Mind/brain interaction.

[charles51]

I’m intrigued by Harvey1’s arguments for dualism. However, I wonder why he’s arguing for dualism, and not idealism. If the mind itself is an irreducible fact, and mind and matter appear to have no ontological being in common, what is the basis for mind/brain interaction?

Note: I’m not asking that anyone give a detailed neurological explanation. I’m only asking for a conceptual explanation.

[charles51]

Harvey,

I'm not making it up. There's tons of examples of how a law of nature combined with a state of affairs produce a new level of emergence. In fact, that's a quality that all emergent features share. The emergent feature is unique and different than what exists at the lower level. I mentioned solids as an example. Solid surfaces emerge from things that specifically have no solid nature at all to them (e.g., quantum fields).

All these examples depend on the underlying presumption that mental states rightly conform to outside events. You haven't yet told us the basis for this presumption. There's no logically necessary reason for it. And besides, if the mind-as-wavefunction has no physical properties, it has no power to act on the brain. It’s a useless by-product. That’s a big problem for your philosophy. This will illustrate what I mean:

Imagine a collection of a hundred million insects. Some have black wings, some have white wings. The insects busily go about their business. Then something very strange begins to happen. Unbeknownst to the insects, the colors of their collective wings begin to spell out a sentence. It reads:

“Thetis fell at the Battle of Marathon.”

Is this sentence believable? If its cause is a mindless activity oblivious to it’s abstract meaning, then obviously not. That it should exist at all is incredible enough, but that it should also be objectively true would confound reason itself.

Likewise, if consciousness depends on the activity of mindless atoms, why should we trust what consciousness tells us? Reason would say it can’t possibly be trusted. And if we can’t reasonably trust it, on what grounds can we believe that atoms are objectively real, since it is only by consciousness that we come to know of atoms in the first place --or of a physical brain, a physical body, or a physical universe.

In other words, no theory of the mind is believable if it makes unbelievable any evidence for that theory.

An autopoietic system like the cell exists as an organism. A component of an autopoietic system can function naturally (i.e., violating no natural laws) without necessarily behaving predictably.

This proves what? That there are practical limits to our powers of prediction? No one argues with that. If at any time a causal chain of events is broken and an alternate course taken, a physical law is violated, whether we directly observe that violation or not. This is why physical laws are regarded as objectively real.

Of course there's always quantum logics... Given the wide experimental success of quantum mechanics, I think that we are justified in suggesting that perhaps the world does not behave according to our classical notions of logic.

There’s a reason why someone came up with the term “quantum logics”. That’s because it can’t be squared with classical logic. Classical logic is not someone’s invention, or valid because Aristotle said it is. Its irresistible veracity is revealed in the understanding of the concepts themselves.

No one’s denying the experiment success of quantum mechanics. It's the interpretation that is questioned. On one as ever simultaneously detected both the wave and particle. These are presumed to exist because it’s the only obvious way to square the findings with an objectively existing world. But if we grant one logical contradiction; why not five, or a thousand? If we cannot trust the veracity of logic, anything and everything becomes possible, and the only thing we can be sure of is our own immediate subjective existence. I don’t think that fits well with your philosophy.

It doesn't exhibit any material properties. The term physical I take to mean that it acts in accordance with physical laws, which I think that mentalese does in fact do.

If true, this is subjective idealism. The mind is a non-material entity that behaves ‘as if’ physical laws apply.

The subjective experience of a red square, I suspect, exists in a geometric space that emerges as a result of dynamical laws that apply to brain structures (e.g., neurons, etc.). It is a physical reality because this geometric space is a result of these dynamical laws. Even our own spatial dimensions might be emergent phenomena on a more primitive topology (e.g., twistor space).

Subjective experience is now a physical reality? Moments ago it was a non-physical reality. Please don’t tell me this is another example of ‘quantum logic’.

[harvey1]

All these examples depend on the underlying presumption that mental states rightly conform to outside events. You haven't yet told us the basis for this presumption. There's no logically necessary reason for it. And besides, if the mind-as-wavefunction has no physical properties, it has no power to act on the brain. It’s a useless by-product. That’s a big problem for your philosophy. This will illustrate what I mean: Imagine a collection of a hundred million insects. Some have black wings, some have white wings. The insects busily go about their business. Then something very strange begins to happen. Unbeknownst to the insects, the colors of their collective wings begin to spell out a sentence. It reads: “Thetis fell at the Battle of Marathon.” Is this sentence believable? If its cause is a mindless activity oblivious to it’s abstract meaning, then obviously not. That it should exist at all is incredible enough, but that it should also be objectively true would confound reason itself.

Let me clarify that I'm not saying the mind is a wavefunction. I'm stating that the mind has a wavefunction. Since it has a wavefunction, it is a physical thing from the perspective of nature. Since the sub-wavefunctions are brain functions, the functions in the brain evolve in line with the evolution of the mind. We have evidence of this kind of behavior with wave-like behavior seen in buckyballs. It strongly suggests that every object has a wavefunction and sub-wavefunctions. The wave-like behavior demonstrates that the ensemble possesses the wavefunction which dominate the characteristics of the sub-wavefunction. We can say it can't happen, but there it is in an experiment right in front of our eyes.

Likewise, if consciousness depends on the activity of mindless atoms, why should we trust what consciousness tells us? Reason would say it can’t possibly be trusted. And if we can’t reasonably trust it, on what grounds can we believe that atoms are objectively real, since it is only by consciousness that we come to know of atoms in the first place --or of a physical brain, a physical body, or a physical universe.

The atoms are not randomly structured in the brain since they are strategically located in the brain after millions of years of selection and emergence which gradually fine-tunes our minds onto the way the world is. Had evolution missed and produced minds that were way off, then all the hominids would have been lion dinners in the Pleistocene.

There’s a reason why someone came up with the term “quantum logics”. That’s because it can’t be squared with classical logic. Classical logic is not someone’s invention, or valid because Aristotle said it is. Its irresistible veracity is revealed in the understanding of the concepts themselves. No one’s denying the experiment success of quantum mechanics. It's the interpretation that is questioned. On one as ever simultaneously detected both the wave and particle. These are presumed to exist because it’s the only obvious way to square the findings with an objectively existing world. But if we grant one logical contradiction; why not five, or a thousand?

Human logic is based on our experience with the world. We are still experiencing the world, but now that experience is also happening on much smaller and larger scales. We have to be open-minded to other possibilities than the experiences that Aristotle was exposed to in his lifetime. Had he learned of the quantum experiments, perhaps he would have been much more tentative in some of his statements. All I'm saying is that here's these experiments, we see clearly how the properties of an emergent whole is what counts in terms of how the components evolve in time, so why not consider this as a possible cause for mind-brain interaction? It's not even clear that this requires a revision of classical logic, although it might. Let's carefully consider the issue. It might be a solution or on the right path toward a solution.

It doesn't exhibit any material properties. The term physical I take to mean that it acts in accordance with physical laws, which I think that mentalese does in fact do.

If true, this is subjective idealism. The mind is a non-material entity that behaves ‘as if’ physical laws apply.

I'm not sure how you came up with "as if." The mind has causal efficacy because physical laws apply. We have lots of examples where material properties are no longer sufficient to account for some of the latest hypotheses and theories of modern day physics. For example, well-known physicists James Hartle and Stephen Hawking suggested that the universe has a wavefunction which give a probability for our universe coming into existence. Is that a material property? I don't see how it could be.

The subjective experience of a red square, I suspect, exists in a geometric space that emerges as a result of dynamical laws that apply to brain structures (e.g., neurons, etc.). It is a physical reality because this geometric space is a result of these dynamical laws. Even our own spatial dimensions might be emergent phenomena on a more primitive topology (e.g., twistor space).

Subjective experience is now a physical reality? Moments ago it was a non-physical reality. Please don’t tell me this is another example of ‘quantum logic’.

It is physical but not material. I'm trying carefully to make that distinction.

In any case, we're probably starting to spin our wheels a bit. If you have something in particular that you would like me to address then let's discuss it. But, I'm a little limited in time so I really can't keep up this pace (unfortunately).

[charles51]

Harvey,

…I do have good reason, I think, to dismiss material being causally efficacious independent of any causal laws or relations, therefore I feel compelled to dismiss a physical world composed solely of material stuff. For example, I think we must add physical laws to account for change in the physical world.

Laws express relations between things, so each implies and requires the other. This I agree with. However, in order to be efficacious, physical laws and relations must have a physical reality. Abstract laws and relations won’t work. As I’ve stated before, in the physical world, only a physical reality has the power to implement and determine physical action. For example, if the abstract Law of Conservation of Energy acted on matter, that law by its own action would violate itself. Therefore, physical laws and relations must have a concrete reality of some kind.

This puts physical laws in a difficult position. A law must be universal, it must undergo change in order to implement change, yet it must maintain its essential identity throughout that change. No physical ‘thing’ meets these requirements. The only reality we know that can fulfill these conditions is the conscious Self. The Self in omnipresent in its conceptual world, it undergoes the very changes in that world, yet its self-identity persists throughout that change. This is a good example of how the Self, mistaking its own conceptions for an objective physical reality, tries to give its own organizing principles an objective form. When made to stand on their own as ‘objective physical laws’, they don’t make any sense.

A similar problem exists for relations. A relation requires at a least two terms and must have both terms in common. This makes your scheme impossible. Mind and matter have no common being. A relation connecting these terms would have to both be (A) and not be (non-A) at the same time and in the same sense. This is logically impossible.

I read somewhere that you hold rational arguments in high regard. Did I misread that?

The brain does have its own wavefunction, as do the individual atoms that may exist within an entangled ensemble of atoms. However, the wavefunction of an atom is only a component in the overall wavefunction of the ensemble. Similarly, the brain structure is a component of the emergent feature that the component(s) gives rise to. The brain structure's wavefunction is a component of the wavefunction of the emergent feature. If we consider the entire brain and body, it too has a wavefunction of all the brain and body components. These wavefunctions might also be component wavefunctions in a larger wavefunction that includes every possible wavefunction that identifies what it means to be that individual.

Couldn’t the very same be said about the wavefunction that is my truck? Why does my brain wavefunction refer to things outside of itself, but the truck wavefunction doesn’t?

The wavefunction is not a physical object: meaning that wavefunctions don't have their own wavefunctions which show that they are physical objects. A wavefunction is a definition of what it means to be a physical thing (i.e., "a physical thing is an object that has a wavefunction"). By having a wavefunction, the laws of physics can causally structure the world based on the object and its relation to other objects. If the wavefunction does not exist, then the laws of physics cannot causally structure the world based on objects that really don't exist as real objects.

Let me state the question differently. Does a wavefunction have any physical reality whatsoever?

[charles51]

Harvey,

Let me clarify that I'm not saying the mind is a wavefunction. I'm stating that the mind has a wavefunction. Since it has a wavefunction, it is a physical thing from the perspective of nature.

This clarifies some things. However, what you’ve done is replace the mind/brain problem with the mind/wavefunction problem. The wavefunction associated with the mind “is a physical thing from the perspective of nature”, but the mind itself is not. So the problem of interaction remains, only under new labels. That’s what I suspected.

The atoms are not randomly structured in the brain since they are strategically located in the brain after millions of years of selection and emergence which gradually fine-tunes our minds onto the way the world is. Had evolution missed and produced minds that were way off, then all the hominids would have been lion dinners in the Pleistocene.

No one’s claiming that atoms are randomly structured in the brain. It may well be that the brain’s physical structure is finely tuned by natural selection to react in ways that enhance survival. That’s not the issue. The question to be resolved is why an abstract entity, itself having no physical properties, and therefore contributing nothing to physical survival, should emerge within the brain and accurately report events about the outside world. Because there's no necessary and logical correlation that should tie a particular brain state to a particular mind state, we are confronted with a coincidence that amounts to a statistical miracle. I doubt your theory has much room for miracles.

Human logic is based on our experience with the world. We are still experiencing the world, but now that experience is also happening on much smaller and larger scales. We have to be open-minded to other possibilities than the experiences that Aristotle was exposed to in his lifetime. Had he learned of the quantum experiments, perhaps he would have been much more tentative in some of his statements.

Classical logic is not conceptually based on world experience, and makes no reference to it. It does, however, apply to the world of experience. For example, the Law of Identity says that a thing is identical to itself (A is A). The truth of this statement does not rely on world experience. It's a self-evident fact; the truth of which is revealed in its comprehending. The same is true for the Law of Non-Contradiction: A thing cannot be both itself (A) and not itself (non-A) at the same time and in the same sense. This is really just a restating of the Law of Identity. We don’t have to go out into the world to confirm there are no such things as square/circles or married bachelors. We only need to comprehend the meaning for the terms involved.

If logic were founded on world experience, logic would forbid physically impossible events. It doesn’t. It’s logically possible for my house to suddenly levitate 5 feet into the air. It may not be physically possible, but it’s logically possible.

Truth requires a standard against which to judge a claim’s veracity; a standard in which no deeper certainty is conceivable. If that standard isn't sufficient, or required an infinite regress of standards, truth would be impossible. Therefore, if the mind is mistaken, and logic’s self-evident truths aren’t really true, the only remaining certainty is immediate subjective experience, which logical or not, exists as brute fact. All else, including your own theory, would be reduced to skepticism. Unless you’re exempting your own theory from these consequences, why should anyone take it seriously? And why should you be granted an exemption?

The mind has causal efficacy because physical laws apply. We have lots of examples where material properties are no longer sufficient to account for some of the latest hypotheses and theories of modern day physics. For example, well-known physicists James Hartle and Stephen Hawking suggested that the universe has a wavefunction which give a probability for our universe coming into existence. Is that a material property? I don't see how it could be.

Physical laws only apply to physical things. The mind is not itself a physical thing. You’ve already said as much when you stated, “I'm not saying the mind is a wavefunction.”

Of course probabilities aren’t physical things. A real thing either exists or it doesn’t. It cannot ‘kind of’ exist. That kind of muddled thinking occurs when people want to salvage a favored idea that’s inherently self-contradictory, but won’t admit it.

It is physical but not material. I'm trying carefully to make that distinction.

I take this to mean that the mind’s wavefuntion has some kind of objective physical properties. The mind itself does not. This is why no test, either logical or physical, can prove the real existence of other minds.

In any case, we're probably starting to spin our wheels a bit. If you have something in particular that you would like me to address then let's discuss it. But, I'm a little limited in time so I really can't keep up this pace (unfortunately).

I appreciate your responses. I’m an artist and my palette misses me. I will continue to post as thoughts occur that might be of some import or our discussions. Thanks.

[harvey1]

...if the abstract Law of Conservation of Energy acted on matter, that law by its own action would violate itself. Therefore, physical laws and relations must have a concrete reality of some kind.

The CoE is a mathematical proposition that tells us what is and isn't allowed in the universe along with what is the case when possibilities are being forbidden. It is not a force that makes things happen. For ease of communication we can speak in terms of laws "acting" in a certain situation, but what is actually happening is that the laws forbade all other options except the one that occurred. So, the CoE tells us what possibilities were denied and therefore explaining why we saw the only possibility occurring.

A similar problem exists for relations. A relation requires at a least two terms and must have both terms in common. This makes your scheme impossible. Mind and matter have no common being. A relation connecting these terms would have to both be (A) and not be (non-A) at the same time and in the same sense. This is logically impossible.

Mind and matter do have a common being. The matter components have wavefunctions that are components of the mind's wavefunction.

Couldn’t the very same be said about the wavefunction that is my truck? Why does my brain wavefunction refer to things outside of itself, but the truck wavefunction doesn’t?

The brain wavefunction doesn't refer to things outside of itself. It refers to sensory data that interacts with the brain, but it is not pointing to any other object. The mind wavefunction includes the brain wavefunction as a sub-component to its own wavefunction, so brain function is causally connected to the mind as a result.

Let me state the question differently. Does a wavefunction have any physical reality whatsoever?

Yes. The wavefunction is what makes the physical world: the physical world. If you wish, you can replace the term physical with "wavefunction associated." So, your question becomes: "Does a wavefunction have any 'wavefunction associated' reality whatsoever?" The answer is quite obvious. Wavefunctions have physical reality by being integral to what it means by "physical reality."

...what you’ve done is replace the mind/brain problem with the mind/wavefunction problem. The wavefunction associated with the mind “is a physical thing from the perspective of nature”, but the mind itself is not. So the problem of interaction remains, only under new labels. That’s what I suspected.

I'm not sure what you mean. The mind's wavefunction qualifies the mind as a physical thing. The mind exists in its own geometric space that is related by physical law to the neurons of the brain which instantiate that geometric space.

The question to be resolved is why an abstract entity, itself having no physical properties, and therefore contributing nothing to physical survival, should emerge within the brain and accurately report events about the outside world. Because there's no necessary and logical correlation that should tie a particular brain state to a particular mind state, we are confronted with a coincidence that amounts to a statistical miracle. I doubt your theory has much room for miracles.

Let me break it down so that it is a little easier to understand:

(1) Physical objects require wavefunctions to be physical
(2) Physical objects, causal laws, and causal relations are the ingredients for causation in the world
(3) Super-wavefunctions of the emergent phenomenon have sub-wavefunctions (of the pre-emergent properties) which refer to those pre-emergent phenomena
(4) The emergent phenomenon acts autopoietically and causally efficacious with its pre-emergent components acting in a holistic union with the emergent phenomenon
(5) Brain structure causes the emergence of mind within a geometric space (or virtual-like or mental space) by dynamic laws that are not fully understood as of right now (consistent with (2))
(6) The emergent mind has a wavefunction once it emerges (see (1))
(7) The mind's wavefunction is a super-wavefunction with the brain components as sub-wavefunctions (see (3))
(8) The mind has causal efficacy over the brain sub-components (as a result of (4))
(9) Hence, the mind is causally efficacious over brain structures even though the mind is instantiated by brain structures

Your objection here is answered by (5), (6), and (8). The emergent mind is a physical object (6), it does have causal efficacy over the material brain and body (8), it emerges from the brain by not-currently-well-understood dynamical laws (5), and therefore it is not necessarily a statistically miracle that the brain follows closely the direction of the mind.

Classical logic is not conceptually based on world experience, and makes no reference to it.

Then where did humans get this knowledge? Is this knowledge infallible? If so, then why do paradoxes such as Liar seem to call for changes? Why do many logicians and philosophers vary their support on important logical principles (e.g., bivalence).

It’s logically possible for my house to suddenly levitate 5 feet into the air. It may not be physically possible, but it’s logically possible.

If it were physically possible, then it cannot be logically impossible. Logical possibility expresses a stronger relation than physical possibility.

Physical laws only apply to physical things. The mind is not itself a physical thing. You’ve already said as much when you stated, “I'm not saying the mind is a wavefunction.”

I would argue that the mind is a physical dynamical system that has its own geometric space The language of that space is mentalese. The brain is part of that physical system with mind events taking place in its own physical space.

I take this to mean that the mind’s wavefuntion has some kind of objective physical properties. The mind itself does not. This is why no test, either logical or physical, can prove the real existence of other minds.

The mind is a physical object. Future theories might be able to show how mind is instantiated by neurons, and therefore there might be scientific research to show how the mind works. It might be possible to attach a mechanism to the brain which enhances the mind. For example, perhaps such a device will enhance the consciousness experience where we can join our conscious experience with others. Such a device would be based on a unified theory of mind, and it might even make predictions that only would be right if the theory accurately modelled the mind. I don't see any reason why this is not possible.

I appreciate your responses. I’m an artist and my palette misses me. I will continue to post as thoughts occur that might be of some import or our discussions.

I was thinking of not responding, but since I still see gaps in your understanding of my theory of mind I thought I should pipe up.

[charles51]

Harvey,

Mind and matter do have a common being. The matter components have wavefunctions that are components of the mind's wavefunction.

This is the crux of the problem and directly relates to my original question. Unfortunately this statement is ambiguous. I’ve pressed you to clarify the ontological relationship between the mind and its wavefunction, but you seem reticent to do this. I’ll give it one more try.

Are you saying that the mind ‘has’ a wavefunction, or, are you saying the mind ‘is’ a wavefunction? This question is important because these are two very different kinds of statements and entail very different implications.

You’ve stated that the wavefunction itself is physical. This we’ve established. However, this leaves three possible interpretations regarding the mind’s own ontological status:

1. If the mind ‘is’ a wavefunction, and the wave function is physical, then obviously you believe the mind itself is physical.

2. If the mind ‘has’ a wavefuntion, but is not the wavefunction itself, it’s possible that the mind itself is non-physical while the wavefunction itself is physical.

3. If the mind ‘has’ a wavefuntion, it’s also possible that the mind itself and the wavefunction itself are both physical.

Which statement is your position?

If you wish to reply, a simple indication of which position is yours is sufficient. Citing arcane scientific theory is fine, but not if it obscures the questions at hand. Obscurity is the refuge of bad philosophy, so I hope we can avoid it.

[harvey1]

I’ve pressed you to clarify the ontological relationship between the mind and its wavefunction, but you seem reticent to do this. I’ll give it one more try.

I thought I've been pretty clear, even providing a point by point summary.

Are you saying that the mind ‘has’ a wavefunction, or, are you saying the mind ‘is’ a wavefunction? This question is important because these are two very different kinds of statements and entail very different implications.

The mind has a wavefunction.

You’ve stated that the wavefunction itself is physical. This we’ve established. However, this leaves three possible interpretations regarding the mind’s own ontological status

I said that physical is having a wavefunction. That's what makes it a physical concept (or, if you prefer, that what makes the term physical a wavefunction concept).

If the mind ‘has’ a wavefuntion, but is not the wavefunction itself, it’s possible that the mind itself is non-physical while the wavefunction itself is physical.

I don't see how since having a wavefunction is what makes something physical. No wavefunction: not physical. Having a wavefunction: physical.

If the mind ‘has’ a wavefuntion, it’s also possible that the mind itself and the wavefunction itself are both physical.

Having a wavefunction is just another way of saying that the mind is physical.

[charles51]

Harvey,

Having a wavefunction is just another way of saying that the mind is physical.

Okay, let’s accept that the mind itself is physical. Although its exact relation to the wavefunction is left unclear, we can leave that issue aside. It is the ontological state of the mind itself we wish to examine.

Now the question is; Does this claim that the mind is physical square with the mind as it’s actually experienced? If it does, your theory may have merit. If not, your theory is false.

Take your conscious experience of this sentence. For you, this conscious experience is undeniably real. It is exactly was it appears to you. There is no ontological distance separating you, the experience-er, from this experience. Is this conscious datum physical, which is to say, a physical reality having objective physical properties which are detectable from a third-person point of view? If it is, it should be possible in principle to examine your brain and actually detect and read this conscious datum. We should be able to see the datum just as you see it.

Is this possible? Or, does your conscious experience have a unique and privileged first-person reality that cannot be accessed from an objective third-person perspective?

[harvey1]

Does this claim that the mind is physical square with the mind as it’s actually experienced?

I think so. The emergent mind is a phenomena that takes place in its own physical geometric space. Let me give you an example. The holographic principle suggests according to the Scientific American sidebar that (who is quoting Raphael Bousso):

The world doesn't appear to us like a hologram, but in terms of the information needed to describe it, it is one...

In the main article of the Scientific American article, physicist Jacob D. Bekenstein wrote:

By studying the mysterious properties of black holes, physicists have deduced absolute limits on how much information a region of space or a quantity of matter and energy can hold. Related results suggest that our universe, which we perceive to have three spatial dimensions, might instead be "written" on a two-dimensional surface, like a hologram. Our everyday perceptions of the world as three-dimensional would then be either a profound illusion or merely one of two alternative ways of viewing reality. A grain of sand may not encompass our world, but a flat screen might.

So, to answer your question, the mind might be as physical as a holographic universe.

Take your conscious experience of this sentence. For you, this conscious experience is undeniably real. It is exactly was it appears to you. There is no ontological distance separating you, the experience-er, from this experience. Is this conscious datum physical, which is to say, a physical reality having objective physical properties which are detectable from a third-person point of view? If it is, it should be possible in principle to examine your brain and actually detect and read this conscious datum. We should be able to see the datum just as you see it.

Not necessarily. Imagine someone reading the contents of a 2-D holographic image, they might not be able to decipher the image unless they know how the image is experienced in 3-D (4-D, 5-D, etc) space.

Is this possible? Or, does your conscious experience have a unique and privileged first-person reality that cannot be accessed from an objective third-person perspective?

If we take the holographic analogy seriously, then we should open up our understanding of physicality to a much wider realm than currently understood by the materialists.

[charles51]

Harvey,

Then where did humans get this knowledge? Is this knowledge infallible? If so, then why do paradoxes such as Liar seem to call for changes?

Logical laws come from intelligence reflecting upon itself. Humans cannot conceive logical contradictions. We can state them linguistically (i.e., a circle has five sides), but the collective meaning of the words cannot be translated into a mental concept. An understanding of the word ‘circle’ entails ‘not having sides’. It’s the meaning of the words themselves that create the contradiction, not an artificial rule. The rules of logic only give formal expression to it.

Is this knowledge infallible? Can these laws be challenged? I don’t believe so. To challenge these laws one must first assume the validity of the very laws being challenged. For example:

To attack the Law of Identity (A is A), it must be admitted that the Law of Identity is what it is, and that arguments against it exist and are what they are.

To attack the Law of Excluded Middle (something is either A or non-A), it must be admitted that the law is either true or false. It must be agreed that all arguments presented are either true or false, valid or invalid.

To attack the Law of Non-contradiction (something cannot be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same sense), it must be admitted that either the law is true or it is false. It must be agreed that it cannot be both true and false. The law’s attackers must argue that their argument, and yours, cannot be both true and false.

Therefore, any attempt to challenge these laws clearly shows the challenger doesn’t understand them. In short, the rules of logic are preconditions for rational discourse. No one can argue against them rationally.

Of course someone can simply dismiss these rules out-of-hand and state that reality is not subject to them, in which case anything and everything may exist and non-exist, and all at the same time. Truth is no longer possible because for every true proposition, it’s opposite and contradiction is equally valid. Knowledge collapses. This leaves immediate subjective experience as the only sure and knowable fact, and solipsism the only philosophy worth considering.

That would seem to put me at a distinct advantage since my philosophy is closer to solipsism than yours.

…why do paradoxes such as Liar seem to call for changes?

I don’t think it does. Here’s my take on it. The paradox creates an unending regress of true and false statements. Because infinity cannot be reached by adding one more step to the regress series, the paradox has no attainable true/false solution whatsoever. And that which has no solution, needs none. As a truth statement, the paradox is meaningless. In the same way, a question that has no theoretical answer is a meaningless question.