself may not be justified by the critics' own standards... and often isn't even recognized as such!

A is impossible. I reject A.

Conversely, many theists make claims and arguments which really seem persuasive to them, but likewise seem to depend on underlying assumptions which critics just don't share.

Many theists make claims and arguments which seem persuasive to them only because they think they support their religious beliefs. They would immediately recognize the argument's irrationality if, say, their kid tried to use it to rationalize a report card.

Plantinga's modal ontological argument, for instance, "proves" that god exists, so theists treat it as serious despite it's obvious flaws. But the same sleight of mouth can also "prove" that god doesn't exist. Theists don't take that seriously at all, even though the logic exactly as strong in the one case as the other.

To the reasonable mind, any argument that proves both X and not-X must weigh zero in the scales of persuasion.

For example in the case of apologetics around Jesus' resurrection it's roughly described by C below - they just try to knock down alternative scenarios to claim that resurrection is the best explanation.

The resurrection story is implausible on its face. You wouldn't believe me if I said that my visible friend died for three days and then revived. Why should I believe that your invisible friend did that.

The resurrection is a story from a book shot thru with contradictions, absurdities, and reprehensible moral claims. So the source material doesn't bolster the claim. If you don't believe your emails from the Nigerian prince, why would you believe the much-less-plausible resurrection stuff?

Or in the case of the 'moral argument' or variations on Pascal's wager it would be something more like E below.

The moral argument depends on surreptitiously two-stepping between incompatible definitions of "objective" morality. Refutation consists of noting when this happens and pointing it out. There is no single definition of "objective" for which the premises have the least bit of plausibility.

In one thread a while back I outlined what I think are the main types of epistemic approaches:

• Principled - Belief as an intellectual stance, which should be measured by specific criteria
  A > Accepting only what is proven with certainty
  B > Accepting only that for which we have 'sufficient evidence' or justification
  C > Accepting the most reasonable theory/s of any given question/s or data
  
  Pragmatic - Belief as a normal process, which should be questioned and refined
  D > Accepting what we start out believing, unless and until we find reason to change those beliefs
  E > Accepting whatever seems most beneficial to ourselves or our community

Personally, I find that some combination of C and D is both what comes most naturally to me and seems most reasonable and easily-justified; with the important caveat that accepting something as the most reasonable view often still leaves plenty of room for uncertainty!

Of course there's worthy criticisms of all approaches. For example, A is usually impossible. B can be entirely arbitrary. C fails in cases of (or fails to account for) big uncertainties or lacking data. D is somewhat arbitrary, in the big picture. E is subjective.



So what about everyone else:
Which epistemic approach/es do you adopt? Do you profess a lack of belief and demand 'sufficient evidence' before accepting something (B), or cling to your existing views unless and until they're disproven (D), or something else? Have I missed some important approach?

Whatever approach you take, how do you justify it? Perhaps you even simply take it as axiomatic, unjustified but necessary?

And what potential problems or weaknesses do you see in the approach you take?

A is impractical.

B, C, and D are probably techniques we switch back and forth between as we negotiate our day.

E is probably something we're all prone to, though we shouldn't be proud of it.

For a discussion like this, where we are reasoning our way to a conclusion about whether gods exist, not hurriedly but deliberately, B seems the only appropriate answer.

---

ETA:

A is good sometimes. But we often don't have the time or ability to employ A.

If someone yells "Duck!" we just duck. We don't have time to absolutely prove that ducking is good.

[Mithrae]

Before I begin to address your questions I would like to voice a concern about the forum venue in which your questions have been posted.

This was not posted in "Philosophy". This was posted in "Christianity and Apolgetics". Therefore how should I respond? Allowing for a purely unadulterated philosophical view of these questions?

That would be preferable. I would say that if a person were to switch to a different epistemic approach whenever they start thinking about a particular topic or religion, such an inconsistency would be quite problematic. In fact I've highlighted one possible example of that already in the OP, in that we all accept other people's testimony as a legitimate source of information throughout our daily lives, but when it comes to testimony in conflict with a worldview of materialist naturalism some people refuse to consider it - even refuse to answer questions about it! - and persist instead with triumphant "not a shred of evidence" rhetoric. Fortunately I don't think that describes you

Principled - Belief as an intellectual stance, which should be measured by specific criteria
A > Accepting only what is proven with certainty
B > Accepting only that for which we have 'sufficient evidence' or justification
C > Accepting the most reasonable theory/s of any given question/s or data

I accept some things based on A. And I also accept that some things can be proven with certainty.

I accept some things based on B. And these things I accept based on the same level of justification that is known about them. In other words, I understand that they may not be carved in stone truth. But I accept that they are reasonable conclusions to live by given the 'sufficient evidence' that justifies having accepted them.

I also accept some things may be reasonable C. And I reserve the right to make the decision on whether or not I see these things as being reasonable. For example, while many physicists have accepted that String Theory seems reasonable to them, I don't feel that I necessarily need to agree with them that String Theory is reasonable. And, of course, when it comes to theology, I often reject things that theologians consider to be "reasonable" as I do not agree that those conclusions are reasonable.

So by the time we get down to C things have already become highly subjective and opinionated.

<C> is not accepting things which are 'reasonable,' it's accepting the most reasonable viewpoint available for the given question/data. Merely describing something as reasonable is a fairly subjective assessment, yes, but most of that subjectivity is removed when they are put in comparison to alternative views; we can see that this theory has more explanatory scope and power, or that factual claim has less supporting evidence.

In fact your criticism of C would apply more appropriately to <B>. The first question I would ask is what constitutes 'sufficient evidence'... and then whether that answer (and everything leading up to it) is itself justified by 'sufficient evidence.' Some people accept things based on very little evidence, while some people are extremely sceptical. And others are selectively-sceptical, applying a different set of evidentiary expectations depending on what conclusions are in view. I'm not sure whether it's a necessarily subjective (or arbitrary) approach, but it often is. <B> is the approach of conspiracy theorists for example, piling up some evidence behind one view which they accept as the basis for interpreting all other data, rather than fairly comparing each alternative view.

And as for <A>... well sure, there's one or two things which can be absolutely certain - our own existence and axioms of logic and maths - but if they are absolutely certain then they are by definition the most reasonable viewpoint (C). I included 'accepting only certain things' mainly as a point of comparison/contrast against 'accepting only sufficiently-justified things.' They key word there is "only"; these are exclusive approaches, in contrast to comparative approaches like D and especially C. Virtually no-one actually adopts <A> as their approach, only extreme solipsists. But it's important to recognize that the scale of what constitutes 'sufficient evidence' could be taken to that extreme.

Pragmatic - Belief as a normal process, which should be questioned and refined
D > Accepting what we start out believing, unless and until we find reason to change those beliefs
E > Accepting whatever seems most beneficial to ourselves or our community

I have always lived by D, and I have changed my views as new information became available. In fact, theologically speaking I started out believing in Christianity because I was indoctrinated into the religion as a child. It wasn't until I became a mature independent thinker that I learned that everything I has been taught was in fact false.

I suspect that we all live by <D> for the most part. It's hard to see how we could not. But the implication of course is that for someone raised in an Islamic environment, say, it is rational for them to accept Islamic beliefs unless and until they encounter reasons to change them. Once again this runs contrary to the <B> approach adopted by many atheists; it is not irrational to remain in the beliefs one was raised in, even "without (sufficient) evidence" backing those beliefs. If we accept <D> as a valid epistemic approach, then the purely passive debate tactic of demanding evidence amounts to nothing more than an expression of subjective opinion - it does not demonstrate any problem with the religious perspective, so anyone interested in 'winning' the debate still has a burden of proof to uphold.

And if the criteria by which 'reasons to change beliefs' are measured is something like <C>, then that burden of proof will often require advancing and justifying a better viewpoint than the religious one. (The exceptions being the rare cases where a logical proof of falsehood such as irreconcilable contradictions are available, because then literally any consistent alternative must be better.)

[Mithrae]

on which we all depend every time we watch the news or weather report or read about some scientific breakthrough - would shatter the "no evidence" rhetoric if it were acknowledged as a modest but valid form of evidence.

I think that's uncharitable. A friend of mine says she was filled with the spirit of god, and that's when she realized that he is just one person, not a trinity.

Do you give that any weight at all?

If not, do you reject it because accepting it would shatter your epistemological theories, or because it really isn't persuasive?

About to head off to bed, but this is an important point so I'll briefly comment. Testimonial evidence is valid evidence but, like all forms of evidence, there are varying degrees of reliability. For example:
- Sources named and known to be generally-reliable carry more weight in their testimony of X than sources known to be dubious or entirely unknown.
- Interaction with/observation of the real world is always preferable to things which happen in people's heads even by their own admission.
- Observations confirmed by multiple sources are much better than observation alleged by a single source, dramatically reducing the possibility of hallucination and slightly mitigating the likelihood of misperception or deliberate deception.
- Observations which can be replicated or confirmed (at least in theory, but even better still if they're within pragmatic reach) by 'anyone,' and especially by you/me personally are much more reliable still.

The last point is why verified media reports and science are (generally) more reliable than facts of history or anecdotal evidence from even the most credible witness. But we do still know things about history and give some credence many anecdotes. Anecdotal evidence is evidence, even if it's weak. The testimony of an anonymous friend of a friend about things inside her head is obviously not worth spending another second's thought on for anyone except her nearest and dearest... and then only if they have really good reasons to trust her integrity, judgement and mental stability.

On the other hand, the question which I asked one particularly gloating "not a shred of evidence" fellow was whether the testimony under oath of three or four surgeons and medical staff who'd seen a leg amputated and later regrown would constitute legitimate evidence? It was actually my first discussion and second post back to the forum after nearly a year's absence, but two weeks and several pointed reminders later I have yet to receive an answer

[Divine Insight]

For example we often see atheists making the claim that there is "no evidence" for the views they reject. Sometimes this is without clarifying (or even refusing point-blank to answer even when asked about very specific examples) what is meant by 'evidence,' perhaps because testimonial evidence - on which we all depend every time we watch the news or weather report or read about some scientific breakthrough - would shatter the "no evidence" rhetoric if it were acknowledged as a modest but valid form of evidence. But even more fundamentally than that, the demand for evidence or boasting that there is "not a shred" of it reflects a particular approach to belief, roughly described by A or B below, which in itself may not be justified by the critics' own standards... and often isn't even recognized as such!

Just to touch on "pure philosophy" and "valid arguments".

In the above quote you make the claim that we all "depend" on testimonial evidence, and you offer as examples, news, weather reports, and scientific breakthroughs, etc.

However, the truth is that we don't depend on these things. In fact, if we're honest about it we know that these things are not dependable. Especially weather reports. I always take weather reports with a huge grain of salt. Sure, they have some value, but the idea of that they should be accepted as "truth" is ridiculous. In fact, I can recall many times throughout my life where I actually depended on a weather report only to be disappointed to discover that it was totally wrong.

Same thing with news. In fact, I've even seen many cases where the news broadcaster would "retract" claims they had made the day before. So we know they don't always get it right and they are prone to making mistakes, not to mention in some cases fabricating outright lies as intentional propaganda.

So the idea that anyone should trust the news as a source of absolute truth is an idea that many people would reject.

Being interested in science my entire life, I have also seen scientific "discoveries" retracted. Probably far more than average people who don't follow the sciences as keenly as I do. I've read about discoveries and retractions in science journals that I have never seen reported on public news sources.

So I think these are false equivalencies. Just because we accept that news and weather reports have "some value", that doesn't mean that we embrace these sources as providing us with guaranteed truths.

I use the weather reports every day. And I can assure you that they often aren't right. Fortunately, lately they've been wrong in my favor. They have been predicting cold rainy weather in my area for the past week. But for some strange reason the weather at my house as been pretty warm dry and sunny.

I'm glad they were wrong, but still. Wrong is wrong.

So the idea that we "depend" on these things is a false assumption.

Some of us actually find them rather amusing.

[StuartJ]

[Replying to post 5 by Mithrae]

You DID receive an answer ...

TWICE.

Twice I told you I wasn't going to play analogies with you.

I keep Jesus and Jehovah and the Holy Ghost and the Blessed Virgin Mary and all the Apostles and Resurrections and talking animals and mud- men and global floods and armies of angels and such ...

Firmly in the spotlight ...

Because no one EVER offers a shred if independently verifiable evidence for ANY of them.

And because of that ...

They look to me like common make-believe.

But the door is WIDE open.

And through the door rolls smokescreens that try to obscure the make-believe.

[Divine Insight]

By the way, I hold the position that ignorance is no excuse for "faith".

In other words, for someone to say that they have to place their "faith" (or belief) in the weatherman because they don't understand how weather on earth can be predicted, that's nonsense.

Laziness and ignorance is no justification for "faith".

Even high school students should be able to understand how weather works on planet earth. And they can even set up "homemade" weather stations and predict their own weather forecasts. Obviously they aren't going to be able to predict very far into the future if they are only making measurement local to their location. Even even with that limited information they can make some predictions.

We don't need to place our "faith" in meteorologists.

The same thing is true for many scientific discoveries. In fact, I was totally infatuated with the study of science since childhood. And one of the greatest things I loved about science was the fact that I could perform many scientific experiments myself. And I did! I found nothing more satisfying than verifying the laws of physics that I had been taught. In fact, I even questioned many of them and set up experiments to prove them wrong, only to gain a better understanding of why they were indeed correct and true.

Granted, there are discoveries being made by scientists today that require experiments that cannot be done by individuals at home. None the less, having gone through the experiments that can be done is quite insightful and demonstrates the whole scientific process and why it can be TRUSTED.

Sure, in the end, with modern day experiment we need to trust scientists to do experiments and make observations that we cannot make ourselves. But still, unless a person is unreasonably paranoid and believes that the entire scientific community is out to hoax them, there's really no rational reason to doubt that the reports they make are indeed trustworthy.

And if we question things like say, the discovery of the Higgs Boson, so what? If we question the validity of that discovery no one is threatening that we'll be cast into a state of eternal punishment over it.

There's just no comparison between embracing reasonable information versus the outlandish claims that are made by Christian Theology.

These kind of arguments do not support the idea that it's just as reasonable to believe in Christian theology as it is to believe your local meteorologist or the discoveries reported by the scientific community.

There's just no comparison at all.

All these arguments amount to is an attempt to argue that it's just as reasonable to believe in Santa Claus as it is to believe in the known laws of physics.

That's a truly pathetic argument really. Unbecoming of any serious philosopher.

[wiploc]

On the other hand, the question which I asked one particularly gloating "not a shred of evidence" fellow was whether the testimony under oath of three or four surgeons and medical staff who'd seen a leg amputated and later regrown would constitute legitimate evidence?

Excellent specific example, thanks.

I don't see how it would constitute evidence of gods. Why wouldn't it be evidence that the Republicans had knocked off their opposition to stem cell research? Why is it the theists who get to say, "I don't understand this, so I get to decide what it means"?

I don't think magic has any explanatory powers at all.

But suppose we stipulate magic. And suppose you say, "Therefore, god," but I say, "Therefore, leprechaun." Does either of us have a shred of evidence that we're right?

I'm open to the possibility that magic will one day be explanatory. Some unforeseen concatenation of events that add up to magic somehow being an explanation, with predictions and testable consequences. Could happen.

I don't expect that, but I'm open to it.

In the meantime, I don't know of any reason to believe in either gods or magic.

[Mithrae]

[Replying to post 6 by Divine Insight]

I wrote: "testimonial evidence - on which we all depend every time we watch the news or weather report or read about some scientific breakthrough"
You somehow read: "the idea that anyone should trust the news as a source of absolute truth"

That pretty much covers my reply, really. Heck, you explicitly agreed with me that you do use news reports etc. as a viable source of information - as we all do. No sense wasting my time with the... well, whatever it was that you spent the rest of your post attacking.

By the way, I hold the position that ignorance is no excuse for "faith".

In other words, for someone to say that they have to place their "faith" (or belief) in the weatherman because they don't understand how weather on earth can be predicted, that's nonsense.

Laziness and ignorance is no justification for "faith".

Even high school students should be able to understand how weather works on planet earth.

Not everyone has as much time on their hands as you or I. Not everyone is as clever as you either. Some folk struggle with fairly basic maths or logic. And I suppose *glancing up at the previous post* some folk struggle with communication We all have our strengths and weaknesses.

There's just no comparison between embracing reasonable information versus the outlandish claims that are made by Christian Theology.

These kind of arguments do not support the idea that it's just as reasonable to believe in Christian theology as it is to believe your local meteorologist or the discoveries reported by the scientific community.

There's just no comparison at all.

All these arguments amount to is an attempt to argue that it's just as reasonable to believe in Santa Claus as it is to believe in the known laws of physics.

That's a truly pathetic argument really. Unbecoming of any serious philosopher.

Please try to avoid preaching in my thread. No-one here has made any argument even remotely similar to that. If all you're interested in is the low-hanging fruit, I'm sure there's plenty of other threads for that.