To what extent can the immaterial affect the material?

[QED]

In the topic titled When God knows a soul goes to hell..

Newtonian mechanics is an approximation to quantum mechanics. It's possible that the uncertainty principle can be more generalized with some yet undiscovered theory, however the uncertainty principle is a theorem in the theory of operators, a derivation of the Cramer-Rao inequality, derivation of the Fourier transform on general locally compact groups, formulation for Fourier integral operators on manifolds, along with other deep mathematical concepts. So, I would argue that the uncertainty principle points to some kind of platonic structure that has deep mathematical significance. Given its importance in explaining the virtual particles, Casimir effect, Hawking radiation, etc., I think we have good reason to believe that the immaterial affects the material.

I think this is a really tricky issue. For example, love can be considered to be immaterial and it can evidently affect material things through the actions of those in love. But then I'd argue that love is a signal riding on a material medium (the neural nets within our brains). I have often stated that wherever we look we find software to be supervenient on hardware. I am unaware of any evidence for pure Information that exists without a supporting material structure anywhere in the cosmos.

The question I wish to put here is how are we to know for sure that a platonic view is justified when all we might be doing is to default to this assumption simply because we lack a complete understanding of some phenomenon or other that we are studying. It seems to me that while Physics lacks a Grand Unification Theory we do not know if the laws we are observing represent restrictions of degrees of freedom imposed by some as yet undiscovered, underlying, material framework. The analogy that I like to use is the tracing-out of the image of a penny coin beneath a sheet of paper by rubbing over it with a pencil. If we never saw behind the paper, the impression might seem to comes to us from nowhere.

This topic covers the related issue of prescriptive vs descriptive laws and can serve to host debates that frequently go off-topic in other threads.

[harvey1]

By the phrase, "minimize action" I mean that nature's fundamental (quantum) particles seek states, positions, etc., where the Feynman path integral calculation of a quantum particle's next state, position, etc., is more probable than any other. A less accurate way of stating it is that particles tend to minimize their action (kinetic energy minus potential energy) by pursuing paths where the action of the path is least compared to all the other paths.

Well, ok, it does disguise them, but why is this a problem ?

Because macro object-talk can lead someone to talk in terms of a causal relation that doesn't actually exist. For example, you said: "We are able to reason out...." The problem is that quantum particles never do that. Nothing reasons things out in a technical sense. What you seem to be saying is that reasoning is effectively what happens when quantum particles act collectively in particular combination of states. Nothing actually "reasons." Just like Bugs doesn't actually run away from Elmer Fudd. My contention is that once we think in terms of how you actually conceive nature as being, we can point out the absurdities. It's difficult to do that if every now and then we were to make a point based on Elmer chasing Bugs.

In this case, disguising the causal issues is exactly what we want to do, because it saves us a lot of time with minimal loss of accuracy (as far as the tire is concerned).

I understand. I'm just trying to avoid the Elmer Fudd language that can slightly mislead us into understanding what is actually happening (causally speaking).

I'd say that our consciousness moves quantum particles around in the same way (categorically speaking; the mechanism is different) that wind moves leaves around. The particles of the air interact with the particles of the leaves in certain ways, and the leaves move as the result. The particles in our neurons -- including those hooked up to our eyes and ears and other sensory organs -- interact with other particles in other neurons, and the neural connections change as the result. I simply don't see any difference between these two activities, other than the obvious difference in complexity.

Again, the macro talk is confusing things. What is actually happening is that quantum particles (strings, etc) are swirling about in different matter configurations. When we look at the mind this way, consciousness is not one of those particles, therefore it has no causal efficacy. It's not wind. Wind is the movement of quantum particles, so it's understandable how quantum particles of wind (having causal efficacy) can move quantum particles (making up leaves) if they move with sufficient momentum. What is not clear is how a non-material structure such as consciousness can do that since it is an effect of quantum particles moving about. An Elmer Fudd analogy helps us to understand consciousness better than a wind analogy. How does Elmer Fudd really chase Bugs? Well, the reality is that Elmer Fudd doesn't exist, neither does Bugs. There is no chasing that happens, no leaves are blown. All that is happening is that quantum particles are moving about changing their states, etc.. Consciousness is a description of the structure of the quantum particles aggregated in a certain way. That's what Elmer Fudd is, too. Elmer is a description of a certain way the quantum particles are structured. There's no causal efficacy with Elmer, just like there cannot be with a good movie or consciousness. Only particular kinds of quantum stuff have causal efficacy (of course assuming quantum mechanics is the way nature really is at its most fundamental level...).

However, that would only explain instinct.

Not true. Take my spam filter, for example -- a very simple system compared to the brain. Yet, despite its simplicity, the filter is able to learn, and adapt to new spam. That's not mere instinct, that's learned behavior. Someone else's filter would probably accept some of the things my filter labels as spam, and vice versa.

Learned behavior cannot be genetically passed on until it becomes a part of our molecular machinery. Therefore, it is not something that comes from our ancestors (at least genetically). Learning is passed on via culture, and strictly from a perspective where all you see are quantum particles, culture and knowledge are quantum particles too. The brain must have the processing of this off-site knowledge through the molecular machinery, otherwise it would have no way to make use of this off-site knowledge. It is instinctual. So, where does the ability to find truth arise? All our knowledge acquisition is based on genetic instructions, and this must be based on instinct. Even new knowledge cannot change this since the cause for every event is because our aggregate of quantum particles are trying to minimize action. What possible explanation could you give for a system of quantum particles to seek truth instead of the role nature has assigned to them to minimize action?

I think you're wrong when you define instints as, "causal consequences of quantum particles minimizing action" (though I still don't know what "minimizing action" means). As I see it, instincts are hardwired biological responses to stimuli -- as opposed to conditional reflexes and conscious choices, which involve learned behaviors. Both instincts and conscious choices are causal consequences of quantum particles doing their thing, and so are bicycles, but the mechanisms are different in each case.

I agree that instincts are hardwired biological responses to stimuli, but the term "instinct" only exists as a quantum particle aggregate of nerves, tissue, etc.. It is this description of a whole quantum particle structure. It's a helpful description that exists because this aggregate of quantum particles was found to minimize action through the eons of evolution. Vast numbers of individual particles "cooperated" over vast spanses of time in this aggregated structure by each being rewarded with a path that gave that particle the a minimum amount of action to follow. If a certain adaptation occurred, that means that a change meant that the quantum particles individually found a way to minimize their action more than was the case before the adaptation. New particles that are brought into the host were found individually to minimize their action by entering the host. If a particle didn't somehow minimize its action, then it would not pursue that path. Collectively, over vast stretches of time, the majority of particles followed paths that made for a "hardwired biological [response] to stimuli." This is instinct.

You have to explain how it is that humans can use models to find approximate truth. Instincts don't have to find approximate truth, they are They technically don't cause anything. They are like bicycle-talk, they technically don't even exist. Only quantum particles acting in aggregated structures exist.

I simply don't see how these two statements are contradictory. Bicycles are collections of particles that are really good at driving straight without falling over, despite having just two wheels. Humans are collections of particles that are really good at changing their own brains in such a way that they are able to simulate the real world with progressively higher accuracy. What's the difference ?

Firstly, you have an implied use of group selection. Group selection is fine if you are not a strict reductionist, but you are a strict reductionist. If selection happens at the group level, then this would indicate that causality is not reducible to quantum behavior alone. The bicycle shouldn't be described as a whole aggregate of quantum particles doing some function that is selected by nature, and neither should minds.

Bicycles, as a collection of particles, are really good at driving straight without falling over, but that has no causal relevance as to why bicycles exist. Bicycles exist because there were quantum particles aggregates making up human brains that began a structuring of the outside world that led to the quantum particles being move about so that an entire aggregate of particles existed which can be described as bicycles (I could say the same about Elmer Fudd).

Yet, when you say:

[h]umans are collections of particles that are really good at changing their own brains in such a way that they are able to simulate the real world with progressively higher accuracy

then this is how I read this:

[Elmer Fudd and Bugs Bunny] are collections of particles that are really good at changing their own brains in such a way that they are able to simulate the real world with progressively higher accuracy.

Why should we treat the particles that make up Elmer Fudd any differently than the particles that make up human minds? Both Fudd and minds are really fictional in some sense (i.e., in your account).

However, besides that, why is it that the causal nature of the quantum particle being affected by minimizing action has anything to do with an aggregate number of such particles seeking truth? That sounds absurd to me that an aggregate number of particles would behave collectively like that.

That assumes that truth has an independent existence, which I, of course, would deny. "Truth" is just another model we've made up to represent the world, and the internal state of our neurons.

So, if you don't think there is truth, then why is it wrong for YEC creationists to claim that evolution is false? Is it only wrong because both evolution and YEC creation are neither true or false?

Ok, I'll need to see some empirical evidence of truth, then, in order to accept your view. But isn't empirical evidence for the existence of truth impossible to produce by definition ?

This sounds like a whole lot of tail chasing to me. If you need empirical evidence for truth, then what is it that empirical evidence is seeking to establish?

Oh, we know for a fact that our ancestors' logic was faulty -- just look at any list of common logical fallacies, these things are miles long. However, our ancestors' logic was good enough to allow them to survive and reproduce (while competing with claws and fur and such), and, evolutionary speaking, that's all that matters.

So, there's no way for us to say that YEC creationism is illogical?

Anyway, I still don't see how viewing our minds as nothing more than complex machinery somehow automatically entails antirealist absurdity. It sounds to me like you're firmly placing abstract thought (or, model-building thought) outside of the realm of activities that complex machinery can perform. I see no reason to do so.

My argument is that if you are right, and all that all causality deduces to the minimizing action of quantum particles, then you have no basis to claim that a model is about truth. The best you can say is that it is about minimizing action at the quantum level. I don't see that as plausible, and I don't see how you can see it is. As I said, under strict reductionism we must interpret consciousness as just a description of how quantum particles are particularly organized in space, and if that's so, then consciousness doesn't refer to a causal entity. The only thing that has can do anything is a quantum particle. A description (like Elmer Fudd) just sits there and looks pretty.

I can't shake this feeling that you're implicitly assuming your connlusion in your arguments. I.e., you keep pointing out why this event or that event does not participate in a causal relationship on the macro level, as though this causal relationship was a universal absolute. But, from my point of view, the very notion of a "causal relationship" is an abstraction like any other. You cannot justify your claim that causal relationships are dualistic in nature by appealing to their dualistic nature.

We can remove the causal talk and just talk in terms of what exists and what it does. That "thing" would be some fundamental quantum particle (string, etc.), and what it does would be a simple set of behaviors that is quantum mechanical in nature (i.e., follows some statistical law of how it evolves through time, called the Schrodinger time evolution equation for non-relativistic frames). I don't assume anything else. I'm looking at this level and ignoring all the causal talk of macro systems because, according to the strict reductionist, macro-talk completely reduces to quantum-talk. So, let's talk quantum. I think if we do so, it is apparent that descriptions of consciousness (etc.) causing anything is flawed. If it's flawed, then this leads to some ridiculous results (e.g., post-modernism).

[Bugmaster]

Ok, so as far as I understand, "minimizing action" is sort of similar to "reaching the lowest possible energy state" (which is what objects tend to do on the macro level). Moving on...

Nothing reasons things out in a technical sense. What you seem to be saying is that reasoning is effectively what happens when quantum particles act collectively in particular combination of states. Nothing actually "reasons." ... All that is happening is that quantum particles are moving about changing their states, etc.. Consciousness is a description of the structure of the quantum particles aggregated in a certain way.

This is a very good summary of my views, yes. Better than what I wrote, anyway. I should also point out that nothing actually "falls", or "corrodes", or "burns", or does anything else, either; these actions are just abstractions that we made up.

It's difficult to do that if every now and then we were to make a point based on Elmer chasing Bugs.

Granted, and I think I see where the problem lies. You think that there's something in this conversation -- the principle of causality, or mental properties, or something -- which is actually different from Elmer Fudd. I think that everything we're talking about -- including all these quantum effects -- is an Elmer-Fudd-esque abstraction, which happens to have a good chance of approximately corresponding to how things really are.

This is the primary difference between us, and this is why we can't come to an agreement.

Wind is the movement of quantum particles, so it's understandable how quantum particles of wind (having causal efficacy) can move quantum particles (making up leaves) if they move with sufficient momentum. What is not clear is how a non-material structure such as consciousness can do that since it is an effect of quantum particles moving about.

Well duh, I believe that consciousness is in fact a perfectly material structure, just like wind. Or, rather, I believe that our concept of "consciousness" is a model of some material structure which is at least as accurate as our concept of "wind", which is a model of a different material structure. We could be totally wrong, and it could be the case that wind and consciousness are caused by gremlins, but that's unlikely.

Learned behavior cannot be genetically passed on until it becomes a part of our molecular machinery...

If you're talking in terms of low-level quantum structures, then genetics is nothing special. Genetics is one way that quantum structures can interact with one another; learning is a different way that quantum structures can interact with one another. There's nothing special about either of them, causally speaking; however, one of them is very evolutionary advantageous in the long run.

I guess the point I've been trying to make throughout this entire argument is just how much simpler my view of reality is. There are no physical/mental categories, no immaculate causal mechanisms, no mysterious consciousness causing things. It's just a bunch of particles rubbing together, metaphorically speaking (or a bunch of waves interfering, if you prefer). And yet, my worldview explains everything else that yours does -- or, at least, it explains all the things which we can observe without relying on religious faith. Thus, I claim that my view is more parsimonious.

What possible explanation could you give for a system of quantum particles to seek truth instead of the role nature has assigned to them to minimize action?

First of all, Nature doesn't assign anyone anything, Nature is just a bunch of particles rubbing together. Secondly, I couldn't possibly give you the exact mechanism that describes how certain quantum particles assemble into large groups called "cells", which assemble into larger groups called "critters", which undergo millions of years of evolution to develop certain groups of quantum particles called "nervous systems" and "sensory organs" that can change their configurations in certain ways we call "learning"... There are, however, many physicists and neurobiologists who can. Again, note that these clouds of quantum particles do not seek truth; "truth" is an abstraction we use to explain their behavior.

Collectively, over vast stretches of time, the majority of particles followed paths that made for a "hardwired biological [response] to stimuli." This is instinct.

You're missing the next step: the response to stimuli got so advanced that it can now configure the brain in such a way that it is able to readjust particles in the creature's head "on the fly", in response to photons hitting the retina, or pressure waves hitting the eardrum, or whatnot. That's learning. So, evolution leads to the development of brains that are capable of learning... group selection or not, that doesn't really matter, philosophically speaking.

[Elmer Fudd and Bugs Bunny] are collections of particles that are really good at changing their own brains in such a way that they are able to simulate the real world with progressively higher accuracy. Why should we treat the particles that make up Elmer Fudd any differently than the particles that make up human minds? Both Fudd and minds are really fictional in some sense (i.e., in your account).

But we do not treat them differently ! Well, at least I don't. The only difference is that Elmer Fudd is an abstraction that someone made up in order to entertain people; human minds are abstractions that someone made up in order to explain human behavior.

Again, there's nothing special about "seeking truth" versus "squishing people"; minds are good at one thing, rocks are good at the other thing, but they're both just huge machines made up of quantum particles. Only their mechanisms are different.

This sounds like a whole lot of tail chasing to me. If you need empirical evidence for truth, then what is it that empirical evidence is seeking to establish?

Precisely; I think your position on the independent existence of truth is absurd.

So, if you don't think there is truth, then why is it wrong for YEC creationists to claim that evolution is false? Is it only wrong because both evolution and YEC creation are neither true or false? ... So, there's no way for us to say that YEC creationism is illogical?

Again, you're confusing abstractions with reality. Yes, there's no such thing as "truth" that we can reach out and touch with our hands; "truth" is an abstraction we made up (in addition to others, such as "AND", "OR", "NOT", or "->"). However, most humans on the planet agree that this abstraction (among many others !) makes it a lot easier to build progressively more accurate models of the world. When we evaluate two such models -- "evolution" and "YEC" -- we can see that one of them is built upon the time-proven abstraction of "truth", and the other one is... well... not. Sure, it's possible that the Earth is 6000 years old; it's also possible that our notions of "truth" are in fact unhelpful, and that quantum physics is wrong, and that the Moon is made out of green cheese. However, the collective body of science that we have today has served us very well (we're using it implicitly to communicate on this forum, for example). If we are faced with the choice of accepting science, or accepting YEC (but not both !), science wins -- for now, at least.

Note that the above paragraph deals entirely with abstractions. You asked "Does the abstraction called 'YEC' fullfill the abstract criterion of 'truth' ?", and I responded. These abstractions are, of course, nothing more than quantum particles in our heads interacting with other particles, but that doesn't really matter.

My argument is that if you are right, and all that all causality deduces to the minimizing action of quantum particles, then you have no basis to claim that a model is about truth.

I never did. A model of the real world can never be absolute truth; the best we can hope for is a very high degree of certainty.

As I said, under strict reductionism we must interpret consciousness as just a description of how quantum particles are particularly organized in space, and if that's so, then consciousness doesn't refer to a causal entity. The only thing that has can do anything is a quantum particle...

No, not a quantum particle by itself, but collections of particles that interact; otherwise, I'd agree with that statement. Again, it sounds to me like you're saying that these "causal entities" have an independent existence a priori; however, I'm not going to accept it because you say so. According to my worldview, "causal entities" are just abstract concepts that we made up in our heads, and (as you said) the only real things are quantum particles, or strings, or what have you.

I don't assume anything else. I'm looking at this level and ignoring all the causal talk of macro systems because, according to the strict reductionist, macro-talk completely reduces to quantum-talk.

Ah ! Ok, I see where the problem is. Would you accept the following statements ?

1). The behavior of a collection of quantum particles can be described without referring to the individual particles, with some loss of accuracy.

2). The behaviors of collections of sub-collections of particles (as per 1) can be described without referring to the behaviors of the sub-collections, or the individual particles, with some loss of accuracy.

If you accept statement 1 (atoms), and statement 2 (molecules and up), then you can build up the "macro-talk" out of "micro-talk" whenever you want.

Anyway, it really sounds like you want consciousness to be an independent entity; whereas I simply don't see why we need to introduce this additional entity (as per Occam). You aren't demanding that we treat rocks as independent entities, only consciousness. Is this because you desire to have some sort of a "free will" ? If so, I can explain why I don't particularly care for that concept...

[QED]

You two must be congratulated for putting in a heroic effort here. I'd just like to comment on Harvey's observation about the perceived difference between instinctive behaviour (which he accepts as being compatible with the least action principles) and the higher levels of consciousness that have evolved latterly in mammals. Anatomical studies readily identify the material structures which accompany these differences so why plunge into assumptions of duality at this point? If you were content with the compatibility of least action and instinct I can't see any logical reason to reject it when it comes to higher brain function.

In support of this I recognize my own instincts and they seem very similar to my conscious motivations. I just find them harder to moderate. This lack of veto being an important vestigial component. You just seem to be arguing from incredulity in the end. I think this is aided and abetted by your premature reduction of brain function to the quantum level of least action. I think you've skipped a layer or two and made an inappropriate connection by doing so.

But if we drop the idea that consciousness is the collective effect of evolved complexity (lots of little thermostats) we invite some pretty weird science do we not? It's fun to try and guess what might be happening -- you know, getting into cosmic entanglements and so on, but the smell of coffee is luring me back to the kitchen.

[harvey1]

I guess the point I've been trying to make throughout this entire argument is just how much simpler my view of reality is. There are no physical/mental categories, no immaculate causal mechanisms, no mysterious consciousness causing things. It's just a bunch of particles rubbing together, metaphorically speaking (or a bunch of waves interfering, if you prefer). And yet, my worldview explains everything else that yours does -- or, at least, it explains all the things which we can observe without relying on religious faith. Thus, I claim that my view is more parsimonious.

I don't think it is a simpler depiction of reality. My view is basically the laws of quantum mechanics giving birth to new laws that open new state spaces. I think this view is much more consistent with even quantum mechanics when you consider virtual particles popping in and out of existence. Laws form the basis of the physical world. I think your view of marble galaxies and marble universes is untenable for a number of reasons. The argument against the strict reductionist of the mind is the argument that we are discussing here.

Again, note that these clouds of quantum particles do not seek truth; "truth" is an abstraction we use to explain their behavior.

This doesn't make sense to me. Truth is what a good explanation is supposed to provide. If the clouds of quantum particles aren't seeking true explanations of behavior or can do so even in principle, then this is an absurdity in my view.

You're missing the next step: the response to stimuli got so advanced that it can now configure the brain in such a way that it is able to readjust particles in the creature's head "on the fly", in response to photons hitting the retina, or pressure waves hitting the eardrum, or whatnot. That's learning. So, evolution leads to the development of brains that are capable of learning... group selection or not, that doesn't really matter, philosophically speaking.

Sure, but learned knowledge doesn't get embedded into the genetic structure. The genes carry the information necessary to have the organism respond to stimuli in a certain way (e.g., to change behavior after learning L). Every bit of L that is acquired is decided upon by the pre-programmed structures that were passed down from the genes. If it's not in the genes, then L is not accessible to the organism. This is what I mean by the limitation posed by instinct. The organism cannot think for itself in a manner that is instinctual-independent. If the organism actually thought for itself in a manner independent of pre-programmed circuitry, then this would be a separate level of causation not related to the minimizing action of the quantum particles. This would violate your epiphenomenalist stance. Therefore, every thought, every mentally aware moment is utilizing the machinery of our ancestors, i.e., animal instinct, and any new L knowledge that is introduced is just another example of quantum particles minimizing action. There is no "us" or "me" to investigate the world the way it really is. All the models of science, in this view, are just instinctual responses to the environment.

This sounds like a whole lot of tail chasing to me. If you need empirical evidence for truth, then what is it that empirical evidence is seeking to establish?

Precisely; I think your position on the independent existence of truth is absurd.

In this context, I'm not talking about truth as something that exists "out there." Rather, I'm talking about it in the more traditional sense as the way the world is versus some other way which the world isn't (or was/wasn't). When you say you need empirical evidence for truth, what you are in effect saying is that you need empirical evidence to be convinced that the world is a certain way versus not a certain way. Of course, if you seek such empirical evidence, then this already assumes that you think that evidence shows the world is a certain way. It is this assumption that I think is invalid if your strict reductionist view is correct. All that empirical evidence can do is minimize action of a quantum particle. It tells you nothing about whether the world is or isn't a certain way. In addition, you came to your conclusion about strict reductionism by already assuming the world is a certain way, so the approach is even absurd since by the lights of your own strict reductionist philosophy you couldn't have come to this conclusion since your strict reductionism rules out access to the way the world is (and probably strongly suggests that we are likely wrong even if we guessed).

Again, you're confusing abstractions with reality. Yes, there's no such thing as "truth" that we can reach out and touch with our hands; "truth" is an abstraction we made up (in addition to others, such as "AND", "OR", "NOT", or "->"). However, most humans on the planet agree that this abstraction (among many others !) makes it a lot easier to build progressively more accurate models of the world.

Stop right there. How can you assume that you have more accurate models of the world when quantum action is not about finding or knowing accuracy of the world? Quantum particles are about minimizing action. That's it. All the "events" that happen as a conglomerate of particles acting together is based on the individual particle behavior acting as a system. The system is explained (in principle) solely in terms of individual particle behavior. I don't see how you can jump from that individual behavior of the quanta to a large collective union of particles as building more accurate models of the world. This cannot be an action that individual particles do, and it cannot be an action that the system can do since the system is explained (in principle) solely in terms of the individual particle behavior.

When we evaluate two such models -- "evolution" and "YEC" -- we can see that one of them is built upon the time-proven abstraction of "truth", and the other one is... well... not. Sure, it's possible that the Earth is 6000 years old; it's also possible that our notions of "truth" are in fact unhelpful, and that quantum physics is wrong, and that the Moon is made out of green cheese. However, the collective body of science that we have today has served us very well (we're using it implicitly to communicate on this forum, for example). If we are faced with the choice of accepting science, or accepting YEC (but not both !), science wins -- for now, at least.

The collective body of science may have served us well, but you've lost the teeth of science as producing approximately true models of the world when it was showed that quantum particles are merely about minimizing action with all collections of particles extending from that one principle. As a result, anyone can say anything, and as long as they can justify it by saying that they are acting out as evolution intended, well, they are as right about the facts as anyone else. There are no facts of the matter since quantum particles are not about finding facts--just minimizing action.

I never did. A model of the real world can never be absolute truth; the best we can hope for is a very high degree of certainty.

You mean we can have a very high degree of our quantum particles' action minimized, right?

No, not a quantum particle by itself, but collections of particles that interact; otherwise, I'd agree with that statement.

However, all interactions of quantum particles are explained in terms of a quantum particle minimizing action. The system is explained (in principle) solely in terms of the individual particle behavior. The system is not the cause since causation is just a description of the behavior of individual particles. The group might behave differently than the individual, but the group's behavior is solely caused by the individual behavior. Therefore, any causation that needs to be explained is a direct reference to what the individual particles in that system are doing (i.e., how are the individuals behaving, which as we know, is by minimizing action).

1). The behavior of a collection of quantum particles can be described without referring to the individual particles, with some loss of accuracy.

Yes. However, it is very misleading to ever have a discussion on the philosophy of mind where the causes are attributed to anything other than the individual particle behavior of minimizing action. It's not just a loss of accuracy if you do, it's complete nonsense (i.e., assuming strict reductionism of the mind).

2). The behaviors of collections of sub-collections of particles (as per 1) can be described without referring to the behaviors of the sub-collections, or the individual particles, with some loss of accuracy.

Same answer as above.

If you accept statement 1 (atoms), and statement 2 (molecules and up), then you can build up the "macro-talk" out of "micro-talk" whenever you want.

Generally speaking, this is true as long as we aren't referring to causation or the ontology of objects. Causation is a tricky phenomena since the macro-objects don't actually exist according to strict reductionists, and therefore we shouldn't make the foolish mistake of thinking that macro structures actually cause something. I would say this is the biggest mistake made in the philosophy of mind discussions.

Anyway, it really sounds like you want consciousness to be an independent entity

No. I am a believer in token physicalism. So, independence is not the appropriate word. I think that the physical provides the boundary conditions for mental behavior (and vice versa).

whereas I simply don't see why we need to introduce this additional entity (as per Occam). You aren't demanding that we treat rocks as independent entities, only consciousness.

That's not correct. I think that many entities exist in the world. I think there are really galaxies, stars, planets, etc.. I don't think strict reductionism is a correct philosophy. It is flawed in my view.

[harvey1]

You two must be congratulated for putting in a heroic effort here.

Thanks, QED. It's a joy to have the attention of such smart people such as yourself and Bugmaster. I'm still disappointed that Spetey left. That really svcks. It was a big loss for this forum.

Anatomical studies readily identify the material structures which accompany these differences so why plunge into assumptions of duality at this point?

Dualism comes in a few varieties. One of those varieties is property dualism which more or less characterizes my view. I don't think evidence of a physical property is evidence that epiphenomenalism is correct. It must be explained why epiphenomenalism is incorrect, and this is what I'm trying to show with my discussion with Bugmaster.

If you were content with the compatibility of least action and instinct I can't see any logical reason to reject it when it comes to higher brain function.

It's hard to state each moment that, "strict reductionists would believe this to be the case...." So, some of my comments might imply that I believe that instinct extends from the least action of quantum particles, but this is not what I believe. I think that quantum laws govern the quanta, and they might govern the universe in some quantum-cosmological sense, however there are really a whole slew of other laws that govern different levels of physical phenomena. In those "levels," the quantum laws act only as boundary conditions of behavior for the new lawful behavior. I actually am amazed that this is not the conclusion that everyone reaches. It seems like commonsense to me.

In support of this I recognize my own instincts and they seem very similar to my conscious motivations. I just find them harder to moderate. This lack of veto being an important vestigial component. You just seem to be arguing from incredulity in the end. I think this is aided and abetted by your premature reduction of brain function to the quantum level of least action. I think you've skipped a layer or two and made an inappropriate connection by doing so.

Well, I don't think attributing cause to the fundamental organization of nature is incorrect (i.e., assuming strict reductionism). The strict reductionist treats macro-talk as an approximation that is superceded by the micro-talk. If we really want to know how nature actually operates, then we are told to seek a lower level. I'm afraid that if this incredulous, then it is only because this happens to be the position that strict reductionism requires that we take.

But if we drop the idea that consciousness is the collective effect of evolved complexity (lots of little thermostats) we invite some pretty weird science do we not? It's fun to try and guess what might be happening -- you know, getting into cosmic entanglements and so on, but the smell of coffee is luring me back to the kitchen.

I don't think it is such weird science. The key for emergentism is that phase transitions and symmetry breaking is a real phenomena. That is, it is impossible for quantum behavior of the particles to dictate the behavior of higher organization since the phase transition to a higher level brings about an indeterminate result. It would be like sending a message via e-mail but first having that message pass through a randomizer filter and then through a phase transitional filter. The original e-mail puts boundary conditions on what the phase transitional filter can do with the message by supplying the letters that can be used, but at no point can you say that the phase transitional filter has the meaning of the text dictated by the original e-mail. The phase transitional filter can put whatever meaning it wants into the "new" message, but it just cannot include letters that weren't already supplied.

[QED]

Well, I don't think attributing cause to the fundamental organization of nature is incorrect (i.e., assuming strict reductionism). The strict reductionist treats macro-talk as an approximation that is superseded by the micro-talk. If we really want to know how nature actually operates, then we are told to seek a lower level. I'm afraid that if this incredulous, then it is only because this happens to be the position that strict reductionism requires that we take.

Can you recall the Parameceum and the way evolution hard-wired it to recoil from acid? This, I argued, was an example of micro-intelligence responding to micro-meaning. Self-organizing, self-replicating molecules are being proposed as a statistical inevitability. Abiogenesis seems reasonable enough given the abundance of raw materials, energy sources and periods of stability provided by this planet. So a path to the Parameceum is not too hard to follow. This is the sort of reductionism that I am talking about. What I want to know is what it is that prompts you to introduce additional mechanisms to account for macro-intelligence as we get to some point in the history of the evolution of life on Earth.

I can easily understand how the more superstitious types out there, who reject molecular evolution, would have a need for additional mechanisms to account for macro-intelligence but I can't understand your need for such things.

[harvey1]

Can you recall the Parameceum and the way evolution hard-wired it to recoil from acid? This, I argued, was an example of micro-intelligence responding to micro-meaning. Self-organizing, self-replicating molecules are being proposed as a statistical inevitability. Abiogenesis seems reasonable enough given the abundance of raw materials, energy sources and periods of stability provided by this planet. So a path to the Parameceum is not too hard to follow. This is the sort of reductionism that I am talking about. What I want to know is what it is that prompts you to introduce additional mechanisms to account for macro-intelligence as we get to some point in the history of the evolution of life on Earth. I can easily understand how the more superstitious types out there, who reject molecular evolution, would have a need for additional mechanisms to account for macro-intelligence but I can't understand your need for such things.

My view is rather straightforward and simple. The universe accepts wholes. That is, as a system undergoes a phase transition, which could happen in an evolutionary sense (or some other diachronic sense), as well as a synchronic sense, the system undergoes critical opalescence of some sort, and then it undergoes a phase transition and symmetry breaking into a new self-organized system (or "level").

Depending on the properties of the system, it will display universal characteristics with unrelated systems. This universality is based on a fixed point attractor which all these systems share. The fixed point attractor is a new set of laws. The fixed point attractor is an instantiation of a platonic object because it is a mathematical object that forces nature to be the way that it is (i.e., nature has no choice but to be mathematical). When nature "falls" into those fixed point attractors, there is a scaling effect (i.e., power law behavior), and so there is a smooth continuum of self-similarity extending from one level to another with only some key self-similar elements of the original system left invariant in the new system (or new level).

I am not a reductionist because once the system undergoes its phase transition, it no longer obeys the fixed point attractor of the laws operating on the lower scale (i.e., lower level). Hence, the new system (or new level) is an ontological emergent system. This, I think, is the connection that happens between the mental and the physical.

There is a "virtual mind" that is a result of some kind of critical opalescence happening in the physical realm of the brain. Therefore, we should expect to find this kind of phenomena happening in the brain. Of course, we cannot see virtual processes, as far as I know, but we can find brain structures that are in some kind of phase transition between the physical and virtual mind states (i.e., mental states). I have no idea what those structures would look like, or whether we already know about them, but they play a key role in consciousness, I imagine.

However, above those structures that display a phase transition between the physical and mental, there is the mental. This virtual mental is a new form of existence in the universe just like atoms were a new form of existence for matter in the early universe. The universe is still evolving new forms of "matter," and this is happening here--inside our brains; versus in the early universe.

So, I guess I'm puzzled by your being puzzled. I don't think I'm saying anything strange or odd. It seems like perfectly straightforward and simple reasoning of complex systems which has been studied for 30 years plus.

[QED]

I am not a reductionist because once the system undergoes its phase transition, it no longer obeys the fixed point attractor of the laws operating on the lower scale (i.e., lower level). Hence, the new system (or new level) is an ontological emergent system. This, I think, is the connection that happens between the mental and the physical.

Why didn't you just say that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts! I'm only puzzled why anyone would reject the notion that we could in principle build our own AI that could achieve consciousness. I assume that you do reject this -- or do you not?

[harvey1]

Why didn't you just say that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts! I'm only puzzled why anyone would reject the notion that we could in principle build our own AI that could achieve consciousness. I assume that you do reject this -- or do you not?

I simply have no idea. I would think that we could, but the obstacle might be the one limitation that evolution doesn't have: time. I think group selection played a huge role in selecting the "wholes," and that this might be the only way to overcome the complexity issues surrounding the nature of the mind. Although, we might be able to speed time in a group selection algorithm happening in a quantum computer, and that might make it possible someday.

[QED]

OK. I'm glad you've got an open mind about this because some people feel strongly that consciousness is something very special that can only be dished-out by God. Of course it could be argued that everything is very special and can only be dished-out by God -- but within that POV it's still valid to debate about whether or not consciousness might be created artificially by human engineers.