The Tanager wrote:First, whether I'm doing something wrong or not does not depend on whether one can prove it so. What we should do in the lack of certainty, or what level of certainty is needed to act is another question.
I was going off the general assumption that people are innocent until proven guilty, and I probably shouldn't go about punishing people without high certainty that they've done something wrong.
The Tanager wrote:Second, I would be punishing someone who's done nothing wrong
only if you are right that there are different standards for different humans. So, obviously, this can't be an argument for there being different standards for different humans.
It wasn't meant to be an argument for differing standards. I simply pointed out that because I can't punish without certainty, and there might be differing standards, I cannot punish anyone.
The Tanager wrote:There aren't infinite possibilities. These are the three logical possibilities I see: (1) all bound by the same standard, (2) various groups bound by different standards (however many there are), or (3) none are bound by any standard. Considering nothing else, each of these has a 1 in 3 chance of being true.
They either flip independently or they don't. That's two possibilities, not an infinite amount of possibilities.
(3) is a subset of (1), if you want to order things like that. It demonstrates that when evidence for correlation is absent, independence should be assumed. In other words, each possibility is its own possibility, equally likely unless we have a good reason to believe it isn't.
Since (2) is composed of infinite possibilities, the whole set is.
The idea that pennies will somehow affect the flips of other pennies is the assumption. The idea that they won't is a nul assumption, which should be the default, but of course be discarded in the face of evidence.
Some people seem to assume everyone is bound by the same standard - that raping a child would be wrong for Bob if it's wrong for me - but there's a bizarre lack of evidence for this premise, often treated like an axiom.
The Tanager wrote:Let's make sure we mean the same things with the terms being used. The moral situations above are:
(a) Should you punch a Nazi?
(b) Should you punch a black supremacist?
(a) yes, you may (permissible)
(b) no, you may not (impermissible)
The Tanager wrote:Are you saying all of the following?:
(1) Person 1 is morally obligated to punch the Nazi but should not punch the black supremacist
(2) Person 2 is morally obligated to punch the black supremacist but should not punch the Nazi
(3) Person 3 is morally obligated to punch both types of people
(4) Person 4 is morally obligated to punch neither type of people
Or what are you arguing for?
I don't think there happens to be any moral obligation, only permissibility. So none of those. But cross out the
is morally obligated for
may, and I think (1) and (4) exist. I'm fairly confident that (2) does not exist in our universe, and I can't say whether (3) does or not. There is no argument for any of this, only direct evidence.
What I am claiming is that the moral standard changes depending upon the people involved; that to me it is fundamentally illogical, but here's how it plays out.
A. You may never punch a black supremacist for his ideology because it is always unacceptable to punch people for their ideology. No matter how horrible we find out the black supremacist's ideology is (even if he thinks eating white babies is permissible) he may never be punished for his beliefs, only his actions, because punishing people for beliefs is absolutely unacceptable at all times.
B. You may punch a Nazi for his ideology because it is acceptable to punch people for bad ideologies. The Nazi may be punished for beliefs, not just actions, because if an ideology is sufficiently bad, it is acceptable to punish for ideology and not just actions. Even if the Nazi just thinks white people > black people, and has no belief that harm to others is acceptable, he may still be punished.
...Both A and B are true. The axiom will shift depending on the situation, but it will still be an axiom. To me this is illogical but this does seem to be how it works.
The standard has changed because of
the person being punched, not the puncher. There may be people who are allowed to punch black supremacists; I wouldn't know.
But there are probably people who may not punch the Nazi, namely other Nazis, those on the alt-right, or even possibly conservatives. What I would conjecture based on the evidence is that these others are not morally high enough over the Nazi to punch him.