Is dualism true?

[harvey1]

Here's a paradox that seems that with today's brain scanning technologies one can envision how this paradox implies free will as well as dualism.

Imagine that you are the owner of a fantastic brain scanning machine that has recently been invented and is now harmlessly connected to your brain. The system is such that it can analyze the electro-chemical state of your brain, and based on that state can predict exactly what you will and must do next. Now, let's say that while sitting at the controls of this machine that it scans your brain upon pressing the green button and it comes back with, "you will press the purple button next." Now, upon hearing that you will press the purple button you decide to be a wise guy and you push the yellow button instead. The machine is wrong. But, how could it be wrong since it must know what your brain circuits would do upon hearing that you will press the purple button, and therefore the machine should be able to consider what your brain circuits would do even in that special case of knowing what you will do? If hearing that you would push the purple button, the machine must know that you would press the yellow button. However, if the machine told you that you would press the yellow button, then you would have surely not have pressed the yellow button. The machine must lie to you in order to predict your behavior. However, if it must lie to you, that means that it cannot predict your behavior by predicting your behavior. This suggests that there is no algorithm or scanning technology that the machine can use that predicts behavior when it has the task of reporting to you what your behavior will be. Therefore, the only way this could be true is if human behavior is indeterministic.

If human behavior is indeterministic, then wouldn't this mean that some form of dualism is true? That is, if no bridge laws exist that allow the machine to absolutely determine a human decision in all situations (as shown above), then the mental is not fully reducible to the physical. Dualism is the view that both the mental and physical exist, and existence is confirmed if the thing that is purported to exist cannot be explained in terms of other phenomena. Since the hypothetical machine cannot reduce every decision to a brain process that is scannable, wouldn't this suggest that there exists some non-physical component to the brain called the mind (i.e., dualism)?

[McCulloch]

True random number generators do exist. Radioactive decay, electronic noise, and weather patterns are all random processes; they can be harnessed to provide a stream of truly random numbers. Actually, a much simpler device, consisting of ping-pong balls with numbers on them, has been in use for many years now in order to generate winning lottery tickets. It would be fairly simple to use these random numbers as an input to a computer program; in fact, people have done so already.

Your ping pong ball device is not indeterminately random. The ping pong balls' behaviour is classically determined. If you had enough knowledge and enough computing power, you could determine the outcome. Apparently the only true source of randomness is quantum. However, I do not think that randomness causes free will. The proponents of free will believe that there is some causal factor that is neither determined nor random.

[Bugmaster]

Your ping pong ball device is not indeterminately random. The ping pong balls' behaviour is classically determined.

Eh, not really. Ultimately, the balls are brushing up against gas molecules in the air, which are random.

However, I do not think that randomness causes free will. The proponents of free will believe that there is some causal factor that is neither determined nor random.

I don't think that randomness (i.e., unpredictability) is equivalent to free will, either, but that's what Harvey seems to be saying.

[McCulloch]

Eh, not really. Ultimately, the balls are brushing up against gas molecules in the air, which are random.

Gas molecules are still governed by classic physics. A single gas molecule in a vacuum will not move randomly. They just seem random because there are a lot of them and their motion is not calculable.

I don't think that randomness (i.e., unpredictability) is equivalent to free will, either, but that's what Harvey seems to be saying.

I will let him speak for himself. But I think that his dualism provides two sources of unpredictability, beyond deterministic complexity. Firstly, quantum randomness, which has been empirically shown to exist. Secondly, entities in the spiritual realm. This is the part I find hard to accept.

[Bugmaster]

Gas molecules are still governed by classic physics. A single gas molecule in a vacuum will not move randomly. They just seem random because there are a lot of them and their motion is not calculable.

But I thought Brownian motion was ultimately caused by quantum effects ?

Firstly, quantum randomness, which has been empirically shown to exist. Secondly, entities in the spiritual realm. This is the part I find hard to accept.

Right. However, I simply don't see what unpredictability and/or randomness has to do with free will. Just because someone can predict all of my actions, doesn't mean that they control them... Actually, I find the concept of free will itself to be irrelevant, but that's another story.

[harvey1]

But, why wouldn't the Machine know exactly which button the device will select if the Machine has the algorithm and can run the same calculation as the device?

Because the Device has been programmed to never select the button predicted by the Machine. If the Machine predicts [6] then it knows that the Device will not select [6]. It then recalculates and determines that if the Machine predicted [6] then the device would select [1]. There is no need for infinite recursion.

Okay. This is a tricky issue. First, let me state a principle that I believe must be true for all finite devices making a calculation, and then let me summarize my position (I'll respond to your posts based on this summary):

If the state of the finite deterministic device is known by an omniscient Scanning Machine, then the Machine will always know every possible answer that the device will produce as its final answer

Now, I think this applies to even this example. Since all devices are finite, there must exist some point where the device is finally caught by an omniscient Machine that can anticipate every calculation, re-calculation, re-re-calculation, and onward to its last answer (which a finite machine would necessarily reach since it is finite). Therefore, in no case could a device outwit the omniscient Machine since for every answer that the device used to outwit the Machine, the Machine would already possess that answer in its counterfactual decision table. If the Machine went to transmit that last counterfactual decision table to the finite device, it would find that the transmission failed because the finite device reached its end of life. Therefore, the Machine has the last laugh.

Now, with regard to humans, the situation is entirely different. Humans aren't trying to outwit the Machine by out-calculating the Machine. A human could not possibly out-calculate an omniscient Machine. The Machine will always know what the human answer was going to be, except in the case the Machine tells the human what that answer is (or downloads the last counterfactual table showing what the Machine expects to happen). When that happens, the human just does something else.

Notice that with the finite device, the Machine and finite device keep trying to out guess each other until the device reaches its finite end, in which case it cannot download the last counterfactual decision table from the Machine, and therefore the last number shown in the device's register was successfully "guessed" by the Machine. The Machine just never reaches that point with a human being. The human just always knows that the Machine can never tell the human how he or she will behave.

So, realistically speaking, if we set a time limit of two seconds for the human and two seconds for the device in making a decision, the device will stop downloading tables and calculating after two seconds, and then give an answer that the Machine knows that the device will make, and the human will merely look at the last counterfactual table inside the Machine, and the human will just make the opposite choice that the Machine has calculated for the human. As it turns out, there could not be any number in the Machine since the Machine would not calculate a wrong number, so the human decision would return as indeterminate.

The Machine cannot accurately predict the Device even though the Machine has perfect knowledge of the Device's processes and algorithms. The Device's behaviour is completely deterministic.

This is impossible. If the device is deterministic, and the calculation of the device is done in a finite period, then the omniscient Machine must know the state of the device at the final moment of calculation. Since the Machine has counterfactual information of what the device would have calculated had the calculation continued, the Machine wins hands down. This is no big surprise if you agree with my General Principle of Finite Deterministic Devices shown above.

Now put a human in the place of the Device. If the Machine does not convey the prediction to the human, the Machine accurately predicts the human's behaviour. But if the Machine lets the human know its prediction, that prediction will affect the human's behaviour... The Machine cannot accurately predict the human even though the Machine has perfect knowledge of the human's processes and algorithms. The human's behaviour is completely deterministic.

Notice however, that all the human has to know is one question: "what do you think I will do Machine?" If the Machine does not answer honestly, then the human asks for its last counterfactual decision table, and the human does the opposite. Of course that table doesn't exist since there can be no last counterfactual decision table. The device would get the same answer if it tried this approach, but it can't try this approach since the device cannot reason. The device can only follow an algorithm to outwit the Machine. Any algorithm that is designed to look at the last table would not be a finite process. Besides, the Machine would know that this algorithm was in place and could take advantage of it by predicting that the device will do nothing as a response. This would then force the device into that arms race again. The human is not in this predicament since the human understands the truth of the situation which is that the Machine cannot predict what the human will do if it provides the data of what the human will do. The human will look for what that data is (even if it is the Machine believing the human will do nothing), and do something else. The finite device can only conform to the General Principle of Finite Deterministic Devices--meaning that the Machine wins.

My argument is only to show that in any scenario where the Machine scans our brain and tells us what we must decide that we can violate the prediction of the Machine.

Yes, but so can a relatively simple deterministic device.

Not if the Machine knows what that deterministic device will do as a result of what the Machine informs the device. Since this would be the case, the device conforms to the General Principle of Finite Deterministic Devices, whereas humans do not.

[harvey1]

I don't think that randomness (i.e., unpredictability) is equivalent to free will, either, but that's what Harvey seems to be saying.

Not having free will, I think, means that there's no freedom allowed as a result of constraints on the individual caused by factors other than Self itself. So, for example, if the components of the Self (e.g., biological or atomic components) constrain the Self to act without its own independent choice, then an individual does not possess free will. Similarly, if all the decisions of the mind reduce to biological or atomic components, then the mind cannot be said to exist as distinct from the brain (i.e., identity theory of mind), or exist at all (i.e., epiphenomenalism). If there's decisions of the mind which cannot be reduced to scannable brain structures, then this suggests not only indeterminism, but it also suggests that something else exists which must account for those decisions which is non-physical. If everything were physical, then we should expect that a Machine should tell us what we will do and be right (or at least contain a counterfactual decision table telling us what we will do which we can have access to prior to our decision). Since this is apparently not the case, it seems to me that a Machine would encounter uncomputable characteristics by scanning brain structures, and those uncomputable characteristics would be needed to be understood to properly simulate the mind. Hence, this would be an argument for the existence of mind since a thing exists if it cannot be reduced further. If our mind is irreducible to these brain structures, it therefore probably exists as something "other" than scannable brain structures.

[harvey1]

But I thought Brownian motion was ultimately caused by quantum effects?

My understanding is that this link is mostly unproven on a wide-scale basis. Schrodinger's time-evolution equation is a linear equation, and linearity is difficult to preserve if non-linear (chaotic) behavior is present. However, there is interesting work with quantum chaos bringing about some classical chaos, but it isn't known how wide-scale and applicable quantum chaos is in understanding classical chaos.

[Bugmaster]

If the state of the finite deterministic device is known by an omniscient Scanning Machine, then the Machine will always know every possible answer that the device will produce as its final answer

Well, sure. If your Machine is omniscient, then it knows everything you will ever do, regardless of whether you have free will or not. It wouldn't be omniscient otherwise.

Since all devices are finite, there must exist some point where the device is finally caught by an omniscient Machine that can anticipate every calculation, re-calculation, re-re-calculation, and onward to its last answer (which a finite machine would necessarily reach since it is finite).

Actually, this is not true. Finte machines can easily produce infinite streams of numbers; here's one such machine, in pseudocode:

Code: Select all

while(true) {
  print(1);
}

This machine is finite (3 lines of code), but produces an output that is infinite.

Moving on, consider the following device:

Code: Select all

// Take a prediction, and press a button in response, where
// n: the button the Machine thinks we'll press, numbered 0..5
// return value: the button we'll actually press, numbered 0..5
int pressButton(int prediction) {
  return (prediction + 1) % 6;
}

The Machine will never be able to accurately predict the output of the pressButton device, because as soon as it voices its prediction, the pressButton device presses a different button than the one that was predicted. And yet, the device is O(1) in both space and time. And it doesn't even need a counterfactual table !

Note, however, that this device is stateless, and thus does not emulate humans properly.

[Bugmaster]

Not having free will, I think, means that there's no freedom allowed as a result of constraints on the individual caused by factors other than Self itself.

In this case, my will is not free, since I can't shoot lasers out of my eyes just by thinking about it. So, there's at least one constraint on me, other than my Self.

So, for example, if the components of the Self (e.g., biological or atomic components) constrain the Self to act without its own independent choice, then an individual does not possess free will.

This argument presupposes that there's a separate Self that the atomic comonents control; thus, it begs the question by assuming that dualism is true to begin with.

Similarly, if all the decisions of the mind reduce to biological or atomic components, then the mind cannot be said to exist as distinct from the brain (i.e., identity theory of mind), or exist at all (i.e., epiphenomenalism).

Agreed.

If there's decisions of the mind which cannot be reduced to scannable brain structures, then this suggests not only indeterminism, but it also suggests that something else exists which must account for those decisions which is non-physical.

Not true. The exact timing of the particles emitted during radioactive decay cannot be predicted, either, but this does not imply that radium has free will. In other words, non-determinism does not automatically imply free will.

If everything were physical, then we should expect that a Machine should tell us what we will do and be right (or at least contain a counterfactual decision table telling us what we will do which we can have access to prior to our decision).

If the machine is truly omniscient, then it will tell us what we will do regardless of whether dualism is true (by definition of omniscience).

[harvey1]

Well, sure. If your Machine is omniscient, then it knows everything you will ever do, regardless of whether you have free will or not. It wouldn't be omniscient otherwise.

The point being that the Machine cannot tell you what you will do, or it cannot have a counterfactual table that we can easily access that tells us what we will do--otherwise we won't do it. Without access to this table, then the Machine could tell us what we will do. (Btw, in this case the omnscient Machine means that it can completely determine our state at time t and know what we will do next given certain inputs that are controlled by the Machine. It doesn't mean that the Machine can look into the future by being omnipresent.)

Actually, this is not true. Finte machines can easily produce infinite streams of numbers; here's one such machine, in pseudocode

At no time in the future would a finite machine produce an infinite series since its finite by definition. The Machine will know the point to where the finite machine cannot surpass (e.g., a googleplex of calculations), and it only has to wait until the finite device fails in making its next calculation.

The Machine will never be able to accurately predict the output of the pressButton device, because as soon as it voices its prediction, the pressButton device presses a different button than the one that was predicted. And yet, the device is O(1) in both space and time. And it doesn't even need a counterfactual table!

The Machine knows this algorithm because it knows the complete state of the finite device, and it would be able to know which button the finite device pressed. So, for example, if the device were allowed 2 seconds to press a button that the Machine did not expect, as soon as the 2 seconds were finished the device's button to press would be entirely predicted by the Machine.

This is not the case for a human since the human knows that the Machine cannot ever provide a prediction that the human has access to know, and still follow suit by picking that prediction. The human understands and knows that no matter what, they can always predict "other" than what the Machine predicts. Since the finite device doesn't have this knowledge, it has an internal algorithm that tries to accomplish the task of selecting a number that the Machine cannot predict, and that's a game that a finite device will always lose unless it is an infinite device. If its an infinite device, then like the human its selection cannot be predicted by the Machine. Of course, no infinite devices exist, and there are time limits to any selection, so a device is deterministic. Humans aren't deterministic since they they can approach the situation having an understanding that immediately prevents the Machine from winning.