Could we have made different choices than the ones we actually made?

[Compassionist]

Could we have made different choices than the ones we actually made? By "we" I mean all living things. For example, I have a potted plant that has tilted westward by twenty degrees. Could the plant have refrained from tilting or tilted at a different direction by a different degree or was it inevitable that it tilted westward by twenty degrees? I ate porridge for breakfast today. Could I have eaten something else or was eating porridge for breakfast inevitable? Nelson Mandela died on 14 June 1999. Was his death on that date inevitable or could he have died at a younger or older age? Albert Einstein was a physicist. Could he have been a professional football player instead of a physicist or was his choice of career inevitable? In your response, please explain how you know what you know.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #60]

On science

If belief-formation or choice were genuinely input-independent, then scientific success would be miraculous rather than explained. That is a cost of the view, not a knockdown refutation. You can accept that cost — but it is a cost.

But we are talking about a specific domain here: human choices, not science as a whole. Libertarian freedom is about human choices, not all the rest. All the rest isn't lost by accepting libertarian freedom.

Libertarian freedom predicts a lack of scientific success concerning predicting human choices. And that is exactly what we see, as we already covered in talking about the various studies. Those studies do not show the scientific success we'd expect if human choices were deterministic, even if we are talking about simple, binary motor decisions, much less more complex choices.


On causal explanation

You’re right that this shows libertarian freedom qualifies as a candidate explanation.

My objection is not “this isn’t an explanation at all,” but:
“This explanation does no additional work.”

Have you not said that if something does no additional work, it is a restatement or relabeling, not an explanation? If you mean it is an explanation, but not a causal explanation, then that is what I was talking about, so you would be saying here that my view isn't a causal explanation at all, right? This whole section was meant to address why my view counts as a causal explanation (even if it is a false one) precisely because you said it didn't count as one

That is unification: fewer principles explaining more facts, not just relabeling observations.

Your view does not explain more facts and it does so with fewer ontological categories but not fewer principles.

because without them, a “cause” does no explanatory work. It cannot tell us:
• why this happened rather than that,
• what would happen if things were different,
• or how the phenomenon fits into a broader pattern.

Why is that what causal explanations are about? X caused Y to occur, no matter what could have happened, but didn't, what would have happened if things were different, or how that fits into a broader pattern. Those are things in addition to what caused Y.

Determinism explains divergence by pointing to differences we may not have measured:
• micro-environmental variation,
• developmental noise,
• stochastic neural processes,
• learning histories.

You’re right that identical twins sometimes diverge sharply — but libertarian freedom explains this by positing a second mechanism that is unconstrained by inputs.

That is exactly the explanatory problem: two mechanisms where one already suffices.

...

I wasn't claiming identical twins were genetically identical and therefore the difference must be due to an immaterial will.

You say GENEs explain societal regularities and challenged me to do the same with a free will. I did that. People do share a lot of similarities in thinking, goals, etc. which inform our wills and this explains regularities perfectly. Both views explain societal regularities.

But not only do social regularities need explaining, so do the social irregularities. When the GENEs are very similar, the different wills being free within those GENEs could obviously explain the irregularities. Your view, it seems, says the irregularities are due to unmeasured/unknown GENEs. That sounds like blind faith to me as well making your view unfalsifiable since whatever happens you'll just say it's because of a different combo of GENEs.

But not only do social regularities and irregularities need explaining, so do individual regularities and irregularities. And here the gap seems even wider between our views. A free will clearly would explain why the same person with identical GENEs does many things in the same situations the same way (forming habits, etc.), but also why they break from that pattern at times.

You however have claimed that G+E+N+E equals a predictable outcome. Well the same GENEs are there the next time, but sometimes the outcome is different. You seem to be appealing to mysterious, unmeasured things that are conceivably measurable to explain that. This sounds like blind faith: these things should be measurable, we can't see any, but I'm going to say those measurable things are there anyway.

You asked for an analogy.

GENEs constrain outcomes by:
• limiting ranges of possible phenotypes,
• biasing responses to environments,
• shaping learning rates and sensitivities.

They do not “choose” outcomes, but they restrict the space in which outcomes can occur.

For the will to add explanatory value, it would need to constrain outcomes in an analogous way — not merely allow alternatives, but rule some out systematically.

I didn't ask for an analogy; I asked for an explanation that wasn't just a restatement since you asked the same of me concerning a libertarian will. But you have simply restated GENEs because GENEs include the phenotypes, environments, learning history, etc.

If everything it explains is already explained by physical agency, then its explanatory contribution is null.

But everything your view explains by physical agency is already explained by my libertarian world view, so that would make your view's explanatory contribution also null.


On "why anything exists" vs. "why something specific exists"

The “trigger” of freezing is a phase transition when molecular kinetic energy drops below a threshold given existing boundary conditions.

There is no single push. The explanation is:
• energy loss,
• molecular bonding constraints,
• ambient conditions.

This is exactly why modern causal explanations are often dispositional rather than event-based.

But that's just a different way to say the same thing. Temperature, pressure, etc. is just a shorthand way to refer to that; temperature and pressure aren't extra things in addition to why the kinetic energy is changing.


On rationality

How do you know we aren’t converging on falsehoods?

We don’t know with certainty. What we know is this:

Methods that converge also:
• improve prediction,
• improve intervention,
• reduce surprise,
• increase control over outcomes.

False theories do not reliably do this across domains and time.

Convergence is justified not because agreement equals truth, but because convergence under error-correcting pressure tracks reliability better than any known alternative.

I'm not talking about certainty, but even reasonably confident. You've provided an observation that we think convergence gives us reliable truth. Establish that we should be reasonably confident of that; you are just assuming our observations that stuff is correct is correct.


On morality

Calling something “moral” does not make it moral. Moral norms must be justifiable to all affected parties under symmetry.

Why? That is what you think, but not what other people think. Using your view as the standard to judge all views begs the question or defines dissenters out of the question altogether, which is not justifiable to all affected parties.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #61]

On science and libertarian freedom

Libertarian freedom predicts a lack of scientific success concerning predicting human choices. And that is exactly what we see.

This is where the argument quietly overreaches.

First, unpredictability does not distinguish libertarian freedom from deterministic complexity. Chaotic, high-dimensional deterministic systems are:
• difficult to predict,
• sensitive to initial conditions,
• resistant to precise forecasting,

yet entirely law-governed e.g. predicting earthquakes is extremely difficult even though they are 100% deterministic.

Second, the empirical record does not show a categorical failure of prediction in human choice. It shows:
• weak prediction at the individual, moment-to-moment level,
• stronger prediction at the population level,
• improving prediction with better models and data.

That pattern is exactly what we expect under GENE-style causation. Libertarian freedom does not predict this gradient; it predicts principled unpredictability even in principle.

So the lack of perfect prediction is not evidence for libertarian freedom. It is neutral between libertarianism and complex determinism.

On whether libertarian freedom is a causal explanation

If you mean it is an explanation, but not a causal explanation, then you would be saying here that my view isn't a causal explanation at all, right?

Yes — that is the position, and I’ll state it plainly.

Libertarian freedom may be:
• a metaphysical account,
• a normative account,
• or a phenomenological description,

but it does not qualify as a causal explanation under the standards we are discussing.

Why? Because it does not specify:
• a mechanism,
• a rule-governed influence,
• or a constraint on outcomes.

Saying “the will chose” identifies an agent, not a cause in the explanatory sense. That is why I said it redescribes rather than explains.

On “what causal explanations are about”

X caused Y to occur, no matter what could have happened, but didn't…

This is the crux of our disagreement.

You are using “cause” in a minimal, metaphysical sense:
“X is what produced Y.”

I am using “cause” in the explanatory sense used in science, history, and everyday reasoning:
• why this rather than that,
• what would have differed under variation,
• how this instance fits a broader pattern.

Without counterfactual structure, causal explanation collapses into mere narration.

That’s not an arbitrary standard — it’s the standard that makes causes useful rather than decorative.

On regularities, irregularities, and “blind faith”

Your view says the irregularities are due to unmeasured/unknown GENEs. That sounds like blind faith.

No — and this is an important distinction.

Appealing to unmeasured variables is legitimate when:
• the variables are independently motivated,
• the domain has demonstrated sensitivity to small differences,
• and similar appeals have paid explanatory dividends elsewhere.

This is exactly how science proceeds in every complex domain:
• genetics before full genome mapping,
• neuroscience before full connectomes,
• meteorology before fine-grained sensors.

Blind faith would be appealing to unmeasured variables with no independent grounding. GENEs (genes, environments, nutrients, experiences) are not ad hoc; they are the very things we already know shape behavior.

Libertarian freedom, by contrast, introduces a second mechanism that is:
• unconstrained,
• input-independent,
• and explanatorily idle.

That asymmetry matters.

On individual regularities and habit-breaking

You say free will explains both habit formation and habit-breaking. But determinism does too:
• habits form via reinforcement,
• habits break when salience, motivation, cost, or context changes.

The fact that a person sometimes behaves differently in “the same situation” does not show the situation was causally identical. Internal state is part of the situation.

Libertarian freedom explains deviation by saying “the will chose otherwise.” Determinism explains deviation by pointing to state change. Only one of those adds causal structure.

On GENEs and “mere restatement”

GENEs are not a restatement; they are a decomposition.

They tell us:
• which factors matter,
• how they bias outcomes,
• where to intervene,
• and why patterns recur.

Saying “the will chose” does none of that. It collapses explanation into agency-labeling.

On symmetry: “your view explains nothing mine doesn’t”

This is false, and the difference is sharp.

The deterministic view explains:
• why predictions improve with better data,
• why interventions work,
• why regularities dominate,
• why deviations cluster rather than scatter randomly.

Libertarian freedom explains none of these better — and explains some of them worse.

Explanatory symmetry fails.

On freezing and boundary conditions

You’re right that temperature and pressure are shorthand — and that’s the point.

Good explanations identify:
• relevant variables,
• not metaphysical triggers.

There is no “extra push” in freezing, just as there is no extra chooser beyond brain dynamics required for decision-making.

On convergence and reasonable confidence

You are assuming our observations that stuff is correct is correct.

No — the justification is pragmatic and comparative.

We trust convergence because:
• it works better than alternatives,
• it self-corrects,
• it produces reliable control over outcomes.

That is not circular; it is instrumental justification. Any rival method must either:
• outperform it,
• or secretly rely on it.

Libertarian metaphysics does neither.

On morality and justification

Why must moral norms be justifiable to all affected parties under symmetry?

Because morality is the practice of giving reasons to others whose interests conflict with yours.

If a norm cannot, even in principle, be justified to those it burdens, then it is not a moral norm — it is an assertion of power.

Nazis and medieval moralists failed not because they had “different tastes,” but because their norms:
• arbitrarily privileged some interests,
• collapsed under role-reversal,
• and could not be endorsed by those coerced.

That is not my preference. It is a structural feature of moral justification among equals.

Conclusion

At every stage, the same pattern appears:

You are satisfied with causes as metaphysical origins.
I am insisting on causes as explanatory constraints.

Libertarian freedom may tell us who chose —
it does not tell us why this choice rather than another.

Until it does, it remains philosophically interesting but explanatorily idle.

That is the disagreement, and I don’t think we’re misreading each other anymore.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #62]

On science

This is where the argument quietly overreaches.

First, unpredictability does not distinguish libertarian freedom from deterministic complexity. Chaotic, high-dimensional deterministic systems are:
• difficult to predict,
• sensitive to initial conditions,
• resistant to precise forecasting,

yet entirely law-governed e.g. predicting earthquakes is extremely difficult even though they are 100% deterministic.

Second, the empirical record does not show a categorical failure of prediction in human choice. It shows:
• weak prediction at the individual, moment-to-moment level,
• stronger prediction at the population level,
• improving prediction with better models and data.

That pattern is exactly what we expect under GENE-style causation. Libertarian freedom does not predict this gradient; it predicts principled unpredictability even in principle.

So the lack of perfect prediction is not evidence for libertarian freedom. It is neutral between libertarianism and complex determinism.

I agree there will always be a chance we are missing something, so I probably phrased things too strongly there, but that makes your view scientifically unfalsifiable. Libertarian freedom is scientifically falsifiable. Start predicting human choices reliably and you’ve falsified it. Now, I don’t think that’s a problem because your view is still philosophically falsifiable, but if you buy into the need for scientific falsifiability, then you need to reject determinism on this front.

And if you buy into the need for scientific success (which you brought into this discussion in favor of your view), I think you need to reason that we have great scientific knowledge that allows us to predict many deterministic things, yet we are nowhere close to predicting human choices, even of the simplest kinds. This should at least weaken your belief in a determined will.


On causal explanation

Libertarian freedom may be:
• a metaphysical account,
• a normative account,
• or a phenomenological description,

but it does not qualify as a causal explanation under the standards we are discussing.

Why? Because it does not specify:
• a mechanism,
• a rule-governed influence,
• or a constraint on outcomes.

The mechanism in your view is the collision of atoms or whatever shorthand you want to use to explain the state change; the mechanism in my view is the will. It doesn’t fail for lacking a mechanism. You may not like that mechanism, but it’s still a mechanism. The real difference for you is on the other elements, which we continue to discuss below.

I am using “cause” in the explanatory sense used in science, history, and everyday reasoning:
• why this rather than that,
• what would have differed under variation,
• how this instance fits a broader pattern.

Without counterfactual structure, causal explanation collapses into mere narration.

You are right to correct me on the sense you’ve been talking about, but you still need to show why (1) your proposed requirements to be a “causal explanation” are valid and (2) why libertarian freedom fails those requirements.

I think it’s clear that “it was A rather than B because I chose that” is coherent even if false. You are saying it’s incoherent, but the reason offered is because it doesn’t follow your deterministic type of explanation, which is the whole point of disagreement.

I think it’s clear that “it would have been B if I chose that” is coherent just as it’s coherent for you to say “it would have been B if the GENEs determining that were different”.

I think it’s clear that this fits a broader pattern of everyone with wills making choices.

I think it’s clear that libertarian freedom explains regularities (which you knocked it for earlier).

You say your view points to a “state change” but so does mine. The will changes the state in my view; you also have something that metaphysically causes the state change.

The deterministic view explains:
• why predictions improve with better data,
• why interventions work,
• why regularities dominate,
• why deviations cluster rather than scatter randomly.

Libertarian freedom explains none of these better — and explains some of them worse.

Predictions of human choices have not improved with better data.

Libertarian freedom does explain why interventions work (our wills agree) and regularities exist (I’m not sure dominate is correct, but it would be consistent with that if it were).

I’m not sure what you mean by deviations clustering instead of scattering randomly. Please just give a specific example of what that looks like.


On “why anything exists” vs “why specific things exist”

You’re right that temperature and pressure are shorthand — and that’s the point.

Good explanations identify:
• relevant variables,
• not metaphysical triggers.

There is no “extra push” in freezing, just as there is no extra chooser beyond brain dynamics required for decision-making.

No, the point is that you were saying having a causal explanation of the universe existing is a category mistake because it only has boundary conditions. You then gave temperature and pressure as an example of a boundary condition for water freezing. If you agree that those are shorthand for the causal explanation, then having boundary conditions is not enough to say asking for a causal explanation of why the universe exists at all is a category mistake.


On rationality

No — the justification is pragmatic and comparative.

We trust convergence because:
• it works better than alternatives,
• it self-corrects,
• it produces reliable control over outcomes.

That is not circular; it is instrumental justification. Any rival method must either:
• outperform it,
• or secretly rely on it.

But our thoughts/judgment that it works better, self-corrects, etc. is what I originally asked for you to justify. If you justify that by saying it works better, etc., you are begging the question or arguing in a circle. So why trust these thoughts?


On morality

Because morality is the practice of giving reasons to others whose interests conflict with yours.

An egoist does that.

If a norm cannot, even in principle, be justified to those it burdens, then it is not a moral norm — it is an assertion of power.

Someone could, in principle, agree with the egoist that the egoist’s perspective matters more. Not likely, but true in principle. That people can agree that something is justified doesn’t make it so, though. I think both you and the egoist are making assertions of power if naturalism is true.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #63]

On science, falsifiability, and prediction

You say:

That makes your view scientifically unfalsifiable. Libertarian freedom is scientifically falsifiable. Start predicting human choices reliably and you’ve falsified it.

This sounds right at first glance, but it turns out to be mistaken.

1. Determinism is not rendered unfalsifiable by unpredictability
Deterministic theories are routinely compatible with limits on prediction. This is not a loophole; it is a known feature of complex systems.

If human behavior were:
• high-dimensional,
• path-dependent,
• sensitive to micro-variation,
• partially stochastic at the neural level,

then poor prediction is exactly what determinism itself predicts. That does not make determinism unfalsifiable; it makes prediction a poor test of it.

Earthquake dynamics are the right analogy here: difficulty of prediction does not count against determinism unless the theory promised predictability — which it never did.

2. Libertarian freedom is not scientifically falsifiable in the way you claim
“Start predicting human choices reliably” is not a clean falsifier.

A libertarian can always reply:
• prediction influenced the choice,
• prediction worked statistically but not universally,
• prediction tracked tendencies, not decisions,
• prediction relied on constraints the will accepted.

So libertarian freedom is no more empirically falsifiable than determinism — it simply relocates where the escape hatch lives.

3. Scientific success does not favor libertarian freedom
You’re right that we have impressive predictive power in many deterministic domains and weak power in human choice. But that asymmetry does not favor libertarianism; it tracks complexity.

Human behavior sits at the intersection of:
• biology,
• learning,
• social context,
• internal feedback loops.

That is exactly where prediction should be hardest under any causal model. The data weaken strong naive determinism, not sophisticated determinism.

On causal explanation and mechanisms

You say:

The mechanism in my view is the will. You may not like that mechanism, but it’s still a mechanism.

This is the key misunderstanding.

A mechanism is not just a named entity. It is:
• a structured process,
• with internal dynamics,
• that links inputs to outputs in a rule-governed way.

Saying “the will caused it” is like saying “the storm caused it” without specifying pressure gradients, temperature differences, or airflow. It identifies an agent, not a mechanism.

That’s why the explanation stalls.

On counterfactuals and coherence

You argue that statements like:
• “it was A rather than B because I chose A”
• “it would have been B if I had chosen B”

are coherent.

I agree — they are linguistically coherent. The issue is not coherence but explanatory content.

Under libertarian freedom:
• identical prior conditions allow multiple outcomes,
• no rule governs which outcome occurs,
• no further explanation is available beyond “the will chose.”

That blocks principled counterfactual support. By contrast, GENE-style explanations tell us:
• which changes matter,
• how they bias outcomes,
• why deviations occur where they do.

Coherence is cheap. Constraint is not.

On regularities, irregularities, and “blind faith”

You accuse determinism of appealing to “mysterious unmeasured GENEs.”

But this is not blind faith — it is abductive reasoning grounded in precedent.

Every mature science has proceeded this way:
• genes before genome sequencing,
• microbes before microscopy,
• atoms before electron imaging.

The appeal is justified because:
• the variables are independently motivated,
• they have already explained large classes of phenomena,
• they generate testable interventions.

Libertarian freedom introduces a second causal source that does none of this work.

On “state change” symmetry

You say both views posit a state change.

True — but only one explains why the state changes the way it does.

Determinism says:
• the state changes because the prior state plus laws necessitate it.

Libertarianism says:
• the state changes because the will selected it.

Only the first tells us what to expect when conditions vary.

On freezing, boundary conditions, and the universe

You’re right that temperature and pressure are shorthand — and that reinforces, not undermines, my point.

Freezing is explained by:
• microphysical dynamics,
• energy transfer,
• molecular bonding constraints.

Those explanations work because the relevant variables are part of a larger causal network.

By contrast, asking “what caused the universe to exist at all?” seeks a trigger where there is no background system in which triggers operate. That is the category mistake.

Boundary conditions explain transitions within systems. They do not explain the existence of the system itself.

On convergence and rationality

You say:

You are begging the question by trusting our judgment that convergence works.

This misunderstands the kind of justification being offered.

The justification is not:
“Convergence is true because we judge it to be true.”

It is:
“Convergence is the only method that has repeatedly reduced error, enabled correction, and improved control, and no alternative method has done better.”

This is pragmatic, not circular. Any rival method must either:
• deliver better results,
• or explain why these results are illusory.

Libertarian metaphysics does neither.

On morality and egoism

You say an egoist gives reasons too, and someone could in principle agree with them.

That misses the constraint.

Moral justification requires reasons that:
• do not depend on one agent’s interests being privileged by fiat,
• remain valid under role reversal,
• can be offered without contradiction to those burdened.

An egoist’s reasons collapse under symmetry. They work only if the egoist is already assumed to matter more.

Agreement is not the test; justifiability under symmetry is.

If naturalism is true, then morality is not cosmic law — but it is still a practice governed by rational constraints among agents who must live together. That is not power; it is coordination under disagreement.

At almost every point, the disagreement reduces to this:

You are satisfied with explanations that terminate in agency.
I am insisting that explanations earn their keep by constraining outcomes.

Libertarian freedom may be metaphysically possible.
But until it explains why this choice rather than that, it remains explanatorily idle.

That’s the disagreement — and at this point, I think it’s fully explicit.

Here are some things I have done, currently do or will do even though I don't actually want to do them:

1. Breathe
2. Eat
3. Drink
4. Sleep
5. Dream
7. Pee
8. Poo
9. Fart
10. Burp
11. Sneeze
12. Cough
13. Age
14. Get ill
15. Get injured
16. Sweat
17. Cry
18. Suffer
19. Snore
20. Think
21. Feel
22. Choose
23. Be conceived
24. Be born
25. Remember some events that I don't want to remember
26. Forget information that I want to remember
27. Die

I am 100% certain that I don't have free will because I have done, am doing and will do things I don't actually want to do. I actually want to go back in time and prevent all suffering, injustice, and death, but I can't. I actually want to make all living things all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful, but I can't. As you can see, I can't do what I actually want to do and instead I do things I don't actually want to do - this is not free will. This is the opposite of free will. This is determined and constrained will. All living things are prisoners of causality who are doomed to suffer and die. I wish I had never existed in such a reality.

To be responsible, an agent must control all determinants of their desires and capacities. Humans don't and can't do this. Nor do other sentient organisms.

This is a logically coherent criterion. Unless one is omniscient, omnipotent and self-caused, responsibility cannot and does not arise.

Omniscient and omnipotent Gods (if they exist, and there is no incontrovertible evidence for their existence) are the only beings who can control all determinants of their desires and capacities, so only such beings are responsible for their choices.

At least 99.9% of all the species that have existed so far on Earth are already extinct. Every year, non-vegans cause suffering and death to 80 billion sentient land organisms (e.g. cattle, chickens, pigs, lambs, goats, ducks, turkeys, etc.) and 1 to 3 trillion sentient aquatic organisms (e.g. fish, lobsters, octopuses, crabs, etc.). Life is full of suffering, injustice, and death. An allegedly all-knowing and all-powerful being, such as the Biblical God, could have prevented all suffering, injustice, and death, but failed to do so. He could have made all organisms made of energy that don't need to consume anything to live forever, but he didn't do that. So, all suffering, injustice, and death are 100% his fault. If he had not created anything, no one would have the burden of existence or the risk of making mistakes. If he had made everyone he has allegedly made, all-knowing and all-powerful, then everyone would always make perfect choices, and no one would have made any mistakes due to ignorance, incompetence or trickery.

I am an agnostic regarding the existence of God(s) because it is impossible to prove or disprove the existence of God(s). However, I am convinced that the Biblical God is imaginary and evil. He is imaginary because there is no evidence for the claims made in the Bible. He is evil because of his many evil words and actions in the Bible. Here is a post which gives the detailed reasons why the Biblical God is evil: viewtopic.php?p=1179106#p1179106

There is no way to be:

fully aware

deeply compassionate

intellectually honest

and be emotionally comfortable in this world. I am so sad about all suffering, injustice, and death in the past, the present and the future. I wouldn't have felt this way if I were a bacterium or a banana tree. I didn't choose to be me, just as you didn't choose to be you. Genes, environments, nutrients and experiences determined our nature and our choices.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #64]

On science

1. Determinism is not rendered unfalsifiable by unpredictability
Deterministic theories are routinely compatible with limits on prediction. This is not a loophole; it is a known feature of complex systems.

If human behavior were:
• high-dimensional,
• path-dependent,
• sensitive to micro-variation,
• partially stochastic at the neural level,

then poor prediction is exactly what determinism itself predicts. That does not make determinism unfalsifiable; it makes prediction a poor test of it.

Earthquake dynamics are the right analogy here: difficulty of prediction does not count against determinism unless the theory promised predictability — which it never did.

If you agree that determinism can’t be falsified via looking at the success or failure of predictions, then (1) why bring its predictive successes up as though that means something? And (2) how is determinism scientifically falsifiable?

2. Libertarian freedom is not scientifically falsifiable in the way you claim
“Start predicting human choices reliably” is not a clean falsifier.

A libertarian can always reply:
• prediction influenced the choice,
• prediction worked statistically but not universally,
• prediction tracked tendencies, not decisions,
• prediction relied on constraints the will accepted.

So libertarian freedom is no more empirically falsifiable than determinism — it simply relocates where the escape hatch lives.

We are talking about something in between getting better at tracking tendencies and requiring universally correct predictions. Scientific studies that focus on decisions, take out prediction influence from the equation, and designed to try to overcome constraints on the will would be easy to make sure happens. Good science could falsify libertarian freedom.


On causal explanation

A mechanism is not just a named entity. It is:
• a structured process,
• with internal dynamics,
• that links inputs to outputs in a rule-governed way.

Saying “the will caused it” is like saying “the storm caused it” without specifying pressure gradients, temperature differences, or airflow. It identifies an agent, not a mechanism.

That’s why the explanation stalls.

Why is a will not a structured process with internal dynamics? Why must a mechanism link inputs to outputs in a rule-governed way?

Under libertarian freedom:
• identical prior conditions allow multiple outcomes,
• no rule governs which outcome occurs,
• no further explanation is available beyond “the will chose.”

Why is allowing multiple outcomes under identical prior conditions a good test for falsehood? Why doesn’t the rule “the will, within the limits upon it, chooses the outcome” not a rule that governs which outcome occurs? Why must there be further explanation beyond “the will chose” if it answers the question?

That blocks principled counterfactual support. By contrast, GENE-style explanations tell us:
• which changes matter,
• how they bias outcomes,
• why deviations occur where they do.

Why doesn’t libertarian freedom tell us which change matters? What do you mean by biasing outcomes? Why doesn’t libertarian freedom explain why deviations occur where they do?

You accuse determinism of appealing to “mysterious unmeasured GENEs.”

But this is not blind faith — it is abductive reasoning grounded in precedent.

Every mature science has proceeded this way:
• genes before genome sequencing,
• microbes before microscopy,
• atoms before electron imaging.

The appeal is justified because:
• the variables are independently motivated,
• they have already explained large classes of phenomena,
• they generate testable interventions.

Libertarian freedom introduces a second causal source that does none of this work.

Yes, saying that there are mechanisms, we just don’t know what they are sounds like blind faith. Yes, science has found mechanisms for other things, but that doesn’t mean science will be able to find mechanisms for everything. If you presented me with an argument against theism that I couldn’t defeat, could I appeal to all the other arguments that I judge theism to have defeated as a reason to reject your particular argument? No, every time we need to go with the merit of the case before us.

You say both views posit a state change.

True — but only one explains why the state changes the way it does.

Determinism says:
• the state changes because the prior state plus laws necessitate it.

Libertarianism says:
• the state changes because the will selected it.

Only the first tells us what to expect when conditions vary.

Libertarian freedom explains that the state changes from Suzie not raising her hand to Suzie raising her hand because Suzie willed herself to raise her hand. It allows for an exploration of what kinds of things went into that decision. It also tells us, under other situations, what choices are available to Suzie and even allows for probabilities on what Suzie would do, but it doesn’t let us know exactly what the outcome will have to be.


On “why anything exists” vs “why specific things exist”

You’re right that temperature and pressure are shorthand — and that reinforces, not undermines, my point.

Freezing is explained by:
• microphysical dynamics,
• energy transfer,
• molecular bonding constraints.

Those explanations work because the relevant variables are part of a larger causal network.

By contrast, asking “what caused the universe to exist at all?” seeks a trigger where there is no background system in which triggers operate. That is the category mistake.

Boundary conditions explain transitions within systems. They do not explain the existence of the system itself.

The universe isn’t a system; it’s a concept referring to all of the specific things in the universe.


On rationality

It is:
“Convergence is the only method that has repeatedly reduced error, enabled correction, and improved control, and no alternative method has done better.”

This is pragmatic, not circular. Any rival method must either:
• deliver better results,
• or explain why these results are illusory.

Libertarian metaphysics does neither.

The thought that “convergence has repeatedly reduced error (etc.)” is the thought I’m asking for reasons to trust, given your view. Alternative methods and whether they fail or not is irrelevant. Why do you trust this thought?


On morality

Moral justification requires reasons that:
• do not depend on one agent’s interests being privileged by fiat,
• remain valid under role reversal,
• can be offered without contradiction to those burdened.

Why?

Here are some things I have done, currently do or will do even though I don't actually want to do them:

…

I am 100% certain that I don't have free will because I have done, am doing and will do things I don't actually want to do. I actually want to go back in time and prevent all suffering, injustice, and death, but I can't. I actually want to make all living things all-loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful, but I can't. As you can see, I can't do what I actually want to do and instead I do things I don't actually want to do - this is not free will. This is the opposite of free will. This is determined and constrained will. All living things are prisoners of causality who are doomed to suffer and die. I wish I had never existed in such a reality.

If you think you are rejecting libertarian freedom because of that list, then you don’t understand what libertarian freedom says. Freedom isn’t an all-or-nothing thing. You can be free to choose within limits and still be free.

To be responsible, an agent must control all determinants of their desires and capacities. Humans don't and can't do this. Nor do other sentient organisms.

This is a logically coherent criterion. Unless one is omniscient, omnipotent and self-caused, responsibility cannot and does not arise.

No, this is not logically coherent. All that is needed for responsibility is the freedom to do 2 or more things. This can be accomplished within complete freedom or the limited freedom of libertarian freedom.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #65]

Thank you for the careful engagement. I’ll respond in the same structured way, because the disagreement here is no longer about misunderstandings — it’s about first principles.

On science, prediction, and falsifiability

You ask:

If determinism can’t be falsified via prediction success or failure, why bring predictive success up at all? And how is determinism scientifically falsifiable?

Two clarifications.

1. Predictive success is evidence, not a falsifier
I did not introduce prediction as a falsification criterion, but as confirmatory coherence.

Determinism predicts:
• improvement in prediction with better data,
• stronger predictability at population levels,
• effective intervention via causal manipulation.

Those are exactly the patterns we observe.

This does not falsify libertarian freedom on its own — but it fits determinism better. That’s abductive reasoning, not overreach.

2. Determinism need not be directly falsifiable to be scientifically respectable
Many core scientific commitments are not directly falsifiable in isolation:
• realism about unobservables,
• causal closure,
• uniformity of nature.

They earn their place by:
• unifying explanations,
• enabling intervention,
• resisting ad-hoc escape.

Determinism survives not because it is unfalsifiable, but because abandoning it reduces explanatory power without gain.

By contrast, libertarian freedom adds structure while explaining nothing additional.

3. Libertarian freedom is not falsified by decision-prediction studies
You say good science could isolate decisions and falsify libertarian freedom.

But any such study still relies on:
• statistical regularities,
• constrained option sets,
• background influences.

Libertarian freedom does not deny regularities; it denies necessitation. No experimental result can distinguish “highly constrained but non-necessitated” from “fully necessitated” outcomes without presupposing determinism.

So both views remain empirically underdetermined — which is precisely why explanatory criteria matter.

On mechanisms and causal explanation

You ask why the will cannot count as a structured process.

Here is the core issue.

1. A mechanism must constrain outcomes
A mechanism is not just an internal process — it must:
• reduce degrees of freedom,
• rule out possibilities,
• generate counterfactual dependence.

“The will chooses” does none of this.

If:
• identical prior states permit multiple outcomes,
• with no principled rule selecting among them,

then the “mechanism” does not constrain — it merely labels the event.

2. “The will chooses” is not a governing rule
A governing rule must tell us:
• when outcome A rather than B occurs,
• how variations change probabilities,
• what would not happen if the rule held.

“The will, within limits, chooses” does not do this. It allows every outcome compatible with the limits. That is underconstraint, not governance.

3. Why further explanation is required
Explanations terminate legitimately only when:
• further “why?” questions stop making sense, or
• additional structure would add nothing.

In determinism, termination occurs at laws + prior state.

In libertarianism, termination occurs at “the will chose,” but:
• nothing makes that choice intelligible rather than arbitrary,
• nothing links it to variation in conditions.

That is why explanation stalls.

On GENEs, abductive reasoning, and “blind faith”

You object that appealing to unknown mechanisms is blind faith.

But the appeal is not:
“Science will eventually explain everything.”

It is:
• these variables are independently motivated,
• they already explain large domains,
• they support intervention.

GENE-style explanations:
• predict effects of trauma,
• predict learning biases,
• predict pharmacological changes,
• predict social regularities.

Libertarian freedom predicts none of this.

Abduction here is not optimism — it’s track record plus constraint.

On state change and explanation

You say libertarianism explains Suzie raising her hand because she willed it.

But that only restates the event at the agent level.

Determinism explains:
• why similar Suzies act similarly,
• why changes in context shift outcomes,
• why interventions work.

Libertarianism allows probabilities, yes — but those probabilities are inherited from background constraints, not from the will itself.

The will adds no new explanatory leverage.

On “why anything exists”

You say:

The universe isn’t a system; it’s a concept referring to all the specific things in the universe.

Exactly — and that is why causal explanation fails.

Causation operates within systems, relating states of parts over time.

Asking “what caused the totality of all states to exist?” removes the background conditions required for causal talk.

That is not evasive — it is category discipline.

On rationality and convergence

You ask why we should trust the thought that convergence reduces error.

Because rejecting it is self-defeating.

Any attempt to doubt convergence must:
• rely on reasoning,
• rely on correction,
• rely on shared standards.

Those are exactly the mechanisms of convergence.

This is not circular — it is transcendental. Any method that denies it cannot justify itself.

On morality and responsibility

You ask why moral justification must satisfy symmetry.

Because without symmetry:
• power replaces reason,
• disagreement becomes brute force,
• justification collapses into preference.

This is not a moral axiom — it is a condition for interpersonal justification at all.

On libertarian freedom and your misunderstanding claim

You say I misunderstand libertarian freedom because freedom can exist within limits.

I understand that claim perfectly — I reject it.

The issue is not limits.
The issue is control over the determinants of choice.

If:
• desires are not chosen,
• capacities are not chosen,
• evaluative frameworks are not chosen,

then, having “two or more options” is irrelevant.

Responsibility does not arise from option plurality.
It arises from authorship.

And authorship requires control over the causal source of one’s will — which biological organisms do not have.

Your criterion fails only if responsibility is lowered by stipulation
You say my criterion is incoherent.

It is not incoherent.
It is unacceptable to those who want responsibility to survive.

Lowering the bar from authorship to “had options” is not an argument — it is a concession made to preserve a practice.

We are no longer disagreeing about details.

We disagree about this fundamental point:

You think responsibility can arise from constrained freedom.
I think responsibility requires causal authorship.

Given:
• determined desires,
• determined capacities,
• unchosen evaluative frameworks,

responsibility — in any non-stipulative sense — does not arise.

What remains is:
• causal management,
• harm prevention,
• protection without blame.

That position is internally consistent, scientifically grounded, and ethically cleaner.

At this point, the disagreement is fully explicit — and that’s where it should be.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #66]

On Science

1. Predictive success is evidence, not a falsifier
I did not introduce prediction as a falsification criterion, but as confirmatory coherence.

Determinism predicts:
• improvement in prediction with better data,
• stronger predictability at population levels,
• effective intervention via causal manipulation.

Those are exactly the patterns we observe.

What evidence shows that predictions and intervention through causal manipulation on human choices are good and improving? Not the studies we talked about earlier.

2. Determinism need not be directly falsifiable to be scientifically respectable

Oh, you agree in rejecting the principle of falsifiability; I'm sorry for thinking you were claiming otherwise.


On Causal Explanation

1. A mechanism must constrain outcomes
A mechanism is not just an internal process — it must:
• reduce degrees of freedom,
• rule out possibilities,
• generate counterfactual dependence.

First, what does "reduce degrees of freedom" mean?

Second, there are certain choices I would not will in a specific situation that someone else would will.

Third, if the reason choice X was made were different, then the choice could differ was how you defined "counterfactual dependence" earlier. The reason is my agency being involved. If that were different, then the choice could differ.

2. “The will chooses” is not a governing rule
A governing rule must tell us:
• when outcome A rather than B occurs,
• how variations change probabilities,
• what would not happen if the rule held.

First, in the situation of what is eaten, outcome A (eating a hamburger) occurs when my agency is involved and outcome B (eating a vegan dish) occurs when your agency is involve.

Second, variations in which will is in the situation changes the probability of what choice will be made.

Third, if agency were not involved and all constraining influences were the same, then the same outcome should always occur.

3. Why further explanation is required
Explanations terminate legitimately only when:
• further “why?” questions stop making sense, or
• additional structure would add nothing.

In determinism, termination occurs at laws + prior state.

In libertarianism, termination occurs at “the will chose,” but:
• nothing makes that choice intelligible rather than arbitrary,
• nothing links it to variation in conditions.

Why is an agent choosing arbitrary (in a non-deterministic begging way) and unintelligible? Which will is in the situation is the condition being varied.

You object that appealing to unknown mechanisms is blind faith.

But the appeal is not:
“Science will eventually explain everything.”

It is:
• these variables are independently motivated,
• they already explain large domains,
• they support intervention.

GENE-style explanations:
• predict effects of trauma,
• predict learning biases,
• predict pharmacological changes,
• predict social regularities.

Effects of trauma, learning biases, pharmacological changes, social regularities, are not what we are talking about; we are talking about human choices. You seem to be arguing that science will eventually explain human choices because it has explained things in those other fields of inquiry. But why think that human choices are a field of inquiry that is the same kind as those? If you agree that not all fields of inquiry are the domain of science alone, then why this one?

You say libertarianism explains Suzie raising her hand because she willed it.

But that only restates the event at the agent level.

Determinism explains:
• why similar Suzies act similarly,
• why changes in context shift outcomes,
• why interventions work.

Libertarian freedom explains why similar Suzies act similarly and why they act differently without resorting to an unfalsifiable claim (your view says there are mechanisms and forces that are just too complex for us right now and maybe ever, but are still there). I don't think falsifiability is all that is needed to find truth, but unfalsifiable answers are not helpful in finding what is true.

Libertarian freedom explains that changes in context can affect the agent's choice and that a shift in the agent in the context can also affect the choice.

Can you remind me what your definition of an intervention is, please?

If your explanation is more than a restatement, than so is this one.

Libertarianism allows probabilities, yes — but those probabilities are inherited from background constraints, not from the will itself.

The will adds no new explanatory leverage.

Yes. Our predictive success existing on the probabilistic level regarding human choices rather than moving beyond that to significant predictive success perfectly fits with this. It also fits with determinism within a more complex web of causation than we are currently aware of. Thus, neither view adds explanatory leverage here.


On “why anything exists” vs. "why specific things exist"

Causation operates within systems, relating states of parts over time.

Asking “what caused the totality of all states to exist?” removes the background conditions required for causal talk.

This still seems to treat the universe as the system and causation as only applying within systems. Why isn't causation metaphysically prior to "systems"?


On Rationality

You ask why we should trust the thought that convergence reduces error.

Because rejecting it is self-defeating.

Any attempt to doubt convergence must:
• rely on reasoning,
• rely on correction,
• rely on shared standards.

Those are exactly the mechanisms of convergence.

This is not circular — it is transcendental. Any method that denies it cannot justify itself.

Why does doubting convergence rely on correction and shared standards?


On Morality

You ask why moral justification must satisfy symmetry.

Because without symmetry:
• power replaces reason,
• disagreement becomes brute force,
• justification collapses into preference.

This is not a moral axiom — it is a condition for interpersonal justification at all.[/quote]

I think we might have been talking past each other a little here. You seem to be talking about which version of moral objectivism would be more reasonable; I'm talking about justifying any view as objectively true in the first place. I'm not saying the egoist's view is reasonable. Yes, you are offering a view that can be applied to all in a fair, coherent way, but that doesn't mean your view is objectively true. What's your justification for that?

You say I misunderstand libertarian freedom because freedom can exist within limits.

I understand that claim perfectly — I reject it.

The issue is not limits.
The issue is control over the determinants of choice.

If:
• desires are not chosen,
• capacities are not chosen,
• evaluative frameworks are not chosen,

then, having “two or more options” is irrelevant.

Why must desires, capacities, and evaluative frameworks be chosen for us to have freedom in choice?

Responsibility does not arise from option plurality.
It arises from authorship.

And authorship requires control over the causal source of one’s will — which biological organisms do not have.

Why does authorship of our choices require control over the causal source of our will?

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #67]

On Science

1. Predictive success and intervention

You ask:

What evidence shows that predictions and intervention through causal manipulation on human choices are good and improving?

The answer is: they are limited, uneven, and probabilistic — exactly as hard determinism predicts.

Hard determinism does not predict:
• perfect prediction,
• precise individual-level forecasting,
• or total behavioral control.

What it predicts is:
• partial predictability,
• population-level regularities,
• sensitivity to initial conditions,
• diminishing returns as systems grow more complex.

And that is precisely what we observe.

Human brains are:
• massively high-dimensional,
• path-dependent,
• developmentally contingent,
• socially embedded,
• and biologically noisy.

Determinism does not entail tractability. Earthquakes, weather systems, and ecosystems are deterministic and still poorly predictable. Human choice is no different.

So the absence of strong predictive success is not evidence against determinism — it is evidence for complex determinism.

2. Falsifiability

You’re right that determinism is not straightforwardly falsifiable by prediction failure.

That is not a defect.

Many scientifically indispensable claims are:
• not directly falsifiable,
• evaluated abductively,
• supported by explanatory unification.

Determinism earns its place by:
• integrating neuroscience, biology, psychology, and sociology,
• explaining why interventions sometimes work and sometimes fail,
• explaining why regularities coexist with divergence.

Libertarian freedom explains none of this better.

On Causal Explanation

1. “Reducing degrees of freedom”

You ask what this means.

It means:
• ruling out outcomes given prior conditions,
• constraining behavior probabilistically,
• narrowing the space of possible futures.

GENE-style explanations do exactly this.

Your examples (e.g., “I would never eat glass”) are constraints produced by prior causes, not evidence of free agency. Those limits arise from:
• evolved aversions,
• learned associations,
• pain avoidance circuitry.

Nothing about them requires an undetermined will.

2. Governing rules

You claim:

Outcome A occurs when my agency is involved; outcome B when your agency is involved.

This is not a rule — it is a relabeling.

Hard determinism explains:
• why your agency differs from mine,
• why different agents produce different outcomes,
• why probabilities shift with identity.

Libertarianism treats “agency” as a primitive explainer.
Determinism explains agency itself.

3. Counterfactual dependence

You say:

If my agency were different, the outcome would differ.

Hard determinism agrees — and explains why.

Your agency differs because:
• your genes differ,
• your developmental history differs,
• your neurobiology differs,
• your learning differs.

Libertarian freedom adds nothing here.

4. Termination of explanation

You ask why “the will chose” is inadequate.

Because it blocks further explanation.

Under determinism:
• we can ask why the will had those preferences,
• why those reasons were salient,
• why that choice felt compelling.

Under libertarianism:
• explanation terminates prematurely,
• variation is declared brute,
• arbitrariness is redescribed as freedom.

That is explanatory loss, not gain.

5. Unknown mechanisms

You accuse determinism of blind faith in unknown causes.

But this is how all mature sciences work.

We inferred:
• genes before sequencing,
• pathogens before microscopy,
• neurotransmitters before isolation.

The justification is not faith — it is track record.

Libertarian freedom has no comparable history of progressive explanatory success.

On Suzie Raising Her Hand

You say libertarianism explains both regularity and deviation.

Hard determinism explains both better.

Regularities arise from shared structures.
Deviations arise from:
• micro-variations,
• learning noise,
• contextual shifts,
• internal competition among neural systems.

Appealing to “the will” explains neither pattern nor deviation — it merely names the phenomenon.

On intervention

An intervention is:
• altering inputs to a system,
• such that output probabilities shift.

Education, incentives, coercion, therapy, medication — all work sometimes, fail sometimes, and depend on prior structure.

That is exactly what determinism predicts.

Libertarianism predicts no principled pattern of success.

On “why anything exists”

You ask why causation can’t explain the existence of the universe.

Because causation presupposes:
• time,
• states,
• transitions.

The universe is not a state within a larger system.
It is the totality of states.

Asking for its cause is a category mistake, not a scientific question. Spacetime began with the Big Bang, so there is no time before the Big Bang.

On Rationality

You ask:

Why does doubting convergence rely on correction and shared standards?

Because argument itself presupposes:
• consistency,
• error correction,
• intersubjective assessment.

These are convergence norms.

Denying them while using them is self-undermining.

This is not circular — it is unavoidable.

On Morality

You say you are asking whether any moral view is objectively true.

From hard determinism, the answer is:

No moral system is objectively true in the metaphysical sense.

But that does not mean all moral systems are equal.

Symmetry is not a moral axiom — it is a practical constraint on coordination among agents who:
• lack free will,
• have conflicting interests,
• must coexist.

Egoism fails not because it is “false,” but because it:
• cannot scale,
• cannot stabilize cooperation,
• collapses into force.

Morality is a tool, not a truth.

On Freedom and Responsibility

1. Freedom

You ask why desires and capacities must be chosen for freedom.

They don’t — but then freedom becomes purely descriptive, not justificatory.

Under hard determinism:
• choices occur according to desires and capacities,
• deliberation occurs according to evaluation frameworks,
• agency is experienced,

but none of this grounds moral responsibility because desires and capacities are not free from genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences. They are determined and constrained by them.

2. Responsibility

Responsibility requires:
• control over the causal source of action,
• not merely participation in it.

Biological organisms do not have such control.

Therefore:
• praise and blame are unjustified,
• rewards and punishments are undeserved,
• retribution is indefensible.

What remains are:
• prevention,
• rehabilitation,
• harm reduction,
• containment when necessary to protect potential victims.

This is not nihilism.
It is ethical realism under determinism.

Why does authorship of our choices require control over the causal source of our will?

Short answer: because without control over the causal source of your will, “authorship” collapses into mere ownership of an event, not responsibility for it.

Now I’ll unpack that carefully, from a hard determinist standpoint, without appealing to moral intuition or libertarian assumptions.

1. What “authorship” is supposed to do

When people invoke authorship of choice, they usually want it to ground something stronger than mere causation. Authorship is meant to justify claims like:

* “You are responsible for this choice.”
* “You deserve praise or blame for it.”
* “It is fair to hold you morally accountable.”

So authorship is not just:

“The choice happened in you.”

It is:

“The choice is attributable to you in a way that justifies moral evaluation.”

That extra justificatory work is crucial.

2. Mere causal involvement is not enough

Suppose a choice results from:

* genes you did not choose,
* early environments you did not choose,
* trauma you did not choose,
* neurochemistry you did not choose,
* information you did not choose to encounter,
* cognitive capacities you did not choose to have.

In that case:

* Yes, the choice occurred in you.
* Yes, your brain executed it.
* Yes, you experienced deliberation.

But none of that makes you the author in the morally relevant sense.

Why? Because you did not determine the determinants.

You were the site of the causal process, not its source.

3. Why control over determinants matters

Authorship is meaningful only if the agent could reasonably be said to have made themselves the kind of chooser they are.

Otherwise, “authorship” reduces to:

“This happened through me, therefore it is mine.”

But that standard is absurdly weak.

By that logic:

* A seizure would be “authored.”
* A reflex would be “authored.”
* A compulsion would be “authored.”
* A phobia response would be “authored.”

Yet we explicitly reject responsibility in those cases — precisely because the agent lacks control over the causal source.

So if we deny authorship when causation bypasses control, consistency requires denying authorship when all causation bypasses control.

4. “But the agent deliberated!”

Deliberation does not rescue authorship.

Deliberation itself is:

* shaped by prior beliefs,
* weighted by prior values,
* constrained by cognitive capacity,
* biased by affect and memory.

If you did not choose:

* what reasons occur to you,
* how strongly they move you,
* which desires dominate,
* how conflict is resolved,

then deliberation is just another deterministic process, not a source of authorship.

The feeling of “I decided” is an experience — not a metaphysical power.


5. Why “two or more options” is insufficient

A common reply is:

“Authorship only requires the freedom to choose between two or more options.”

But this confuses option plurality with source control.

If the options, preferences, salience, and capacities are all fixed by prior causes, then the branching point is superficial.

You didn’t author:

* the option set,
* your attraction to each option,
* your threshold for choosing,
* your susceptibility to reasons.

So the existence of multiple options does nothing to ground responsibility.


6. The regress problem

If someone claims:

“You are the author because the choice came from your will.”

We can ask:

“Why does your will have the structure it does?”

If the answer is:

* genetics,
* upbringing,
* culture,
* chance,

then authorship evaporates.

If the answer is:

“Because I chose my will,”

then we face an infinite regress:

* you would need a prior will to choose your will,
* and a will before that,
* and so on.

The only way out is self-causation — which is incoherent.

7. What remains without authorship

Rejecting authorship does not mean:

* people don’t make choices,
* reasoning is meaningless,
* behavior cannot change,
* harm doesn’t matter,
* restraint is unjustified.

It means:

* blame is unjustified,
* praise is unjustified,
* desert is a fiction.

What remains are forward-looking practices:

* prevention,
* rehabilitation,
* education,
* harm reduction,
* proportionate containment when necessary.

These do not require authorship — only causation.

8. Bottom line

Authorship of choice requires control over the causal source of one’s will because:

* responsibility tracks origination, not mere execution;
* without source control, authorship reduces to happenstance;
* deliberation and choice can occur without authorship;
* all determinants of human choice are unchosen and constrained.

We are not authors of our wills.

We are products of causality, making decisions inside systems we did not design, using capacities we did not choose, driven by desires we did not author.

That is not free will.
That is determined agency.


Conclusion

The real divide is this:

You want:
• constrained freedom,
• partial responsibility,
• authorship without self-origination.

I reject that as incoherent.

Hard determinism explains:
• why choices feel free,
• why control is limited,
• why blame is misplaced,
• why harm reduction — not punishment — is rational.

Freedom, responsibility, and moral desert do not survive contact with causality.

But compassion, prevention, and justice without blame do.

That is the position I am defending.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Compassionist in post #68]

On science

What evidence shows that predictions and intervention through causal manipulation on human choices are good and improving?

The answer is: they are limited, uneven, and probabilistic — exactly as hard determinism predicts.

Libertarian freedom predicts limited, uneven, and probabilistic predictions of human choice as well. What evidence shows it is improving due to scientific investigation? What evidence shows that "intervention through causal manipulation on human choices" (which may need to be defined more clearly) is good and improving?

Determinism earns its place by:
• integrating neuroscience, biology, psychology, and sociology,
• explaining why interventions sometimes work and sometimes fail,
• explaining why regularities coexist with divergence.

Libertarian freedom explains none of this better.

It definitely doesn't explain it any worse. That's enough against your claim that science supports determinism over libertarian freedom.


On Causal Explanation

1. “Reducing degrees of freedom”

You ask what this means.

It means:
• ruling out outcomes given prior conditions,
• constraining behavior probabilistically,
• narrowing the space of possible futures.

GENE-style explanations do exactly this.

Your examples (e.g., “I would never eat glass”) are constraints produced by prior causes, not evidence of free agency. Those limits arise from:
• evolved aversions,
• learned associations,
• pain avoidance circuitry.

Nothing about them requires an undetermined will.

Libertarian freedom rules out outcomes given prior conditions. There are some things one agent does that another wouldn't in the same situation.

Libertarians hold a wider social view of humanity where we think very similarly and like to follow those who are like us (this is a very simplified version that could be deepened) accounting for the constraint of behavior probabilistically.

Libertarian freedom narrows the space of possible futures by the limits on freedom in the system, generally, and by specific agents being in specific situations, specifically. That narrows specific future outcomes in specific situations.

I didn't give the example of "I would never eat glass". I did talk about how you would not eat meat, but I would in certain situations because we are distinct free agents. I'm not arguing that a deterministic narrative can't be formulated about this, I'm simply arguing that we both have coherent narratives that are equally causal explanations (while you claim mine is incoherent) and that you have produced nothing to support your claim that determinism fits the data of reality better than libertarian freedom.

2. Governing rules

You claim:

Outcome A occurs when my agency is involved; outcome B when your agency is involved.

This is not a rule — it is a relabeling.

Hard determinism explains:
• why your agency differs from mine,
• why different agents produce different outcomes,
• why probabilities shift with identity.

Libertarianism treats “agency” as a primitive explainer.
Determinism explains agency itself.

That is no more relabeling than what you are doing with determinism. Determinism explains why our choices differ by saying we have different GENEs; libertarian freedom explains why our choices differ by saying we have different wills (limited by different GENEs).

You are tricking yourself with unintended semantics here. Either:

(1) you agree with the libertarian that 'choice' and 'agency' pick out distinct concepts and, therefore, can't use them as synonyms like you did above or

(2) you reject that agency (as understood in libertarian freedom) is a valid concept and shouldn't use it in your explanation of determinism; if you use it anyway, you would be equivocating on terms, which is fallacious reasoning.

3. Counterfactual dependence

You say:

If my agency were different, the outcome would differ.

Hard determinism agrees — and explains why.

Your agency differs because:
• your genes differ,
• your developmental history differs,
• your neurobiology differs,
• your learning differs.

Libertarian freedom adds nothing here.

Hard determinism explains why 'choices' differ, not 'agencies' (as distinct concepts, even if you reject the libertarian concept of agency exists).

4. Termination of explanation

You ask why “the will chose” is inadequate.

Because it blocks further explanation.

Under determinism:
• we can ask why the will had those preferences,
• why those reasons were salient,
• why that choice felt compelling.

Under libertarianism:
• explanation terminates prematurely,
• variation is declared brute,
• arbitrariness is redescribed as freedom.

That is explanatory loss, not gain.

We aren't talking about the will's preferences, desires, feelings, etc. but about why the choice was made. Under determinism, you say the choice was made because of GENEs and then there is no further explanation. Under libertarian freedom, I say the choice was made because of the will involved (limited by GENEs) and then there is no further explanation. Our views are exactly the same on this point.

You accuse determinism of blind faith in unknown causes.

But this is how all mature sciences work.

We inferred:
• genes before sequencing,
• pathogens before microscopy,
• neurotransmitters before isolation.

The justification is not faith — it is track record.

Determinism is not science; it's philosophy.

An intervention is:
• altering inputs to a system,
• such that output probabilities shift.

Libertarian freedom is an intervention under this definition because when you alter GENEs, you'll have different choices available to the will (altering output probabilities) and that when you alter the will in the situation, you'll also have shifting output probabilities.

Education, incentives, coercion, therapy, medication — all work sometimes, fail sometimes, and depend on prior structure.

That is exactly what determinism predicts.

Libertarianism predicts no principled pattern of success.

There is no principled pattern of success when we can say these things work sometimes, fail sometimes, and depend on their structure; that's the opposite of a pattern of success.


On “why anything exists” vs. "why specific things exist"

You ask why causation can’t explain the existence of the universe.

Because causation presupposes:
• time,
• states,
• transitions.

The universe is not a state within a larger system.
It is the totality of states.

Asking for its cause is a category mistake, not a scientific question. Spacetime began with the Big Bang, so there is no time before the Big Bang.

First, causation does not presuppose time; it governs timeless existence conceptually as well.

Second, saying that the universe is not a state within a larger system, but is the totality of states is a naturalistic definition of 'universe', not a neutral one like "the totality of all physical objects and laws".

Third, yes, causality is not a scientific question even if it can be applied scientifically.


On Rationality

You ask:

Why does doubting convergence rely on correction and shared standards?

Because argument itself presupposes:
• consistency,
• error correction,
• intersubjective assessment.

These are convergence norms.

Denying them while using them is self-undermining.[/quote]

I thought convergence referred to how certain lines of evidence are converging on the same point. Here you use it as a synonym for 'argument'.


On Morality

You say you are asking whether any moral view is objectively true.

From hard determinism, the answer is:

No moral system is objectively true in the metaphysical sense.

But that does not mean all moral systems are equal.

If there is no objective truth that does mean all answers are equal. There is no objectively true best ice cream flavor. That means that everyone's claims are equal (whether you want to say equally true, equally false, or that true/false is a category mistake).

Symmetry is not a moral axiom — it is a practical constraint on coordination among agents who:
• lack free will,
• have conflicting interests,
• must coexist.

Egoism fails not because it is “false,” but because it:
• cannot scale,
• cannot stabilize cooperation,
• collapses into force.

Morality is a tool, not a truth.

Yes, we are talking about different concepts using the same term 'morality'! I agree that determinism can give us what you are calling 'morality' here; that was never my critique. Yes, your moral view is a better tool to get mutually beneficial cooperation than egoism.

My critique has always been that determinism cannot tell us that we should strive for mutually beneficial cooperation (or self-centered actions or whatever). Choosing one over the other is like choosing different ice cream flavors. You like cooperation and the egoist likes self-benefit.

Responsibility requires:
• control over the causal source of action,
• not merely participation in it.

Biological organisms do not have such control.

Therefore:
• praise and blame are unjustified,
• rewards and punishments are undeserved,
• retribution is indefensible.

What remains are:
• prevention,
• rehabilitation,
• harm reduction,
• containment when necessary to protect potential victims.

This is not nihilism.
It is ethical realism under determinism.

So, at best, "we" have causal responsibility, not moral responsibility, on your view as I said all along.

If libertarian freedom is true, then humans do have control over the causal source of action and, therefore, praise and blame are justified, consequences deserved and defensible. Yet, we can still seek prevention, rehabilitation, harm reduction, and containment when necessary.

3. Why control over determinants matters

Authorship is meaningful only if the agent could reasonably be said to have made themselves the kind of chooser they are.

Otherwise, “authorship” reduces to:

“This happened through me, therefore it is mine.”

In libertarian freedom the agent does have control over the determinant of the choice (their will). That's distinct from having complete control over the determinant of the determinant of the choice, which is what I'm critiquing.
All of your critiques that follow assume determinism is true and then fault libertarian freedom for not having control over those deterministic processes. Of course libertarian freedom doesn't make sense if you assume determinism is true.

[Compassionist]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #69]

Overview

Your response repeatedly relies on a single strategy:
re-labeling deterministic structure as “libertarian freedom” without adding explanatory or predictive content.

I will address this point-by-point. The core issue is not whether a libertarian narrative can be told, but whether it does explanatory work beyond what causal models already provide.

1. Science, prediction, and intervention

Libertarian freedom predicts limited, uneven, and probabilistic predictions of human choice as well.

This is true — and irrelevant.

The question is not whether libertarianism can accommodate noise, but whether it explains why the noise has the structure it does.

Hard determinism predicts:
• improvement in prediction when causal variables are better measured,
• improvement in intervention when leverage points are identified,
• systematic failure where causal access is poor.

And this is exactly what we observe:
• pharmacology improves outcomes relative to placebo,
• early childhood interventions shift long-term trajectories,
• behavioral nudges change population-level behavior without “choosing differently.”

Libertarian freedom predicts none of this distinctively. It is compatible with every possible outcome, including total failure of intervention. Compatibility is not evidence.

Science favors the framework that tightens error bars as information improves.

Determinism does that. Libertarianism does not.

2. “Reducing degrees of freedom” is not what you think it is

You write:

Libertarian freedom rules out outcomes given prior conditions.

No — it does not.

Libertarian freedom explicitly holds that:
given identical prior conditions, multiple futures remain genuinely possible.

That is precisely what makes it libertarian.

Hard determinism, by contrast, says:
• prior conditions probabilistically constrain outcomes,
• variance reflects hidden variables, not metaphysical openness,
• different agents differ because their causal histories differ.

Your appeal to “social similarity” and “agents liking similar things” simply re-introduces causal regularities — while insisting they are not determining.

That is not an alternative explanation.
It is determinism with an extra metaphysical rider.

3. “Different wills” vs. explained differences

You claim:

Determinism says choices differ because of GENEs; libertarianism says they differ because of wills.

Correct — and this is exactly the problem.

“Different wills” is not an explanation. It is a label.

Determinism explains why wills differ:
• genetic variance,
• developmental inputs,
• neuroplastic change,
• learning history.

Libertarianism says:
they differ because they differ.

Calling that “agency” does not add structure. It blocks further inquiry.

This is not semantics.
It is the difference between:
• an explanans that decomposes, and
• one that terminates explanation prematurely.

4. Counterfactuals: you are conceding the determinist point

You say:

Hard determinism explains why choices differ, not agencies.

This is simply false.

Under hard determinism:
“agency” just is the organized causal system producing behavior.

If the system were different, the behavior would differ.
That is counterfactual dependence — fully preserved.

Libertarianism adds:
a metaphysically undetermined “chooser” that itself has no internal explanation.

Nothing is gained.

5. Where explanation actually terminates

You argue:

Under determinism you say the choice was made because of GENEs and then there is no further explanation.

This is a misunderstanding of how causal explanation works.

Determinism does not stop at genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences.

Genes are explained by:
• inheritance mechanisms (DNA replication, meiosis),
• mutation processes (copying errors, radiation, chemical damage),
• selection pressures (differential survival and reproduction).

But those themselves are not primitives.

Inheritance is explained by:
• molecular binding affinities,
• base-pair chemistry,
• enzyme-mediated transcription and repair,
• thermodynamic constraints on molecular stability.

Mutation is explained by:
• quantum-level stochastic events (e.g. tunnelling, radiation hits),
• chemical reaction kinetics,
• entropy-driven error rates in replication,
• environmental energy fluxes.

Crucially:
stochastic ≠ agentic
Randomness is not freedom; it is just unpredictability at a lower level.

Selection pressures are explained by:
• ecological resource distributions,
• population dynamics,
• competition and cooperation equilibria,
• physical limits on metabolism, locomotion, and reproduction.

Ecology is explained by:
• planetary conditions (gravity, atmosphere, temperature),
• energy flows (solar radiation, chemical gradients),
• geophysical history (plate tectonics, climate cycles).

Planetary conditions are explained by:
• astrophysical formation processes,
• stellar nucleosynthesis,
• orbital mechanics,
• initial matter-energy distributions.

Physics itself is explained by:
• fundamental forces,
• symmetry principles,
• conservation laws,
• boundary conditions of the universe.

At this point, explanation bottoms out.

Not because determinism failed —
but because explanation must bottom out somewhere.

Now notice the asymmetry

Hard determinism says:

• explanation terminates only at the most fundamental level we can reach,
• everything above that level is causally structured and decomposable,
• ignorance is provisional, not principled.

Libertarian freedom says:

• explanation terminates at the will,
• the will is not decomposable,
• variation is primitive and unanalyzable.

That is a vastly earlier stopping point.

Why this matters

Stopping early has consequences:

• fewer testable predictions,
• fewer intervention levers,
• more moralized blame,
• less capacity for prevention and repair.

Hard determinism keeps inquiry open.

Libertarian freedom closes it by fiat.

The key point

Every worldview hits brute facts eventually.
The question is not whether explanation ends, but where you choose to stop.

• Determinism stops at physics (or deeper, if discovered).
• Libertarian freedom stops at the will.

One of these maximizes understanding.
The other preserves dogma.

That is the real difference.

Explanations terminate only where inquiry reaches brute facts — as they must in any worldview.

Libertarianism, by contrast, terminates immediately at the will.

That is not symmetry.
That is explanatory asymmetry.

6. “Determinism is philosophy, not science”

Correct — and misleading.

So are:
• realism,
• instrumentalism,
• reductionism,
• libertarian freedom.

The question is not “is this philosophy?”
The question is:
which philosophy integrates best with successful science?

Determinism does:
• neuroscience,
• behavioral genetics,
• psychology,
• sociology,
• epidemiology.

Libertarian freedom integrates with none of these without becoming epiphenomenal.

7. Intervention clarified (again)

You write:

Libertarian freedom is an intervention under this definition.

No.

Changing genes, environments, nutrients, experiences, or neurochemistry are interventions because they:
alter causal inputs.

Invoking “the will choosing differently” is not an intervention — it is a restatement of the outcome.

Libertarian freedom predicts no principled success conditions for intervention.
Determinism does.

8. Patterns do exist — you are redefining them away

You say:

There is no principled pattern of success if things work sometimes and fail sometimes.

That is simply incorrect.

Medicine, education, and policy all work:
• probabilistically,
• unevenly,
• better under some conditions than others.

That is exactly what a causal system with noise looks like.

The existence of variance does not refute pattern.
It presupposes it.

9. Morality: preference vs. coordination

You argue that without objective truth all moral views are “equal.”

This equivocates between:
• metaphysical truth, and
• practical dominance.

There is no objective best chess opening — yet some lose more often.

Egoism fails not because it is “false,” but because:
• it destabilizes cooperation,
• it scales poorly,
• it increases conflict.

Morality is a social engineering problem, not a flavor preference.

10. Responsibility and control

You say libertarian freedom allows control over the causal source of action.

It does not.

It merely relocates causation into an unexplained chooser.

Hard determinism says:
your determinants (i.e. genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences) are causally responsible, so you are not morally deserving of praise or blame.

It is why:
• retribution is unjust,
• prevention succeeds,
• rehabilitation makes sense.

Libertarianism preserves moral desert — and with it, cruelty — without explanatory warrant.

Final point: question-begging runs both ways

You conclude by saying I “assume determinism is true.”

No.

I infer determinism because it explains more, predicts more, and blocks less inquiry.

Libertarian freedom survives only by:
• redescribing causation,
• resisting decomposition,
• insulating itself from evidence.

That is not a competing explanation.

It is a stopping rule.

Summary

• Determinism explains agency; libertarianism names it.
• Determinism predicts intervention success; libertarianism tolerates it.
• Determinism integrates with science; libertarianism floats above it.
• Determinism removes moral desert without nihilism; libertarianism preserves moral desert without actual control.

That is why science favors determinism — not by decree, but by fit.