Are there any non-fallacious arguments for non-theism?

[EduChris]

Let's assume for sake of argument that if non-theism were the objective reality, we would be able to offer some positive and non-fallacious argument to support the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism.

In this discussion, we will use the following definitions:

Theism: the philosophical viewpoint that the non-contingent source and fount of all possibility is not less than personal.

Non-theism: the philosophical viewpoint that theism need not be the case.

God: the non-contingent, not-less-than-personal source and fount of all possibility.

Our universe and our selves constitute the evidence, and we must provide arguments as to why, given this evidence, we should adopt the philosophical viewpoint known as non-theism. In this thread we are not allowed to rely on some supposed "default position of non-theism"; rather, we must provide an actual, non-fallacious argument for non-theism.

After all, if non-theism can be asserted (or adopted, or held) without evidence, then non-theism can be dismissed without evidence.

[EduChris]

...Ionian_Tradition so elegantly shows...

I applaud Ionian_Tradition for complying with the parameters of the OP, despite my inability to find anything but untethered speculation in his argument.

But Joey, why should anyone bother to read your posts unless you can offer your own arguments--on-topic, substantive, and not just repeating or cheerleading what others have said?

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 228:

Click off that ignore button, get your points in, and then click it right back on!

I applaud Ionian_Tradition for complying with the parameters of the OP, despite my inability to find anything but untethered speculation in his argument.

But Joey, why should anyone bother to read your posts unless you can offer your own arguments--on-topic, substantive, and not just repeating or cheerleading what others have said?

How on God's green earth might you ever know a poster has responded on point, when you're so dead set to ignore 'em when they disagree?

It's my firm conviction that you can't refute many of your opponents, so you declare 'em "uncivil", but, God forbid, on the off chance you see they've responded, and you feel you have something, you'll turn that ignore button off, and you'll hop in with whatever it is you feel pertinent. But by all that's holy, just as soon as it doesn't go your way, they're the "uncivil" ones and you can sit proud in ignorance of their refutations and arguments.

It's my contention, and I'm willing to support it, that you ignore anyone and any argument that you personally feel incapable of arguing against, and that when you find you a spot of courage, you hop in with this "what argument" angle. I propose that if you'd actually dare to even see the arguments put against you, you wouldn't even hafta ask the question about what arguments are put against ya.

I propose that if you were capable of defending your own arguments, or refuting the arguments of others, you'd not feel the need to ignore 'em at the first sign of your discomfort. Instead, I propose, you'd deal with 'em on a case by case basis, and let the chips fall where they may.

Alas, you seem only capable of turning that ignore button off for just long enough to express incredulity (aka argumentum ad ignorantiam) at why some folks may disagree. I propose that if you'd actually start reading the arguments of those with whom you disagree, you wouldn't hafta play this, "oh, my stars, what argument might you have" game. Or at least you'd see that I actually do have various arguments, only you seem only ever to have the courage to unbutton those arguments I present that address the repeated claims of others.

But that ain't cool, is it? No, instead of understanding that in all this there's gonna be some repeating, you can't fathom why the repeated claims of theists must be repeatedly challenged, 'cause there they sit, them theists keep repeating the same claims I hafta sit over here and keep repeatedly challenging.

I propose that only upon engaging those who disagree with you, will you ever understand why they do disagree. I further propose that you've got a lot of dadgum temerity in accusing me of repeating my situation, when we've some of us about had it up to here with your repeating that whole "font of the be all and end all and y'all ain't rational if ya disagree - even if I gotta ignore ya to set myself to keep repeating all that".

Here again we get your typical ploy of placing folks on that ignore list of yours, at least until you find you enough intellectual courage to engage. But don't it beat all, your ignorance of those arguments against you, borne of the fact you set it up so those arguments never even show in your browser has you incredulous as to what those arguments may be. Yours is the most pernicious form of debate - Ignore until courage is found, hop in there all incredulous - and then hop right back out when it gets put to you.

How on God's green earth can you know all I ever do is "repeat" arguments, when you're so dang fast to click that ignore button? How on God's green earth can you know I repeat my arguments when you make it so you don't even hafta be discomforted in seein' 'em?


How on God's green earth is it acceptable for you to "repeat" your same arguments - all the while ignoring any refutations or challenges thereof?


The god concept, that's how. Where confusion and discombobulation reigns; ignore, ignore, ignore. Where some small spot of courage crops up, click off that ignore button, and declare your opponent does nothing but repeat his refutations of your repeated claims and arguments. But keep your finger on that button, lest you and your arguments get all manner of upset!

You go right on ahead and click that button like I know you're gonna do, and put your challenger back on ignore. That does seem to be your best "argument".

Click it, like I know you will.

Click it, like so many theists I've encountered who declare any disagreement "Satanic", "rude", "uncivil", or "anything but I by golly don't wanna wrestle with it"!


How dare you accuse me of "repeating" arguments when it's obvious you've set it so you don't even need to seem 'em - and for sure when you repeat some of your own - and all the while ignoring any refutations of your repeated arguments.

[Bust Nak]

I don't see your logic here at all. For example, the statement, "It might be the case that nothing exists," runs afoul of the obvious fact of our existence. Therefore, it cannot possibly be the case that "nothing exists."

But it can, that's the point. In some possible universe there might be nothing.

On the other hand, if we say, "It might be the case that no leprechauns exist," that statement is not contradicted by logic or by any known body of facts.

For any one possible world either they exist or they don't. If infact they don't, then by your argument, they don't exist necessarily. If infact they do, then they do necessarily. What you are calling a contingent, is simply an unknown.

Leprechauns might exist in some possible universe, but it is not immediately and obviously necessary (logically or empirically) that any should actually exist in any universe. Therefore, we are justified in assuming that leprechauns are contingent.

What possibility? Your reasoning have rule that out, everything is necessarity true because they match certain facts or necessarity false because they don't match any facts. Is the statement China is in Europe contingent? It runs afoul of the obvious fact that China is in Asia. Would you therefore conclude that, it cannot possibly be the case that "China is in Europe"?

You're being too cryptic for me. I can't see any point to your statement.

Even after I explained it? Let me think of a different way. In some possible universe, God exist, in other universes, God don't exist.

Again I am not following your logic. The "something" which "exists necessarily" is "that which gives rise to any and all actualities." There cannot not exist this "something which gives rise to any and all actualities" if in fact anything at all (such as our universe) exists.

But that "something" is not in any world, as opposed to something that is in every world - there are worlds where nothing exists. This "something" makes the possibility of nothing existing possible.

But regarding personal agency, non-theism relies on an assumption of "impossible," which pertains to all possible worlds.

No, non-theism relies on one assumption - that it "isn't" in this world.

The theist's assumption of "possible," is more privitive since it need pertain to only one possible world.

Just like the non-theist position.

[EduChris]

...How dare you accuse me of "repeating" arguments...

Consider this my third and final invitation for you to contribute to this thread per the parameters of the OP and post #201.

[EduChris]

I don't see your logic here at all. For example, the statement, "It might be the case that nothing exists," runs afoul of the obvious fact of our existence. Therefore, it cannot possibly be the case that "nothing exists."

But it can, that's the point. In some possible universe there might be nothing.

If it is possible for a universe to consist of nothing, then everything in our universe is contingent--just as I have claimed all along.

On the other hand, if we say, "It might be the case that no leprechauns exist," that statement is not contradicted by logic or by any known body of facts.

For any one possible world either they exist or they don't. If infact they don't, then by your argument, they don't exist necessarily. If infact they do, then they do necessarily. What you are calling a contingent, is simply an unknown.

If leprechauns exist in all possible worlds, then leprechauns are necessary entities. If they exist in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for leprechauns to exist. If leprechauns exist in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then leprechauns are contingent.

Leprechauns might exist in some possible universe, but it is not immediately and obviously necessary (logically or empirically) that any should actually exist in any universe. Therefore, we are justified in assuming that leprechauns are contingent.

What possibility? Your reasoning have rule that out, everything is necessarity true because they match certain facts or necessarity false because they don't match any facts...

Something is "necessary" if it exists in all possible worlds. Something is "impossible" if it exists in zero possible worlds. Something is contingent if it exists in at least one possible world, but not all possible words.

Is the statement China is in Europe contingent? It runs afoul of the obvious fact that China is in Asia. Would you therefore conclude that, it cannot possibly be the case that "China is in Europe"?

It might well be the case that there is a possible world in which there is a country named "China" which is located on a continent named "Europe." The fact that all possible universes needn't have a country named "China" located on a continent called "Asia" is all the demonstration we need that the naming of our countries and continents is a contingent phenomenon.

In some possible universe, God exist, in other universes, God don't exist...

Per the OP, God is not an entity which is confined to any particular universe. God is the logically necessary, source and fount of all possibility (and possible universes, including our own, are a subset of all possibility).

Again I am not following your logic. The "something" which "exists necessarily" is "that which gives rise to any and all actualities." There cannot not exist this "something which gives rise to any and all actualities" if in fact anything at all (such as our universe) exists.

But that "something" is not in any world, as opposed to something that is in every world - there are worlds where nothing exists. This "something" makes the possibility of nothing existing possible.

It might be the case that at least one "nothing universe is possible. But our universe is evidently also possible, and our universe is not "nothing"; therefore, a "nothing universe," if it can exist, can only exist contingently. Our universe also exists, and it is contingent. The existence of the full set of possible universes (of which our universe is one member) demonstrates that the prior probability for this set of universes must have been greater than zero. The source and fount from which the full set of universes derives, is logically necessary. The universes themselves are contingent.

But regarding personal agency, non-theism relies on an assumption of "impossible," which pertains to all possible worlds.

No, non-theism relies on one assumption - that it "isn't" in this world.

If the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility involves any element of personal agency at all, then theism is the case. Non-theism therefore must insist that for each and every possible universe, there can be no personal agency involved in any way for the actualization of that universe.

The theist's assumption of "possible," is more privitive since it need pertain to only one possible world.

Just like the non-theist position.

No. See above.

[scourge99]

On the other hand, if we say, "It might be the case that no leprechauns exist," that statement is not contradicted by logic or by any known body of facts.

For any one possible world either they exist or they don't. If infact they don't, then by your argument, they don't exist necessarily. If infact they do, then they do necessarily. What you are calling a contingent, is simply an unknown.

If leprechauns exist in all possible worlds, then leprechauns are necessary entities. If they exist in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for leprechauns to exist. If leprechauns exist in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then leprechauns are contingent.

If god exists in all possible worlds, then god is a necessary entity. If god exists in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for god to exist. If god exists in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then god is contingent.

God does not exist in a possible world of nothing. Therefore god is contingent?

[EduChris]

... If god exists in all possible worlds, then god is a necessary entity. If god exists in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for god to exist. If god exists in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then god is contingent.

God does not exist in a possible world of nothing. Therefore god is contingent?

God is not an entity which exists in a universe; rather, God is the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility; God "exists" independently from any and all universes.

We know this source and fount of all possibility is logically necessary because it cannot be negated without immediately contradicting the known fact that our universe exists.

The only question is whether this logically necessary source and fount of all possibility is less than personal, or not. To assume it is less-than-personal is to assume that for each and every possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is less-than-personal. Non-theism thus makes an assumption about all possible worlds. Theism, by contrast, need only assume that for at least one possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is not-less-than-personal. Theism therefore involves the more privitive assumption, and is more justified than non-theism per the normal and standard epistemological principle that assumptions must be kept to a minimum.

[Bust Nak]

If it is possible for a universe to consist of nothing, then everything in our universe is contingent--just as I have claimed all along.

If leprechauns exist in all possible worlds, then leprechauns are necessary entities. If they exist in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for leprechauns to exist. If leprechauns exist in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then leprechauns are contingent.

Something is "necessary" if it exists in all possible worlds. Something is "impossible" if it exists in zero possible worlds. Something is contingent if it exists in at least one possible world, but not all possible words.

Correct, now apply this logic to the statement "something exist" and acknowledge that you were incorrect when you stated "something exists necessarily."

It might well be the case that there is a possible world in which there is a country named "China" which is located on a continent named "Europe." The fact that all possible universes needn't have a country named "China" located on a continent called "Asia" is all the demonstration we need that the naming of our countries and continents is a contingent phenomenon.

But according to you, "nothing at all exists" is immediately and instantly contradicted by the fact that we do exist. Since we cannot negate the statement, "something exists," without facing instant and obvious contradiction, it follows that something exists necessarily.

Why doesn't the fact that "China is in Europe" is immediately and instantly contradicted by the fact that China is in Asia, lead you to the conclude that since China isn't in Europe cannot be negated without facing instant and obvious contradicted, it follows that China isn't in Europe necessarily?

Per the OP, God is not an entity which is confined to any particular universe. God is the logically necessary, source and fount of all possibility (and possible universes, including our own, are a subset of all possibility).

Ok, would you agree that then if you make assumption on this "God" you aren't assuming anything about any possible worlds, let alone all possible worlds?

It might be the case that at least one "nothing universe is possible. But our universe is evidently also possible, and our universe is not "nothing"; therefore, a "nothing universe," if it can exist, can only exist contingently. Our universe also exists, and it is contingent. The existence of the full set of possible universes (of which our universe is one member) demonstrates that the prior probability for this set of universes must have been greater than zero. The source and fount from which the full set of universes derives, is logically necessary. The universes themselves are contingent.

Granted.

If the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility involves any element of personal agency at all, then theism is the case.

Well, there is still the part of the counter-argument that if any element of impersonal agency is involve, the personal part is constrained, and hence not the source of all possibility, but I will set that aside for now. I grant that "God" has to have no element of personal agency at all, for non-theism is the case.

Non-theism therefore must insist that for each and every possible universe, there can be no personal agency involved in any way for the actualization of that universe.

By your argment, theism must insist that for for each and every possible universe, there is be some element of personal agency involved in the way for the actualization of that universe.

Alternatively, and I think this is simplier: I assume one thing, that no element of personal agency is involved. You assume the opposite, that some element of personal agency is involved. Either way your standard and normal epistemological rules argument is debunked.

[scourge99]

... If god exists in all possible worlds, then god is a necessary entity. If god exists in no possible worlds, then it is impossible for god to exist. If god exists in at least one possible world, but not all possible worlds, then god is contingent.

God does not exist in a possible world of nothing. Therefore god is contingent?

God is not an entity which exists in a universe; rather, God is the logically necessary source and fount of all possibility; God "exists" independently from any and all universes.

Ok. So you've kicked the can down the road. So god doesn't "exist" in a universe but instead in some meta-universe. Therefore the same question applies to the meta-universe. Is it possible that this meta-universe that god "exists" in does not necessarily exist or could be different? I think the answer is yes.

We know this source and fount of all possibility is logically necessary because it cannot be negated without immediately contradicting the known fact that our universe exists.

But we are talking about possibilities here. You agreed before that our universe need not exist. Have you changed your mind? Is our universe now necessary (and therefore its not contingent)? If our universe isn't necessary then referencing its existence isn't proof that whatever it is contingent upon is necessary (I.E., god).

The only question is whether this logically necessary source and fount of all possibility is less than personal, or not. To assume it is less-than-personal is to assume that for each and every possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is less-than-personal. Non-theism thus makes an assumption about all possible worlds. Theism, by contrast, need only assume that for at least one possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is not-less-than-personal. Theism therefore involves the more privitive assumption, and is more justified than non-theism per the normal and standard epistemological principle that assumptions must be kept to a minimum.

The only question is whether this logically necessary source and fount of all possibility is not less than malevolent. To assume it is less-than-malevolent is to assume that for each and every possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is less-than-malevolent. Non-malevolentism thus makes an assumption about all possible worlds. Malevolentism , by contrast, need only assume that for at least one possible universe, the source and fount of that universe is not-less-than-malevolent. Malevolentism therefore involves the more privitive assumption, and is more justified than non-malevolentism per the normal and standard epistemological principle that assumptions must be kept to a minimum.

Why can "not-less-than-personal" be substituted with any number of other adjectives?

[Ionian_Tradition]

...All true thought, if it is to be named such, requires contextualization to some degree...

How do we know this?

Uncontextualized thoughts are logically incoherent and therefore cannot constitute intelligent thought. Consider the concept of "pain". "Pain" as a concept is only made intelligible with reference to physical sensation. In the absence of experiential knowledge regarding what physical sensation implies, the concept of "pain" could never be coherently formed ("pain" without reference to sensation is a contradiction in terms). Thus physical sensation serves as the contextual framework from which the concept of "pain" derives its coherency.

This same principle applies for all thoughts. There is no coherent thought which can exist which is not first made in reference to some subjective experience. Again, this is because experiential knowledge provides the contextual framework from which coherent thoughts are formed. It will be incumbent upon you to show why this need not be the case if you wish to pose a serious challenge to the argument I have presented.

Why should we believe it to be true?

Because its negation would render all thought uncontextualized, and thus logically incoherent.

When do we know that the "to some degree" turns into "to some sufficient degree"?

The degree to which experiential context renders thoughts coherent is the degree to which it is sufficient.

...Experience is that which provides thought its context...

Experience of what? The material world? How do we know that the material world exists? All we know with any certainty is that "thoughts are occurring."

The material world may or may not be an illusion, but this is more or less irrelevant to the point. The fact remains that minds experience what is perceived to be a "material world". Such experiences provide the contextual framework within which coherent thoughts concerning a perceived reality are capable of forming. If the "material world" (illusion or not) was entirely divorced from experience, no thoughts concerning it would occur.

...In order for a mind to form substantive thoughts, it must rely on its own subjective experience to apply to its thoughts the necessary measure of context true thought demands...

Even if this were true of a finite mind, what evidence do we have that this is true for a mind which provides the context for all reality?

Context is acquired through experience. If this mind provides the context for anything, it will be context born from experience. By what means then has this mind gained experiential knowledge of itself? Surely not by touch, taste, smell, sight or hearing, lest you posit this mind as something material. The only remaining alternative left to a immaterial mind would be experience acquired through the awareness of its own thoughts. However, as my argument has shown, thought cannot be experienced before it exists. Given that thought is contingent upon experience, the "non-contingent" mind of God seems be bereft of any viable means by which to begin thinking. Minds that cannot think are no minds at all. If thoughts are contingent upon experience in order to produce a functional (personal) mind, the person of God would seem to be quite contingent indeed.

...We might then say that thought is contingent upon experience...

Or we might say that finite experience is contingent upon possibilities actualized from the imagination of unbounded thought.

Imagination implies coherent conceptualization. Concepts require context in order to be made intelligible. Context is only acquired through subjective experience. I fear you're putting the cart before the horse my friend.

...A immaterial mind, by nature, lacks the physical apparatus necessary to experience anything beyond its own thoughts...

How do we know this? How many immaterial minds have you studied?

Well for one, if such a mind preceded the genesis of all things then I suppose experiential knowledge concerning such things would be somewhat absent prior to their very existence. Moreover, I am uncertain of the means by which, for instance, a non-spacial mind could logically acquire the means to attain experiential knowledge of spacial occupation, such that it might coherently conceive the concept of "space". In order for a non-spacial mind to experience spacial occupancy it must first cease to be what it is (a non-spacially located mind). As previously mentioned, this would imply the existence of space prior to the point where God actually conceived the concept which resulted in its creation. Quite the set of utterly absurd contradictions, if I may be so bold in saying.

...Therefore, it naturally requires experience of its own thoughts in order to form the contextual basis for intelligible thoughts conducive with personhood...

Why cannot thought provide its own contextual basis?

It can, provided it can be experienced. Unfortunately, experience of thought is required in order to conceive it. Thought cannot be experienced before it is conceived, thus thought alone cannot provide the contextual basis required in order to bring thought into existence.

...The experience of thought required to contextualize, and thus conceive, any intelligible thought cannot precede the existence of thought itself...

It must proceed in temporal sequence? What if unbounded thought is not arbitrarily limited in any spatio-temporal dimensions?

Context, derived from experience, is both logically and ontologically prior to thought itself. This certainly denotes a contingency you say the personal mind of God intrinsically lacks and also demonstrates why experiential context must precede the formation of all thought. If you place a thought in ontological priority over the contextual frame work from which it was derived, paradox invariably ensues.

...Therefore we may draw the following conclusions...

This argument begins and ends with assumptions which cannot be supported through evidence or reason; therefore, nothing whatsoever can be concluded.

Pardon my candor, but you've demonstrated nothing of the kind. The reader will require more than mere assertion in order to be satisfied that you've successfully rebutted my argument.