Proofs... So what?

[Nirvana-Eld]

After some thinking I am willing to accept that there must have been a first cause that initiated the series of events we call existence. I think that this is the underlying substratum of causuality. Here the problem. So what? I do not see the connection from "there must have been a first cause" to "this is a being which we all call God" (quod omnes dicunt Deum). I see the point of the First Cause Idea more as pointing to a natural process, not a Christian God and or the classic "Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnibenevolent God". There seems to be no connection.

I would like the proponents of the First Cause Argument who believe in the God of the three "O's" to logically make the connection between a process and a God. Civility is a must! I just glanced through a thread by a "killingevolution" ( ) and I would like this thread to be cleaner. 8)

[Bugmaster]

That's not my point. I realize that if I gave you a negative integer that you could compute that integer if given enough time.

Thank you !

However, what you cannot do is produce an infinite complete set.

...at least, not in a finite amount of time. I agree.

How does this render infinite regress impossible ? I'm not talking about re-creating the entire infinite set of events in a finite amount of time; I'm just talking about its existence. The set of integers cannot be re-created in a finite amount of time, and yet it exists (especially in your worldview).

1) There is no lowest blue integer

Are you saying that the very notion of "a computable integer" is absurd ? I initially thought that the notion of "the lowest integer" is absurd, but apparently you meant something else.

[harvey1]

1) There is no lowest blue integer

Are you saying that the very notion of "a computable integer" is absurd? I initially thought that the notion of "the lowest integer" is absurd, but apparently you meant something else.

No, it is absurd to say that there is a complete infinite number of computable numbers since a finite Turing machine cannot compute an infinite number of computable numbers. That's how we should define a computable number, so it is absurd. There can only be as many computable numbers as a finite Turing machine could compute, which in physical terms is limited by quantum mechanics.

How does this render infinite regress impossible? I'm not talking about re-creating the entire infinite set of events in a finite amount of time; I'm just talking about its existence. The set of integers cannot be re-created in a finite amount of time, and yet it exists (especially in your worldview).

That's what the argument I presented shows. You can't assume infinite regress without leading to absurdity.

[Bugmaster]

No, it is absurd to say that there is a complete infinite number of computable numbers since a finite Turing machine cannot compute an infinite number of computable numbers.

Agreed. I don't see how it's relevant, though.

How does this render infinite regress impossible? I'm not talking about re-creating the entire infinite set of events in a finite amount of time; I'm just talking about its existence. The set of integers cannot be re-created in a finite amount of time, and yet it exists (especially in your worldview).

That's what the argument I presented shows. You can't assume infinite regress without leading to absurdity.

Are you saying that an infinite set of integers could not exist, because we finite creatures cannot recreate it ?

[harvey1]

Agreed. I don't see how it's relevant, though.

Causes are very similar to computable numbers. The occurrence of an event is a "computation" which makes the event real. Since you can't have a complete infinite set of negative computable numbers, you can't have a complete infinite set of previous occurring causes.

Are you saying that an infinite set of integers could not exist, because we finite creatures cannot recreate it ?

No, I'm talking in terms of computability because that's the closest analogy to a caused event.

[HughDP]

Since you can't have a complete infinite set of negative computable numbers, you can't have a complete infinite set of previous occurring causes.

On the surface this sounds quite reasonable because if there was an infinite set of previous occuring causes up until this moment, we would appear to have traversed infinity already in order to get to now, which is impossible.

But that makes the assumption that each event is traversed, and that they're traversed in temporal sequence (I believe they call this 'additive'). I'm not sure that these assumptions can be taken for granted.

[OccamsRazor]

On the surface this sounds quite reasonable because if there was an infinite set of previous occuring causes up until this moment, we would appear to have traversed infinity already in order to get to now, which is impossible.

Why is this impossible? I do not see any reason why the Universe cannot have already completed an infinite series of events.

No, it is absurd to say that there is a complete infinite number of computable numbers since a finite Turing machine cannot compute an infinite number of computable numbers.

So if it is absurd to say that there is a lowest computable number (and I agree that it is based on the term meaning computable by a Turing Machine) then surely this backs up BugMaster's original point that there need not be a First Cause?

[QED]

No, I'm talking in terms of computability because that's the closest analogy to a caused event.

But it's only an analogy. It seems to me that the inability to traverse an infinite set to go and "pin a label" on something doesn't actually tell us anything really meaningful anyway. Even so, isn't it the case that philosophers have been unable to rule out Supertasks as being intrinsically impossible therefore the labelling events in infinite series might actually be possible?

[HughDP]

On the surface this sounds quite reasonable because if there was an infinite set of previous occuring causes up until this moment, we would appear to have traversed infinity already in order to get to now, which is impossible.

Why is this impossible? I do not see any reason why the Universe cannot have already completed an infinite series of events.

Ok, well first off we have to be careful about our terminology here and clear about what we mean by an 'infinite series of events'.

Things proceeding in a linear temporal sequence where one event conditions the next are 'additive'. If I begin counting events now and logging them in a sequential, 'additive' way (such as one moment in time conditioning the next) I could start with 1 and then go 2, 3, 4 etc., but I'm always dealing with finite set at any moment in time although it is potentially infinite. It is finite because I cannot add to an infinite set.

One analogy I've read that I like relates to dominoes: if I'm looking at a particular domino that requires an infinite number of dominoes to be struck before my domino gets struck, my domino will never get struck. So if an infinite number of sequential, temporal events need to happen before 'now', we would never have made it to 'now'.

However, this all makes the assumption that the past is constructed of temporally sequenced events which proceed in additive fashion. I'm not convinced that necessarily has to be the case.

[Edit: I should add that this also assumes that the entire infinite sequence of events has always had to be traversed, which is another assumption that may be false]

[Bugmaster]

What OR and QED said. I don't see why "computability" is a requirement at all.

[OccamsRazor]

So if an infinite number of sequential, temporal events need to happen before 'now', we would never have made it to 'now'.

The concept of infinity is always a diffeicult one to deal with. My main point is that in a steady state Universe, an infinite amount of time has already happened. This, by definition, means that an infinite amount of temporal events have occurred.

The issue here is if the infinite series of prior temporal events is possible (based on your logic that we could never get to 'now'). If not then a steady state Universe is also impossible meaning that there must be a first cause. This is where we argue Kant's First Antimony.

Also an additive series of temporal events does not necessarily need to traverse an infinite period of time (as QED points out in his reference to 'Supertasks') as per Xeno's paradoxes.