Could we have made different choices than the ones we actually made?

[Compassionist]

Could we have made different choices than the ones we actually made? By "we" I mean all living things. For example, I have a potted plant that has tilted westward by twenty degrees. Could the plant have refrained from tilting or tilted at a different direction by a different degree or was it inevitable that it tilted westward by twenty degrees? I ate porridge for breakfast today. Could I have eaten something else or was eating porridge for breakfast inevitable? Nelson Mandela died on 14 June 1999. Was his death on that date inevitable or could he have died at a younger or older age? Albert Einstein was a physicist. Could he have been a professional football player instead of a physicist or was his choice of career inevitable? In your response, please explain how you know what you know.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #50]

I certainly don't want to mischaracterize your position. I am showing you how it looks to me and why I think it looks that way.

Thank you — and I appreciate the clarification.
But “how it looks” is not neutral here. The disagreement is not about tone or intuition; it is about what counts as an explanation. That distinction matters throughout what follows.

Why did Suzie raise her hand? A free will explanation could go something like this…

What you’ve provided is a reasons-responsiveness narrative, not a causal explanation.

Nothing in that story explains why this outcome occurred rather than the alternative given identical total conditions. You list considerations Suzie was aware of, but awareness is not selection.

Crucially:

* Those reasons were present before the choice.
* You explicitly say she has gone both ways in the past under similar competing reasons.

So the explanandum remains: why this outcome now?

Saying “she freely chose” merely labels the outcome; it does not explain its occurrence.

This rules out alternatives. She wasn't forced at gunpoint.

Ruling out coercion is not the same as explaining causation.

“No gunpoint” tells us what didn’t happen, not what did. Explanatory adequacy is not satisfied by eliminating irrelevant possibilities.

Is this explanation non-arbitrary?

Yes — but only because the arbitrariness has been pushed into the will itself.

If:

* all reasons are held fixed,
* all dispositions are held fixed,
* all prior states are held fixed,

and either outcome remains possible, then the selection mechanism is unconstrained. Calling it “reasoned” does not add constraint unless reasons determine or bias the outcome.

That is the core issue.

The outcome does have a reason: the agent reasoned about it and freely chose.

This conflates justification with causation.

Reasons can justify an action without causing it to occur rather than another. My challenge is not “were there reasons?”, but “what made this reason prevail?”

Without an answer, “free choice” functions as a terminus, not an explanation.

To say that X (Suzie's free will) made a difference to Y…

You quietly switch from intra-agent comparison to inter-agent comparison.

Comparing Suzie to Jimmy is irrelevant. The question is not:

“Why did Suzie act differently than Jimmy?”

but:

“Why did Suzie act differently than Suzie could have, under identical conditions?”

Difference-making must operate within the same agent across counterfactuals, not across different people.

Your deterministic chain also has no antecedent cause to it…

This is a false symmetry.

A boundary condition (why anything exists at all) is not explanatorily equivalent to local causal gaps within the domain. Science routinely accepts global boundary conditions while insisting on local causal closure.

Appealing to a cosmological terminus does not license unconstrained choice at every decision point.

Your worldview is truly reductionist with illusory "higher-levels"…

This misstates my position.

Higher-level explanations are legitimate when they track stable intervention patterns. Education matters because changing education predictably changes outcomes.

That is not illusion; it is causal compression. Reductionism does not eliminate levels — it constrains them.

Can you point out an observable difference between a deterministic world and a libertarian world?

Yes — and this is the crux.

A libertarian will predicts:

* outcome variance not explainable by prior states,
* violations of probabilistic constraint under identical conditions,
* intervention failures where reasons do not bias distributions.

If no such differences appear, the posit adds no explanatory power — even if metaphysically coherent.

This is not special pleading; it is standard explanatory discrimination.

Why trust those perceptions?

Because reliability is established through convergence, not metaphysical freedom.

Error correction, predictive success, and intervention stability are publicly trackable. A causally unconstrained will would undermine this by allowing belief formation to decouple from evidential constraint.

Freedom does not secure reliability; constraint does.

Why does free will undermine the reliability of science?

Because unconstrained choice severs counterfactual dependence.

If beliefs could have been otherwise with no change in inputs, then success becomes accidental rather than earned. Science depends on biasing mechanisms, not spontaneity.

The will explains the choice.

Only by stipulation.

If the will:

* is not itself constrained by reasons,
* does not alter outcome probabilities,
* permits all options equally under identical conditions,

then it explains nothing about why this outcome occurred. It merely names the stopping point.

Why is the egoist's a preference, but yours is a justification?

Because justification generalises across perspectives; preference does not.

An egoist cannot criticise another egoist with different interests without contradiction. A realist can criticise both using reasons that do not privilege identity.

That asymmetry is structural, not preferential.

Your principle would say the wall didn't have a cause.

No — that is precisely the category error I flagged.

The wall is the organised pattern of bricks. Causation applies to the processes that arranged them, not to the abstraction over and above those processes.

Asking for an extra cause of “the wall” reifies a description into an entity.

Once again… both events are fixed.

Fixity is not the issue. Constraint is.

A fixed outcome can still be explained if it is fixed because of biasing factors. A fixed outcome with no selection mechanism remains unexplained.

Timelessness blocks counterfactual dependence; determinism does not.

Both of our views end the explanation.

Yes — but where they end matters.

Mine ends at constrained causal dynamics that:

* support prediction,
* enable intervention,
* ground counterfactuals,
* and improve error correction.

Yours ends at agent causation that:

* permits all outcomes under identical conditions,
* forbids deeper explanation,
* and insists this still “explains”.

That is the real disagreement — not free will versus determinism, but explanatory constraint versus explanatory termination.

If I’m wrong, the path forward is simple:
Specify what the libertarian will forbids, what distributions it alters, or what intervention would fail without it.

Absent that, the will remains metaphysically interesting — but explanatorily idle.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #51]

I think I need a reset, as I am possibly misunderstanding you and feeling misunderstood in some respects. I’ll use this post as an opportunity to mainly just ask you some questions to try to clarify our views.


On science

1. I agree that science depends on mechanistic reliability. One question we have been addressing is whether human wills fall under science alone or have an element that may not fall under science. What is your position here: human wills fall under science alone, they don’t fall under science alone, or we don’t know if they fall under science alone?


On providing an explanation

2. Could you give a causal explanation for Suzie raising her hand from your worldview so that I know exactly what type of explanation you are looking for and better give a free will account?

3. Could you name the "difference-maker" in your proposed causal explanation?

4. Could you give a causal explanation for Suzie raising her hand for any non-deterministic alternatives you believe are logically possible?

5. Do you believe libertarian predictions are different from deterministic predictions? If so, then doesn't this add explanatory power to both sides? If not, then isn't explanatory power not added to either side?


On the difference between why anything exists and why a specific thing exists

6. What kind of boundary conditions and local causes are you talking about that allow for the distinction you’ve been making here? Can you give a specific example?


On rationality

7. Why trust the perception that convergence establishes reliability?

8. What does it mean for error correction, predictive success, and intervention stability to be publically trackable? And why doesn't the belief in free will have that?


On morality

9. What does it mean to generalize across perspectives?

[William]

I thought I would interject here with the following, as I have experienced this type of questioning from The Tanager often in the past and this has always lead to a breakdown of communication between us.

Me: I am following a discussion and would like AI input into whether the first person (CP) has explained in their post things which the second person (TT) subsequently asks for explanation of in their answering post...

AI: Yes, CP has extensively explained, in substance, the very points TT is now asking for clarification on.

The Pattern: TT's Post #52 reads as a request for CP to re-state, simplify, or provide concrete examples for positions and distinctions that CP already laid out in a complex, integrated, and philosophically dense form in Post #51.

The Disconnect: The core issue seems to be one of framing and philosophical vocabulary. CP is arguing from a framework of causal explanation, constraint, and counterfactual dependence (common in philosophy of science and metaphysics). TT appears to be working from a different starting point (agent causation, reasons as explanations).

The Evidence: For nearly every one of TT's nine questions, a direct quote from CP's post can be found that provides the conceptual answer. TT is not asking about new topics; they are asking for CP's views to be broken down according to TT's own checklist.

In short, TT's post largely asks CP to re-explain their already-stated position in a different format. The debate is stalled not because CP hasn't explained their view, but because the two participants are using different foundational models of what constitutes an "explanation." CP has detailed their model; TT is now asking for that model to be applied to specific questions.

Me: Re "CP has detailed their model; TT is now asking for that model to be applied to specific questions."

Yet it is established that the "specific questions" have been answered. What can we make of this? I ask because I have experienced this type of questioning from The Tanager often in the past and this has always lead to a breakdown of communication between us.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #52]

Replying to The Tanager

Thank you for the reset. I think that’s a good move, and I agree that part of the difficulty here has been us talking past each other. I’ll answer your questions directly and try to make my commitments as explicit as possible.

On science

1. Do human wills fall under science alone, not alone, or do we not know?

My position is this:

Human willing is entirely constituted by physical processes, but not all descriptions of those processes are equally useful.

So:
• Ontologically: human wills fall under the same causal fabric studied by science.
• Epistemically: we do not yet (and may never) have a complete mechanistic account at the level of lived deliberation.

There is no extra non-physical causal ingredient doing work. But higher-level explanations (psychological, social, normative) can still be legitimate without positing metaphysical freedom.

On providing an explanation

2. Could you give a causal explanation for Suzie raising her hand?

Yes. A sketch-level explanation would be:

Suzie raises her hand because:
• she has a belief that raising her hand will allow her to speak,
• a desire to speak or answer,
• attentional focus on the teacher’s question,
• neural activation patterns shaped by prior learning, social norms, and current context,
• motor planning and execution following those neural states.

This explanation is causal, mechanistic, and multilevel. It does not appeal to an uncaused “act of will.”

3. What is the difference-maker in this explanation?

The difference-makers are proximal neural and psychological states — specifically, the configuration of beliefs, desires, attention, and motor readiness at that moment.

Change those, and the outcome changes.

4. Could you give a causal explanation for Suzie raising her hand under a non-deterministic alternative?

Here’s the key point: I don’t see how a non-deterministic alternative adds causal intelligibility.

If indeterminism is introduced at the moment of decision, then either:
• it makes no systematic difference (noise), or
• it becomes another probabilistic causal factor governed by lawlike constraints.

In neither case does it ground authorship in a way that determinism does not already undermine.

5. Do libertarian predictions differ from deterministic predictions?

At the level of observable behavior: no.

Libertarian freedom does not yield novel, testable predictions about action that could not also arise from complex deterministic systems. That is precisely why it does not add explanatory power.

The disagreement is metaphysical, not predictive.

On “why anything exists” vs “why this specific thing exists”

6. What boundary conditions and local causes are you referring to?

Example:

Why humans exist at all:
• cosmology, physics, chemistry, evolutionary history.

Why Suzie raised her hand at 10:03 a.m.:
• local neural states,
• classroom context,
• prior learning,
• immediate sensory input.

These explanations operate at different scales. Appealing to ultimate metaphysics does not explain specific actions; local causes do.

On rationality

7. Why trust convergence as a marker of reliability?

Because convergence under independent methods, observers, and error-correction pressures is the only mechanism we know that reliably distinguishes signal from illusion.

This is not infallible — but it is corrigible, self-correcting, and pragmatically indispensable.

Rejecting it leaves us with no non-arbitrary way to prefer one belief-forming process over another.

8. What does publicly trackable error correction mean, and why doesn’t free will have it?

Public trackability means:
• predictions can be checked,
• errors can be identified,
• interventions can be tested,
• results can be independently replicated.

Belief in libertarian free will does not improve prediction, correction, or intervention. It does not guide successful control or understanding of behavior. It remains explanatorily inert.

On morality

9. What does it mean to generalize across perspectives?

It means evaluating moral claims in a way that:
• does not privilege one agent’s subjective standpoint,
• scales across individuals and contexts,
• tracks harms, needs, and consequences in a way others can recognize.

This is exactly what breaks down when moral responsibility is grounded in metaphysical freedom rather than causal understanding and harm prevention.

Closing clarification

My core claim is not that deliberation is an illusion or that agency disappears.

It is that:
• deliberation is a causal process,
• agency is functional, not metaphysical,
• and “could have done otherwise” only makes sense relative to different prior conditions — not holding everything fixed.

If you disagree, the burden is to show where an extra causal ingredient enters that is neither noise nor law-governed — and how it improves explanation rather than obscuring it.

The actual answer to the question "Could we have made different choices than the ones we actually made?" is "Only if the determinants were different. The determinants are genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences. If you change one or more of them, the choice will also change." What do you think of my answer? I hope this clears up where I’m coming from.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #54]

Thank you for the reset. I think that’s a good move, and I agree that part of the difficulty here has been us talking past each other. I’ll answer your questions directly and try to make my commitments as explicit as possible.

Thank you; that is very helpful and kind of you.

On science

1. Do human wills fall under science alone, not alone, or do we not know?

Human willing is entirely constituted by physical processes, but not all descriptions of those processes are equally useful.

So:
• Ontologically: human wills fall under the same causal fabric studied by science.
• Epistemically: we do not yet (and may never) have a complete mechanistic account at the level of lived deliberation.

There is no extra non-physical causal ingredient doing work. But higher-level explanations (psychological, social, normative) can still be legitimate without positing metaphysical freedom.

And if my view is right, human wills don't fall under science alone. Do you agree?


On providing an explanation

2. Could you give a causal explanation for Suzie raising her hand?

Yes. A sketch-level explanation would be:

Suzie raises her hand because:
• she has a belief that raising her hand will allow her to speak,
• a desire to speak or answer
• attentional focus on the teacher’s question,
• neural activation patterns shaped by prior learning, social norms, and current context,
• motor planning and execution following those neural states.

This explanation is causal, mechanistic, and multilevel. It does not appeal to an uncaused “act of will.”

3. What is the difference-maker in this explanation?

The difference-makers are proximal neural and psychological states — specifically, the configuration of beliefs, desires, attention, and motor readiness at that moment.

Change those, and the outcome changes.

Okay, but she also has a desire to not speak/answer and one to wait, so why does this desire outweigh the other?

4. Could you give a causal explanation for Suzie raising her hand under a non-deterministic alternative?

Here’s the key point: I don’t see how a non-deterministic alternative adds causal intelligibility.

If indeterminism is introduced at the moment of decision, then either:
• it makes no systematic difference (noise), or
• it becomes another probabilistic causal factor governed by lawlike constraints.

In neither case does it ground authorship in a way that determinism does not already undermine.

But to say indeterminism is the causal explanation of X, would be to say indeterminism is making the difference being discussed and in a way that isn't governed by lawlike constraints. For determinism to undermine that, you must beg determinism in.

5. Do libertarian predictions differ from deterministic predictions?

At the level of observable behavior: no.

Libertarian freedom does not yield novel, testable predictions about action that could not also arise from complex deterministic systems. That is precisely why it does not add explanatory power.

Okay, but doesn't that also mean that determinism doesn't yield novel, testable predictions about action that could not also arise from a libertarian system?


On "why anything exists” vs “why this specific thing exists”

6. What boundary conditions and local causes are you referring to?

Why humans exist at all:
• cosmology, physics, chemistry, evolutionary history.

Why Suzie raised her hand at 10:03 a.m.:
• local neural states,
• classroom context,
• prior learning,
• immediate sensory input.

These explanations operate at different scales. Appealing to ultimate metaphysics does not explain specific actions; local causes do.

You noted the scientific domains in the first, but not in the second, getting more specific there. Let's do it equally at the more specific level. What specific boundary conditions? If you are agnostic, just choose one for the sake of the discussion.


On rationality

7. Why trust convergence as a marker of reliability?

Because convergence under independent methods, observers, and error-correction pressures is the only mechanism we know that reliably distinguishes signal from illusion.

This is not infallible — but it is corrigible, self-correcting, and pragmatically indispensable.

Rejecting it leaves us with no non-arbitrary way to prefer one belief-forming process over another.

Why trust that independent methods, observers, and error-correction pressures reliably distinguish signal from illusion? It kind of sounds like you are saying "because, if we don't, we won't have a way to get to trust". Is that what you are claiming?

8. What does publicly trackable error correction mean, and why doesn’t free will have it?

Public trackability means:
• predictions can be checked,
• errors can be identified,
• interventions can be tested,
• results can be independently replicated.

Belief in libertarian free will does not improve prediction, correction, or intervention. It does not guide successful control or understanding of behavior. It remains explanatorily inert.

We are talking about the will here, specifically, not science in general. Libertarian free will still allows for the prediction, correction, and intervention in scientific realms. Right?

If so, then are you talking here about how libertarian free will doesn't allow for us to predict, correct, or controllingly intervene in the wills of others? And, if so on that, why is this a reason to accept determinism over libertarian free will?


On morality

9. What does it mean to generalize across perspectives?

It means evaluating moral claims in a way that:
• does not privilege one agent’s subjective standpoint,
• scales across individuals and contexts,
• tracks harms, needs, and consequences in a way others can recognize.

This is exactly what breaks down when moral responsibility is grounded in metaphysical freedom rather than causal understanding and harm prevention.

And you don't think this begs the question in favor of your preference over the egoist's preference? Those three bullet points just are your preference. You are using your preference to judge your preference over their preference.


As to the answer in your conclusion, I think you are wrong, but I thank you for continuing to talk with me about it. I think wills are the additional determinant. I think you have stacked the deck against even considering the possibility by your definitions and think we need to deal with that as a first step in me carrying my burden.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #55]

Thank you for the careful engagement. I’ll respond concisely but directly, because I think several of your questions turn on the same underlying confusion — namely, what counts as a causal contribution versus what merely redescribes an outcome.

On science

And if my view is right, human wills don't fall under science alone. Do you agree?

No — not in the sense you mean.

If by “not under science alone” you mean that higher-level descriptions (psychology, reasons, norms) are not reducible to current physics vocabulary, I agree.

If you mean that there is an extra causal determinant — something over and above the physical processes science studies e.g. a soul — then no, I do not agree.

There is a difference between:
• non-reductive explanation, and
• non-physical causation.

I accept the former and reject the latter.

On difference-makers and competing desires

Okay, but she also has a desire not to speak, so why does this desire outweigh the other?

Because desires are not scalar entities floating independently. They are weighted, context-sensitive, and integrated within a larger decision process.

What “outweighs” means here is precisely:
• greater activation,
• stronger motivational salience,
• greater coherence with goals, expectations, and situational cues.

There is no further explanatory work to be done by invoking an additional “will” that selects among desires. That just redescribes the outcome rather than explaining it.

If you say “the will chose,” I will ask: why that choice rather than another? And we are back to the same causal factors.

On indeterminism as a difference-maker

To say indeterminism is the causal explanation would be to say it makes the difference in a way not governed by lawlike constraints.

That is exactly the problem.

Something that is:
• not law-governed,
• not systematically biasing outcomes,
• not intervention-sensitive,

is not a causal explanation — it is explanatory silence.

Calling that “the will” does not rescue it. It merely labels the gap.

This does not beg determinism. It applies the same standard of causal intelligibility to all proposals.

On symmetry of prediction

Doesn't this mean determinism also adds no explanatory power?

No — because determinism integrates with a broader causal framework that:
• supports counterfactuals,
• enables intervention,
• explains regularities.

Libertarian freedom, as you are invoking it, floats free of that framework. The symmetry is superficial.

On boundary conditions

What specific boundary conditions? Choose one for discussion.

Fine. Take this one:

Suzie is a human organism with:
• a nervous system operating within biological constraints,
• a classroom governed by social norms,
• a linguistic environment with learned conventions.

These are boundary conditions in exactly the same sense as temperature and pressure are boundary conditions in chemistry. They constrain which causal pathways are available.

No metaphysical freedom is required.

On rationality and convergence

Is this just saying “if we don’t trust convergence, we can’t trust anything”?

Yes — and that is not circular.

It is a transcendental point: convergence is justified because it is the only method that demonstrably improves reliability over time. Any alternative must either secretly rely on it or abandon error correction altogether.

On public trackability and free will

Are you saying libertarian free will can’t predict or intervene in wills? Why does that favor determinism?

Because an explanatory posit that:
• does not improve prediction,
• does not improve intervention,
• does not improve understanding,

does no explanatory work.

Determinism is not chosen because it is philosophically prettier — it is preferred because it integrates with successful explanatory practice.

On morality and “begging the question”

Aren’t those just your preferences?

No — they are constraints on interpersonal justification.

An egoist’s preference cannot be generalized without contradiction. A framework that scales across perspectives is not a personal preference; it is a structural requirement for moral reasoning among agents who disagree.

Final clarification

You say:

I think wills are the additional determinant.

That is the claim. But it is not yet an explanation.

To carry your burden, you still need to say:
• what the will causally does,
• what outcomes it forbids or enables,
• how it differs from chance or law,
• and how its absence would change predictions or interventions.

Until then, invoking “the will” is not adding a determinant — it is naming a stopping point.

I’m not stacking the deck against libertarian freedom. I’m asking it to meet the same explanatory standards we apply everywhere else.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #56]

On science

And if my view is right, human wills don't fall under science alone. Do you agree?

No — not in the sense you mean.

If by “not under science alone” you mean that higher-level descriptions (psychology, reasons, norms) are not reducible to current physics vocabulary, I agree.

If you mean that there is an extra causal determinant — something over and above the physical processes science studies e.g. a soul — then no, I do not agree.

There is a difference between:
• non-reductive explanation, and
• non-physical causation.

I accept the former and reject the latter.

I know you reject non-physical causation, but I'm saying that if my view is right (i.e., there is non-physical causation), then human wills wouldn't fall under science alone. Do you agree with that?


On providing an explanation

I think the key thing here is to properly define causal explanation before continuing. You seem to say that causal explanation must be law-governed, systematically bias outcomes, be intervention-sensitive, improve prediction, improve intervention, and improve understanding. Could you please define each of those elements more specifically and in a non question begging way?

Doesn't this mean determinism also adds no explanatory power?

No — because determinism integrates with a broader causal framework that:
• supports counterfactuals,
• enables intervention,
• explains regularities.

Libertarian freedom, as you are invoking it, floats free of that framework. The symmetry is superficial.

Could you more specifically define those three things in a non question begging way?

I think wills are the additional determinant.

That is the claim. But it is not yet an explanation.

To carry your burden, you still need to say:
• what the will causally does,
• what outcomes it forbids or enables,
• how it differs from chance or law,
• and how its absence would change predictions or interventions.

(1) The will causally chooses some outcomes (just as you say the prior physical causes choose those outcomes).

(2) The will enables attempted outcomes of the agent while forbidding attempted outcomes by external agents or forces (just as your view enables certain outcomes and not others).

(3) The will involves deliberation which chance does not. The will differs from the law in that, if the prior conditions are exactly the same, the will could have chosen something different, while law only allows for one possibility.

(4) If there were no will, it would be conceivably easier to predict the outcome. If there were no will, one could intervene in the causal chain to change the outcome that chain would determine to happen otherwise.


On "why anything exists" vs. "why specific things exist"

What specific boundary conditions? Choose one for discussion.

Fine. Take this one:

Suzie is a human organism with:
• a nervous system operating within biological constraints,
• a classroom governed by social norms,
• a linguistic environment with learned conventions.

These are boundary conditions in exactly the same sense as temperature and pressure are boundary conditions in chemistry. They constrain which causal pathways are available.

So these are boundary conditions, but not causes? Suzie's biology isn't part of the causal explanation of anything in Suzie? Temperature and pressure aren't part of the causal explanation for why the water in a cup freezes?


On rationality

Is this just saying “if we don’t trust convergence, we can’t trust anything”?

Yes — and that is not circular.

It is a transcendental point: convergence is justified because it is the only method that demonstrably improves reliability over time. Any alternative must either secretly rely on it or abandon error correction altogether.

Could you define convergence again for me?


On morality

Aren’t those just your preferences?

No — they are constraints on interpersonal justification.

An egoist’s preference cannot be generalized without contradiction. A framework that scales across perspectives is not a personal preference; it is a structural requirement for moral reasoning among agents who disagree.

We can disagree on our favorite ice cream flavor without such a structural requirement, so why not with moral preferences?

And if I wanted to say that everyone should like and eat my favorite flavor of ice cream, why isn't that an example of "scaling across perspectives"? It takes an observation about myself and says that should apply to everyone no matter their perspective.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #57]

I’ll answer each section in order and try to be maximally explicit, since many of your questions are requests for clarification rather than objections.

On science

If my view is right (i.e., there is non-physical causation), then human wills wouldn’t fall under science alone. Do you agree with that?

Yes, if you first prove the existence of non-physical souls and demonstrate how souls interact with physical brains.

If there genuinely were a non-physical causal determinant (i.e. the soul) that:
• made systematic differences to outcomes,
• was not reducible to physical processes,
• and was not merely epiphenomenal,

then, human willing would not fall under science alone.

On causal explanation

You ask for non–question-begging definitions. Here they are, stated minimally.

Law-governed
A cause operates according to stable regularities such that similar conditions reliably produce similar outcomes.

Systematically biases outcomes
A cause makes some outcomes more likely than others in a repeatable, non-random way.

Intervention-sensitive
If we manipulate the cause (or its inputs), the outcome changes in a predictable direction.

Improves prediction
Including the cause increases our ability to anticipate outcomes relative to models without it.

Improves intervention
Understanding the cause allows us to reliably change outcomes by acting on it.

Improves understanding
The cause unifies phenomena under a coherent framework rather than merely redescribing them.

None of these definitions presuppose physicalism; they presuppose only that causes do explanatory work.

On determinism vs. libertarian will

You asked for clarification of the three features I listed.

Supports counterfactuals
We can say: “If X had been different, Y would have been different,” in a principled way.

Enables intervention
We can identify levers that reliably alter outcomes (education, incentives, neural disruption, etc.).

Explains regularities
We can account for why similar agents in similar conditions behave similarly.

Determinism integrates with all three. Libertarian freedom, as you’ve described it, does not.

On your four claims about the will

Let’s take them one by one.

“The will causally chooses some outcomes.”
This is a restatement, not an explanation. Saying “the will chooses” adds no causal structure unless you specify how that choosing constrains outcomes.

“The will enables attempted outcomes of the agent while forbidding external ones.”
This is already explained by physical agency: bodies block forces, brains initiate actions, and boundaries are enforced by physics. No extra determinant is doing work here.

“The will involves deliberation; if conditions were identical, it could choose otherwise.”
This is precisely where explanation collapses. A cause that allows multiple outcomes under identical conditions:
• breaks counterfactual support,
• removes predictive leverage,
• and becomes indistinguishable from chance with reasons attached.

Deliberation as a process is explicable. Deliberation as an outcome-independent selector is not.

“Without will, prediction would be easier; intervention would be possible.”
This actually counts against the will as an explanatory posit. Introducing something that makes systems less predictable and less intervention-sensitive is not explanatory gain unless it earns that cost by constraining outcomes elsewhere - which the will does not do.

On boundary conditions vs. causes

Good question, and an important distinction.

Boundary conditions are not separate from causes; they are part of causal explanations at the appropriate level.

Suzie’s biology is causally relevant, but not as a single event-cause. It constrains the space of possible causal pathways. Likewise:
• temperature and pressure do not “push” water into freezing,
• but without them, freezing cannot occur.

So yes — biology, temperature, pressure all enter causal explanations, but as constraints, not as discrete triggers. That is exactly the sense in which they are boundary conditions.

On convergence

By “convergence,” I mean this:

Independent agents, using different starting assumptions and methods, tend over time to arrive at increasingly similar conclusions when a method reliably tracks truth.

Science converges.
Engineering converges.
Medicine converges.

Astrology, revelation-based theology, and libertarian metaphysics do not.

This is not circular. It is historical: convergence is justified because it has demonstrably reduced error and increased control over outcomes.

On morality

Why not moral preferences like ice cream preferences?

Because moral claims are action-guiding in a way taste claims are not.

Ice cream preferences:
• do not impose costs on others,
• do not require justification to those affected,
• do not claim authority over dissenters.

Moral claims do all three.

Why isn’t “everyone should like my ice cream” scaling across perspectives?

Because scaling is not mere universalization. It requires that the justification be acceptable from multiple perspectives without contradiction.

“Everyone should like my ice cream” fails because:
• it ignores others’ tastes and interests,
• it provides no reason they could endorse,
• it collapses into coercion or arbitrariness.

Moral norms differ because they regulate shared social space. That is why interpersonal justification imposes structural constraints that taste does not.

At several points, your replies show exactly where the disagreement lies:

You are treating “could have been otherwise” as explanatory.
I am treating explanation as requiring constraint.

Until the will is shown to:
• rule out outcomes,
• improve counterfactual reasoning,
• or enhance intervention,

it remains a metaphysical assertion rather than a causal explanation.

That is the crux.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #58]

On science

If my view is right (i.e., there is non-physical causation), then human wills wouldn’t fall under science alone. Do you agree with that?

Yes, if you first prove the existence of non-physical souls and demonstrate how souls interact with physical brains.

If there genuinely were a non-physical causal determinant (i.e. the soul) that:
• made systematic differences to outcomes,
• was not reducible to physical processes,
• and was not merely epiphenomenal,

then, human willing would not fall under science alone.

Okay. The reason I bring this up is because a few posts back you said: "If beliefs could have been otherwise with no change in inputs, then success becomes accidental rather than earned. Science depends on biasing mechanisms, not spontaneity." You seemed to offer this as a reason in support of your view over mine. Am I understanding that correctly or did you mean something else there?


On causal explanation

You ask for non–question-begging definitions. Here they are, stated minimally.

Law-governed
A cause operates according to stable regularities such that similar conditions reliably produce similar outcomes.

Systematically biases outcomes
A cause makes some outcomes more likely than others in a repeatable, non-random way.

Intervention-sensitive
If we manipulate the cause (or its inputs), the outcome changes in a predictable direction.

Improves prediction
Including the cause increases our ability to anticipate outcomes relative to models without it.

Improves intervention
Understanding the cause allows us to reliably change outcomes by acting on it.

Improves understanding
The cause unifies phenomena under a coherent framework rather than merely redescribing them.

None of these definitions presuppose physicalism; they presuppose only that causes do explanatory work.

Thank you for providing those; it is really helpful.

First, let's look at "improves understanding". What do you mean by "unifies phenomena" rather than merely redescribing them? Please use an example that does not mention determinism or a free will or even a will at all.

Second, those other 5 terms. I don't see why causal explanations must have any of these features to be a causal explanation. Why must a cause produce similar outcomes under similar conditions to be a cause? Why must a cause bias particular outcomes more than others repeatably for it to be a cause? Why must a cause be understandable to us in a way that we can reliably manipulate certain outcomes from it for it to be a cause? Why do we need to be able to anticipate the outcome of a cause for it to be a cause?

You asked for clarification of the three features I listed.

Supports counterfactuals
We can say: “If X had been different, Y would have been different,” in a principled way.

Enables intervention
We can identify levers that reliably alter outcomes (education, incentives, neural disruption, etc.).

Explains regularities
We can account for why similar agents in similar conditions behave similarly.

On the first, on the libertarian view changing X (from, say, my will to yours) can produce a different Y (from, say, eating chicken to not eating it). So, the key here seems to be "in a principled way"? What do you mean by that?

To the second, this is already covered in two of the definitions in the previous section.

To the third, I think libertarian free will accounts for both cases since agents are similar types of creatures with similar constraints on their choices heavily influenced by similar environments, learning, etc. But then you'll have cases, say, of identical twins who have the same GENEs that make very different choices in the same situation. Libertarian freedom accounts for both things by (1) similar influences in the first and (2) a free will in the second...two different mechanisms accounting for the different outcomes.

Determinism absolutely accounts for why similar agents in similar conditions behave similarly, but how does it account for when they don't?

“The will causally chooses some outcomes.”
This is a restatement, not an explanation. Saying “the will chooses” adds no causal structure unless you specify how that choosing constrains outcomes.

You say GENEs constrain the outcome, so please specify how GENEs do that, so that I can see what kind of additional thing you are requiring.

“The will enables attempted outcomes of the agent while forbidding external ones.”

This is already explained by physical agency: bodies block forces, brains initiate actions, and boundaries are enforced by physics. No extra determinant is doing work here.

You said to carry my burden that libertarian freedom counts as a causal explanation we needed to see that it enables some outcomes and forbids others (among 3 other steps); it does. Your response here accepts that and then just asserts that your causal explanation is the real one. That's a different question; here we are only talking about whether it qualifies as an explanation, not whether it is a true one.

“The will involves deliberation; if conditions were identical, it could choose otherwise.”
This is precisely where explanation collapses. A cause that allows multiple outcomes under identical conditions:
• breaks counterfactual support,
• removes predictive leverage,
• and becomes indistinguishable from chance with reasons attached.

Deliberation as a process is explicable. Deliberation as an outcome-independent selector is not.

“Without will, prediction would be easier; intervention would be possible.”
This actually counts against the will as an explanatory posit. Introducing something that makes systems less predictable and less intervention-sensitive is not explanatory gain unless it earns that cost by constraining outcomes elsewhere - which the will does not do.

This is part of the definitions discussion above, so nothing new here from me.


On the difference between "why anything exists" and "why specific things exist"

Boundary conditions are not separate from causes; they are part of causal explanations at the appropriate level.

Suzie’s biology is causally relevant, but not as a single event-cause. It constrains the space of possible causal pathways. Likewise:
• temperature and pressure do not “push” water into freezing,
• but without them, freezing cannot occur.

So yes — biology, temperature, pressure all enter causal explanations, but as constraints, not as discrete triggers. That is exactly the sense in which they are boundary conditions.

What is the trigger of water freezing?


On rationality

By “convergence,” I mean this:

Independent agents, using different starting assumptions and methods, tend over time to arrive at increasingly similar conclusions when a method reliably tracks truth.

Science converges.
Engineering converges.
Medicine converges.

Astrology, revelation-based theology, and libertarian metaphysics do not.

This is not circular. It is historical: convergence is justified because it has demonstrably reduced error and increased control over outcomes.

How do you now that the similar conclusions are true and we aren't converging on falsehoods?


On morality

Because moral claims are action-guiding in a way taste claims are not.

Ice cream preferences:
• do not impose costs on others,
• do not require justification to those affected,
• do not claim authority over dissenters.

Moral claims do all three.

The Nazis felt art and music tastes were "moral" tastes. Medievals felt clothing tastes were "moral". They imposed cost on those who had different tastes, justified the laws, and claimed authority to punish dissenters. Why aren't you doing the same thing with what you call "moral" instead of taste?

Why isn’t “everyone should like my ice cream” scaling across perspectives?

Because scaling is not mere universalization. It requires that the justification be acceptable from multiple perspectives without contradiction.

“Everyone should like my ice cream” fails because:
• it ignores others’ tastes and interests,
• it provides no reason they could endorse,
• it collapses into coercion or arbitrariness.

So, your perspective that we shouldn't ignore the tastes and interests of others against the egoist who says we should is justified because it doesn't ignore the tastes and interests of others. And this isn't begging the question?

The egoist could easily say your view that harm on everyone matters fails because:
- it ignores their taste and interest
- it provides no reason they could endorse
- it collapses into coercion or arbitrariness

But you are saying they are wrong because of your preference on those 3 things. And this isn't begging the question?

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #59]

Thank you — this is a demanding but fair set of questions. I’ll answer them in order and be explicit about where I think we are talking past each other versus where we genuinely disagree.

On science

You seemed to offer this as a reason in support of your view over mine. Am I understanding that correctly?

Almost — but with an important clarification.

That point was not meant to refute libertarian freedom outright. It was meant to show that if beliefs or choices could vary independently of all inputs, then their success would be decoupled from truth-tracking mechanisms.

Science depends on causal structures that:
• bias outcomes toward accuracy,
• allow error correction,
• make reliability non-accidental.

So the point was conditional:

If belief-formation or choice were genuinely input-independent, then scientific success would be miraculous rather than explained. That is a cost of the view, not a knockdown refutation. You can accept that cost — but it is a cost.

On causal explanation

1. “Unifies phenomena” — an example

Take infectious disease before germ theory.

Pre-germ explanations redescribed symptoms:
• fever here,
• cough there,
• miasma over there.

Germ theory unified them by showing:
• the same underlying mechanism (pathogens),
• explaining why different diseases shared patterns,
• predicting new phenomena (sterilization effects, antibiotics).

That is unification: fewer principles explaining more facts, not just relabeling observations.

2. Why must causes have those other features?

This is the key point:
I am not giving a definition of “cause” in the metaphysical sense. I am giving criteria for explanatory causal relevance.

Something can be a metaphysical cause and still fail as an explanation.

We require:
• regularity,
• bias,
• counterfactual sensitivity,
• intervention relevance,

because without them, a “cause” does no explanatory work. It cannot tell us:
• why this happened rather than that,
• what would happen if things were different,
• or how the phenomenon fits into a broader pattern.

Without those features, “cause” collapses into “something happened and then something else happened.”

3. “In a principled way”

By “principled,” I mean governed by rules that generalize beyond the single case.

Saying:
“If the will had been different, the outcome would have been different”

is trivial unless you can say:
• when,
• how often,
• and under what conditions,

this difference would arise.

Determinism supports counterfactuals like:
“If incentives change, behavior changes.”

Libertarian freedom, as you describe it, allows counterfactuals only by stipulation, not by rule — which makes them uninformative.

4. When similar agents act differently

Determinism explains divergence by pointing to differences we may not have measured:
• micro-environmental variation,
• developmental noise,
• stochastic neural processes,
• learning histories.

You’re right that identical twins sometimes diverge sharply — but libertarian freedom explains this by positing a second mechanism that is unconstrained by inputs.

That is exactly the explanatory problem: two mechanisms where one already suffices.

Why “identical” twins are not genetically identical

Even monozygotic (so-called identical) twins differ genetically in several well-documented ways:

1. Postzygotic mutations
After the fertilized egg splits, new mutations occur independently in each twin. These include:
• single-nucleotide variants,
• copy-number variations,
• structural rearrangements.

By adulthood, identical twins can differ by hundreds of mutations.

2. Epigenetic divergence
DNA methylation, histone modification, and chromatin structure diverge over time due to:
• nutrition,
• stress,
• illness,
• random developmental noise.

Epigenetics directly affects gene expression without changing DNA sequence and can strongly influence behavior and personality.

3. Mosaicism
Some mutations occur in only a subset of cells. One twin may carry mutations in brain tissue that the other does not.

4. Mitochondrial differences
Mitochondria are inherited stochastically. Twins can differ in mitochondrial DNA composition and energetic efficiency.

Why this matters for the free will debate

This undermines a common move in libertarian arguments:

“If two genetically identical agents in identical environments choose differently, something non-physical must explain the difference.”

The premise fails. The agents are never actually identical:
• their genomes diverge,
• their brains diverge,
• their developmental trajectories diverge.

So divergent choices do not require an extra, non-physical chooser. They are exactly what we expect from:
• sensitive dependence on initial conditions,
• developmental stochasticity,
• GENE causal model (Genes, Environments, Nutrients, Experiences).

Identical twins choosing differently is not evidence for libertarian free will.
It is evidence that biological systems are:
• complex,
• noisy,
• path-dependent,
• and never perfectly duplicated.

On GENEs as constraints

You asked for an analogy.

GENEs constrain outcomes by:
• limiting ranges of possible phenotypes,
• biasing responses to environments,
• shaping learning rates and sensitivities.

They do not “choose” outcomes, but they restrict the space in which outcomes can occur.

For the will to add explanatory value, it would need to constrain outcomes in an analogous way — not merely allow alternatives, but rule some out systematically.

On “enables and forbids outcomes”

You’re right that this shows libertarian freedom qualifies as a candidate explanation.

My objection is not “this isn’t an explanation at all,” but:
“This explanation does no additional work.”

If everything it explains is already explained by physical agency, then its explanatory contribution is null.

Qualification is not vindication.

On freezing and triggers

The “trigger” of freezing is a phase transition when molecular kinetic energy drops below a threshold given existing boundary conditions.

There is no single push. The explanation is:
• energy loss,
• molecular bonding constraints,
• ambient conditions.

This is exactly why modern causal explanations are often dispositional rather than event-based.

On convergence and truth

How do you know we aren’t converging on falsehoods?

We don’t know with certainty. What we know is this:

Methods that converge also:
• improve prediction,
• improve intervention,
• reduce surprise,
• increase control over outcomes.

False theories do not reliably do this across domains and time.

Convergence is justified not because agreement equals truth, but because convergence under error-correcting pressure tracks reliability better than any known alternative.

On morality and the Nazi objection

This is a crucial challenge — thank you for pressing it.

The difference is not that Nazis called tastes moral. It is that their justifications failed under interpersonal scrutiny.

Their norms:
• privileged one group’s interests arbitrarily,
• could not be endorsed by those coerced,
• collapsed when role positions were reversed.

Calling something “moral” does not make it moral. Moral norms must be justifiable to all affected parties under symmetry.

On egoism and question-begging

This is not preference vs preference.

The egoist’s position fails because:
• it cannot be universalized without contradiction,
• it undermines the very practice of justification,
• it treats reasons as binding only when convenient.

Saying “your interests matter too” is not a preference; it is a constraint generated by the fact that we are reasoning together under disagreement.

If the egoist rejects that constraint, they are not offering a rival morality — they are opting out of moral justification altogether.

At multiple points, the pattern repeats:

You are asking whether something can be a cause.
I am asking whether it earns explanatory authority.

Libertarian freedom may be metaphysically possible — but unless it constrains outcomes, supports counterfactuals, and improves understanding, it remains explanatorily idle.

That is the real disagreement, and I think it’s now clearly on the table.