Proofs... So what?

[Nirvana-Eld]

After some thinking I am willing to accept that there must have been a first cause that initiated the series of events we call existence. I think that this is the underlying substratum of causuality. Here the problem. So what? I do not see the connection from "there must have been a first cause" to "this is a being which we all call God" (quod omnes dicunt Deum). I see the point of the First Cause Idea more as pointing to a natural process, not a Christian God and or the classic "Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnibenevolent God". There seems to be no connection.

I would like the proponents of the First Cause Argument who believe in the God of the three "O's" to logically make the connection between a process and a God. Civility is a must! I just glanced through a thread by a "killingevolution" ( ) and I would like this thread to be cleaner. 8)

[harvey1]

Again, why is A the cause for B?

I'm not sure I understand the question. Let's say that, for each effect y, there's a cause x, such that x directly causes y. Let's say further that it's possible for an event Z to be both a cause and an effect. In this case, I claim that it's possible to map events in Z to a number line, thus assigning a unique integer to each event; let's call a function that does this f(z). If x directly causes y, then f(y) = f(x) + 1, and f(x) - 1 = f(y), by definition.

So, let's assume that f(x)=5; f(x)+1=6 (or f(y)=f(x)+1). If f(y)=f(x)+1 by definition, then f(x) is the cause of f(y) by definition. However, if it is by definition that f(y) is an effect of f(x), then there is no reason why "f(y)=6". It just does. A brute fact. If that is the case, then this is an irrational world since there is no reason why a certain cause brings about a certain effect--it is so not by reason but by definition (i.e., a contingent fact).

If it is possible to map causes and effects in this manner, then we have an infinite chain of causes and effects. Each effect has one and only one direct cause...

All you've done is eliminate a cause as a reason for an effect, and instead substituted the notion of cause as an occurrence accompanying an effect.

[Bugmaster]

However, if it is by definition that f(y) is an effect of f(x), then there is no reason why "f(y)=6". It just does. A brute fact.

You are confusing the issue. I am not interested in the question, "why does causality work at all ?" -- at least, not for the purposes of this example. Let's assume that there are causes, that causes have effects (which can, in turn, become causes for other effects), and that each given effect has one and only one direct cause, which, as you would put it, is a reason for that effect. Now, given this, we should be able to map causes and effects onto integers, as I've described.

If my assumptions above are true, then it's possible to have an infinite chain of causes and effects, with no First Cause, which is nonetheless completely connected. That is, if we take two arbitrary events a and b, we can always trace the chain of causes and effects that connects them (i.e., a causes t0, which causes t1, which causes t2, which causes b). This is equivalent to looking at the number line, picking two arbitrary integers a and b, and enumerating all integers t between them, such as a < t0..tn < b (i.e., 5, 6, 7, 8). We can do this for any two integers, regardless of how far apart they are.

Again, for the purposes of this example, I'm assuming that causality works, and that certain events cause certain other events. I'm not interested in why causality works -- maybe it's a law of nature, maybe God makes it work, maybe unicorns enforce it, whatever. It works, that's what's important for our current discussion.

[Grumpy]

Kaku did not commit to the conjecture being true. The point made by Kaku is what the conjecture means.

If the conjecture is not possible in the real universe, IT DOES NOT MATTER WHAT THE CONJECTURE MEANS, thus mind games, science fiction, pure speculation. Your arguement is logically bankrupt. Thus anything built using this bankrupt logic is also bankrupt(By the way, this is a more polite way of saying BS, hope it is more acceptable)

Your position is that your mind games ARE reality instead of constructs of our intellect which represent reality. After this logical fallacy everything built upon it is also a logical fallacy and your whole house of cards falls flat and YOUR "proof" of pantheistic unity is falsified(as has every other attempt so far). It is the continued insistence of it's validity that is absurd.

This is just dogmatism. "My position is right no matter what you say!" If you want to really debate your position as being right, then why not respond to the questions I posed to you versus acting out in this uncivil manner?

What I am saying is that your mind constructs are not reality, no matter how convoluted your retoric or how many logical fallacies you can pile one atop the other. I have answered your questions repeatedly, you just don't approve of my answers, I can live with that. But just to be polite I will state them once again.

Nature behaves the way it does due to it's physical properties and the relationship with the other forces and materials that make up the universe. These physical properties are the built in "rules" or "laws" which nature NEVER violates. Paradoxes or miracles which would violate the nature of the universe CAN NEVER HAPPEN(at least we have NEVER observed them to happen, even if they apparently do it will be our understanding which is at fault, not nature violating it's properties)

Man observes those relationships and formulates "laws", which are models of the way nature behaves which allow him to predict what happens next and to understand the causes of the behavior of nature. Those laws HAVE NO EXISTENCE OUTSIDE OF OUR INTELLECT and have no effect on nature. You can(and will) chop, dice, puree, mix, blend and spread these intellectual concepts in your attempts to justify your philisophical beliefs but in the end they are simply mind games, meaning nothing to reality. Thus you may "prove" the existence of your God according to your apparently loose standards(at least to yourself) but you are very far from any proof that will stand up to the standards of reality. And your conclusion that your proof applies to nature is logically bankrupt.

Any questions???

Grumpy 8)

[harvey1]

Let's assume that there are causes, that causes have effects (which can, in turn, become causes for other effects), and that each given effect has one and only one direct cause, which, as you would put it, is a reason for that effect. Now, given this, we should be able to map causes and effects onto integers, as I've described.

Okay, but keep in mind that this assumption of your's is what I conclude to be false. Of course, if you can show that this assumption leads to rational conclusions, then that would mean I have no reason in principle to dispute the assumption.

if we take two arbitrary events a and b, we can always trace the chain of causes and effects that connects them (i.e., a causes t0, which causes t1, which causes t2, which causes b). This is equivalent to looking at the number line, picking two arbitrary integers a and b, and enumerating all integers t between them, such as a < t0..tn < b (i.e., 5, 6, 7, 8). We can do this for any two integers, regardless of how far apart they are.

Okay, but how does this address my objection? Remember I said that a cause is a reason for an occurrence and not a mapping of an occurrence onto a line of integers. Of course you can map events (causes/effects) that occur onto a line of integers, however this doesn't answer how E can cause F if there is no ultimate cause for E. This is your problem. In order to show how E causes F, you must bring refer the cause of E to D, and so on ad infinitum into the past. At no point do we ever have a reason to why E caused F. Therefore, every point (effect) on your line is without reason (cause). That's an irrational universe.

Again, for the purposes of this example, I'm assuming that causality works, and that certain events cause certain other events. I'm not interested in why causality works

Fine, but if I ask you what causes F you say E. When I say what causes E, you say D, and so on ad infinitum. At no point do you ever give a cause for F since every time I asked for a reason for F in the name of the variable you gave me as a substitute for F, you just pointed me to another variable without ever having told me the reason for F (or any of the variables you offered as a substitute for F--e.g., E, D, C, etc.).

Shouldn't we be having this discussion in the First Cause thread?

[harvey1]

If the conjecture is not possible in the real universe

Why should we reject the conjecture out of hand? I realize you believe in your atheism, but I see no reason to reject a conjecture of physicists just because of your philosophical belief system.

IT DOES NOT MATTER WHAT THE CONJECTURE MEANS, thus mind games, science fiction, pure speculation.

Of course, if the conjecture is correct, then IT DOES NOT MATTER WHAT ATHEISTS BELIEVE, thus mind games, science fiction, pure speculation.

Your arguement is logically bankrupt.

You have to establish this by providing an argument. So far, you have only insisted that your dogma is correct without providing any reason to think that it is.

Thus anything built using this bankrupt logic is also bankrupt(By the way, this is a more polite way of saying BS, hope it is more acceptable)

Since you can't answer simple questions put forth, I don't see any merit to this rhetoric.

What I am saying is that your mind constructs are not reality, no matter how convoluted your retoric or how many logical fallacies you can pile one atop the other.

I'm just asking you questions, Grumpy. You're the one who became all upset and started throwing out dogmatic claims as your "reasons" when faced with those simple questions.

I have answered your questions repeatedly, you just don't approve of my answers, I can live with that. But just to be polite I will state them once again.

You didn't answer my questions. We arrived to the question on whether the properties of nature are necessary, and then you backtracked on your response by saying in your last post that, "properties of the universe we call laws are built into their structure." Now, you have laws of the universe causing the laws of the universe. Before it was the properties causing the intrinsic laws.

Nature behaves the way it does due to it's physical properties and the relationship with the other forces and materials that make up the universe.

Okay, we're back to properties. Alright, are the properties necessary based on some law, or are you saying that the properties of nature are brute fact?

These physical properties are the built in "rules" or "laws" which nature NEVER violates.

Here you sound like physical properties are laws. So, let's just call them laws, okay? If nature never violates them, then that means that the laws are necessary. If these laws are necessary, then why are these laws necessary?

Paradoxes or miracles which would violate the nature of the universe CAN NEVER HAPPEN(at least we have NEVER observed them to happen, even if they apparently do it will be our understanding which is at fault, not nature violating it's [laws])

Since you've equated properties with laws, let's just dispense of property-talk since you made this equality (not me). But, these necessary laws that nature cannot violate are not themselves material since a law is a behavior, not stuff. Why is nature restricted to certain (ultimately) logical behaviors?

Man observes those relationships and formulates "laws"

Let's dispense of what man observes and just say that these "laws of nature" that nature cannot violate are the laws in which necessitates how nature behaves.

Those laws HAVE NO EXISTENCE OUTSIDE OF OUR INTELLECT and have no effect on nature.

But, the laws which you referred to above "which nature NEVER violates" must have existence outside of our intellect if nature cannot violate these laws (behaviors). Since you treat these laws as necessary (e.g., "which nature NEVER violates"), you are saying these laws do exist outside the mind. These laws (behaviors) are real and they happen and are necessary for nature to obey.

You can(and will) chop, dice, puree, mix, blend and spread these intellectual concepts in your attempts to justify your philisophical beliefs but in the end they are simply mind games, meaning nothing to reality.

This is just rhetoric. If you put forth a position, you should know full well that coming to a site as this that you will be asked to defend it. If your defense is the crying defense then I'm not impressed ("in the end your attempts to wreck my defense are just mind games, you brute...").

you are very far from any proof that will stand up to the standards of reality. And your conclusion that your proof applies to nature is logically bankrupt.

Rather than worrying about my arguments at this stage, you should be more concerned as to why you keep referring to properties, and then say excuse me I meant laws, and then saying excuse me I meant properties, and so on. Which is it, is nature's laws necessary because nature has no choice but to obey them, or is nature's properties necessary because nature has no choice but to have them?

Any questions???

Lots, but I doubt you'll try to answer them when the crying defense is so much more attractive to you.

[Bugmaster]

Okay, but keep in mind that this assumption of your's is what I conclude to be false. Of course, if you can show that this assumption leads to rational conclusions, then that would mean I have no reason in principle to dispute the assumption.

Oh, I don't know if I can -- as I said in the beginning, it seems intuitively false to me. However, lots of things that seem intuitively false are actually true, to the best of our knowledge (such as particle/wave duality) -- and thus, I'm deliberately playing devil's advocate for you, hoping that you can come up with a rigorous proof.

Okay, but how does this address my objection? Remember I said that a cause is a reason for an occurrence and not a mapping of an occurrence onto a line of integers.

I think you misunderstood my argument. I'm not saying that integers are the penultimate explanation for causality; I'm using integers to illustrate my point, which I'll clarify in a minute.

In order to show how E causes F, you must bring refer the cause of E to D, and so on ad infinitum into the past.

I disagree, and, again, this is where my integer analogy comes in. We do not need to know what the smallest number in the world is, in order to say that 5 < 6. Similarly, given and event E, we can show that it causes F, without referring to whatever caused E.

Again, I contend that, given an infinite ordered set of causes and effects, we can take any two events, and trace the chain of causality between them. Similarly, given an infinite ordered set of integers, we can pick two integers, and write out all the integers between them, in ascending order. More specifically:

At no point do we ever have a reason to why E caused F.

You seem to be saying that, without the First Cause, the very concept of causality is meaningless. I disagree. Consider, for example, two billiard balls: A and B. A is in motion, while B is at rest. When A hits B, B starts moving.

What was the cause of B's motion ? It was A, and we can say this with a high degree of certainty. It does not matter, for our purposes, what caused A itself to move; ultimately, A caused B to move.

In other words, for any effect, we can easily discern its immediate cause. Similarly, for any integer, we can easily discern its immediate antecedent. Expanding on this principle, we can build a chain of arbitrary length that leads us from one event to another, or from one integer to another. We do not need to know what the smallest integer is, or what the penultimate cause is, in order to build such a chain.

In other words:

1). Let's say that, for every event e, there's a function f(e) that gives us the immediate cause of e.
1a). We can get the indirect cause of e by evaluating f(f(e)), or f(f(f(e))), etc., as desired.
2). In this case, I claim that we can map each event e to an integer i, and
3). We can map the function f(e) to the function g(i), where g(i) = i-1.

If you object, then please state which premise (1, 2 or 3) you disagree with, and why.

Shouldn't we be having this discussion in the First Cause thread?

Yeah, maybe... It's up to the moderators, I guess.

[harvey1]

1). Let's say that, for every event e, there's a function f(e) that gives us the immediate cause of e.

f(e) must show that the effect is necessary as a result of the immediate cause of e, and it must also show that the immediate cause of e is sufficient to cause e. However, in order to do so, this immediate cause cannot be left even partially unexplained. If there is anything missing from the explanation which requires referring to a previous cause, then your "immediate cause" is not a real cause since it does not answer why the effect was completely necessary based on this immediate cause, nor why the immediate cause was sufficient to bring about this effect.

Let me give an analogy. Let's say that a certain mathematical proof exists which proves the Reimann hypothesis. Unfortunately part of the proof on page 15 of the proof refers back to an earlier journal. Excited, mathematicians quickly look up the journal only to feel the agony of being referred to a yet earlier journal, and so on. Eventually a brilliant mathematician proves that this "proof" of Reimann's hypothesis will refer to an infinite number of journal entries. Now, has Reimann's hypothesis been proved? No! The reason is that no complete proof exists.

My contention is that your (1) makes the assumption that the full cause of e is contained by what f(e) refers to, the "immediate cause." However, this cannot be the case since the "immediate cause" is an event that itself has a cause. By not having access to this earlier cause, the cause of e is undecidable. The reason is that previous causes provide an explanation why e is necessary and its cause is sufficient for e to occur. This is what it means to have a cause.

It's the same with mathematical proofs. A proof of Reimann's hypothesis shows why given certain axioms that Reimann's hypothesis is necessarily true, and why these axioms are sufficient to arrive at Reimann's hypothesis as a theorem. A partial proof does not accomplish this. A partial explanation that comes from an "immediate cause" does not accomplish this for e.

2). In this case, I claim that we can map each event e to an integer i

You can map many mathematical hypotheses to the mathematical theories that spawned them, but that doesn't mean that the mathematical hypothesis is true. To show that the hypothesis is true, the mapping must show cause from the beginning. If there is no beginning, then you never map a proof from axiom to hypothesis, thus leaving the hypothesis as a hypothesis--unproven and irrational to claim as a deduction.

[Bugmaster]

f(e) must show that the effect is necessary as a result of the immediate cause of e, and it must also show that the immediate cause of e is sufficient to cause e... If there is anything missing from the explanation which requires referring to a previous cause, then your "immediate cause" is not a real cause... My contention is that your (1) makes the assumption that the full cause of e is contained by what f(e) refers to, the "immediate cause."

No, that's not how I'm defining f(e). f(e) is merely the necessary cause, not the sufficient cause. Thus, c = f(e) could be contingent on some other event d = f(c), etc.

Eventually a brilliant mathematician proves that this "proof" of Reimann's hypothesis will refer to an infinite number of journal entries. Now, has Reimann's hypothesis been proved? No!

I think this is a false analogy. For any event e, we don't need to prove that it happened; we know that it happened. We're only concerned with its causes, not the fact of its ocurrence.

There are many other issues I have with using mathematical theorems as substitutes for events (as you already know), so let's stick with simple events for the purposes of illustrating this discussion -- such as bouncing balls, colliding particles, or whatever. I don't want this thread to diverge into our usual dualism vs. materialism quagmire.

By not having access to this earlier cause, the cause of e is undecidable.

I would say that the sufficient cause is undecided, but the necessary cause is decided, and it's f(e).

Now, here's an interesting question: is the sufficient cause of e undecidable, in principle ? I would say that it is unknowable to finite human beings, but knowable to an infinite God (assuming it exists). After all, what does it mean to be omniscient ? It means that you can know all the digits of Pi (just for example), and being able to grasp any infinite set in its entirety. That's totally off-topic, though.

[harvey1]

for every event e, there's a function f(e) that gives us the immediate cause of e... f(e) is merely the necessary cause, not the sufficient cause.

Please clarify if f(e) is the cause of e, or is f(e) a mapping from e to the cause of e.

f(e) is merely the necessary cause, not the sufficient cause.

You need both necessity and sufficiency to describe a real cause. For example, it is necessary that I register and log in to post to this forum, but registering and logging in are not enough (not sufficient) to be a cause of me posting. If your f(e) was or identified the necessary conditions for my post, it still is not (or identified) the sufficient conditions to bring about a post from me. Similarly, sufficient conditions without necessary conditions are not enough to bring about an effect. For example, it is sufficient that I post a response in the Philosophy subforum to say that I caused a post to appear in this forum, but posting in the Philosophy subforum is not a necessary condition for posting a message in this forum. I could post in the Christianity subforum, for example.

For any event e, we don't need to prove that it happened; we know that it happened. We're only concerned with its causes, not the fact of its ocurrence.

That's not what that analogy is trying to show. The analogy is trying to show that a cause, to be a cause, must refer to all the events or conditions that tie a cause to its effect. As I mentioned, there's necessary conditions (e.g., logging into the forum) and there's sufficient conditions (e.g., posting in the Philosophy subforum). If a cause lacks either these necessary or sufficient conditions for the effect (post in this forum) to occur, then the "immediate cause" is not a cause since it does not meet the conditions of it being a cause (i.e., it lacks necessary and sufficient conditions of what it means to be a cause).

I would say that the sufficient cause is undecided, but the necessary cause is decided, and it's f(e).

If the sufficient conditions are undecided (i.e., the immediate cause as being sufficient to bring about the effect is undecided), then in what way is the immediate cause a real cause? Imagine if I said that logging in is the immediate cause of me posting here, but I also said that I often log in and do not post. How is logging in a cause of me posting? It seems that it is a necessary step to posting, but it is only part of the necessary conditions of obtaining the effect. I need sufficient conditions as well that bring about the effect (posting).

Now, here's an interesting question: is the sufficient cause of e undecidable, in principle?

I think you are answering your own question here. The cause of an effect is not one event as I've been saying all along. The cause of (i.e., the sufficient and necessary conditions that bring about) an effect are strewn out over a large expanse of many events over the vastness of time (i.e., the whole causal nexus that preceded the effect). When someone says that you can have a universe without a beginning, what they are in fact saying is that the universe does not have sufficient and necessary conditions for its existence, and that means that any event that occurs in the universe does not have a sufficient and necessary condition for its occurrence. That's an irrational view of events since we are left with understanding events as "they just happen for no reason." That seems a bit odd since I'm sure I posted this reply for a reason.

[Grumpy]

harvey1

You didn't answer my questions. We arrived to the question on whether the properties of nature are necessary, and then you backtracked on your response by saying in your last post that, "properties of the universe we call laws are built into their structure." Now, you have laws of the universe causing the laws of the universe. Before it was the properties causing the intrinsic laws.

Necessary???

Is it necessary that nature acts according to it's properties??? Yes, it can do nothing else.

Is it necessary for you(or I) to be concious of nature for it to behave according to it's properties??? No.

Is it necessary for us to understand nature's properties in the form of "rules", "laws" or "constraints" for nature to behave according to it's properties??? No.

Is it necessary for us to impose those "rules", "laws" or "constraints" on nature before it can behave according to it's properties??? No.

Does it matter how much you twist logic and turn phrases in your quest to "prove" your personal concepts of god (or anything else), will it affect the way that nature behaves??? No, nature does not know or care that you exist, it got along fine for 4.5 billion years without you, it will continue long after you are dust. And the same thing is true about your superstitious concepts, nature behaves the same way it did before we came along to invent the concept of god(or any other philisophical concept)

Okay, we're back to properties. Alright, are the properties necessary based on some law, or are you saying that the properties of nature are brute fact?

No, the "law" is a mental construct based on those properties, not the other way around. The properties, like nature itself, are just a part of the fabric of the universe. Call that a brute fact if you like, nature does not require you to understand.

Here you sound like physical properties are laws. So, let's just call them laws, okay? If nature never violates them, then that means that the laws are necessary. If these laws are necessary, then why are these laws necessary?

Physical properties are what determines how nature behaves, laws are mental constructs describing that behavior. If we were not here to construct those mental constructs the laws would not exist, yet nature would still behave the same way. So logic would indicate that laws are NOT necessary.

Since you've equated properties with laws, let's just dispense of property-talk since you made this equality (not me). But, these necessary laws that nature cannot violate are not themselves material since a law is a behavior, not stuff. Why is nature restricted to certain (ultimately) logical behaviors?

Nature never does anything which it's physical properties do not allow, it has no mechanism to do so. And it always behaves as it's physical properties dictate, it can do NOTHING else.

Grumpy wrote:
Man observes those relationships and formulates "laws"

Let's dispense of what man observes and just say that these "laws of nature" that nature cannot violate are the laws in which necessitates how nature behaves.

Let's not. The distinction between the properties of nature, which determine how it will behave and are built into it's structure, and the mental constructs of man, which, you are correct, have no existence outside of the intellect is the one you keep trying to paper over on your way to your conclusion. It is the logical fallacy which negates everything you try to argue based upon it. This is where you depart from reality and delve into superstition.

Fine, believe in your god(s) if you must, just drop the pretence that he(they) must exist for nature to know how to behave.

Grumpy [/quote]