Mind/brain interaction.

[charles51]

I’m intrigued by Harvey1’s arguments for dualism. However, I wonder why he’s arguing for dualism, and not idealism. If the mind itself is an irreducible fact, and mind and matter appear to have no ontological being in common, what is the basis for mind/brain interaction?

Note: I’m not asking that anyone give a detailed neurological explanation. I’m only asking for a conceptual explanation.

[charles51]

Harvey,

I'm curious. You state that physical events can't cause anything on their own. Isn't this epiphenomenalism in reverse? What is the purpose for positing a material world if it has no causal powers? If it causes nothing, it ultimately explains nothing. At least in conventional epiphenomenalism the mind, although causing nothing, does exist as a brute fact, which is the only reason epiphenomenalism has for positing its existence. If matter itself is never directly experienced, and causes nothing, why presume its existence at all?

[harvey1]

If it causes nothing, it ultimately explains nothing. At least in conventional epiphenomenalism the mind, although causing nothing, does exist as a brute fact, which is the only reason epiphenomenalism has for positing its existence. If matter itself is never directly experienced, and causes nothing, why presume its existence at all?

A material world is a state of affairs. Even if there were nothing then there is still a state of affairs that exist that is referable as "something" (e.g., the Void, the great Zero, etc.). So, I don't see anyway to not refer to "the world" even if we assume all material stuff is an illusion.

You state that physical events can't cause anything on their own. Isn't this epiphenomenalism in reverse? What is the purpose for positing a material world if it has no causal powers?

I think the material world is part of the causal chain. For example, if we consider causation as akin to material implication, then the material world is like unto the propositional variables (e.g., p and q) whereas the implication relation would be the game rules of how (and in what instances) p can bring about q. It's not that p causes q in this scenario, rather there are logical rules that exist in addition to p that bring about q.

I think that emergence brings about the creation of new physical objects in the world. So, for example, atoms really exist even though they are composed of sub-atomic particles. They exist because the emergent laws bring them into existence (e.g., sub-atomic particles p are sufficient and necessary to bring about atoms q given the causal laws and relations that exist).

I believe that this view that causal laws and relations actually exist, and that material objects actually are formed as a result of emergence is the best way to explain the natural world (i.e., the world that we see). I don't find any convincing reason to say that objects do not exist. For example, last night I got up and stubbed my toe in the dark. I am convinced that that Moorean object exists since I felt the pain.

[charles51]

Harvey,

I think there is sufficient reason to appeal to emergent phenomenon as a law of nature. For example, solids are an emergent phenomena of quantum particles having enormous amount of space between them. The composition of solids becomes even stranger when we consider quantum mechanics where the position of particles is perhaps vague (i.e., as a result of the uncertainty principle), and are not just particles but are particle-waves. The world of solid stuff that we experience is a result of natural law producing higher and higher emergent levels up until the point to where the world is made of solid stuff such as what we see and experience. Color is another simple example of a quality existing in the world where it simply does not exist even in principle at the quantum level.

All of this assumes, but doesn’t explain, why conscious events should rightly conform to outside physical events. There is no logically necessary reason why a particular brain state should give rise to a particular mental state. Given the almost infinite number of ways in which a mental state might falsely correspond, and the comparatively few ways in which it might accurately correspond, that it should rightly correspond even once is remote. That it should do so repeatedly would amount to a statistical miracle. What is your explanation for this?

I don't think that autopoietic systems require that we think of them as necessarily deterministic, at least without considering the system as a whole. What I actually mean by the emergence of the mental (or emergence of the self) is that we must consider the state of the self before we understand and predict what will happen on the lower emergent levels of the organism. The nature of this autopoietic self is that it can defy any algorithmic prediction of its behavior if immediately presented to itself, thus showing it has free will.

I agree the Self is not necessarily determined, but only because it has no underlying mechanistic causes. If I understand you correctly, you’re saying that the ‘system as a whole’ can act independently of its underlying mechanistic causes. How is this possible without violating physical laws? The only way I can see this occurring would be if the ‘system as a whole’ always acted ‘as if’ its actions were completely determined by the underlying causes. But this would reduce its independent status to name only, and be of no help to rational thought, which requires true volition.

While it’s true that an 'emergent property' may appear to behave in ways not fully explicable in terms of its underlying causes, that appearance is an illusion created in us, the observers, due to the complex cause and effect relationships involved. The ‘emergent property’ itself is still wholly contingent upon, and determined by, those very causes.

In other words, if the underlying physical series always ‘behaves’ as if it’s strictly determined, and a law exists that requires the mental series to always conform to the physical series, then it logically follows that the mental series is effectively determined, just as if it had no independent power of action at all. To say the emergent property has volitional power, but is powerless to use it, is meaningless.

At the lowest level of existence--quantum mechanics, "particles" have a dualistic nature where they can be a localized as a particle, and at the same time they are non-localized as a wave where they can even entangle with other particles as a complex system of particles. The wavefunction describes the state of the particle and the state of an ensemble of particles. I think that this forms the physical basis for all emergent systems in that the wavefunction, I wildly speculate, describes the mind as well, and even the whole universe. This is a hypothesis of some in quantum cosmology that the universe has its own wavefunction that describes the world as a whole. However, there is evidence for this on some large scales where hundreds if not thousands of atoms have already been shown to be entangled. The wavefunction for the entangled atoms would describe the system as one quantum system.

You appear to be saying contradictory things. On one hand, you describe the physical world as a wavefunction. On the other hand, you describe the mind itself as a wavefunction. Are you saying that the universe is really just mind? Moreover, it’s unclear if you’re saying that a wavefunction is merely our mental description of the physical events, or the physical events themselves. In any case, a wave and particle are two very different things. One is spread out in space; the other is confined to a point in space. Simply regarding something as having a ‘dualistic nature’ doesn’t resolve what appear to be contradictory properties.

And none of this addresses my question. What is the ontological basis for mind/matter interaction? What ontological fact allows each to exist for the other?

[harvey1]

All of this assumes, but doesn’t explain, why conscious events should rightly conform to outside physical events. There is no logically necessary reason why a particular brain state should give rise to a particular mental state. Given the almost infinite number of ways in which a mental state might falsely correspond, and the comparatively few ways in which it might accurately correspond, that it should rightly correspond even once is remote. That it should do so repeatedly would amount to a statistical miracle. What is your explanation for this?

The brain state (call it p) is sufficient and necessary to produce mental state (q) based on the laws of mind emergence that exist. So, for example, if 1000 neurons are structured in a certain way, they meet the p mental condition and therefore produce the q mental effect (e.g., a tickle). The mental effect is experienced in a geometric space that is a "virtual" world of the internal mindset. It requires a mentalese language to describe that effect in its full experiential/subjective mode. However, the geometric space (or mental space) itself is instantiated by the 1000 neurons being in a particular configuration.

I agree the Self is not necessarily determined, but only because it has no underlying mechanistic causes. If I understand you correctly, you’re saying that the ‘system as a whole’ can act independently of its underlying mechanistic causes. How is this possible without violating physical laws? The only way I can see this occurring would be if the ‘system as a whole’ always acted ‘as if’ its actions were completely determined by the underlying causes. But this would reduce its independent status to name only, and be of no help to rational thought, which requires true volition.

Once the laws establish the geometric space (or mind), the evolution of the system is largely determined by the events in the geometric space. From the perspective of the material mapping of the physical events in the brain (or physical space) there simply is no material reason why certain events are occurring versus many other potential events. This is not a violation of conservation laws since the brain is operating according to physical laws (e.g., quantum mechanical and thermodynamical laws are not violated); yet, it is structured in a way that is unexplained by looking at just those laws. If we probe the causal operation of the brain to fully understand why certain brain events are happening instead of other equally potential events, then that pushes us up to the autopoietic operation of the mental layer of the mind. We are back at the level trying to understand mentalese.

While it’s true that an 'emergent property' may appear to behave in ways not fully explicable in terms of its underlying causes, that appearance is an illusion created in us, the observers, due to the complex cause and effect relationships involved. The ‘emergent property’ itself is still wholly contingent upon, and determined by, those very causes.

If you buy into the notion that emergence is only an epistemological phenomena and not an ontological affair. I think that emergence requires us to view the process as being an ontological event (i.e., strong emergence). I don't try to reduce the world into base components, and then being eliminitivist about the emergent entities. Rather, I think the emergent entities are real things that... uhm... emerge. They emerge when Law(Base Layer) ≡ State of Possible Object ⇒ New Object(Wavefunction). When a base layer (e.g., a brain state) by the laws of mind emergence are identical to a state of a new possible object (e.g., a mind), then a new object having its own unique wavefunction obtains. It's not just an epistemological status, it's its own ontic state of being. It's a new thing having a physical wavefunction that evolves according to the function of that system. In the case of the Self, the Self evolves according to its own autopoietic self. The lower components respond to this higher emergent layer because it is a law of nature for it to do so. The sub-components are described by the emergent wavefunction of the new object. The emergent wavefunction exists as a result of complying with the laws of nature (i.e., Law(Base Layer) ≡ State of Possible Object ).

(Btw, this is all being very speculative, so please don't think I'm trying to state this as fact or something.)

In other words, if the underlying physical series always ‘behaves’ as if it’s strictly determined, and a law exists that requires the mental series to always conform to the physical series, then it logically follows that the mental series is effectively determined, just as if it had no independent power of action at all. To say the emergent property has volitional power, but is powerless to use it, is meaningless.

However, once a new object having a new wavefunction is born, the rules of evolution are quite different--physically speaking. The emergent wavefunction determines how the system at lower levels evolves since nature considers the wavefunction of the emergent layer to determine how the whole organism evolves. Thus, the emergent layer structures and determines its own fate with nature's permission. The only restriction is that nature will not violate its own laws, and therefore the emergent layer cannot do anything that would violate the laws in lower layers. Also, if something happens to our brain state such that the new emergent layer is necessarily impacted (e.g., we are knocked unconscious or killed), then the new emergent layer cannot continue to exist without being impacted by this event. If the impact to the brain is not severe, then the mind can maintain control and continue to operate by controlling the general operation of the brain and body.

You appear to be saying contradictory things. On one hand, you describe the physical world as a wavefunction. On the other hand, you describe the mind itself as a wavefunction. Are you saying that the universe is really just mind?

No, but it is quite possible that a cosmic mind is emerging in the universe as a result of its "neurons."

What I'm saying here is that any physical object in the world has a wavefunction--that's what makes it real. As we move from quantum particles to the classical realm, I'm postulating that a wavefunction exists for all classical objects including the universe itself. The mind is just one of these objects.

Moreover, it’s unclear if you’re saying that a wavefunction is merely our mental description of the physical events, or the physical events themselves.

Neither. The wavefunction is a function that exists which identifies the object (e.g., what micro-objects compose it), and restricts what can and cannot happen.

In any case, a wave and particle are two very different things. One is spread out in space; the other is confined to a point in space. Simply regarding something as having a ‘dualistic nature’ doesn’t resolve what appear to be contradictory properties.

The prejudice is our own. We have the problem with dualism, nature doesn't have such a problem.

And none of this addresses my question. What is the ontological basis for mind/matter interaction? What ontological fact allows each to exist for the other?

The fact that a new emergent object has a wavefunction that includes its components. The physical evolution of the components must also conform to the emergent object's state of affairs. Nature requires objects (i.e., things having wavefunctions) to evolve according to their own properties, and this means that the emergent properties exercise causal influence over its lower layers.

[charles51]

Harvey,

A material world is a state of affairs. Even if there were nothing then there is still a state of affairs that exist that is referable as "something" (e.g., the Void, the great Zero, etc.). So, I don't see anyway to not refer to "the world" even if we assume all material stuff is an illusion.

I see no problem with regarding ‘the world’ as a linguistic artifact. But why assert it’s objective physical reality if that reality can’t impact experience?

I think that emergence brings about the creation of new physical objects in the world. So, for example, atoms really exist even though they are composed of sub-atomic particles. They exist because the emergent laws bring them into existence (e.g., sub-atomic particles p are sufficient and necessary to bring about atoms q given the causal laws and relations that exist).

This statement appears key to your philosophy. However, it intermingles ‘mental facts’ and ‘physical things’ in a way that is unorthodox, if not confusing. I want to get a clear understanding of exactly what you’re saying.

Take my truck as an example. Physically speaking, it is nothing more than a configuration of elemental particles in space. My ‘truck’, as distinct from the particles, is an idea that occurs in me as a response to my interaction with those particles. This is conventional understanding. What you seem to be saying is that in addition to the elemental particles, these exists something called ‘truck-ness’ that is superimposed onto the particles themselves and causes them to come together into that configuration. The idea (if that’s what it is) resides in the physical object itself and causally acts on the object.

If this Platonic interpretation represents your view, my question to you is:

Is ‘truck-ness’ a physical reality, or a non-physical reality?

[charles51]

Harvey,

The brain state (call it p) is sufficient and necessary to produce mental state (q) based on the laws of mind emergence that exist. So, for example, if 1000 neurons are structured in a certain way, they meet the p mental condition and therefore produce the q mental effect (e.g., a tickle). The mental effect is experienced in a geometric space that is a "virtual" world of the internal mindset. It requires a mentalese language to describe that effect in its full experiential/subjective mode. However, the geometric space (or mental space) itself is instantiated by the 1000 neurons being in a particular configuration.

What ‘law’ makes it necessary and sufficient that a particular neurological structure produce a particular mental state? Is this the law according to Harvey? How can that law be ‘necessary’ when there is no logically necessary correlation between mental states and brain states to begin with? It sounds like you’re making stuff up because your philosophy won’t work without it.

Once the laws establish the geometric space (or mind), the evolution of the system is largely determined by the events in the geometric space. From the perspective of the material mapping of the physical events in the brain (or physical space) there simply is no material reason why certain events are occurring versus many other potential events. This is not a violation of conservation laws since the brain is operating according to physical laws (e.g., quantum mechanical and thermodynamical laws are not violated); yet, it is structured in a way that is unexplained by looking at just those laws. If we probe the causal operation of the brain to fully understand why certain brain events are happening instead of other equally potential events, then that pushes us up to the autopoietic operation of the mental layer of the mind. We are back at the level trying to understand mentalese.

Either the physical brain operates according to statistically deterministic laws or it doesn’t. This is philosophy 101. If it does operate only according to these laws, then any effect the mind has on the brain must also be in accord with those laws. There can be no exception. Thus the mind would operate according to the very same deterministic laws as the brain. This would be true whether the mind does this voluntarily or involuntarily. Either way, the mind’s activity would be determined, thereby making rational thought meaningless. This is why materialism is a self-refuting philosophy.

If you buy into the notion that emergence is only an epistemological phenomena and not an ontological affair. I think that emergence requires us to view the process as being an ontological event (i.e., strong emergence). I don't try to reduce the world into base components, and then being eliminitivist about the emergent entities. Rather, I think the emergent entities are real things that... uhm... emerge. They emerge when Law(Base Layer) ≡ State of Possible Object ⇒ New Object(Wavefunction). When a base layer (e.g., a brain state) by the laws of mind emergence are identical to a state of a new possible object (e.g., a mind), then a new object having its own unique wavefunction obtains. It's not just an epistemological status, it's its own ontic state of being. It's a new thing having a physical wavefunction that evolves according to the function of that system. In the case of the Self, the Self evolves according to its own autopoietic self. The lower components respond to this higher emergent layer because it is a law of nature for it to do so. The sub-components are described by the emergent wavefunction of the new object. The emergent wavefunction exists as a result of complying with the laws of nature (i.e., Law(Base Layer) ≡ State of Possible Object ).

I return to the example of my truck. You seem to be saying that a new ontological reality called ‘truck-ness’ comes into being when the elemental particles reach a certain stage of complexity. At this point ‘truck-ness’ can causally act upon the particles themselves. So, again, I ask you this question: Is ‘truck-ness a physical reality (A), or a non-physical reality (non-A). Obviously it must be one or the other (Law of Excluded Middle). Which is it?

What I'm saying here is that any physical object in the world has a wavefunction--that's what makes it real. As we move from quantum particles to the classical realm, I'm postulating that a wavefunction exists for all classical objects including the universe itself. The mind is just one of these objects.

Are wavefunctions physical realities, or non-physical realities? If a physical reality, how can the mind, which is essentially conscious, be a wavefunction? But if a wavefunction is a non-physical reality, what is the ontological basis for its connection to the physical world?

The prejudice is our own. We have the problem with dualism, nature doesn't have such a problem.

While I can’t speak for nature, logic definitely has a problem with wave/particle duality. The Law of Non-contradiction clearly states that a thing cannot be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same relation. If logic sets the limits of what is possible, nature must comply as well.

The fact that a new emergent object has a wavefunction that includes its components. The physical evolution of the components must also conform to the emergent object's state of affairs. Nature requires objects (i.e., things having wavefunctions) to evolve according to their own properties, and this means that the emergent properties exercise causal influence over its lower layers.

You say emergent objects exercise causal influence over its lower layers. So evidently the emergent object (or wavefunction) is a physical reality of some kind. How else could it exercise a causal influence on its physical components? But this doesn’t describe the mind. The mind itself has no physical properties. If I experience a sense image of a red square, for example, there is no physical reality in my brain that is red-like and square-ish. Yet my sense image in incorrigible; it IS a red square. Thus that image, as a brute ontological fact, is not itself a physical reality. And not being a physical reality, it has no power to effect physical change.

These are very basic issues in philosophy. The reason is simple: If a philosophy can account everything but the mind itself, it ultimately accounts for nothing, for it is only because of the mind that a philosophy is possible at all. Such a philosophy would be self-refuting, and therefore false.

[harvey1]

I see no problem with regarding ‘the world’ as a linguistic artifact. But why assert it’s objective physical reality if that reality can’t impact experience?

I think the material world does impact our experience as a combination of objects, causal laws, and relations. Laws and relations require objects.

Take my truck as an example. Physically speaking, it is nothing more than a configuration of elemental particles in space. My ‘truck’, as distinct from the particles, is an idea that occurs in me as a response to my interaction with those particles. This is conventional understanding.

I wouldn't say that everything imaginable is an emergent phenomena. Ontological emergence, I suggest, is specifically tied to passing through certain phase transitions via a critical point. This comprises a very large number of events-objects, but I wouldn't even attempt to say this is the case for everything (e.g., asteroids becoming plutons and plutons becoming planets).

What you seem to be saying is that in addition to the elemental particles, these exists something called ‘truck-ness’ that is superimposed onto the particles themselves and causes them to come together into that configuration. The idea (if that’s what it is) resides in the physical object itself and causally acts on the object. If this Platonic interpretation represents your view, my question to you is: Is ‘truck-ness’ a physical reality, or a non-physical reality?

If an object actually exists, then that means to me that a wavefunction actually exists for that object. This is different than "truck-ness" since that's a universal property and not an object. Universal properties, I suppose, are what wavefunctions share as part of what categorizes them (e.g., some wavefunctions share "atom-ness" or the property of identifying atoms), but the atom universal is not itself a wavefunction. It's a platonic universal. It is not a physical object.

As for wavefunctions, the wavefunction itself is not a physical object but rather it is what all physical objects possess. It is the identity of the object. If a new object emerges from a previous set of objects, then the former wavefunctions either become a subset of the emergent wavefunction or it ceases to exist as an identifier to an object (since the former object may no longer exist--the wavefunction no longer exists).

[harvey1]

What ‘law’ makes it necessary and sufficient that a particular neurological structure produce a particular mental state? Is this the law according to Harvey? How can that law be ‘necessary’ when there is no logically necessary correlation between mental states and brain states to begin with? It sounds like you’re making stuff up because your philosophy won’t work without it.

I'm not making it up. There's tons of examples of how a law of nature combined with a state of affairs produce a new level of emergence. In fact, that's a quality that all emergent features share. The emergent feature is unique and different than what exists at the lower level. I mentioned solids as an example. Solid surfaces emerge from things that specifically have no solid nature at all to them (e.g., quantum fields).

Either the physical brain operates according to statistically deterministic laws or it doesn’t. This is philosophy 101. If it does operate only according to these laws, then any effect the mind has on the brain must also be in accord with those laws. There can be no exception. Thus the mind would operate according to the very same deterministic laws as the brain. This would be true whether the mind does this voluntarily or involuntarily. Either way, the mind’s activity would be determined, thereby making rational thought meaningless. This is why materialism is a self-refuting philosophy.

An autopoietic system like the cell exists as an organism. A component of an autopoietic system can function naturally (i.e., violating no natural laws) without necessarily behaving predictably.

While I can’t speak for nature, logic definitely has a problem with wave/particle duality. The Law of Non-contradiction clearly states that a thing cannot be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same relation. If logic sets the limits of what is possible, nature must comply as well.

Of course there's always quantum logics... Given the wide experimental success of quantum mechanics, I think that we are justified in suggesting that perhaps the world does not behave according to our classical notions of logic.

...this means that the emergent properties exercise causal influence over its lower layers.

You say emergent objects exercise causal influence over its lower layers. So evidently the emergent object (or wavefunction) is a physical reality of some kind. How else could it exercise a causal influence on its physical components? But this doesn’t describe the mind. The mind itself has no physical properties.

It doesn't exhibit any material properties. The term physical I take to mean that it acts in accordance with physical laws, which I think that mentalese does in fact do.

If I experience a sense image of a red square, for example, there is no physical reality in my brain that is red-like and square-ish. Yet my sense image in incorrigible; it IS a red square. Thus that image, as a brute ontological fact, is not itself a physical reality. And not being a physical reality, it has no power to effect physical change.

The subjective experience of a red square, I suspect, exists in a geometric space that emerges as a result of dynamical laws that apply to brain structures (e.g., neurons, etc.). It is a physical reality because this geometric space is a result of these dynamical laws. Even our own spatial dimensions might be emergent phenomena on a more primitive topology (e.g., twistor space).

[charles51]

Harvey,

I think the material world does impact our experience as a combination of causal laws and relations. Laws and relations require objects.

Laws and relations do require objects, but not necessarily physical objects. Relations exist within dreams, and dreams may behave according to physical laws, but ‘objects’ in dreams are conceptual only.

I wouldn't say that everything imaginable is an emergent phenomena. Ontological emergence, I suggest, is specifically tied to passing through certain phase transitions via a critical point. This comprises a very large number of events, but I wouldn't even attempt to say this is the case for everything (e.g., asteroids becoming plutons and plutons becoming planets).

This sounds as if emergent phenomena are a purely subjective determination. Why is an emergent phenomena attached to one blob of matter and not another? Both may be equally complex; the only difference being that we attach significance to one and not the other. Phrases like ‘phase transitions’ and ‘critical point’ therefore seem highly artificial and contrived.

If an object actually exists, then that means to me that a wavefunction actually exists for that object. This is different than "truck-ness" since that's a universal property and not an object. Universal properties, I suppose, are what wavefunctions share as part of what categorizes them (e.g., some wavefunctions share "atom-ness" or the property of identifying atoms), but the atom universal is not itself a wavefunction. It's a platonic universal. It is not a physical object.

Here’s a problem I see with your theory. As you describe it, the emergent property (or wavefunction) refers to its own physical reality. The wavefunction for my truck, for example, refers to the physical reality that is my truck. It doesn’t refer to the nearby tree. The mind and brain don’t relate this way. The mind rarely refers to the brain itself. When perceiving, the mind refers to things and events that exist altogether outside the brain, like that tree over there. This is very odd. Shouldn’t the brain’s wavefunction refer to the brain itself? And why doesn’t it?

As for wavefunctions, the wavefunction is itself not a physical object but rather it is what all physical objects possess. It is the identity of the object. If a new object emerges from a previous set of objects, then the former wavefunctions either become a subset of the emergent wavefunction or it ceases to exist as an identifier to an object (since the former object may no longer exist--the wavefunction no longer exists).

Harvey, this reveals an obvious problem with your theory. If the wavefunction itself is not a physical ‘thing’, then the wavefunction itself has no physical powers. It can’t cause or effect any physical change. After all, a thing can only act according to what it is. This would seem to subvert the basis of your philosophy, and reduce it to some form of epiphenomenalism. At the minimum, it would reduce all knowledge to total skepticism. That can't be good for a theory that bases its claims on having reliable knowledge an the outside world.

[harvey1]

Laws and relations do require objects, but not necessarily physical objects. Relations exist within dreams, and dreams may behave according to physical laws, but ‘objects’ in dreams are conceptual only.

True, but then the label "physical" is just a place holder to mean "this stuff in front of us." If life were a dream, then "physical" would be a place holder for "this stuff in front of us while we are dreaming." Since I have no reason to think that physical stuff requires me to dismiss its existence, I have, I believe, a good reason for accepting the physical place holder to consist of the world of objects that we see. On the other hand, I do have good reason, I think, to dismiss material being causally efficacious independent of any causal laws or relations, therefore I feel compelled to dismiss a physical world composed solely of material stuff. For example, I think we must add physical laws to account for change in the physical world.

This sounds as if emergent phenomena are a purely subjective determination. Why is an emergent phenomena attached to one blob of matter and not another? Both may be equally complex; the only difference being that we attach significance to one and not the other. Phrases like ‘phase transitions’ and ‘critical point’ therefore seem highly artificial and contrived.

It might seem contrived, but I think that this designation is justified based on the study of complex systems. These are features that science is finding that emergent systems have in common. And, since these complex systems exhibit universal properties seen throughout nature (e.g., scaling and universality) and not to mention they are well-defined in their scientific description, then why not just push aside absurd notions which only lead to strange paradoxes such as Sorites paradox?

Here’s a problem I see with your theory. As you describe it, the emergent property (or wavefunction) refers to its own physical reality. The wavefunction for my truck, for example, refers to the physical reality that is my truck. It doesn’t refer to the nearby tree. The mind and brain don’t relate this way. The mind rarely refers to the brain itself. When perceiving, the mind refers to things and events that exist altogether outside the brain, like that tree over there. This is very odd. Shouldn’t the brain’s wavefunction refer to the brain itself? And why doesn’t it?

The brain does have its own wavefunction, as do the individual atoms that may exist within an entangled ensemble of atoms. However, the wavefunction of an atom is only a component in the overall wavefunction of the ensemble. Similarly, the brain structure is a component of the emergent feature that the component(s) gives rise to. The brain structure's wavefunction is a component of the wavefunction of the emergent feature. If we consider the entire brain and body, it too has a wavefunction of all the brain and body components. These wavefunctions might also be component wavefunctions in a larger wavefunction that includes every possible wavefunction that identifies what it means to be that individual.

The point, though, is that since a mind is an emergent feature, its wavefunction must also be composed of the brain components that instantiate that emergent feature. The brain components are causally connected to the overall emergent feature of the mind.

If the wavefunction itself is not a physical ‘thing’, then the wavefunction itself has no physical powers.

The wavefunction is not a physical object: meaning that wavefunctions don't have their own wavefunctions which show that they are physical objects. A wavefunction is a definition of what it means to be a physical thing (i.e., "a physical thing is an object that has a wavefunction"). By having a wavefunction, the laws of physics can causally structure the world based on the object and its relation to other objects. If the wavefunction does not exist, then the laws of physics cannot causally structure the world based on objects that really don't exist as real objects. For example, Bugs Bunny exists as a piece of paper with ink, or as a DVD, etc., but there's no wavefunction that exists for Bugs Bunny as a real object composed of atoms. Such an object does not exist, so there's no wavefunction for him. Therefore, the laws of physics cannot causally structure the world with Bugs as a referrant since Bugs does not actually exist. Since emergent phenomena have wavefunctions, the combinations of the causal laws and relations in place become causally efficacious with how the brain evolves. The wavefunction does not cause an event, rather the wavefunction makes it possible for an object to be potentially causally efficacious.