To what extent can the immaterial affect the material?

[QED]

In the topic titled When God knows a soul goes to hell..

Newtonian mechanics is an approximation to quantum mechanics. It's possible that the uncertainty principle can be more generalized with some yet undiscovered theory, however the uncertainty principle is a theorem in the theory of operators, a derivation of the Cramer-Rao inequality, derivation of the Fourier transform on general locally compact groups, formulation for Fourier integral operators on manifolds, along with other deep mathematical concepts. So, I would argue that the uncertainty principle points to some kind of platonic structure that has deep mathematical significance. Given its importance in explaining the virtual particles, Casimir effect, Hawking radiation, etc., I think we have good reason to believe that the immaterial affects the material.

I think this is a really tricky issue. For example, love can be considered to be immaterial and it can evidently affect material things through the actions of those in love. But then I'd argue that love is a signal riding on a material medium (the neural nets within our brains). I have often stated that wherever we look we find software to be supervenient on hardware. I am unaware of any evidence for pure Information that exists without a supporting material structure anywhere in the cosmos.

The question I wish to put here is how are we to know for sure that a platonic view is justified when all we might be doing is to default to this assumption simply because we lack a complete understanding of some phenomenon or other that we are studying. It seems to me that while Physics lacks a Grand Unification Theory we do not know if the laws we are observing represent restrictions of degrees of freedom imposed by some as yet undiscovered, underlying, material framework. The analogy that I like to use is the tracing-out of the image of a penny coin beneath a sheet of paper by rubbing over it with a pencil. If we never saw behind the paper, the impression might seem to comes to us from nowhere.

This topic covers the related issue of prescriptive vs descriptive laws and can serve to host debates that frequently go off-topic in other threads.

[harvey1]

Firstly, if the computer's survival and the ability to reprodice depended on making the best move, then computer populations would pretty quickly evolve behaviors that make the best moves possible, you betcha.

But, what reason is there to suspect that survival and reproduction depend on making the best moves? Why cannot we just say that a computer's survival and ability to reproduce depend on making moves that are adequate enough for survival and adequate enough for reproduction? Why do we need to take that extra and unrequired step to suggest that the instruction set must exceed adequacy for survival (or exceed adequacy for reproduction) such that truth determination is also a derived result of instruction sets?

Secondly, remember that, according to me, humans are also following their own instruction sets; thus, your statement above doesn't conflict with my views at all.

But, the term "humans" refers to what exactly? Does it refer to the mental efficacy of human minds as a collective whole? Obviously you cannot say so. What exactly are you referring to in terms of instruction sets for humans, and why can't we completely replace such "instruction sets" with minimizing action of the quantum particles acting in a large collection? If we can, as I think you agree, then again why shouldn't the instruction set of humans be completely determined by minimizing action at some lowest level of physics rather than all this truth determining stuff?

Now, why should an instruction set of particles minimizing action have anything to do with whether an organism's beliefs are true or likely to be true of the world?

This sounds like some kind of an argument from ignorance, but actually I think QED already answered it. It's because organisms with true beliefs are more likely to survive and reproduce.

This is your conclusion! What I want to hear is how you arrive at the conclusion from the minimizing action of quantum particles. I don't expect a full explanation, just fill me in on the "in principle" stuff so that I can understand how individual particles minimizing action implies that beliefs of a non-existent entity (i.e., the mind) happen to lead to true beliefs. I thought the mental properties were inefficacious in your view, right? How do they suddenly become efficacious by making an organism more likely to survive? I don't think I'm arguing from ignorance since you are making a claim based on assumptions that I'm not buying yet. I want to know how in principle you get from epiphenomenalism to a truth determining machine.

Sorry to be repetitive, but that's why I put your argument in a more formal style. I want to understand how you logically reach your conclusion that epiphenomenalism can be consistent with scientific realism, and commonsense realism for that matter.

[QED]

Harvey, as Bugmaster replied, it seems reasonable to say that organisms are capable of evolving "true beliefs" as those are the ones more likely to survive and reproduce etc. I'm not going to argue about the applicability or meaning of epiphenomenalism because I think that term is confusing the issue here. It allows you to come out with apparently damming statements like:

I thought the mental properties were inefficacious in your view, right? How do they suddenly become efficacious by making an organism more likely to survive?

A robot made from relays has "mental states" if you like, but as has been stated time and time again this is only a shorthand way of describing complex patterns of switch states. Would we lose anything important if we kept to this sort of level in the discussion? I'm quite sure the whole thing can be worked out without resorting to your preferred philosophical labels which provide ample traps for people less familiar with them like me.

What I want to hear is how you arrive at the conclusion from the minimizing action of quantum particles. I don't expect a full explanation, just fill me in on the "in principle" stuff so that I can understand how individual particles minimizing action implies that beliefs of a non-existent entity (i.e., the mind) happen to lead to true beliefs.

Now I'm confused by the above. Had you asked:

"What I want to hear is how you arrive at the conclusion from the minimizing action of quantum particles. I don't expect a full explanation, just fill me in on the "in principle" stuff so that I can understand how individual particles minimizing action implies that beliefs of a non-existent entity (i.e., the mind) happen to lead to true beliefs."

...Leaving out the bit I made small "implies that beliefs of a non-existent entity (i.e., the mind)" then we already have a reasonable answer: evolution leads to true beliefs. I'm sorry, but I can't parse the whole thing sensibly (my fault of course!) but I do want a proper understanding of what you're asking.

[harvey1]

it seems reasonable to say that organisms are capable of evolving "true beliefs" as those are the ones more likely to survive and reproduce etc.

Here, let me summarize your argument as I understand it:

1. Organisms are more likely to survive and reproduce if they have conscious mental properties that can evaluate and choose between beliefs (or "evaluators" or EB) that accurately depict the way the world actually is (i.e., conscious "true beliefs" or BT)
2. We can in principle deconstruct these conscious "true beliefs" (BT) into neurochemical elements of the brain until we get to quantum particles "minimizing action." Each collection set of particles of BT is formed by eons of evolution. Inaccurate set representations of the world were not selected
3. The instruction set to consciously evaluate a belief for its veracity (EB) is also composed of neurochemical elements of the brain until we get to quantum particles "minimizing action." Each collection set of particles that compose EB was also formed by eons of evolution. Inaccurate evaluators of the world were not selected
4. Therefore, humans have BTs by natural selection favoring our ancestors with EBs capable of producing conscious "true beliefs"

Does that sound like a fairly accurate depiction to you?

If so, then let's look at a few problems. Your BTs are produced by EBs that are not necessarily required by evolution to be accurate depictions of reality. All natural selection cares about is that EBs are adequate for survival. However, let's be charitable and say that over time the only way to be "adequate" in a fiercely competitive environment is to consciously produce BTs that are accurate. However, that cannot be since our ancestors had many false beliefs. In fact, the further back in time we go, the more false beliefs we see in our ancestors. Yet, they survived with their EBs and BTs, and therefore we have no overwhelming reason to believe that evolution requires accurate depictions of reality to survive and reproduce. Evolution teaches us that we only have reason to believe that our ancestors' EBs and BTs were adequate for their survival. So, if the structures that are in place from our evolutionary heritage are obviously not suitable to show that reality is accurately depicted, then how is it that we can be justified in saying that our current models are doing more than just adequately depicting things for our survival and reproduction (i.e., they are exceeding adequacy to the point of being "true")?

In addition, how do you avoid the same pitfall that Bugmaster's computer chess has? Recall that this chess program has an instruction set to determine the best move (i.e., its EB is selecting for BT). However, if our instruction set is the minimizing of action at the quantum level, then there is no overwhelming reason to believe that any minimizing of action requires that our EBs are accurately optimized for selecting "true beliefs." We have to suppose "true beliefs" aid in our survival, which contrasts with the paragraph above.

A robot made from relays has "mental states" if you like, but as has been stated time and time again this is only a shorthand way of describing complex patterns of switch states... Leaving out the bit I made small "implies that beliefs of a non-existent entity (i.e., the mind)" then we already have a reasonable answer: evolution leads to true beliefs. I'm sorry, but I can't parse the whole thing sensibly (my fault of course!) but I do want a proper understanding of what you're asking.

The mind exists only if it has causal powers. However, once you place the instruction set of humans beyond access to the self and down to the quantum level, then there is no causal role for the self. We don't consciously choose our beliefs since there is no "us" to make the choices. Therefore, if the self has no causal role in the decisions or beliefs that it forms, then what function could a belief have in terms of our actions? Beliefs affect the path of people who are in charge of making their choices. If there is no "us" to make a choice, then a false belief is going to happen anyway (neuro-chemically speaking). Beliefs are just consequences of physical things that happen in the interiors of our skull.

If quantum particles are collectively organized as a belief and this belief causes someone to act in favor of their survival and reproduction, then how does a belief cause them to act in favor of their survival and reproduction since the mind has no causal role? Beliefs would be analogous to watching a movie, we can certainly watch them like we watch characters on a screen have beliefs, but we cannot control what we do as a result of a belief anymore than we can control what the movie characters do after they form their beliefs. Therefore, for a strict reductionist account such as what you are suggesting, I think true beliefs would have virtually no role whatsoever in our survival and reproduction. This would also undercut your argument that "true beliefs" would naturally occur in organisms that are enhancing their chances of surviving and reproducing.

[QED]

Here, let me summarize your argument as I understand it:

1. Organisms are more likely to survive and reproduce if they have conscious mental properties that can evaluate and choose between beliefs (or "evaluators" or EB) that accurately depict the way the world actually is (i.e., conscious "true beliefs" or BT)
2. We can in principle deconstruct these conscious "true beliefs" (BT) into neurochemical elements of the brain until we get to quantum particles "minimizing action." Each collection set of particles of BT is formed by eons of evolution. Inaccurate set representations of the world were not selected
3. The instruction set to consciously evaluate a belief for its veracity (EB) is also composed of neurochemical elements of the brain until we get to quantum particles "minimizing action." Each collection set of particles that compose EB was also formed by eons of evolution. Inaccurate evaluators of the world were not selected
4. Therefore, humans have BTs by natural selection favoring our ancestors with EBs capable of producing conscious "true beliefs"

Does that sound like a fairly accurate depiction to you?

Oh boy! You've certainly put a lot of work into expanding my simple statement that

It seems reasonable to say that organisms are capable of evolving "true beliefs" as those are the ones more likely to survive and reproduce etc.

I don't know why you're bringing in things like "instruction sets [to] consciously evaluate a belief for its veracity" and "humans have BTs by natural selection favoring our ancestors with EBs capable of producing conscious "true beliefs". You seem to be layering things on top of others when there is no need. Surely the Parameceum is as good as a human when it comes to evaluating how evolution can lead to beliefs?

If so, then let's look at a few problems. Your BTs are produced by EBs that are not necessarily required by evolution to be accurate depictions of reality. All natural selection cares about is that EBs are adequate for survival. However, let's be charitable and say that over time the only way to be "adequate" in a fiercely competitive environment is to consciously produce BTs that are accurate. However, that cannot be since our ancestors had many false beliefs. In fact, the further back in time we go, the more false beliefs we see in our ancestors.

Really? Fancy you trying this on with me. Anyone bearing false beliefs about the consequences of heights, water, fire, wild animals etc. wouldn't be passing their genetic blueprints on too far would they? In fact we can assume that on the whole all beliefs of a safety critical nature are sound in an unbroken line all the way back to the very origins of life.

Yet, they survived with their EBs and BTs, and therefore we have no overwhelming reason to believe that evolution requires accurate depictions of reality to survive and reproduce. Evolution teaches us that we only have reason to believe that our ancestors' EBs and BTs were adequate for their survival. So, if the structures that are in place from our evolutionary heritage are obviously not suitable to show that reality is accurately depicted, then how is it that we can be justified in saying that our current models are doing more than just adequately depicting things for our survival and reproduction (i.e., they are exceeding adequacy to the point of being "true")?

This might only seem a mystery if you mix simple biologically evolved beliefs (as exemplified by the Parameceum) with those more readily identifiable as our own intellectual beliefs. However evolution accounts for the platform on which both of these processes run.

...Therefore, for a strict reductionist account such as what you are suggesting, I think true beliefs would have virtually no role whatsoever in our survival and reproduction. This would also undercut your argument that "true beliefs" would naturally occur in organisms that are enhancing their chances of surviving and reproducing.

You're conclusion simply looks wrong to me. Are you quite sure it looks right to you? I have to say that your arguments here have been highly abstract in nature and not at all easy to follow. For that reason I may well be missing your point. But just studying your conclusion above I am not overly filled with doubt.

[harvey1]

Really? Fancy you trying this on with me. Anyone bearing false beliefs about the consequences of heights, water, fire, wild animals etc. wouldn't be passing their genetic blueprints on too far would they? In fact we can assume that on the whole all beliefs of a safety critical nature are sound in an unbroken line all the way back to the very origins of life.

They are adequate for surviving and reproducing. There are many examples in biology of how this adequacy translates into jury-rigged designs. Your answer indicates that only some beliefs must be accurate about the world or else the organism doesn't survive and reproduce, but I think this only begs the question. Why must some beliefs be accurate about the world versus only making the organism adequate to survive and reproduce? Sometimes this adequacy is not enough because of changing environments (more competitors, evolved defenses of food sources, evolved offenses of predators, etc.), and the organism's species doesn't survive and reproduce. I think that you are presupposing realism in order to conclude realism. What I'm asking you to do is show how your view of the mind can allow us to conclude realism without assuming it in your premises.

If it's any consolation, I agree with you that organisms are attuned to their environment by accurately depicting the world as it is. However, the big difference in our views is that I attain realism by saying that the cognitive capabilities of organisms interact with the environment by the fact that they are conscious of their environment. My position is that your view cannot allow for conscious minds to be causal agents in that the self is doing the interacting (and not just neural components of the self doing the interacting), and therefore your realism has no foundation. Realism only has a foundation if the mental has causal efficacy. It's how we know that our minds are connecting with the real world and not just prisoners of how our evolutionary past dictates how we adequately depict the world.

This might only seem a mystery if you mix simple biologically evolved beliefs (as exemplified by the Parameceum) with those more readily identifiable as our own intellectual beliefs. However evolution accounts for the platform on which both of these processes run.

This doesn't tell me anything. How is it that evolution causes an organism to accurately depict the world in addition to adequately depicting it for survival and reproduction? Or, more appropriately, how is it that the minimizing action of quanta cause the quanta as a collective to depict the world accurately versus adequately depict the world to minimize action as a collective quantum world?

You're conclusion simply looks wrong to me. Are you quite sure it looks right to you?

I think the conclusion is a natural implication of your position. I think it is wrong, but that's only because your position is wrong. What you've done is taken the reductionist train to the ad absurdum station, and you should have gotten off prior to that point.

[QED]

OK Harvey, let me explain why I think the way I do: On the path from the Paramecium to the human there is a gradient of sophistication in beliefs. Simple multicellular life evolves instinctive reactions e.g. to motor away from acid. More sophistication is seen when such reactions (beliefs) are moderated by the reactions to other sensory inputs. The evolution of such "neural networks" gradually yield more complex behaviour as time goes on...

In the summer I was played a good trick on my son. I found a tiny red spider mite making its way across the table. I casually wondered how much traction such a tiny moving spec might have so I started blowing on it. To my surprise it froze at the faintest amount of breath. This gave me a great idea. I drew the attention of my son over to the scurrying insect and declared that I had trained it to obey my commands. "Stop" I shouted and magically the spider halted (of course as soon as I had said "Stop" I started quietly blowing on it). When I felt like it I'd say "Go" and stop blowing. The level of control was astounding.

Now this insect obviously believed that if it was too windy it was better off staying still. It seems to me that there's not much difference to my cat who holds the same belief. But my cat also has more sophisticated beliefs. He believes it is worth exploring unknown tunnels and other dark recesses presumably because nine times out of ten cats gained more benefit from doing so than harm. Evolution is capable of permitting all forms of behaviour and belief so long as it is not overly detrimental. So I do not have you problem with why evolution would permit the development of beliefs above and beyond those required for pure survival. You would seem to be suggesting that the evolution of human intellect cannot be explained in exactly this way and I really can't understand that.

[harvey1]

Evolution is capable of permitting all forms of behaviour and belief so long as it is not overly detrimental. So I do not have you problem with why evolution would permit the development of beliefs above and beyond those required for pure survival.

This is not part of my argument, though. My argument is that natural selection does not require the evolution of accurate cognitive representations of the world, it only requires adequate cognitive representations (i.e., adequate enough for survival and reproduction). Of course I agree with you that evolution did produce accurate cognitive representations in many evolved organisms (including humans). The issue, though, is how is that possible if the mental has no causal efficacy. I think your position does not entail this possibility as being reasonable.

You would seem to be suggesting that the evolution of human intellect cannot be explained in exactly this way and I really can't understand that.

No. I think human intellect is explainable in terms of evolving systems where mental efficacy has adaptive advantages. Where we disagree is on the mental efficacy issue. I don't think evolution would have succeeded if the mental was not capable of being efficacious.

[QED]

I think human intellect is explainable in terms of evolving systems where mental efficacy has adaptive advantages. Where we disagree is on the mental efficacy issue. I don't think evolution would have succeeded if the mental was not capable of being efficacious.

Well we seem to have some confusion here because I think that Mental states = neural network states. Mental efficacy = neural network efficacy. Neural networks are a biological structure that are evolved as brains. Embryos have brains so we are definitely talking about genetic inheritance here. If the embryo goes on to develop more beliefs than are merely adequate (I'm not even sure that this is in fact a reality as competition is fierce and any edge, no matter how small, can be inflated into selective advantage) for survival it doesn't seem all that remarkable. Perhaps you could summarise the problem you see once more in as simple a way as possible because I seem to be rather oblivious to it.

[harvey1]

Perhaps you could summarise the problem you see once more in as simple a way as possible because I seem to be rather oblivious to it.

The whole is more than the sum of its parts. Or, (W ≠ Σ(P)).

[QED]

Perhaps you could summarise the problem you see once more in as simple a way as possible because I seem to be rather oblivious to it.

The whole is more than the sum of its parts. Or, (Whole ≠ Sum(Parts)).

Excellent. I much prefer debating at this sort of level. We see no end of examples of this all around us, not just in biology but in the arts, engineering and so on. But, as always, what we are experiencing is property of our perception of the world. Hydrogen and Oxygen atoms combine to produce water for example -- something clearly different to its components. But water can still be reduced back to these components. Our 'sensors' might have told us this well before Sir William Grove proved it experimentally in the 1800's -- if only we could 'see' at the atomic level.

Now don't get me wrong... you tend to paint me as some arch reductionist and I am not when it comes to the quantum world. But there are many times when I would say that people are introducing additional unnecessary qualities to the macro world that are already fully predictable -- if only we were equipped with sufficient auditing and computing power to sum together all the constituent parts (i.e. to run the model in some way). This after all is what nature is so accomplished at doing and we are not. This is why I would say that things only appear to be more than the sum of their parts rather than them actually being so with some supernatural agency 'adding in the extras by hand'. If ever we sense the divine at work, I suggest it is simply the tireless and comprehensive efforts of nature doing that which we cannot even begin to conceive of calculating.