Do you prefer "free-will suffering"or "robots

[Jagella]

As we all should know, apologists often employ the "free-will" defense against any argument from suffering or evil that serves to cast doubt on the existence of the Christian god. Doubters might maintain that no good god would allow suffering. Since suffering exists, God probably doesn't exist. Apologists often counter telling us that God needs to allow suffering so that we may have free will to do evil as well as good.

Needless to say, there are several objections that might be raised to this apologetic, but I'd like to start out by pointing out that it makes an assumption that may not hold for all people. That assumption is that suffering and evil is universally preferred over our being robots programmed to do only good. Personally, I'd take the robots! My being programmed to do good is fine with me, and giving up my choice to do evil is a small price to pay to attain safety, security, and happiness. Besides, I have no desire to do evil. So my being programmed to do only good would make little difference for me.

Question for Debate: Do you prefer suffering or people being "robots"?

[Divine Insight]

I find overall that non-theists offer me nothing I can 'get my teeth into' often because their interpretation of Theism is usually very shallow and boorish to say the least.

I am neither a theist nor a non-theist. I reject that whole mentality of trying to force people to enlist in those imaginary wars.

I'm a human living on planet earth. Period.

I am more into encouraging folk to focus on GOD and identifying ideas about GOD which are more than likely false.

Fine. No one is stopping you from doing that.

And by the way, if you want to focus on GOD, then you'll need to define what you mean by that word. You mentioned Zzyzx. I believe Z has made it clear to you on many previous occasions that he takes an ignostic stance when that term comes up. I do as well.

The term GOD is an utterly meaningless term if you can't define what you mean by that term. Capitalizing it in bold blue print doesn't do anything toward defining what the term might mean. Obviously when we're discussing the Biblical God we have a definition. The Bible itself describes what this God is necessarily like. So that's a well-defined GOD if you like. Of course, it's also a God that is grossly self-contradictory based on the Biblical narration, but that's something that can be addressed based on the doctrine contained in the Bible.

As far as I'm concerned there is no evidence for the existence of any GOD that has already been defined in any known theology.

So until you can define what you mean by that term, and provide some level of evidence for why anyone should believe it exists, then how could anyone hope to communicate with you on the topic of GOD when you haven't even made it clear what you're even talking about?

[Mithrae]

That you or Jagella or any other non-theist only wishes to debate with a certain type of Christian, and thus design your OP blurbs and questions to reflect that preferential, is besides the point. Doing so will not and cannot sanction what others can or cannot post.

I am here specifically to offer the reader alternatives to those preferential views such non-theists hold.

In that, it is a good thing to be able to recognize that not all folk calling themselves "Christians", believe in the things you are arguing Christians MUST believe in order for them to be able to call themselves "Christians".

I'm reminded of a rather old thread discussing the kind of tendency you describe:

Both of those claims are objectively and verifiably false, and in my experience those who insist on maintaining either (or, not infrequently, both) are just as dogmatic and doctrinaire in their own way as any Bible-thumping fundamentalist. There is only one correct way to think, and that is MY way -- even when one is thinking about religion. Even though I do not believe in it, I will make pronouncements which may not be questioned about how and what religionists must think and believe. . . . .


But; For the first group, I propose that there is very frequently -- though not always -- another reason for concerning oneself exclusively with repressive, literalist fundamentalism in debate: It is the easiest kind of religion to argue against. The arguments in favor of it are easy to counter, and the arguments against it are easy to mount. Besides, its safe and fun -- the intellectual equivalent of beating up ten-year-olds.

Okay. But the way I learned it, shooting fish in barrels does not make you a master fisherman.

There are a number of enlightened liberal religious traditions and approaches, including some Christian ones, which teach and practice virtually none of the problematic dogmas and behaviors which one associates with literalist, fundamentalist Christianity; virtually none of those practices or teachings are found in modern Judaism, either. And yet, few are willing to extend their disputes with religion to these liberal and nonrepressive iterations of religious faith, without applying the transparently fallacious arguments outlined above -- and yet continue to insist that their argument is with RELIGION ITSELF [or 'Christianity' itself; Mithrae] and not only with the toxic varieties of it which they address and refer to in every post.

Mind you I'm not convinced that even most conservative forms of Christianity etc. are as "toxic" as cnorman suggested, but they often are obviously unreasonable at the least. I suppose if folk enjoy themselves most by discussing some very particular views they imagine to represent a monolithic 'Christian theology,' attacking and imagining that they are "tearing their Christian apologetics to pieces" as suggested earlier in the thread, then at least there is some benefit coming from it. But personally I feel that there's more benefit to be found for myself and others by avoiding such simplistic, binary approaches; trying to imagine and understand a variety of ways of thinking, steelmanning views I don't currently hold rather than knocking down what essentially amounts to a strawmen.

[Divine Insight]

Willliam,

By the way William. If all you are trying to do is create a coherent philosophical idea of a God that doesn't contain self-contradictions, I can do that.

In fact, as far as I'm concerned some Buddhist have already done a very nice job of inventing a plausible God that does not include contradictions. I believe I have already made my position on that clear.

So if that's all you are looking for, then why bother with the theist vs. non-theist nonsense? It wouldn't matter whether the philosophers in question actually believed in the God they create via their own philosophical construction.

It's not necessary to actually believe in the existence of a God to create a logically consistent philosophical picture of a "God".

As far as I'm concerned I can already do that, so there is no need for me to search for ways of doing that.

However, the bottom line still remains. Just because I can imagine a logically consistent "God" doesn't mean that this God I have created in my imagination actually exists.

All it means is that I was able to design a working picture of a "God". That's all.

I don't see the value in that other than possibly an exercise in amusement?

[William]

[Replying to post 81 by Divine Insight]

Fine. No one is stopping you from doing that.

Well you were attempting to argue otherwise. It is good that you have come around DI.

The rest of your post and your next one are beside the point, and are an effort on your part to mislead the reader regarding the content and contextual message of my theology.. My theology is actually outlined in great detail in every post I have made in the Members Notes section, and any reader interested can view these and decide for themselves whether there is any truth in your contrary assertions about that, or not.

[center]My theological notes can be found here.[/center]

[Jagella]

In practice you would hate your daughter dying in agony and would gladly have the doctors override her self-determination to spare her.

Did you read what I posted above? I said I would honor any person's wish to refuse medical treatment.

Wow, I'm learning so much about logic by following your lead, aren't I? It's easy to win a debate when we get to make up other folks' positions for them.

I have no idea of what you're talking about.

Your arguments are going from bad to worse. You misrepresent what I say and then move on to make an incoherent, irrelevant comment.

But I suppose that's the kind of thinking that forms the basis for defending a view of a world full of suffering over a great world in which we cannot do evil. And all for the sake of religion!

[wiploc]

1 > Describe a coherent model in which humans' ability to choose evil is wholly or even just significantly reduced from where it currently stands, without eliminating meaningful free will or diminishing our happiness and appreciation of our world.

2 > Explain how a choice can be morally significant if there is no possibility of making the other decision.

Plantinga wrote about morally significant free will. His argument has a couple of problems.

Suppose that god knew, at the beginning, everything that would ever happen in every possible world. And suppose that he had the choice, out of all of these possible worlds, of which one to create.

There must be, among these possible worlds, many in which people have free will, and in which they never choose evil. (Such worlds aren't impossible. They don't include logical contradictions like married bachelors or square circles, and so they are therefore, by definition, possible.)

Plantinga argues that if god created one of these goodworlds, that would rob us of morally significant free will. God knows all of our choices from the beginning, and therefore, if he created a goodworld while knowing that we would do only good in that world, then he would have effectively made all of our choices for us.

One problem with that argument is that it works equally well on badworlds. If god created a bad world while knowing every choice that we ever made in that world, then he would have effectively made our choices for us.

I don't think that's a compelling argument, but it is exactly as strong as Plantinga's argument about goodworlds. If Plantinga is right about goodworlds, then I am right about badworlds: According to Plantinga's logic, an omniscient god cannot create any world with morally significant free will.

Another problem with that argument is that it makes morally significant free will worthless.

Suppose that we don't know whether god created this world, the real world. Then it follows (according to Plantinga's logic) that we don't know whether we have morally significant free will.

If there's no god, then we have MSFW. But if god exists, then we don't. God exists or he doesn't; we have MSFW or we don't. Nothing else changes. This is the same world either way. If everything is the same, then whether we have MSFW is of no consequence.

[Mithrae]

1 > Describe a coherent model in which humans' ability to choose evil is wholly or even just significantly reduced from where it currently stands, without eliminating meaningful free will or diminishing our happiness and appreciation of our world.

2 > Explain how a choice can be morally significant if there is no possibility of making the other decision.

Plantinga wrote about morally significant free will. His argument has a couple of problems.

Suppose that god knew, at the beginning, everything that would ever happen in every possible world. And suppose that he had the choice, out of all of these possible worlds, of which one to create.

I agree with your analysis, but that's a theological supposition, not a logical or empirical conclusion - and a very specific theological supposition at that. One could say that it follows from an extreme, absolutist notion of 'omniscience,' but that absolutist notion is itself a theological supposition. Even the bible doesn't spell out such an idea in that kind of detail; not even close! In fact in a similar vein some argue (weakly in my opinion) that even genuine foreknowledge of this world would invalidate free will, but besides a couple of verses about predestination in Ephesians I'm not sure the bible even necessarily attributes 'genuine' foreknowledge of this world to God (as compared with God shaping events as he sees fit). And of course non-Christian theism is a whole other question.

Suppose that we don't know whether god created this world, the real world. Then it follows (according to Plantinga's logic) that we don't know whether we have morally significant free will.

If there's no god, then we have MSFW. But if god exists, then we don't. God exists or he doesn't; we have MSFW or we don't. Nothing else changes. This is the same world either way. If everything is the same, then whether we have MSFW is of no consequence.

We don't really know whether we have MSFW regardless of Plantinga's logic, and as DI has pointed out we might not have free will at all regardless of whether there is or isn't a god. But the argument here - particularly from a Christian perspective, but not necessarily so - is the view that in order to have goodness or morally-significant free will there has to be the real possibility of evil choices, and therefore the existence of evil choices doesn't weigh against a good God or optimal creation.

I don't really see a way around that short of trying to argue that a good God would not prioritize goodness his creation!

The anti-religious argument with the most potential I see here would not be trying to argue in favour of robots or 'free will without freedom for evil,' but rather removing some of the worst evil choices from the range of possibilities; just sliding the scale up a little rather than suggesting an absolute approach. Even if we could still fight and steal, surely the world would be better if we were incapable of choosing to murder, torture or rape others, right? And that presumably would not preclude morally significant free will. But that's why my first question above remains relevant; is such a world feasible, is that something that we as human societies should really consider desirable, would less evil correspond to less or more good, and would it increase our happiness?

[bjs]

The anti-religious argument with the most potential I see here would not be trying to argue in favour of robots or 'free will without freedom for evil,' but rather removing some of the worst evil choices from the range of possibilities; just sliding the scale up a little rather than suggesting an absolute approach. Even if we could still fight and steal, surely the world would be better if we were incapable of choosing to murder, torture or rape others, right? And that presumably would not preclude morally significant free will.

I considered this possibility as well, but I dont think it would work.

If God had slid the scale up, it seems likely that people would then say that God could slide the scale up a little further. I am reminded of the story of Abraham arguing with God about the destruction of Sodom. God promised not to destroy Sodom if He could find 50 righteous people. Abraham said, What if you only find 45 righteous people? Will you destroy the city over five people? When God said, I will not destroy the city if I find 45 righteous people, Abraham then said, What if you only find 40 righteous people, and so on. It seems that if God prevented murder, rape and torture then people would say, Okay, but will you also prevent stealing? No matter how much evil God prevents, people can always say that God could prevent a little bit more.

In fact, who is to say that God has not already slid the scale? The worst things we can do are rape, murder and torture. It seems that there are worse things that it is logically possible to do, but they are beyond human capacity.

The scale is where it is. Short of complete paradise, it seems that people will always say that God could slide the scale a little bit farther up.

[Jagella]

It seems that if God prevented murder, rape and torture then people would say, Okay, but will you also prevent stealing? No matter how much evil God prevents, people can always say that God could prevent a little bit more.

The only way we could know if what you're positing here is true is if a god, assuming any gods exist, would disallow murder, rape, and torture. But fat chance of that ever happening! If gods exist, they don't seem very helpful in preventing evil.

So my point is that you are engaging in wild speculation that cannot be proved or disproved. If we just give up the silly and dangerous notion of gods, then we can easily and simply conclude that evil and suffering results from the human condition and that we need to overcome it ourselves.

[1213]

I dont think suffering can be understood without knowing it. If one knows what suffering means, he can also feel it.

"Can" as in have the capability to feel it? Then sure. That does not contradict what I said.

"Can" as in, is currently feeling it? Why would that be the case?

Sorry, I meant, to know suffering, one must have felt it. And in the beginning people wanted to know evil, which is why I think we also have this lesson, where we can learn what evil and suffering truly means. Luckily this is just a short lesson and no suffering lasts forever.