There are a lot of people on this site...Why is that?

[Visionary]

People are very...very strange creatures. Every question ever asked has a non-subjective 'best' answer. Now, assuming that is a true statement, why not always yield to the 'best' possible answer; thus, negating the debate process completely?javascript:emoticon(':-k')

[Adamoriens]

What is the best possible answer? Commence debate.

[LiamOS]

People are very...very strange creatures. Every question ever asked has a non-subjective 'best' answer. Now, assuming that is a true statement, why not always yield to the 'best' possible answer; thus, negating the debate process completely?javascript:emoticon(':-k')

The problem possibly is that many questions, particularly those pertaining to philosophical and theological matters are arguably incapable of having actual answers.

[Adamoriens]

People are very...very strange creatures. Every question ever asked has a non-subjective 'best' answer. Now, assuming that is a true statement, why not always yield to the 'best' possible answer; thus, negating the debate process completely?javascript:emoticon(':-k')

The problem possibly is that many questions, particularly those pertaining to philosophical and theological matters are arguably incapable of having actual answers.

Do you mean that we have no realistic hope of achieving answers, or that most of the questions are meaningless?

[LiamOS]

That most questions are probably meaningless.

[james.hoggatt]

That most questions are probably meaningless.

Then by its extension so are most answers, including the quote above. Its a nonsensical argument. I think what you mean to say is that many concepts are meaningless. This sounds like a happy meal sized version of ignosticism.

[LiamOS]

Asking whether a question is capable of being meaningful is not analogous to asking questions of God, existence and life.
Questions pertaining to the latter are usually destined to fail due to the fact that when asking the question, the concepts are rarely(if ever) defined sufficiently to make the question meaningful.

As for it being a Happy Meal sized version of Ignosticism, given that Ignosticism is largely limited to questions of a theological nature.

[james.hoggatt]

Asking whether a question is capable of being meaningful is not analogous to asking questions of God, existence and life.
Questions pertaining to the latter are usually destined to fail due to the fact that when asking the question, the concepts are rarely(if ever) defined sufficiently to make the question meaningful.

As for it being a Happy Meal sized version of Ignosticism, given that Ignosticism is largely limited to questions of a theological nature.

The concept is more readily recognized by referencing ignosticism rather than trying to explain metaphysical non-cognitivism.

Questions about whether questions are really questions that are answerable ultimately fall into the same realm of criticism, as the only way to answer both is to apply presuppositions to the nature of the question, and harkens to pretty baseline epistemological critique. The questions ultimately have answers as there is on objective truth or are relativistic, the presupposition that the question is meaningless excludes the theological position de facto from the possible set of answers.

[Ragna]

Asking whether a question is capable of being meaningful is not analogous to asking questions of God, existence and life.
Questions pertaining to the latter are usually destined to fail due to the fact that when asking the question, the concepts are rarely(if ever) defined sufficiently to make the question meaningful.

As for it being a Happy Meal sized version of Ignosticism, given that Ignosticism is largely limited to questions of a theological nature.

The concept is more readily recognized by referencing ignosticism rather than trying to explain metaphysical non-cognitivism.

Questions about whether questions are really questions that are answerable ultimately fall into the same realm of criticism, as the only way to answer both is to apply presuppositions to the nature of the question, and harkens to pretty baseline epistemological critique. The questions ultimately have answers as there is on objective truth or are relativistic, the presupposition that the question is meaningless excludes the theological position de facto from the possible set of answers.

Yes, but he's not taking a complete skeptical approach. As I see it, he's saying a very particular subset of questions (mainly philosophical and theological ones) are meaningless, and he's justified so in the vagueness of the concepts used. If those concepts get to be defined, they will acquire meaning.

Asking the meaning of a question is not "falling into its criticism" provided that the question formed in the process has meaning. And a question about another question can have meaning when the question itself lacks it.

"Do round squares exist?" is meaningless, but: "Does that question have a meaning?" is meaningful, as it will have a yes/no answer provided definitions.

[james.hoggatt]

Asking whether a question is capable of being meaningful is not analogous to asking questions of God, existence and life.
Questions pertaining to the latter are usually destined to fail due to the fact that when asking the question, the concepts are rarely(if ever) defined sufficiently to make the question meaningful.

As for it being a Happy Meal sized version of Ignosticism, given that Ignosticism is largely limited to questions of a theological nature.

The concept is more readily recognized by referencing ignosticism rather than trying to explain metaphysical non-cognitivism.

Questions about whether questions are really questions that are answerable ultimately fall into the same realm of criticism, as the only way to answer both is to apply presuppositions to the nature of the question, and harkens to pretty baseline epistemological critique. The questions ultimately have answers as there is on objective truth or are relativistic, the presupposition that the question is meaningless excludes the theological position de facto from the possible set of answers.

Yes, but he's not taking a complete skeptical approach. As I see it, he's saying a very particular subset of questions (mainly philosophical and theological ones) are meaningless, and he's justified so in the vagueness of the concepts used. If those concepts get to be defined, they will acquire meaning.

Asking the meaning of a question is not "falling into its criticism" provided that the question formed in the process has meaning. And a question about another question can have meaning when the question itself lacks it.

"Do round squares exist?" is meaningless, but: "Does that question have a meaning?" is meaningful, as it will have a yes/no answer provided definitions.

He doesn't just ask the question. He makes the exclusionary statement that questions of that subsection have no meaning as they have no real answers. This by default excludes universal based moral argument, or theological premises from being postulated.

The reason the question itself falls into the same criticism is that his question has no answer unless you apply the same level of wish-thinking or vagueness he criticizes the philosophical/theological question of having. In order to answer the question you have to make a foundational assumption that x means x and y means y and define the realm of the question, in the exact way you have to ask philosophical question. In fact, the question itself is an epistemological question, which is a philosophical question in and of itself.

Is God Real? must define what makes a god a god.

Can questions of a theological nature be answered? must define what makes an answer an answer.