If God is good...Why do good?

[Ionian_Tradition]

I've often heard it posited by theists, in response to the all too popular modification of Plato's "Euthyphro dilemma", that it is God's intrinsic nature which forms the objective foundation for human morality. It is said that moral virtues such as honesty, kindness, self-sacrifice, and fairness are "good" because they are attributes of God's essential nature. In other words: God, being defined as omni-benevolent, is "good" by nature, thus any actions conducive with his/her/its nature are also by definition "good". From this notion emerges a standard, or rule of measurement, which allows us to juxtapose our actions with the character of God to determine if in fact our actions are a reflection of God's nature (and thus "good") or a privation of that nature (and thus evil). Hence an objective standard of "good" and "evil" is derived from God's nature....but I would argue that this standard is established at the expense of any objective requirement to do what is morally "good".

Granting the central premise of the argument, the assertion "God is good" provides us with, at most, a moral fact...but do moral facts beget moral duties? Can an "ought" be derived from an "is". If God IS "good" by nature, why is it objectively true that one OUGHT to do good by acting in accordance with that nature? Establishing God's nature as the objective source of good in no way demonstrates that human beings possess an objective obligation to perform actions which reflect that nature. So why do "good" at all? If one is by nature "evil", what objective moral duty requires one to abandon one's own nature in order to conform to the nature of another (God)?

The theist may retort that the threat of divine retribution provides proper intensive to do "good" and not "evil", but this "might makes right" mentality only serves to underscore the subjective nature of any moral duties which may be derived from such a notion. The threat of punishment for failing to acquiesce to the subjective desire of a God to conform to his/her/its own nature is hardly grounds upon which to establish an objective moral duty to do so. Though it may be objectively true that God subjectively desires for man to do "good", it is not objectively true that man ought to do as God desires.

The implications of this, I believe, render the terms "good" and "evil" devoid of moral substance, in that "good" and "evil" become merely descriptive terms, referring to actions which do or do not conform to God's intrinsic nature. They carry with them no objective moral obligation to prefer one over the other, and as such, they cannot instruct moral behavior. If God's nature is by definition "good"...Objective moral duties have yet to be accounted for as a result of that fact.

Question for debate: If God's intrinsic nature is the objective standard of "good", why is it OBJECTIVELY true that a man ought to conform to God's nature and do "good"?

[Ionian_Tradition]

As you have pointed out, you based your question on the premise that one hold Adonai as the standard of good for man. If someone with that view chimes in, I will step aside. Until then, let me point out that I believe that Adonai is the standard of unltimate or absolute good. However, it is not Adonai Himself, but Adonai's ways (for man) that are the standard of good for man. The temptation of the serpent was based on that false premise. It is not the purpose of man to become like Adonai, but to respect Adonai and keep Him commandments.

Would you be willing to say that it is Adonai's volition which determines what is good for a man and what is not?

Volition is an interesting choice in refering to a qualitative standard. That term primarily refers to the motivating force behind an action, not the qualitative definition of that action. Framing the discussion in this way presumes the principle of good intentions. We see the difficulty in this approach when we look at the sacrifice of Saul that cost him the throne. He claimed it was his intent to honor Adonai by making sacrifice, because Samuel was delayed in coming. This was a violation of HaTorah, because Saul was not a priest. When one overrides HaTorah on the basis of good intentions, such intentions then undermine the credibility of one's actions. This is because only Adonai and the person making the claim can conclusively validate the intentions of the individual. Therefore, the claimed "volition" of Adonai is not the determinator of what is generally considered good for man. It is the commandments of Adonai that determine that, because they were by defintion established by the volition of Adonai.

And would you say that Adonai, by virtue of his own volition, subjectively chooses what is good for man when listing it in the form of a commandment?

[cnorman18]

You probably have a contract with your mortgage holder or your insurance agent, possibly your employer or employees. Do those contracts specify general standards for Good and Evil outside the contractual relationship?

Standards? No. Practices which might be employed outside the bounds of the contract? Yes. But the moral quality of these principles stand undefined apart from an objective moral standard which actually distinguishes "good" from "evil".

Are you saying that the contract itself does not specify standards of good and evil? I would agree, and that was my point.

But then the following quote leaves me curious..

It certainly does NOT apply to Jews. First, in Jewish tradition, the Covenant allows us to hold God Himself to standards of morality that are higher than He..

Perhaps you are implying that the covenant itself is not the standard of morality which God is subject to but rather the covenant is that which grants men the right to hold God to a moral standard greater than himself? If so, what is this moral standard. How is it greater/higher than God? Is it objectively valid? If so, by what method might we demonstrate that such is indeed the case?

I don't know that Abraham was addressing God, in the teaching tale that contains this scene, in terms that were designed to fit your standards for debate. He told God, in so many words, that it was unjust to kill the innocent along with the guilty. God didn't ask why that was so; he seemed to accept it as stated. Perhaps He thought it was as self-evident as Abraham did, and as I do.


Is that not self-evident to you as well? If not, why not?

While it is evident to me that killing the innocent along side the guilty would be considered by many to be unjust...

Sorry, but if you haven't figured this out by now, I'm not a big fan of abstruse theoretical debate. You aren't answering my question. Is it not self-evident to YOU that killing the innocent along with the guilty is wrong? I didn't ask whether you thought it would "be considered by many" to be unjust. Is it unjust by YOUR standards? If so, why? If not, why not? Please don't attempt to claim that you have no opinion. THAT would be sophistry and nonsense.

...it is not evident to me that this is objectively true or that there exists an objective obligation for both God and men to be just. And given that you claim to reject the existence of objective moral duties and obligations, the same ought apply for you....Unless of course you're being inconsistent. Which is it? Is God objectively obligated to adhere to this self evident "higher moral standard" you posit (and have yet to define) or do you stand by your initial assertion:

In any case, morality ISN'T objective;

Well?

See below.

Why is it objectively true that I should not do to my neighbor what is hateful to myself? Surely not because rabbi Hillel tells me so...

Perhaps Hillel assumed that his listener possessed enough common sense to understand that his "neighbor" was a person like himself, and enough human compassion to understand that he ought not inflict pain upon him that he himself did not want to endure. Perhaps it was the rather obvious inference that "what goes around comes around," and that if one went about doing unpleasant things to one's neighbors, they might eventually do the same to me.

And this "common sense" reasoning, predicated upon a subjective desire to be treated well by others, is Hillel's OBJECTIVE justification for a moral obligation which requires that all men, everywhere, love their neighbor as themselves? Was this to be a legitimate answer to my question? How can an OBJECTIVE moral obligation (which applies to all men) be predicated upon a SUBJECTIVE desire (by some men) for reciprocal altruism to be practiced among neighbors? You do understand that "subjective desire" and "objective obligation" are not one in the same do you not?

Of course; and, if you don't mind terribly, you might work on your rather nasty and rude habit of patronizing me every chance you get.

The phrase is "one AND the same," by the way, and if you end a sentence with an interrogatory clause of address, e.g. "do you not?" it should be set off with a comma. If you want to flaunt your superior intellect and erudition with me, you'd better write flawless, nay, bulletproof English prose.

Now: I have said that morality isn't objective; but it isn't subjective, as in an individual personal decision, either. I have said that it is collective, determined by the consensus of the community. In the case of the Jews, by the wisest and best of our people over the course of centuries, who are also identified by the consensus of the WHOLE community. Moral standards are not arbitrarily imposed by a Deity, but they are not at the mercy of the whims of individuals either.

I am not an atheist; I don't say that God has nothing to do with the equation. But I don't say that God has dictated moral standards that are eternal and unchangeable, either. In Jewish teaching, God gave the Torah -- which of course includes moral teachings -- to the Jewish people; but since then, the meaning of the Torah itself, and therefore the specifics of moral judgment and standards, are the responsibility of humans in the terms which I have outlined above.

There is a teaching story in the Talmud, which I have quoted many times on this forum, that speaks directly to that point -- a story wherein the head of a council of rabbis rebukes God for interfering in their deliberations, and which goes on to say that God was pleased by this development.

And then again, it might be the ancient Jewish assumption that people are expected to have a capacity for intelligent moral judgment themselves, and aren't to be dependent on Eternal Rules imposed by an Authority, whether from someone's idea of Logic or from God.

Define "intelligent moral judgment". Is there a standard by which we can measure the moral judgment of another to determine if their judgment is indeed intelligent? Can you make a case for intelligent moral judgments without appealing to a subjective, and fundamentally arbitrary, definition of "moral intelligence"?

I believe I have dealt with that question adequately above. "Subjective" and "objective" are a false dichotomy in this case. Moral standards are reached collectively, not individually, and thus cannot be said to be "arbitrary."

You say "one should do good because it is good to be good" but why is it objectively true that one ought to prefer what is good over the converse? You've not accounted for this.

I'll leave that question to the ivory-tower philosophers. Most five-year-olds seem to grasp it without a detailed justification. It's better to be the good guy than the bad guy, whether you're watching Spongebob Squarepants or Criminal Minds.

Am I to take your answer as such? "Well, it works for 5 year olds"....Its a wonder that, with such depth of philosophical insight, my young nephew hasn't been invited to lecture at Cambridge....

If you think that cheap, facile sarcasm is appropriate in a civil, rational debate, perhaps you are not quite the brilliant and highly-educated philosophical arbiter of truth that you seem to think you are.

Come now, I'm sure that even your 5 year old moral philosophers can see that even the nice guy sometimes finishes last. Can we truly say it is objectively "better" to ALWAYS to be the good guy if one can benefit from occasionally being the bad guy? Amusing as it is, your moral philosophy is not as robust as you seem to assume.

Whoever said that being moral ever had anything to do with being REWARDED? Abstruse and bloodless as it is, perhaps your OWN "moral philosophy" has more to do with supercilious sophistry and faux erudition than with actual real-life moral judgment.

Don't think I've ever met anyone (who was not a remarkably obstinate fundamentalist, anyway) who actually holds that view. Most Christians seem to hold that "good" and "God" are congruent, like "circle" and "round." God could no more be evil than a circle could have corners. Which one determines the other? It's a nonsense question.

Christian apologists Dr. William lane Craig...

Who is most famous for defending the Kalam Cosmological Argument and both the historicity and moral rightness of the massacres in the OT, and thus qualifies in my opinion. Richard Dawkins refuses to debate him; here's why.

...John Lennox...

Who is a mathematician, not a theologian or moral philosopher; and he argues that God is necessary for morality to exist. I've got no problem with that; God may very well be from where the concept of morality first came -- indeed, Judaism is often characterized as the first ethical monotheism, which first connected belief in a Supreme Being with moral behavior -- but the specific standards of morality are quite another matter.

and Alvin Plantinga come to mind...

Here is Plantinga's article on the Divine Command theory. He doesn't appear to be a huge fan, as far as I can see. Here's a quote:

The divine command theorist, then, need not concede that morality is based merely on God’s whims; he can maintain that it is God’s love for us and concern for our well-being, or our desires and interests, or anything else that might inform God’s commands, that is the ultimate reason why morality is as it is.

One -- or YOU, at any rate -- might ask why God would believe that it's better to love humankind and be concerned for our well-being, or care about our concerns and interests, and how He would justify those priorities; but it's apparent that Plantinga implies another standard to which God Himself refers -- or perhaps even that God Himself is good, as a circle is round. In any case, he's not exactly of the "God said so, therefore it's good" school, which you seem to imply here.

It might be unwise to assume that I'm totally unfamiliar with thinkers to whose work I do not refer and in which I am not particularly interested; and you might also remember that I am a Jew. Christian apologists aren't at the top of my reading list, and I don't think anyone's proposed a rule that says they have to be.

Want to compare knowledge of Jewish thinkers now? I'm ready.

Far from obstinate fundamentalists.

Like I said, Lane qualifies, in my opinion; and the other two don't seem to be arguing against my own ideas -- which you don't quite seem to grasp, but apparently feel free to make assumptions about anyway.

My argument is a response to an attempt, made by a number of christian apologists, to reconcile the Euthypro dilemma with the assertion that God is the objective standard of human morality. With all due respect, I believe your unfamiliarity with this topics stems more from an ignorance of modern Christian apologetics then from your assertion that only a minority of obstinate fundamentalists hold this view.

With all due respect, I believe your unwarranted assumptions about my unfamiliarity with Christian theology and philosophy in general comes more from an ignorance of modern Jewish belief and teachings than from your implicit assertion that my views are childish, amateurish and uneducated.

This might be a good time to tell you that before I converted to Judaism, I was an ordained Christian minister trained in a liberal Methodist seminary. It might behoove you not to assume that I'm an ignorant Yahoo because I don't agree with you and have another perspective, which is informed by neither atheism nor Christianity -- though I am pretty well-versed in both.

Speaking for many Jews -- that God is absolutely good is one of the things about Him that we cannot claim to know, anyway. Isaiah 45:7 has always been a bit of a conundrum in that respect.

So its possible that God is a little good and a little evil then? God is sounding more human all the time.

Another facile, snide, and clearly disparaging throwaway line. Apparently you don't know that the Jewish religion does not presume to define the nature of God.

If you're going to presume to pontificate and sit in high judgment upon the beliefs and approaches of others, you might take the time to grow a bit more familiar with ideas from other traditions and other approaches -- and even take them seriously, as opposed to smearing them with implications that they are based on childishness and ignorance.

But given that your moral philosophy has yet to establish "good" and "evil" as anything more than a set of relative, and fundamentally meaningless, terms, I suppose a morally ambiguous God is the least of your problems.

I may not have established my "moral philosophy" -- which is not mine alone, but is part of the broad, pluralistic, and primarily PRACTICAL spectrum of Jewish thought, about which you very clearly know virtually nothing -- to YOUR satisfaction; but you really have no warrant to dismiss it as "meaningless."

If you're going to behave as if you are my professor of theology and philosophy, I'd like to see a contract. I've studied under minds much greater than yours -- Albert Outler, Schubert M. Ogden, and William R. Farmer, for starters. Don't put on airs with me, dude. You're not smart enough.

If such is truly your stance then I believe we have little to debate regarding this particular topic. Though this would seem to remove any objective obligation to pursue "righteousness" from your world view. More over, "good" and "evil" become relative terms in the absence of an objective standard to define them.

Only if you're willing to use that specious bit of rationalization, that if something cannot be proven beyond doubt in rigid logic and made into unquestionable dogma, then it is meaningless and not worth consideration.

No comment on this observation, I see. Why is that? DO you believe that something must be proven beyond doubt in rigid logic and made into unquestionable dogma before it can be said to have meaning or be worth considering?

Like I said; Jewish tradition assumes a human obligation to use one's common sense and capacity for moral judgment. Not doing so is being less than human. Humans are not machines, that need unambiguous programming. If you choose to live so -- well, that's no one else's responsibility.

Though appealing to "common sense" in this matter may provide you with a bit of solace...

Is there some reason that you think I might require "solace"?

...moral philosophy is not as accommodating as you would wish it to be. If one cannot clearly define "right" from "wrong" in objective terms the terms themselves become meaningless.

Ah. I suppose that is an answer to my observation above. If it can't be objectively defined and rigidly proven, it has no meaning at all.

Sorry; your own idea of "moral philosophy" strikes me as smug intellectual boardgaming. I suppose I do prefer something a bit more "accommodating" -- aka, a bit less rigid and rarefied and a bit more humanly practical. Your own approach leaves just a BIT to be desired -- for instance:

If a powerful man's common sense intuitions lead him to conclude that exploiting and abusing the weak for personal gain is "right", what standard of "right" and "wrong" can you refer him to in order to demonstrate that his intuitions are truly flawed?

How about "do unto others?" Remember that? If this man's "common sense intuitions" truly tell him that that ancient and universal standard is trumped by his own greed and callousness, and he is neither consciously hypocritical nor demented (either of which is far more likely than that he actually believes this) -- it's irrelevant; sophistry and solipsism don't matter a pin in the real world. It's inarguably true that his professed "standards" violate the rather well-established collective consensus of every society in human history. Maybe that doesn't qualify as "objective obligation" to you in rigid, ivory-tower philosophical terms, but I think that most of us ignorant yahoos would still say that it's a pretty authoritative standard -- and that it might be unwise to toss it out the window for philosophical considerations.

The conclusions you've drawn from your own common sense intuitions? Can you demonstrate that the conclusions drawn from your own moral intuitions are more accurate than his own? Without appealing to an objective standard of "right" and "wrong" you surely cannot.

I just did. Virtually every thinking human from the beginning of civilization agrees with them, even those who violate them -- proven by the fact that those who do generally make some effort to CONCEAL those violations. Again, that may not constitute rigidly steel-riveted intellectual and philosophical "proof" -- but then, that kind of "proof" doesn't count for much in the courtroom or on the street.

Like I said, "objective and rigidly proven" and "subjective and arbitrary" are not the only alternatives here. There is also "collective consensus." That can be erroneous in retrospect -- slavery is the best-known example -- but it is also self-correcting over time. I think it beats both rarefied theoretical philosophy which has a problematic relationship with real life, and an assertion of "meaninglessness" which implies that there are no standards at all.

How then can you say that anything is truly "right" or "wrong"? How can you claim this man is less "morally intelligent" than you and those who share your moral proclivities? Forgive me, but your moral philosophy seems a junkyard of confused rhetoric, comprised of meaningless terms that are bereft of the capacity to instruct moral behavior.

Everybody's entitled to their opinion, but YOUR "moral philosophy" seems to me to be a members-only private library open only to other smug, intellectually arrogant and overconfident pedants more interested in playing theoretical games than in actual, real-world, blood-and-bone moral judgment and action -- and one that is, not incidentally, totally unaware of three thousand years of Jewish thought on the subject.

Judaism has held for many centuries that the THEORETICAL side of morality and ethics does not have to be totally, objectively proven, justified beyond question, and carved in stone -- you'll pardon the expression -- before it can be PRACTICALLY applied. You may disagree. Fine; next time you have a moral decision to make, sit down and work out all the implications and try to prove that your standard for making that decision is objectively, provably and unquestionably true. For my own part, I regard most moral decisions as fairly obvious, and I don't like to let my coffee get cold while I prove that it's bad to cheat my neighbors or good to feed the hungry.

When they are NOT obvious, I do as intelligent people who are members of an actual society, as opposed to isolated theoreticians, have done for millennia; I consult the tradition and heritage of thought of my own people and that of others, in PRACTICAL terms, and then apply my own intelligence, experience, and judgment to the question. And I might even turn out to be wrong; but then I am human, and not an infallible machine with inflexible standards of rigid programming which is theoretically always objectively correct.

We had an expression for people who were obsessed with theological and doctrinal "rightness" and self-consciously displayed public piety in the Methodist Church: we used to say that they were "so heavenly-minded that they were no earthly good." I can't think of an analogous expression to describe people so obsessed with philosophical theoreticals and rigid logic that they can't tell right from wrong any more -- who, for instance, think it's perfectly acceptable and right to sneer at and disparage and demean, with snide and thinly-veiled insults, others who merely disagree with them -- but I suppose there's a need to come up with one.

Perhaps we should just agree to disagree. I'd hate to see you take another run at "subtly" attempting to portray me as a benighted, ignorant, perhaps semiliterate fool and have it blow up in your face again.

[bluethread]

And would you say that Adonai, by virtue of his own volition, subjectively chooses what is good for man when listing it in the form of a commandment?

Yes, just as you, by virtue of your volition, subjectively choose what is good for your children(presuming you have any), when you list the rules of your household.

[Ionian_Tradition]

You probably have a contract with your mortgage holder or your insurance agent, possibly your employer or employees. Do those contracts specify general standards for Good and Evil outside the contractual relationship?

Standards? No. Practices which might be employed outside the bounds of the contract? Yes. But the moral quality of these principles stand undefined apart from an objective moral standard which actually distinguishes "good" from "evil".

Are you saying that the contract itself does not specify standards of good and evil? I would agree, and that was my point.

Fair enough.

Sorry, but if you haven't figured this out by now, I'm not a big fan of abstruse theoretical debate. You aren't answering my question. Is it not self-evident to YOU that killing the innocent along with the guilty is wrong? I didn't ask whether you thought it would "be considered by many" to be unjust. Is it unjust by YOUR standards? If so, why? If not, why not? Please don't attempt to claim that you have no opinion. THAT would be sophistry and nonsense.

I would myself stand among the many who consider such an act "unjust". Though I claim no objective validity to my own socio-culturally conditioned, and purely subjective, moral opinion regarding the matter. Which underscores my point, though my conditioned moral inclinations concerning the act itself may hold an appearance of self evident validity, what appears to be "self evident" to me may not in fact be objectively valid. Without an objective standard of "justice" by which to measure the validity of my stance, my "self evident" conclusion, born from my subjective moral preferences, may be little more than conjecture. You appeal to the "self evident" as if it provides you, or myself, a solid basis upon which to root our moral conclusions. Though it may, on a superficial level, serve some practical purpose, deeper inspection reveals just how precarious an appeal to what seems "self evident" truly is. Now I understand you're not a fan, but philosophy is the art of looking deeply. If you have no interest in looking beneath the practical and superficial, you would do well to avoid discussion with those who do...It might prevent further frustration on your part.

...it is not evident to me that this is objectively true or that there exists an objective obligation for both God and men to be just. And given that you claim to reject the existence of objective moral duties and obligations, the same ought apply for you....Unless of course you're being inconsistent. Which is it? Is God objectively obligated to adhere to this self evident "higher moral standard" you posit (and have yet to define) or do you stand by your initial assertion:

In any case, morality ISN'T objective;

Well?

See below.

Why is it objectively true that I should not do to my neighbor what is hateful to myself? Surely not because rabbi Hillel tells me so...

Perhaps Hillel assumed that his listener possessed enough common sense to understand that his "neighbor" was a person like himself, and enough human compassion to understand that he ought not inflict pain upon him that he himself did not want to endure. Perhaps it was the rather obvious inference that "what goes around comes around," and that if one went about doing unpleasant things to one's neighbors, they might eventually do the same to me.

And this "common sense" reasoning, predicated upon a subjective desire to be treated well by others, is Hillel's OBJECTIVE justification for a moral obligation which requires that all men, everywhere, love their neighbor as themselves? Was this to be a legitimate answer to my question? How can an OBJECTIVE moral obligation (which applies to all men) be predicated upon a SUBJECTIVE desire (by some men) for reciprocal altruism to be practiced among neighbors? You do understand that "subjective desire" and "objective obligation" are not one in the same do you not?

Of course; and, if you don't mind terribly, you might work on your rather nasty and rude habit of patronizing me every chance you get.

The phrase is "one AND the same," by the way, and if you end a sentence with an interrogatory clause of address, e.g. "do you not?" it should be set off with a comma. If you want to flaunt your superior intellect and erudition with me, you'd better write flawless, nay, bulletproof English prose.

While I appreciate the grammatical critique, I can't help but note the fantastic irony emanating from this response and those subsequent to it.. None the less, it was never my intention to offend you sir. Perhaps you mistake a friendly dialectic joust with an attack on your character. Your rather embellished interpretation regarding the implications of my previous post are not an accurate representation of my intentions.

Now: I have said that morality isn't objective; but it isn't subjective, as in an individual personal decision, either. I have said that it is collective, determined by the consensus of the community. In the case of the Jews, by the wisest and best of our people over the course of centuries, who are also identified by the consensus of the WHOLE community. Moral standards are not arbitrarily imposed by a Deity, but they are not at the mercy of the whims of individuals either.

So to avoid the problems surrounding the subjective opinion of the individual you defer to the collective subjective opinions of the community? Opinions, be they held by the individual or agreed upon by communal consensus, are still by nature subjective. Simply because a collection of individuals communally share a particular moral opinion does not mean that this collection of identical opinions somehow shed their subjectivity in light of mutual consensus. What you really have is a group of many subjective opinions disguised as one by virtue of the fact that they're all alike.

In truth, this line of reasoning seems little more than the old "argumentum ad populum"...a logical fallacy. The fact remains, though the community may mutually agree that a particular moral tenet is "right", their shared opinion is not enough to validate it as such...Not in any objective sense....which would leave you with the alternative. There is no middle ground between objective truth and subjective opinion my friend...No matter how many subjective minds you throw into the mix.

I am not an atheist; I don't say that God has nothing to do with the equation. But I don't say that God has dictated moral standards that are eternal and unchangeable, either.

Fascinating no doubt, but this stance renders your position irrelevant to the OP. Which begs the question, If you do not believe that God is the source of objective moral values and duties, why are we having this discussion? Perhaps you might consider starting another thread and presenting your Jewish instructed moral position there for scrutiny. I might even drop by and put in a word or two.

In Jewish teaching, God gave the Torah -- which of course includes moral teachings -- to the Jewish people; but since then, the meaning of the Torah itself, and therefore the specifics of moral judgment and standards, are the responsibility of humans in the terms which I have outlined above.

Are you saying God gave human beings a set of moral commandments and then said "interpret these as you will and once a consensus is reached, practice them according to what has been communally agreed upon? If so, this moral stance is subjective from top to bottom.

And then again, it might be the ancient Jewish assumption that people are expected to have a capacity for intelligent moral judgment themselves, and aren't to be dependent on Eternal Rules imposed by an Authority, whether from someone's idea of Logic or from God.

Define "intelligent moral judgment". Is there a standard by which we can measure the moral judgment of another to determine if their judgment is indeed intelligent? Can you make a case for intelligent moral judgments without appealing to a subjective, and fundamentally arbitrary, definition of "moral intelligence"?

I believe I have dealt with that question adequately above. "Subjective" and "objective" are a false dichotomy in this case. Moral standards are reached collectively, not individually, and thus cannot be said to be "arbitrary."

Contrary to your self affirming response, you've done nothing of the sort. Replacing individual opinion with collective opinion does not render opinion itself less subjective. Opinion, or consensus, is by nature subjective if it is derived and agreed upon by subjective minds.

You say "one should do good because it is good to be good" but why is it objectively true that one ought to prefer what is good over the converse? You've not accounted for this.

I'll leave that question to the ivory-tower philosophers. Most five-year-olds seem to grasp it without a detailed justification. It's better to be the good guy than the bad guy, whether you're watching Spongebob Squarepants or Criminal Minds.

Am I to take your answer as such? "Well, it works for 5 year olds"....Its a wonder that, with such depth of philosophical insight, my young nephew hasn't been invited to lecture at Cambridge....

If you think that cheap, facile sarcasm is appropriate in a civil, rational debate, perhaps you are not quite the brilliant and highly-educated philosophical arbiter of truth that you seem to think you are.

Tough crowd? Come now, my light use of sarcasm is hardly grounds for deeming me uncivil. But perhaps the disingenuous manner in which you portray my self opinion is not far from uncivil. Shall we cease with the trivialities?

Come now, I'm sure that even your 5 year old moral philosophers can see that even the nice guy sometimes finishes last. Can we truly say it is objectively "better" to ALWAYS to be the good guy if one can benefit from occasionally being the bad guy? Amusing as it is, your moral philosophy is not as robust as you seem to assume.

Whoever said that being moral ever had anything to do with being REWARDED? Abstruse and bloodless as it is, perhaps your OWN "moral philosophy" has more to do with supercilious sophistry and faux erudition than with actual real-life moral judgment.

Such venom cnorman....Given that you never provided a comprehensive definition of what actually constitutes as "better", it is not unreasonable to assume that there are those who might consider a moral stance which produces the most benefit to themselves, or to their society, "better" than a moral stance which provides very little benefit...or no benefit at all. What exactly do you mean when you say "it is better to be the good guy" if not that being the "good guy" is "better" because it is most beneficial for the individual and for those affected by the moral choices of the individual?

Don't think I've ever met anyone (who was not a remarkably obstinate fundamentalist, anyway) who actually holds that view. Most Christians seem to hold that "good" and "God" are congruent, like "circle" and "round." God could no more be evil than a circle could have corners. Which one determines the other? It's a nonsense question.

Christian apologists Dr. William lane Craig...

Who is most famous for defending the Kalam Cosmological Argument and both the historicity and moral rightness of the massacres in the OT, and thus qualifies in my opinion. Richard Dawkins refuses to debate him; here's why.

Considering the fact that Craig rejects the doctrine of biblical inerrancy and holds an agnostic position regarding the theory of evolution, I believe counting him among the ranks of obstinate fundamentalists might offend fundamentalists...at least the obstinate ones.

...John Lennox...

Who is a mathematician, not a theologian or moral philosopher; and he argues that God is necessary for morality to exist. I've got no problem with that; God may very well be from where the concept of morality first came -- indeed, Judaism is often characterized as the first ethical monotheism, which first connected belief in a Supreme Being with moral behavior -- but the specific standards of morality are quite another matter.

Though a mathematician by profession, the apologetic arguments he puts forward regarding morality ARE philosophical in nature. I trust you do not dismiss his arguments on account of his profession. Such would be to commit the genetic fallacy. With that said, if morality is by origin a conceptualization born from the mind of a deity, it is rendered, at its most fundamental level, subjective....Making your appeal to communal consensus as that which makes morality non-subjective a bit silly...Given that morality is fundamentally the product of one mind...not many. But rest easy, you won't have to defend this given that we've already established that the number of minds which agree on a given opinion have no bearing whatsoever on whether or not that opinion is subjective in nature.

and Alvin Plantinga come to mind...

Here is Plantinga's article on the Divine Command theory. He doesn't appear to be a huge fan, as far as I can see. Here's a quote:

The divine command theorist, then, need not concede that morality is based merely on God’s whims; he can maintain that it is God’s love for us and concern for our well-being, or our desires and interests, or anything else that might inform God’s commands, that is the ultimate reason why morality is as it is.

One -- or YOU, at any rate -- might ask why God would believe that it's better to love humankind and be concerned for our well-being, or care about our concerns and interests, and how He would justify those priorities; but it's apparent that Plantinga implies another standard to which God Himself refers -- or perhaps even that God Himself is good, as a circle is round. In any case, he's not exactly of the "God said so, therefore it's good" school, which you seem to imply here.

Given that Plantiga considers God's love for human kind and concern for our well being to be aspects of his own intrinsic nature, the argument I put forward in the OP stands applicable. Just as it is applicable to your circle analogy. Facts concerning God's nature do not instruct moral behavior. Thus objective moral duties cannot be derived from merely granting God the appellation "good".

It might be unwise to assume that I'm totally unfamiliar with thinkers to whose work I do not refer and in which I am not particularly interested; and you might also remember that I am a Jew. Christian apologists aren't at the top of my reading list, and I don't think anyone's proposed a rule that says they have to be.

Want to compare knowledge of Jewish thinkers now? I'm ready.

I never said apologetic literature had to be at the top of your reading list, but if you're going to make the blanket claim that only a small minority of "obstinate fundamentalist Christians" consider God's nature to be the standard of objective morality, it might behoove you to familiarize yourself with information that stands in direct opposition of your preconceived notions before doing so....Lest you end up sounding a bit silly.

Far from obstinate fundamentalists.

Like I said, Lane qualifies, in my opinion; and the other two don't seem to be arguing against my own ideas -- which you don't quite seem to grasp, but apparently feel free to make assumptions about anyway.

All three support a position you claimed was held only by obstinate fundamentalists...I have demonstrated that your misguided generalization was indeed false. That is all I set out to do. Whether or not their position conflicts with your own is irrelevant.

My argument is a response to an attempt, made by a number of christian apologists, to reconcile the Euthypro dilemma with the assertion that God is the objective standard of human morality. With all due respect, I believe your unfamiliarity with this topics stems more from an ignorance of modern Christian apologetics then from your assertion that only a minority of obstinate fundamentalists hold this view.

With all due respect, I believe your unwarranted assumptions about my unfamiliarity with Christian theology and philosophy in general comes more from an ignorance of modern Jewish belief and teachings than from your implicit assertion that my views are childish, amateurish and uneducated.

How my assumptions regarding your knowledge of christian APOLOGETICS correlates with my knowledge of your personal beliefs I will never know..

This might be a good time to tell you that before I converted to Judaism, I was an ordained Christian minister trained in a liberal Methodist seminary. It might behoove you not to assume that I'm an ignorant Yahoo because I don't agree with you and have another perspective, which is informed by neither atheism nor Christianity -- though I am pretty well-versed in both.

Ignorant yahoo? Who is running with false assumptions here? Never have I assumed you were such. I believe your emotions are clouding your perceptions. Please do not put words in my mouth.

Speaking for many Jews -- that God is absolutely good is one of the things about Him that we cannot claim to know, anyway. Isaiah 45:7 has always been a bit of a conundrum in that respect.

So its possible that God is a little good and a little evil then? God is sounding more human all the time.

Another facile, snide, and clearly disparaging throwaway line. Apparently you don't know that the Jewish religion does not presume to define the nature of God.

If you're going to presume to pontificate and sit in high judgment upon the beliefs and approaches of others, you might take the time to grow a bit more familiar with ideas from other traditions and other approaches -- and even take them seriously, as opposed to smearing them with implications that they are based on childishness and ignorance.

Temper, temper my friend. I judge no one, but I am entitled to draw what implications I please. If my assessment is false then correct it, but do not dismiss it out of hand by virtue of the false assumption that I narcissistically fancy myself the pontiff judge over your beliefs.

But given that your moral philosophy has yet to establish "good" and "evil" as anything more than a set of relative, and fundamentally meaningless, terms, I suppose a morally ambiguous God is the least of your problems.

I may not have established my "moral philosophy" -- which is not mine alone, but is part of the broad, pluralistic, and primarily PRACTICAL spectrum of Jewish thought, about which you very clearly know virtually nothing -- to YOUR satisfaction; but you really have no warrant to dismiss it as "meaningless."

If you're going to behave as if you are my professor of theology and philosophy, I'd like to see a contract. I've studied under minds much greater than yours -- Albert Outler, Schubert M. Ogden, and William R. Farmer, for starters. Don't put on airs with me, dude. You're not smart enough.

While I find your posturing amusing, I will decline to respond in kind and instead call attention to the ironic manner in which you insult my own intelligence while falsely accusing me of insulting your own. What would rabbi Hillel think I wonder?..."Do unto others".. right?

If such is truly your stance then I believe we have little to debate regarding this particular topic. Though this would seem to remove any objective obligation to pursue "righteousness" from your world view. More over, "good" and "evil" become relative terms in the absence of an objective standard to define them.

Only if you're willing to use that specious bit of rationalization, that if something cannot be proven beyond doubt in rigid logic and made into unquestionable dogma, then it is meaningless and not worth consideration.

No comment on this observation, I see. Why is that? DO you believe that something must be proven beyond doubt in rigid logic and made into unquestionable dogma before it can be said to have meaning or be worth considering?

In matters of morality, yes a concrete definition of "right" and "wrong" that is established to be true beyond a reasonable doubt would be preferable. Lest the rapist have just as equal claim to the moral high ground as Rabbi Hillel....At least philosophically. "Good" and "evil" as relative terms render the quality of moral acts indistinguishable from one another. If say, cannibalism can be both "good" and "evil", relative to societal consensus, the terms become meaningless...At least in regard to instructing moral behavior..and isn't that what we're after? A way to truly distinguish right from wrong so as to objectively determine our moral obligations to ourselves and one another? A definition of morality that is ultimately predicated upon subjective opinion cannot give you that.

Like I said; Jewish tradition assumes a human obligation to use one's common sense and capacity for moral judgment. Not doing so is being less than human. Humans are not machines, that need unambiguous programming. If you choose to live so -- well, that's no one else's responsibility.

Though appealing to "common sense" in this matter may provide you with a bit of solace...

Is there some reason that you think I might require "solace"?

You seem quite vexed my friend...I'm sure you could use a bit of solace.

...moral philosophy is not as accommodating as you would wish it to be. If one cannot clearly define "right" from "wrong" in objective terms the terms themselves become meaningless.

Ah. I suppose that is an answer to my observation above. If it can't be objectively defined and rigidly proven, it has no meaning at all.

Sorry; your own idea of "moral philosophy" strikes me as smug intellectual boardgaming. I suppose I do prefer something a bit more "accommodating" -- aka, a bit less rigid and rarefied and a bit more humanly practical. Your own approach leaves just a BIT to be desired -- for instance:

If a powerful man's common sense intuitions lead him to conclude that exploiting and abusing the weak for personal gain is "right", what standard of "right" and "wrong" can you refer him to in order to demonstrate that his intuitions are truly flawed?

How about "do unto others?" Remember that? If this man's "common sense intuitions" truly tell him that that ancient and universal standard is trumped by his own greed and callousness, and he is neither consciously hypocritical nor demented (either of which is far more likely than that he actually believes this) -- it's irrelevant; sophistry and solipsism don't matter a pin in the real world. It's inarguably true that his professed "standards" violate the rather well-established collective consensus of every society in human history. Maybe that doesn't qualify as "objective obligation" to you in rigid, ivory-tower philosophical terms, but I think that most of us ignorant yahoos would still say that it's a pretty authoritative standard -- and that it might be unwise to toss it out the window for philosophical considerations.

Since when is "do unto others" a universal standard? War itself, as ancient as our species, is predicated upon NOT doing unto others what you would have them do unto you. Yet our common sense intuitions do not name it "immoral" so long as it is done in our defense, or rationalized in some other context. The fact of the matter is, there are philosophical implications which are somewhat problematic for your world view, yet you ignore them by fallaciously appealing to practical application and societal consensus. In truth, on a superficial level I can sympathize with you, I truly can. But we're doing philosophy here, and philosophy requires greater attention to nuance.

If your pragmatic view of morality, causes you an aversion toward deeper philosophical inspection of your beliefs, and if you feel adequately justified in those beliefs at face value, then who am I to argue? Let it be known however that this OP pertained to a deep philosophical inspection regarding the nature of morality, if looking deeply causes you discomfort or irritation, perhaps you're on the wrong thread.

The conclusions you've drawn from your own common sense intuitions? Can you demonstrate that the conclusions drawn from your own moral intuitions are more accurate than his own? Without appealing to an objective standard of "right" and "wrong" you surely cannot.

I just did. Virtually every thinking human from the beginning of civilization agrees with them, even those who violate them -- proven by the fact that those who do generally make some effort to CONCEAL those violations. Again, that may not constitute rigidly steel-riveted intellectual and philosophical "proof" -- but then, that kind of "proof" doesn't count for much in the courtroom or on the street.

The fear of retaliation by those who are negatively affected by one's actions, or a governing body which protects them, is NOT proof that one's actions were objectively wrong. Rather it is proof that one believes their actions ( "right" or "wrong") would most likely be met with retaliation by those who subjectively believe those actions to be immoral.. if of course they were caught..nothing more. Philosophically your argument does not stand. Appeal to practicality if you wish, but do so on another thread. We're doing philosophy here.

Like I said, "objective and rigidly proven" and "subjective and arbitrary" are not the only alternatives here. There is also "collective consensus." That can be erroneous in retrospect -- slavery is the best-known example -- but it is also self-correcting over time. I think it beats both rarefied theoretical philosophy which has a problematic relationship with real life, and an assertion of "meaninglessness" which implies that there are no standards at all.

Collective consensus is consensus of subjective opinion or preference. It is dripping with subjectivity. Just because everyone agrees upon a given proposition does not make it right or true. Remember, it is subjective minds doing the agreeing. Subjective minds, no matter how many, do not determine objective truth, and collectivity is not middle ground between objectivity and subjectivity. Collectivity, in the context you wish to employ it, is a set of subjective minds in unanimous agreement with one another....nothing more.

The very fact that the moral implications of slavery are so fluid in your world view demonstrates how fickle your terms truly are. Slavery was "good" but self-corrected to become eventually "evil"? What we're left with is one morally neutral act that is prescribed a moral quality by consensus, which can change over time...Your terms are enigmatic, how can you say any act is truly good or evil if its moral quality can be changed through the passing of time and consensus between subjective minds?

Everybody's entitled to their opinion, but YOUR "moral philosophy" seems to me to be a members-only private library open only to other smug, intellectually arrogant and overconfident pedants

I do as intelligent people who are members of an actual society, as opposed to isolated theoreticians, have done....

I can't think of an analogous expression to describe people so obsessed with philosophical theoreticals and rigid logic that they can't tell right from wrong any more -- who, for instance, think it's perfectly acceptable and right to sneer at and disparage and demean, with snide and thinly-veiled insults, others who merely disagree with them -- but I suppose there's a need to come up with one.

Oh the irony...But on a brighter note I found an expression to describe a certain Jewish friend of mine who thinks it's perfectly acceptable and right to sneer at and disparage and demean, with snide and thinly-veiled insults, others who merely disagree with him....."Hypocrite".

Perhaps we should just agree to disagree. I'd hate to see you take another run at "subtly" attempting to portray me as a benighted, ignorant, perhaps semiliterate fool and have it blow up in your face again.

Haha I like you cnorman, I really do...Yes I'm content to agree to disagree. Though if you actually want to talk philosophy without getting bent out of shape when your reasoning doesn't exactly stand up to scrutiny, you know where to find me. See you around the forum.

[cnorman18]

In looking back over the thread, I confess I do seem to have bristled a bit more than was either courteous or properly warranted by our conversation; but only a little. You DID, inarguably and without doubt, patronize me and sneer at some of my remarks; if you don't want to get cut off at the knees, you might try to avoid characterizing the thoughts of others as "amusing," "ignorant," and "a junkyard of meaningless terms," etc. Your tone was pretty obviously mocking and superior throughout your previous post, and your last, which professes to be surprised that anyone could infer that your patronizing and sneering was intended, was more than a little disingenuous. If you don't mean to come across as a smug pedant who disdains the opinions and knowledge of others as not up to his own highly superior standard, you might work on your style of communication just a bit. Surely this isn't the first time anyone has told you this.

In any case, I apologize for my responding in kind -- but if you are allowed to draw conclusions from my posts, so I am from yours; and I emphasize that I responded in kind. I shall overlook a few more such cheap shots in your last, in hopes that we can go on.

Back to the discussion, and hopefully leaving aside all rancor, I have a question that I think might be relevant. How, exactly, CAN one "objectively validate" a moral judgment? If moral standards are not given by God, and subjective human thought is "meaningless," what means IS there for objective validation of moral standards?

Perhaps if we establish that, we can go forward.

[cnorman18]

No reply after a week; I guess we're done.

From the silence in answer to the single question in my last post, I conclude that my original suspicion was right; according to this member, there IS no way to "objectively validate a moral judgment," and therefore this entire conversation was nothing more than an intellectual chess match. In the "art of philosophy," there is apparently no such thing as "objective morality," and therefore no such thing as morality at all. One wonders what the practical application of such a conclusion might be, other than giving one the opportunity to parade one's erudition, verbosity and intellectual superiority, take snide potshots at the intelligence and learning of others, and then huffily deny that intention and cast it back at whoever has the temerity to complain. That seems to be all that's left here.

[Ionian_Tradition]

No reply after a week; I guess we're done.

From the silence in answer to the single question in my last post, I conclude that my original suspicion was right; according to this member, there IS no way to "objectively validate a moral judgment," and therefore this entire conversation was nothing more than an intellectual chess match. In the "art of philosophy," there is apparently no such thing as "objective morality," and therefore no such thing as morality at all. One wonders what the practical application of such a conclusion might be, other than giving one the opportunity to parade one's erudition, verbosity and intellectual superiority, take snide potshots at the intelligence and learning of others, and then huffily deny that intention and cast it back at whoever has the temerity to complain. That seems to be all that's left here.

Ah cnorman, I see patience is not your strongest virtue...Enough with this self victimizing prattle. Have I not stressed, in appropriate measure, that it was never my intention to offend your intelligence? I would have hoped that a week would have sufficed in cooling both your temper and your tongue....A fallacious assumption on my part it would seem. If you indeed desire continued discourse between us regarding this topic then I would suggest you find the means to temper your emotions so that substantive dialogue may ensue. Fail in this regard, and I shall content myself to leave you to your embellished drivel.

Now, in regards to the search for an objective moral judgment...It is possible that such may be found, but before we commence our search I would ask that you define your terms. Define the word "moral" cnorman.


(If I do not respond immediately, please do not fret my friend. I am not ignoring you...I have business at the moment that is of some precedence which requires my attention. Rest assured I shall make every effort to respond to you when I am able.)

[cnorman18]

No reply after a week; I guess we're done.

From the silence in answer to the single question in my last post, I conclude that my original suspicion was right; according to this member, there IS no way to "objectively validate a moral judgment," and therefore this entire conversation was nothing more than an intellectual chess match. In the "art of philosophy," there is apparently no such thing as "objective morality," and therefore no such thing as morality at all. One wonders what the practical application of such a conclusion might be, other than giving one the opportunity to parade one's erudition, verbosity and intellectual superiority, take snide potshots at the intelligence and learning of others, and then huffily deny that intention and cast it back at whoever has the temerity to complain. That seems to be all that's left here.

Ah cnorman, I see patience is not your strongest virtue...Enough with this self victimizing prattle. Have I not stressed, in appropriate measure, that it was never my intention to offend your intelligence? I would have hoped that a week would have sufficed in cooling both your temper and your tongue....A fallacious assumption on my part it would seem. If you indeed desire continued discourse between us regarding this topic then I would suggest you find the means to temper your emotions so that substantive dialogue may ensue. Fail in this regard, and I shall content myself to leave you to your embellished drivel.

Now, in regards to the search for an objective moral judgment...It is possible that such may be found, but before we commence our search I would ask that you define your terms. Define the word "moral" cnorman.

(If I do not respond immediately, please do not fret my friend. I am not ignoring you...I have business at the moment that is of some precedence which requires my attention. Rest assured I shall make every effort to respond to you when I am able.)

Yes, sir. I do most humbly beg your pardon, sir.

mor·al/ˈmôrəl/
Adjective:
Concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human
character.

mor·al adj \ˈmȯr-əl, ˈmär-\

1a : of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior : ethical <moral judgments>
b : expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior <a moral poem>
c : conforming to a standard of right behavior
d : sanctioned by or operative on one's conscience or ethical judgment <a moral obligation>
e : capable of right and wrong action <a moral agent>

mor·al   [mawr-uhl, mor-]
adjective
1. of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principles or rules of right conduct or the distinction between right and wrong; ethical: moral attitudes.
2. expressing or conveying truths or counsel as to right conduct, as a speaker or a literary work; moralizing: a moral novel.
3. founded on the fundamental principles of right conduct rather than on legalities, enactment, or custom: moral obligations.
4. capable of conforming to the rules of right conduct: a moral being.
5. conforming to the rules of right conduct ( opposed to immoral): a moral man.

I think it would be fair and reasonable for me to ask you to define the term in return; what do you mean by the term "moral'? Are any of these definitions sufficient? If not, what definition would you suggest?

[Ionian_Tradition]

No reply after a week; I guess we're done.

From the silence in answer to the single question in my last post, I conclude that my original suspicion was right; according to this member, there IS no way to "objectively validate a moral judgment," and therefore this entire conversation was nothing more than an intellectual chess match. In the "art of philosophy," there is apparently no such thing as "objective morality," and therefore no such thing as morality at all. One wonders what the practical application of such a conclusion might be, other than giving one the opportunity to parade one's erudition, verbosity and intellectual superiority, take snide potshots at the intelligence and learning of others, and then huffily deny that intention and cast it back at whoever has the temerity to complain. That seems to be all that's left here.

Ah cnorman, I see patience is not your strongest virtue...Enough with this self victimizing prattle. Have I not stressed, in appropriate measure, that it was never my intention to offend your intelligence? I would have hoped that a week would have sufficed in cooling both your temper and your tongue....A fallacious assumption on my part it would seem. If you indeed desire continued discourse between us regarding this topic then I would suggest you find the means to temper your emotions so that substantive dialogue may ensue. Fail in this regard, and I shall content myself to leave you to your embellished drivel.

Now, in regards to the search for an objective moral judgment...It is possible that such may be found, but before we commence our search I would ask that you define your terms. Define the word "moral" cnorman.

(If I do not respond immediately, please do not fret my friend. I am not ignoring you...I have business at the moment that is of some precedence which requires my attention. Rest assured I shall make every effort to respond to you when I am able.)

Yes, sir. I do most humbly beg your pardon, sir.

mor·al/ˈmôrəl/
Adjective:
Concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human
character.

mor·al adj \ˈmȯr-əl, ˈmär-\

1a : of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior : ethical <moral judgments>
b : expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior <a moral poem>
c : conforming to a standard of right behavior
d : sanctioned by or operative on one's conscience or ethical judgment <a moral obligation>
e : capable of right and wrong action <a moral agent>

mor·al   [mawr-uhl, mor-]
adjective
1. of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principles or rules of right conduct or the distinction between right and wrong; ethical: moral attitudes.
2. expressing or conveying truths or counsel as to right conduct, as a speaker or a literary work; moralizing: a moral novel.
3. founded on the fundamental principles of right conduct rather than on legalities, enactment, or custom: moral obligations.
4. capable of conforming to the rules of right conduct: a moral being.
5. conforming to the rules of right conduct ( opposed to immoral): a moral man.

I think it would be fair and reasonable for me to ask you to define the term in return; what do you mean by the term "moral'? Are any of these definitions sufficient? If not, what definition would you suggest?

While the definition you've cited provides a broad overview of "morality", I believe it may lack the attention to nuance required for the purpose of our discussion. What can be derived from this particular definition is little more than a set of linguistic labels. "Moral", "good", "right", "ethical"...In and of themselves, these terms are meaningless. Just as the term "apple", in and of itself, is meaningless unless it is first linked in reference to a particular phenomenon (the traits and characteristics inherent within the physical phenomenon we've labeled "apple"). Likewise, In order to ascribe to our terms substantive value, we must first designate the phenomena to which they refer. So what is the phenomenon to which the term "morality" refers? I am content to work with whatever definition you provide, though ,for the purpose of moving the discussion along, I will submit the following for your approval:

"Morality" is that which refers to a particular set of actions which produce the result of promoting human happiness, health, and cooperative exchange between both individuals and societies collectively. In conjunction, these actions also serve the purpose of reducing unnecessary/gratuitous human harm or suffering.

What say you? Will this definition suffice? Or do you believe it requires further refinement?

[cnorman18]

No reply after a week; I guess we're done.

From the silence in answer to the single question in my last post, I conclude that my original suspicion was right; according to this member, there IS no way to "objectively validate a moral judgment," and therefore this entire conversation was nothing more than an intellectual chess match. In the "art of philosophy," there is apparently no such thing as "objective morality," and therefore no such thing as morality at all. One wonders what the practical application of such a conclusion might be, other than giving one the opportunity to parade one's erudition, verbosity and intellectual superiority, take snide potshots at the intelligence and learning of others, and then huffily deny that intention and cast it back at whoever has the temerity to complain. That seems to be all that's left here.

Ah cnorman, I see patience is not your strongest virtue...Enough with this self victimizing prattle. Have I not stressed, in appropriate measure, that it was never my intention to offend your intelligence? I would have hoped that a week would have sufficed in cooling both your temper and your tongue....A fallacious assumption on my part it would seem. If you indeed desire continued discourse between us regarding this topic then I would suggest you find the means to temper your emotions so that substantive dialogue may ensue. Fail in this regard, and I shall content myself to leave you to your embellished drivel.

Now, in regards to the search for an objective moral judgment...It is possible that such may be found, but before we commence our search I would ask that you define your terms. Define the word "moral" cnorman.

(If I do not respond immediately, please do not fret my friend. I am not ignoring you...I have business at the moment that is of some precedence which requires my attention. Rest assured I shall make every effort to respond to you when I am able.)

Yes, sir. I do most humbly beg your pardon, sir.

mor·al/ˈmôrəl/
Adjective:
Concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human
character.

mor·al adj \ˈmȯr-əl, ˈmär-\

1a : of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior : ethical <moral judgments>
b : expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior <a moral poem>
c : conforming to a standard of right behavior
d : sanctioned by or operative on one's conscience or ethical judgment <a moral obligation>
e : capable of right and wrong action <a moral agent>

mor·al   [mawr-uhl, mor-]
adjective
1. of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principles or rules of right conduct or the distinction between right and wrong; ethical: moral attitudes.
2. expressing or conveying truths or counsel as to right conduct, as a speaker or a literary work; moralizing: a moral novel.
3. founded on the fundamental principles of right conduct rather than on legalities, enactment, or custom: moral obligations.
4. capable of conforming to the rules of right conduct: a moral being.
5. conforming to the rules of right conduct ( opposed to immoral): a moral man.

I think it would be fair and reasonable for me to ask you to define the term in return; what do you mean by the term "moral'? Are any of these definitions sufficient? If not, what definition would you suggest?

While the definition you've cited provides a broad overview of "morality", I believe it may lack the attention to nuance required for the purpose of our discussion. What can be derived from this particular definition is little more than a set of linguistic labels. "Moral", "good", "right", "ethical"...In and of themselves, these terms are meaningless. Just as the term "apple", in and of itself, is meaningless unless it is first linked in reference to a particular phenomenon (the traits and characteristics inherent within the physical phenomenon we've labeled "apple"). Likewise, In order to ascribe to our terms substantive value, we must first designate the phenomena to which they refer. So what is the phenomenon to which the term "morality" refers? I am content to work with whatever definition you provide, though ,for the purpose of moving the discussion along, I will submit the following for your approval:

"Morality" is that which refers to a particular set of actions which produce the result of promoting human happiness, health, and cooperative exchange between both individuals and societies collectively. In conjunction, these actions also serve the purpose of reducing unnecessary/gratuitous human harm or suffering.

What say you? Will this definition suffice? Or do you believe it requires further refinement?

I think "refinement" can easily become an endless loop. For instance, in your own proposed definition; how does one determine the meaning of the words "happiness," "cooperative," "unnecessary/gratuituous," "harm" and "suffering"? Is there any way to objectively verify the meaning of any of those words without reference to subjective human opinions, either individual or consensus?

Further: even if we accept it, is such a utilitarian definition as yours not still dependent on consensus, or on the benefit to the majority? Here's a very old question that illustrates the problem: Suppose it were possible to guarantee the health, happiness, security, justice and peace of the entire world at the cost of the continuous torture of one small child. As long as a child is being burned, or flayed, or slowly torn to pieces with red-hot pincers -- choose your medieval technique -- the world will be a perfect Paradise for everyone else in it; but if that torment stops, the world returns to its normal chaotic, unjust, miserable and warring state. In that thought experiment, would torturing one child after another to death be right, or wrong? By your standard, it seems to me, it would be right. I rather disagree.

I don't see that your definition is any more useful than "concerned with right and wrong" or "good and evil." We're still dealing with the question I asked in the first place: If "morality" -- or "right and wrong" if you like, using whatever definition we choose -- cannot be determined by subjective human thought, and if there is no Divine authority to which we may appeal, how DOES one "objectively verify" ANY conclusion or judgment on such questions? IS there a way to do that? Why not just cut to the chase and answer that rather simple question?

It does not seem to me that that question depends on specific meanings or standards or "nuances," but on HOW one is to "objectively verify" ANY judgment one makes, by ANY standard.