The Coherent Causality Argument

[William]

For years, I've seen Christians argue for a supernatural creator - an entity outside nature, beyond scientific understanding, uncaused and eternal.

But if "supernatural" means beyond understanding and evidence, how does that explain anything rather than simply labeling the unknown as unknowable?

Here is an alternative argument that retains a first cause but removes the incoherence of supernaturalism. I welcome thoughtful engagement, particularly from theistic perspectives, on the following:

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Definitions (Oxford Languages):

Supernatural: (of a manifestation or event) attributed to some force beyond scientific understanding or the laws of nature.

Supernaturalism: the belief in a supernatural agency that intervenes in the course of natural laws.

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The Coherent Causality Argument

P1: Everything that begins to exist within nature has a natural cause.

P2: It is generally accepted in modern cosmology that this universe (our spacetime reality) had a beginning.

C1: Therefore, this universe has a natural cause.

P3: A “natural cause” means a cause that operates within some framework of consistent laws, is potentially understandable in principle, and is part of a broader causal reality.

P4: A supernatural cause, by definition, is beyond natural laws, understanding, and evidence, thus it cannot function as a causal explanation.

C2: Therefore, the cause of the universe is not supernatural - it is part of a broader natural reality (a “source reality”).

P5: This source reality may be eternal, timeless, or uncreated relative to our universe, but it is still natural in the sense of being coherent, consistent, and conceptually describable.

C3: Since an infinite regress of contingent causes provides no ultimate explanation, the source reality must be eternal (or necessary).

Overall Conclusion:
The universe was caused by an eternal natural entity - not by a supernatural one. This avoids the explanatory dead-end of supernaturalism while still satisfying the demand for a causal origin.
(By “natural,” I mean “operating within some consistent framework of cause and effect, even if outside our observable universe.”)

Note on Consciousness:
If the natural source-entity is intelligent and consciously creative, this would provide a coherent origin for consciousness itself, potentially resolving the "hard problem" by grounding subjective experience in a fundamental, conscious cause. This is not required by my argument, but it is a logically consistent possibility if one accepts both an intelligent source and the principle that consciousness cannot emerge from purely non-conscious substrates.

A Clarification on Terms:

If “supernatural” simply means existing outside our universe but still operating by consistent, higher-level laws, and is not being used in its strong, classical philosophical sense here, then it becomes a subcategory of the natural - understood broadly as any reality operating within a coherent framework of cause and effect.

If, however, “supernatural” means wholly beyond understanding, outside any consistent laws, and intrinsically inexplicable, then it cannot meaningfully explain anything—including the origin of the universe.

This argument proceeds under the second definition, which is both standard in philosophical discourse and necessary for the term “supernatural” to retain any distinct meaning. If you hold the first definition, then your “supernatural” cause aligns with what I term the eternal natural source-entity—and we are largely in agreement on the nature of the first cause, differing only in terminology.

Q1: If a cause is supernatural - beyond understanding and evidence - does it actually explain anything, or does it merely relabel an unknown as unknowable?

Q2: Can a Christian (or any theist) coherently define God as both supernatural (in its strong, classical philosophical sense) and personally interactive without contradiction?

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #110]

Thanks for that clarification. There are other ones offered, although that is my favorite. Here are two others:

There are two types of causal explanation: scientific explanations (laws, initial conditions, etc.) and personal explanations (agents and their volitions). The first state of the universe can’t have a scientific explanation since those require prior states and earlier conditions and the first state of the universe has no prior state.

The universe is spatiotemporal reality, as I use that term. The cause of such a thing would have to be (even if it transforms into spatiotemporal reality) timeless and immaterial. The only entities that possess those properties are immaterial minds and abstract objects (like numbers). Abstract objects don’t have causal powers, so that leaves an unembodied mind, which is a personal thing.

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #111]

Tanager,

You've offered your will-based argument (eternal causes without will produce eternal effects) as your favorite for why Model C is necessary. Let's focus there.

The argument:

"Eternal causes without a will can only produce eternal effects because the conditions for the effects to exist are eternally present."

I agree this is a strong intuition. But let's examine what it assumes.

Will is only necessary in relation to creating. Creating implies a beginning - something that wasn't there before. Before any beginning, there is no creation occurring. Therefore, before any creativity, will is not necessary.

This suggests will cannot be an essential attribute of the eternal ground itself. If will were essential and eternally present, the conditions for creation would be eternally present - and as you note, the effect (the universe) should then be eternal. But it's not. The universe began.

So we have a problem for Model C: an eternal will with no object, no creation, no "before" to act within. What does "will" even mean in that context?

Here's an alternative that preserves your insight while avoiding the problem:

B is the eternal ground: self-existent, undivided consciousness. No will is needed because there is no beginning to relate to - no creation occurring.

In relation to bringing forth a temporal universe, B expresses as will. Will is the mode of relation between ground and creation - not an eternal feature of the ground itself. It is emergent from B

This is B → C: the ground in creative mode.

This accounts for:

The beginning (will activates in relation to creation) Will itself had to begin. The first act of creation then would be WILL.

Your intuition that will is involved

The parsimony of B as the eternal state

C without B fails because eternal will should yield eternal creation. B without C is sufficient but doesn't explain why a beginning occurs. Together they work: B is the ground; C is B relating to the contingent.

My question back to you: Does this preserve what you think is necessary about will, without requiring will to be an eternal attribute of the ground? If not, why must will be essential rather than relational?

[William]

From another thread

Nonetheless, you are correct that natural things cannot explain "the supernatural" whatever "supernatural" means, because supernatural is a belief rather than a fact.

I am correct that natural things cannot explain "the supernatural", because supernatural means not naturally explained by natural law.

Supernatural is therefore neither proven nor disproven as fact by natural means. Therefore, even if a supernatural event is fact, then it still takes faith, since it can't be proven naturally.

Even so, the bible does not explain the natural/natural things by invoking "the supernatural" -

Correct. The record of natural events in the Bible are open to investigation by natural means.

That's why many modern efforts have been made to prove by natural law, science, and evidence, that the heaven and earth are naturally evolved, not supernaturally created.

However, that old pagan cosmology/theology of an uncreated eternally living and intelligent universe, called natural deism, has not been proven. Since natural evolution of life is not proven by any natural facts.

RBD,

Thank you for your continued engagement. I want to take your recent points seriously and respond within the framework I've been developing here in this thread - the Coherent Causality Argument (CCA). I'll summarize it briefly, then show how it applies to our exchange.

The CCA in Brief
The Coherent Causality Argument establishes that the universe requires an eternal necessary cause, and that this cause must be:

Coherent (operating within some consistent framework, even if outside our universe)

Conceptually describable (we can say true things about it)

Not "supernatural" in the strong sense (where "supernatural" means beyond understanding, lawless, intrinsically inexplicable)

The argument distinguishes:

Strong supernaturalism: Cause is wholly beyond understanding, outside any consistent laws, inexplicable in principle → cannot function as an explanation at all

Weak supernaturalism: Cause exists outside our universe but operates by consistent higher-level laws, is conceptually describable → this is functionally identical to what CCA calls "broad naturalism"

If you hold weak supernaturalism, we largely agree on the nature of the cause - the disagreement is merely terminological. If you hold strong supernaturalism, your "explanation" explains nothing.

Applying This to Your Recent Reply
You wrote:

"Supernatural is therefore neither proven nor disproven as fact by natural means. Therefore, even if a supernatural event is fact, then it still takes faith, since it can't be proven naturally."

This raises the question: What kind of "supernatural" do you mean?

If you mean strong supernatural (beyond understanding, lawless, inexplicable), then:

You've defined it as something that cannot, even in principle, be investigated or understood

This means you cannot meaningfully claim it explains anything - including the origin of the universe or the events in the Bible

The Bible's claims, on this view, would be references to something intrinsically beyond comprehension—which raises the question: how can you understand them well enough to affirm them as true?

If you mean weak supernatural (outside our universe but coherent, lawful, describable), then:

This aligns with CCA's "broad naturalism"

The cause is conceptually accessible in principle

The question then becomes: what is its nature? Is it conscious? Personal? How do we know?

The Bible and the CCA
You've argued that the Bible's internal consistency and eyewitness claims make it believable. The CCA doesn't dispute that the Bible contains claims - it asks: What is the nature of the reality those claims point to?

If the God of the Bible is:

Eternal

Necessary

Coherent and conceptually describable (as Scripture presents Him - with attributes, actions, intentions)

The cause of all that exists

...then the CCA's conclusion (an eternal necessary cause that is coherent and describable) is compatible with your position. The question becomes one of identification: given that the CCA establishes a necessary ground, how do we identify it with the God of the Bible rather than, say, an impersonal ground or some other personal conception?

This is where the Bible's claims could function as evidence for identification - but only if the cause is already established as the kind of thing that can be identified through revelation.

My Question to You
To move forward productively, I need you to clarify:

Do you hold strong supernaturalism or weak supernaturalism? Is the God you believe in intrinsically beyond all understanding and law, or is He coherent and describable (as Scripture seems to present Him)?

If weak supernaturalism (which aligns with CCA), on what basis do you identify the necessary ground specifically with the God of the Bible? Does the Bible's internal consistency serve as evidence for this identification, and if so, how?

If strong supernaturalism, how can you claim to know anything about this God - including that He inspired Scripture, that He acted in history, or that His words are true?

Looking forward to your response.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #112]

Will is only necessary in relation to creating. Creating implies a beginning - something that wasn't there before. Before any beginning, there is no creation occurring. Therefore, before any creativity, will is not necessary.

This suggests will cannot be an essential attribute of the eternal ground itself.

A will doesn’t have to create, so the lack of creation doesn’t suggest that will can’t be an essential attribute of the eternal ground. My arguments (if true) show that it has to be an essential attribute of an eternal ground of a temporal reality.

If will were essential and eternally present, the conditions for creation would be eternally present - and as you note, the effect (the universe) should then be eternal. But it's not. The universe began.

All of the conditions are not eternally present because a person doesn’t have to act on their will. The act is not forced but free and is, therefore, not an eternal condition.

Here's an alternative that preserves your insight while avoiding the problem:

B is the eternal ground: self-existent, undivided consciousness. No will is needed because there is no beginning to relate to - no creation occurring.

In relation to bringing forth a temporal universe, B expresses as will. Will is the mode of relation between ground and creation - not an eternal feature of the ground itself. It is emergent from B

This is B → C: the ground in creative mode.

This accounts for:

The beginning (will activates in relation to creation) Will itself had to begin. The first act of creation then would be WILL.

I think the problem remains. If the will had a beginning, it couldn’t be the result of an impersonal ground because all of the conditions were eternally present and would result in an eternal will, not a created will.













So we have a problem for Model C: an eternal will with no object, no creation, no "before" to act within. What does "will" even mean in that context?

Here's an alternative that preserves your insight while avoiding the problem:

B is the eternal ground: self-existent, undivided consciousness. No will is needed because there is no beginning to relate to - no creation occurring.

In relation to bringing forth a temporal universe, B expresses as will. Will is the mode of relation between ground and creation - not an eternal feature of the ground itself. It is emergent from B

This is B → C: the ground in creative mode.

This accounts for:

The beginning (will activates in relation to creation) Will itself had to begin. The first act of creation then would be WILL.

Your intuition that will is involved

The parsimony of B as the eternal state

C without B fails because eternal will should yield eternal creation. B without C is sufficient but doesn't explain why a beginning occurs. Together they work: B is the ground; C is B relating to the contingent.

My question back to you: Does this preserve what you think is necessary about will, without requiring will to be an eternal attribute of the ground? If not, why must will be essential rather than relational?
[/quote]

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #114]

A will doesn’t have to create, so the lack of creation doesn’t suggest that will can’t be an essential attribute of the eternal ground. My arguments (if true) show that it has to be an essential attribute of an eternal ground of a temporal reality.

You need to show why this is impossible, or why will must be essential rather than relational.

All of the conditions are not eternally present because a person doesn’t have to act on their will. The act is not forced but free and is, therefore, not an eternal condition.

This doesn't address the B→C model—it just defends classical theism's solution to the same puzzle (Augustine's "eternal will, temporal creation via free choice").

The problem: Your defense still assumes will is essential. I am offering an alternative where will isn't essential but emerges relationally. You haven't engaged that alternative at all.

I think the problem remains. If the will had a beginning, it couldn’t be the result of an impersonal ground because all of the conditions were eternally present and would result in an eternal will, not a created will.

That is the standard free will defense: God's will is eternal, but the decision to create is a free act not necessitated by His nature, so creation can be temporal despite an eternal will.

But this assumes what I am questioning: that will is essential and eternal. My B→C model offers a more parsimonious alternative - will itself begins with the idea of creating. No need to posit eternal will plus "mysterious free decision". Just: ground + relation to creation = will emerges as first beginning.

You need to explain why eternal will is necessary rather than relational will. "Free will" doesn't answer that—it just describes how eternal will supposedly operates.

The free will defense just labels the mystery - it doesn't explain how an eternal will produces a temporal effect. It asserts "free choice" as the bridge, but that's just strong supernaturalism by another name: an inexplicable causal gap.

CCA's criterion is coherence and explanatory power. "Eternal will + free decision" fails both:

Coherence: If all conditions (including will) are eternally present, why isn't the effect eternal? "Freedom" doesn't resolve the category violation - it just names it.

Explanatory power: It explains nothing; it merely asserts a strong supernatural exception.

The B→C model actually explains: will is the first beginning itself. No gap, no mystery, no supernatural exception. Just ground + relation = emergence.

Your position now requires you to defend why supernatural assertion is preferable to coherent explanation. Especially since you have already agreed that any explanation MUST be naturally coherent.

Another thing to consider is that in this case the Creative will DID create this universe so saying it didn't need to also has to provide a reason for why it DID if it didn't need to - something which CCA can explore coherently...

The free will defense just pushes the question back: if the eternal will didn't need to create, why did it? "Freedom" isn't an answer—it's just a placeholder for "no reason."

CCA can explore this coherently: if will emerges relationally as the first beginning, then the "reason" for creation is simply that the ground, in its nature, expresses as creative will. No gap between "could have not created" and "did create"—the expression is the creation.

Your current model leaves an inexplicable gap between eternal will and temporal act. My model has no gap - the act is the will, beginning.

So, please this time defend your position rather than just restate it.

[RBD]

RBD,

Thank you for your continued engagement. I want to take your recent points seriously and respond within the framework I've been developing here in this thread - the Coherent Causality Argument (CCA). I'll summarize it briefly, then show how it applies to our exchange.

Sorry I took so long to get back to the site. Hope you're still there.

The CCA in Brief
The Coherent Causality Argument establishes that the universe requires an eternal necessary cause, and that this cause must be:

Coherent (operating within some consistent framework, even if outside our universe)

Conceptually describable (we can say true things about it)

There two causes for a natural universe:
1. A finite natural universe created by an eternal intelligent Creator. Bible God.
2. An uncreated eternal living and intelligent natural universe. Pagan deism.

Strong supernaturalism: Cause is wholly beyond understanding, outside any consistent laws, inexplicable in principle → cannot function as an explanation at all

Or rather, strong delusion: a wholly imagined self-made illusion. Such as universal mysticism, transcendentalism, metaphysical infinity, etc...Or. just good ol' Timothy O'leary LSD trip.

Weak supernaturalism: Cause exists outside our universe but operates by consistent higher-level laws, is conceptually describable → this is functionally identical to what CCA calls "broad naturalism"

This isn't supernaturalism at all, but rather as you say broad naturalism.

Standard supernaturalism is what cannot be explained by natural law, nor defined by natural means. The supernatural is not a 'greater' naturalism. The Bible calls it the spiritual kingdom, that is wholly separate from the natural universe. The spiritual things have nothing to do with the natural things.

Jhn 3:6
That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.


Now, if you mean that the creating intelligent Spirit can be discerned by the fact of an orderly universe operating by fixed laws, then the Bible says as much:

Psa 19:1
The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handywork.

Rom 1:20
For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead;

However, that does not make the intelligent Spirit's creation a weak supernaturalism. It's simply the supernatural creating the natural. As well as sustaining the universe by supernatural power, and operating within the natural universe by supernatural intervention:

Heb 1:3
Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power,...

Heb 1:1
God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, Hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds;

However, if you are speaking of a natural power of will and understanding, in order to conceive and commune with the eternal Divinity, then that's back to strong delusion.

2 Pe 1:21
For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man: but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

Jhn 1:12
But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name. Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.

If a natural universe can conceive and act by it's own intelligence, or 'waking up' to it's own intelligent power, then we're back to the pagan deism of an uncreated natural universe 'broadened' into it's own supernatural being: The Universal Mind, the primordial gods and nature spirits. A nature-centered spiritual path to eternal being. The uncreated universe, and all things therein are eternally divine.

The Bible God reasons intelligently, that a natural creation cannot possibly 'become supernatural' through natural will and reason alone.

1Co 2:14
But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.

The only way for man living in natural body to discern the spiritual things, and fellowship with the Divine God, is by God's revelation to man, not by man's 'broadening' his own spiritual horizons by personal will alone. Such as the Buddha's blow out through diligent meditation, and natural control over the body.

I suppose Aristotle's Universal Mind, is the closest effort to intersect the natural with the supernatural, as a weak supernaturalism by broadened natural philosophy?

The question then becomes: what is its nature? Is it conscious? Personal? How do we know?

The Creator's nature is spiritual and divine. The created universe is natural and mortal. The natural cannot become the spiritual:

1Co 15:50
Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption.

And we know the Creator must be a conscious person, because we are conscious people. We did not create ourselves, nor create our Creator.

This is why there are only two options: The Creator creating the temporal natural universe, and man in His intelligent image. Or, an uncreated living and thinking natural universal being.

While something natural can be created out of nothing, intelligence cannot create itself from nothing.

The Bible and the CCA
You've argued that the Bible's internal consistency and eyewitness claims make it believable.

The unerring consistency of Bible Scripture makes the unprovable supernatural claims believable. Which also includes the unerring provable record of natural events.

Show any error in the Bible text, or recorded event, and the supernatural claims can be dismissed. The Book is not Authored the eternally perfect God and Creator of all things.

The CCA doesn't dispute that the Bible contains claims - it asks: What is the nature of the reality those claims point to?

The supernatural claims all point to the Author being the LORD God Almighty.

given that the CCA establishes a necessary ground, how do we identify it with the God of the Bible rather than, say, an impersonal ground or some other personal conception?

An impersonal cause is impossible, with personal beings present.

A personal conception of God once again, is only the personal imaginings of the natural mind and will seeking to 'transcend' the natural to the supernatural. To personally escape the natural boundaries of mortal flesh and blood.

If they were true, then the person could leave the natural body at will, and/or the person to could live in the natural body forever.

The former is attempted by natural techniques already described, and the latter has never happened on this earth.

[William]

[Replying to RBD in post #116]

CCA doesn't advocate impersonality. It just refuses to smuggle personality in via strong supernaturalism. Personhood, if attributable, must be established through further reasoning—not assumed because the alternative is "pagan deism."

This binary (Biblical God vs. pagan deism) is a false one. CCA occupies different ground: the nature of the cause is something to be investigated, not assumed at the outset or hand-waved away as "beyond human ability to comprehend"

If a creator person cannot be comprehended, then it may as well be a deist god. Since the Bible presents the creator as a conscious entity which can interact with humans and appears to want humans to understand him, clearly the bible portrays that entity as understandable. Thus the very definition of strong supernaturalism works against that logic, which is what the CCA is investigating...

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #115]

A will doesn’t have to create, so the lack of creation doesn’t suggest that will can’t be an essential attribute of the eternal ground. My arguments (if true) show that it has to be an essential attribute of an eternal ground of a temporal reality.

You need to show why this is impossible, or why will must be essential rather than relational.

Show why what is impossible?

You gave an argument that (if my critiques are true) wrongly asserted that a lack of creating would show that will isn’t an essential attribute. I have given arguments that (if true) show that personal agency would need to be a part of the cause of the temporal reality we see.

I think the problem remains. If the will had a beginning, it couldn’t be the result of an impersonal ground because all of the conditions were eternally present and would result in an eternal will, not a created will.

That is the standard free will defense: God's will is eternal, but the decision to create is a free act not necessitated by His nature, so creation can be temporal despite an eternal will.

But this assumes what I am questioning: that will is essential and eternal. My B→C model offers a more parsimonious alternative - will itself begins with the idea of creating. No need to posit eternal will plus "mysterious free decision". Just: ground + relation to creation = will emerges as first beginning.

The free will defense has nothing to do with this part, it is a pure analysis of your model. In your model, will is a creation and has a beginning, but the conditions for that creation are all eternally present, meaning the effect would be eternally present as well, meaning the personal agency of the ground would have to be eternal. Model B conflicts with that truth and is, therefore, false.

Free will does matter for Model C, as all the conditions would not be eternally present, conceivably allowing for a temporal effect from an eternal cause. But that doesn’t mean anything until we have evidence of the temporal effect. Only at that point do we get an argument that moves from a temporal effect to the conclusion of will being essentially part of the eternal source. It’s a conclusion, not an assumption, so you’ve got to show the flaws in the premises.

The free will defense just labels the mystery - it doesn't explain how an eternal will produces a temporal effect. It asserts "free choice" as the bridge, but that's just strong supernaturalism by another name: an inexplicable causal gap.

That it produces a temporal effect is what is needed to be explained here, not any intricacies of how it works. But I’m also not sure why how it works is a mystery or inexplicable unless one assumes a naturalistic pattern that should be followed.

Another thing to consider is that in this case the Creative will DID create this universe so saying it didn't need to also has to provide a reason for why it DID if it didn't need to - something which CCA can explore coherently...

The free will defense just pushes the question back: if the eternal will didn't need to create, why did it? "Freedom" isn't an answer—it's just a placeholder for "no reason."

The free will defense doesn’t push that question back because it isn’t trying to answer that question in the first place; that’s just a different question.

Sure, Model B provides the reason will creates, but can’t account for the temporal nature of the will or the creation. The Bible says the eternal ground chose to create out of love.

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #118]

You're asserting eternal will solves the problem. I've shown why eternal will creates its own problems.

If will is eternal and essential, the conditions for creation are eternally present

Therefore, creation should be eternal (as he himself argues in his will-based premise)

But creation is not eternal—the universe began

Conclusion: Eternal will leads to contradiction unless creation is eternal

Your "free will" response doesn't solve this - it just asserts that an eternal will can "choose" without explaining how a timeless being makes a temporal choice without change

Now you need to explain how an eternal will with no temporal framework produces a temporal effect without change or incoherence. Not just assert it - explain it.

What is the positive argument that personhood and will are necessary attributes of the conscious ground itself, rather than contingent features of its manifestations?

How does an eternal will with no temporal framework produce a temporal universe without change or incoherence?

Breaking this down:

No temporal framework = no "before" or "after" for the will to act within

Produce a temporal universe = bring about something with a beginning

Without change = the will itself doesn't alter (since eternal)

Without incoherence = without logical contradiction

The puzzle: If will is eternal and unchanging, and the universe began, then either:

The will was always willing creation (so universe eternal)

The will was not always willing creation (so will changed)

The will's action is somehow both eternal and temporal (incoherent)

You need to explain which it is and how it avoids the problem.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #119]

If will (i.e, personal agency) is eternal and essential, the conditions for creation are not eternally present because one condition for creation is the willing agent deciding to act. That decision is the added condition.

An additional question is whether this decision to create is a change in the nature of the being or simply a relational change. A relational change being like how I am no longer taller than my son, not because of any change in me but because of a change in him. But that question seems irrelevant here because even if the eternal being becomes temporal at the moment of its act of creation, it was still non-temporal in its state as the cause. Perhaps once it causes the temporal effect it also causes itself to become temporal rather than its initial timeless state, but that’s irrelevant to what we’ve been talking about.

Regardless of whether you accept this explanation (not just an assertion), you still need to show why your model doesn’t produce an eternal will and an eternal spatiotemporal universe.