How can the univese exist without God to create it?

[EarthScienceguy]

Explain the existence of the universe without God to create it.
In other words, how can the universe be shown to come into existence empirically without God to create it?

The basic building block of the universe is energy. We do not even know what energy in its most basic form is.

There is a fact, or if you wish, a law, governing all natural phenomena that are known to date. There is no known exception to this law – it is exact so far as we know. The law is called the conservation of energy. It states that there is a certain quantity, which we call energy, that does not change in manifold changes which nature undergoes. That is a most abstract idea, because it is a mathematical principle; it says that there is a numerical quantity which does not change when something happens. It is not a description of a mechanism, or anything concrete; it is just a strange fact that we can calculate some number and when we finish watching nature go through her tricks and calculate the number again, it is the same.

— The Feynman Lectures on Physics

[William]

[Replying to Haven in post #154]

Recall that atheism is simply the lack of assent to god claims, not the positive assertion that no gods exist.

Is this to say then, that those who positively assert that no gods exist, are NOT atheists? If they are not atheists, what are they?

Those who positively assert that no gods exist* would be strong atheists or positive atheists. That’s a distinct, somewhat faith-based philosophical position, although I think it’s pretty reasonable given the overwhelming evidence against religious claims.

*In a lifetime of religious practice (since abandoned), discussion and debate, I’ve only met one person who held this position. The vast majority of philosophically informed atheists are weak atheists.

If you think it’s pretty reasonable given the overwhelming evidence against religious claims to hold the "strong/positive" atheist position, why not hold that one?

[Haven]

If you think it’s pretty reasonable given the overwhelming evidence against religious claims to hold the "strong/positive" atheist position, why not hold that one?

Because I don’t do faith and I want to account for the possibility that I might be wrong.

My epistemology is probabilistic and evidence-based. There are many things I have a high degree of certainty about, and others that I have some certainty about, and others that I’m unsure of or reject, and these distinctions are based on the level of evidence. Theistic claims have not met their burden of proof, so it is rational to reject them (more technically, to fail to reject the null hypothesis). But to definitively claim “there are no gods,” I would either need to search the totality of that which exists or rule out all “gods*” by logical necessity, and I can’t do that.

You seem really desperate to assign me to a position of faith, and I’m just not cooperating .

*the term is vague to begin with. What, exactly, defines a god? Different religions have vastly different claims about what this word means.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Difflugia in post #151]

On the null hypothesis

This is a statistical concept. It represents the status quo when testing new proposed relationships between variables. That depends on at least causal regularity because it relies on the stability of probabilities across time and conditions. To apply this to the discussion of the truth of the causal principle itself is a category error. And that error leads to begging the metaphysical question concerning the causal principle.

On quantum events possibly being uncaused

You are right, this thread can be answered by showing mere logical possibility. I think our beliefs should be stronger than that, but that’s all that this thread is asking for. Yes, it’s logically possible that quantum events have no efficient cause, so that if there is an eternal quantum field, it could have a fluctuation. So, let’s explore that further.

The quantum field is still the cause (reason, explanation) of the fluctuation in what ancients called the material cause sense. It’s the conditions of the quantum field that allow for the quantum event to take place. Without that field, no fluctuations.

So, we have an impersonal, eternal cause producing a temporal effect. It seems to me that the eternal cause would have to be timeless in order to make this work. I think a temporally eternal entity is logically impossible, as it is in infinite regress. But a quantum field is a physical thing with physical properties, including being temporal, isn’t it?

On the Kalam

Depending on how you mean that, it might be true, but that doesn't actually oppose my argument. My argument is that empirical falsifiability is necessary for a statement to be meaningful.

What do you mean by ‘meaningful’?

That statement is also self-defeating, as it’s not empirically falsifiable, so it would itself be a meaningless statement.

I don't know what you mean by "philosophical means."

That the Kalam is falsifiable (at least) by showing weaknesses in the philosophical reasons it uses.

Without a way to test Craig's rebuttal, P1 of the KCA might be true and it might not be. That's the only information that we can possibly know about it. That means that in a state of actual nothingness, we have no information about whether quantum fluctuations happen, with or without causes. Craig's certainly incredulous about uncaused events, but that's not worth very much to me.

His point is that quantum fluctuations require the existence of the quantum field, which is not a state of actual nothingness. Fluctuations require something already existing. That’s why they are not a counter example of P1. We don’t need to test a ‘nothing’ to come to that conclusion, because we are able to experimentally see where quantum fluctuations actually come from and it’s not uncaused from nothing. If there is something that comes from nothing, it is something else than these quantum events. Calling those things “quantum events” is an equivocation that makes this option sound more reasonable because we accept that quantum events exist, but this is misleading.

[William]

If you think it’s pretty reasonable given the overwhelming evidence against religious claims to hold the "strong/positive" atheist position, why not hold that one?

Because I don’t do faith and I want to account for the possibility that I might be wrong.

Agnostic agnostic, yes...?

My epistemology is probabilistic and evidence-based.

Same here, yet you are agnostic atheist and I am agnostic gnosis - which signifies that the same evidence we both have is treated differently.

There are many things I have a high degree of certainty about, and others that I have some certainty about, and others that I’m unsure of or reject, and these distinctions are based on the level of evidence.

Therein, the differences will include ones degrees of certainty re ones personal experiences and where those lead one...

Theistic claims have not met their burden of proof, so it is rational to reject them (more technically, to fail to reject the null hypothesis).

I consider theistic claims to include OOBE and NDE reports alongside everything to do with consciousness - both the mystery and the working out that mystery...

But to definitively claim “there are no gods,” I would either need to search the totality of that which exists or rule out all “gods*” by logical necessity, and I can’t do that.

No one can rule out a creator/creators. I think this is where atheism builds its wall. It also rules out "we exist within a creation" because this implies "gods"...

You seem really desperate to assign me to a position of faith, and I’m just not cooperating .

Based on the evidence, I think you misinterpret. I am not interested in assigning anyone any position, faith or not.
Why I question is because I want to understand your position (where you are coming from) clearly.

*the term is vague to begin with. What, exactly, defines a god? Different religions have vastly different claims about what this word means.

Precisely my argument. It is not about "gods" but about whether we exist within a created thing, or not. I am unconvinced atheism as a position has any say in that. Sure, they can argue about "gods" but it seems that they have no argument about being within a created thing - and no evidence to support that we do or do not.

[Difflugia]

On the null hypothesis

This is a statistical concept. It represents the status quo when testing new proposed relationships between variables. That depends on at least causal regularity because it relies on the stability of probabilities across time and conditions. To apply this to the discussion of the truth of the causal principle itself is a category error. And that error leads to begging the metaphysical question concerning the causal principle.

Read that to yourself again. You're trying to justify "the causal principle" by asserting that the causal principle can't be a variable (or relationship between variables?). Whether the question is metaphysical or not, that's begging it.

We have data. You keep trying to explain why speculation is somehow superior to straightforward conclusions drawn from the data. That's apologetics in a nutshell.

On quantum events possibly being uncaused

You are right, this thread can be answered by showing mere logical possibility. I think our beliefs should be stronger than that, but that’s all that this thread is asking for. Yes, it’s logically possible that quantum events have no efficient cause, so that if there is an eternal quantum field, it could have a fluctuation. So, let’s explore that further.

The quantum field is still the cause (reason, explanation) of the fluctuation in what ancients called the material cause sense. It’s the conditions of the quantum field that allow for the quantum event to take place. Without that field, no fluctuations.

Is that what Craig's P1 means? Material causation? So, anything that happens in the presence of the quantum field requires the quantum field?

If we assume that there's a quantum field, the quantum field isn't external to the universe. That tells us nothing about things that happen (or begin to happen or whatever) outside the presence of the quantum field, like the universe itself.

So, we have an impersonal, eternal cause producing a temporal effect.

If the quantum field exists, it came into existence either at the moment of the Big Bang or very slightly afterward, so it's not eternal.

It seems to me that the eternal cause would have to be timeless in order to make this work. I think a temporally eternal entity is logically impossible, as it is in infinite regress. But a quantum field is a physical thing with physical properties, including being temporal, isn’t it?

Sure. If there's a cause, then it's eternal. Since eternal things are apparently a logical impossibility, there are no causes. QED. Unless we postulate that there's an eternal entity that isn't temporal, whatever that means, which I guess passes your sniff test and isn't special pleading at all.

On the Kalam

Depending on how you mean that, it might be true, but that doesn't actually oppose my argument. My argument is that empirical falsifiability is necessary for a statement to be meaningful.

What do you mean by ‘meaningful’?

That it gives us some sort of information. You asked me if I thought a statement that isn't falsifiable can also be true. It can. If a statement isn't falsifiable, though, we can have no information about whether it's true. If we omnisciently posit that a particular unfalsifiable statement is true, then someone that's not omniscient can't actually know if it's true or not. In that case, we have a true statement that gives us no information.

That statement is also self-defeating, as it’s not empirically falsifiable, so it would itself be a meaningless statement.

Maybe. Let me check my navel and get back to you.

I don't know what you mean by "philosophical means."

That the Kalam is falsifiable (at least) by showing weaknesses in the philosophical reasons it uses.

That's not what falsifiable generally means. If logical (or philosophical) consistency is enough to declare something falsifiable, then the falsifiability discussion becomes much different.

His point is that quantum fluctuations require the existence of the quantum field, which is not a state of actual nothingness. Fluctuations require something already existing. That’s why they are not a counter example of P1. We don’t need to test a ‘nothing’ to come to that conclusion, because we are able to experimentally see where quantum fluctuations actually come from

The bolded part of your statement isn't true.

and it’s not uncaused from nothing. If there is something that comes from nothing, it is something else than these quantum events. Calling those things “quantum events” is an equivocation that makes this option sound more reasonable because we accept that quantum events exist, but this is misleading.

The equivocation is on what you and Craig mean by "cause." My understanding of the P1 that we've been discussing is that "cause" is what you've been referring to as "efficient cause." That's the case in which quantum events appear to happen without a cause and P1 is false. If, as you seem to mean right now, "uncaused from nothing" includes what you've been calling "material cause," then we can only know if P1 is true within this universe, where nothing is ever outside the presence of your material cause. Since the syllogism is supposed to tell us about something that happened outside of the quantum field and can't in principle, it's meaningless. This is what I've been telling you. The KCA is either invalid or meaningless.

[EarthScienceguy]

[Replying to Difflugia in post #0]

Thank you, wow! And this is why it is a problem, because there are no theories that start off with low entropy that the mathematics do not produce Boltzmann brains.

That's not true, either. A number of cosmologists have proposed mechanisms by which low-entropy initial states far outnumber high-entropy ones. This isn't the first time I've had a similar conversation here.

I said the only cosmologies that will work have to have low-entropy initial states. That is actually another problem. Why is the initial state of the universe so low? And even if it is low, there is the Boltzmann Brain paradox.

Here is the problem

Let us first formulate the problem precisely in the current framework. Suppose that some “observation” is made. This requires us to take prior condition A to be classes of information processing occurring in spacetime in some physical form (which includes firings of neural signals in a human brain). We then take condition B to be that these “observations” find some ordered pattern (e.g. the sight “seen” by this process is an ordered world obeying regular rules). The Boltzmann brain problem arises if we obtain P(B|A) ≪ 1. Since the world we (or I/you) see is ordered, such a result would contradict observations.

Yasunori, Nomura. "Physical Theories, Eternal Inflation, and the Quantum Universe." Journal of High Energy Physics 2011, no. 11 (11, 2011): 39.

What this is saying is that the probability of event B occurring (observations with an ordered pattern), given that event A (A physical entity making an observation) has already happened, is very small. According to positivism, the number of observers should be lower than the number of observations. Yasunori makes the same statement you did, that "such a result would contradict observation." Yasunori, or you would never know if you were a Boltzmann brain or not. An individual entity existing in a finite time and place is a Christian belief. God made "man" and placed him in an ordered finite space. Nothing in positivism predicts Man in an ordered or low entropy environment.

Positivism would predict order from chaos.
Christianity would predict chaos from what was once ordered.
Observation would say that Christianity is correct and positivism is falsified. But don't mind me, “I am nothing more than an undigested bit of beef, a blot of mustard, a crumb of cheese, a fragment of underdone potato. There's more of gravy than of grave about me, whatever I am in that Boltzmann brain of yours!” Just wish me away. Well, no, you can't because Boltzmann brains do not have free will; their thoughts are already determined. What are the fundamental constants of nature producing in that brain today? I will remember that it is not really you talking, but the fundamental constants of nature talking. There I go again, forgetting that I am not real.

[EarthScienceguy]

[Replying to William in post #0]

The Boltzmann brain paradox is a thought experiment from physics, not a literal theory, used to test cosmological models. It highlights a statistical problem: in an eternally old, high-entropy universe, random fluctuations make it exponentially more probable for a single, conscious brain with false memories (a "Boltzmann brain") to form than the complex, ordered universe we observe.

A Paradox is a contradictory statement, and in this case, it is of reality. In most cases, it is of reality. It is a theory of what occurs when a universe is created at low entropy. May want to lay off the AI.

As for the rest of your post, you may have been watching too many reruns of The Matrix or something. We are physically real beings that exist individually. And the only way to be individual beings is for a creator God to create the beings.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Difflugia in post #165]

Okay, let me arrange this in a helpful way (for my mind at least) and let's make sure we are understanding each other. The overarching question is: why is there a physical universe at all? The default answer, I think, is "I don't know". This thread seems to have been created to analyze proposed atheistic answers to the question.

One level of this question regards whether there is a logically possible atheistic answer. Difflugia, you seem to me to be saying that since we don't know that quantum events are caused, the possibility that the universe is also uncaused and no god exists is still logically possible. I agree.

If you want to end things there, okay, but you would probably also agree that some theistic answers are also logically possible. And, so, we are still at the default "I don't know" answer to the question. I think our beliefs should go beyond logical possibility, though, so I'd like to go further in our analysis.

On the null hypothesis

This is a statistical concept. It represents the status quo when testing new proposed relationships between variables. That depends on at least causal regularity because it relies on the stability of probabilities across time and conditions. To apply this to the discussion of the truth of the causal principle itself is a category error. And that error leads to begging the metaphysical question concerning the causal principle.

Read that to yourself again. You're trying to justify "the causal principle" by asserting that the causal principle can't be a variable (or relationship between variables?). Whether the question is metaphysical or not, that's begging it.

We have data. You keep trying to explain why speculation is somehow superior to straightforward conclusions drawn from the data. That's apologetics in a nutshell.

I'm saying you can't support rejection of the causal principle (as more than a logical possibility) by saying "there is no cause" is the null hypothesis. Doing so misapplies the conceptual tool of 'null hypothesis,' which itself works within causal regularity.

The data we have is not that quantum events are uncaused, but that they may be uncaused. Building another conclusion (such as that it's likely the universe was uncaused) would be speculation. And so would building God's creation of the universe off of the mere possibility that quantum events are caused. I'm saying we should go beyond speculation, if we can.

One atheistic attempt that tries to go beyond logical possibility that I've seen (and mistakenly thought you and/or Haven were trying to offer as such) is that there was an eternal quantum field and our bubble fluctuated from that. Here are your thoughts on it:

If we assume that there's a quantum field, the quantum field isn't external to the universe. That tells us nothing about things that happen (or begin to happen or whatever) outside the presence of the quantum field, like the universe itself.

I agree and my critique was moving towards showing why I think the same, so it seems we are on the same page here.

So, I'm left wanting a specific atheistic answer to the overarching question. Yes, there may be one and it's just a mystery. I can understand an atheist saying this is the most rational position because the rest of the balance of the theism vs. atheism debate is overwhelmingly on the atheistic sid in spite of not having a specific theory here. Just like I could understand a theist saying theism is still the most rational even though they don't have a good explanation on one particular question. But I still want to explore individual explanations to see if there are good ones to strengthen one side or the other.

----------

As to the Kalam as an answer, you seem to be saying that if something is unfalsifiable, then while it may be true, we couldn't know if it is true, which makes it meaningless. I think the Kalam is falsifiable.

I don't know what you mean by "philosophical means."

That the Kalam is falsifiable (at least) by showing weaknesses in the philosophical reasons it uses.

That's not what falsifiable generally means. If logical (or philosophical) consistency is enough to declare something falsifiable, then the falsifiability discussion becomes much different.

I don't mean that the Kalam is falsifiable simply because it is logically consistent. You could show that there are things that begin to exist uncaused (not just possibly, but actually so). You could show that the universe didn't begin to exist. You could show that P4 is false via defeating the arguments given in support of it.

If this isn't being falsifiable, then why not?

The equivocation is on what you and Craig mean by "cause." My understanding of the P1 that we've been discussing is that "cause" is what you've been referring to as "efficient cause." That's the case in which quantum events appear to happen without a cause and P1 is false.

P1 does not pick out efficient causation alone, but uses 'cause' more generally within the metaphysical causal principle. The conditions of the quantum vacuum are required for the fluctuations to take place, even if they occur randomly. Take the vacuum away and, logically, there won't be fluctuations from it. The vacuum is a necessary cause in that sense (and the ancients named that kind of cause a 'material' cause).

His point is that quantum fluctuations require the existence of the quantum field, which is not a state of actual nothingness. Fluctuations require something already existing. That’s why they are not a counter example of P1. We don’t need to test a ‘nothing’ to come to that conclusion, because we are able to experimentally see where quantum fluctuations actually come from

The bolded part of your statement isn't true.

It's not true if you are talking about efficient cause, but it's true if you are understanding and using 'cause' in the more general sense that the Kalam does.

If, as you seem to mean right now, "uncaused from nothing" includes what you've been calling "material cause," then we can only know if P1 is true within this universe, where nothing is ever outside the presence of your material cause. Since the syllogism is supposed to tell us about something that happened outside of the quantum field and can't in principle, it's meaningless. This is what I've been telling you. The KCA is either invalid or meaningless.

This conflates empirical causality with the metaphysical causal principle. If immaterial things began to exist, the causal principle would say those things also need a cause. That means it isn't just constrained to things within our physical universe. While it may be untrue, it isn't meaningless.

It seems to me that the eternal cause would have to be timeless in order to make this work. I think a temporally eternal entity is logically impossible, as it is in infinite regress. But a quantum field is a physical thing with physical properties, including being temporal, isn’t it?

Sure. If there's a cause, then it's eternal. Since eternal things are apparently a logical impossibility, there are no causes. QED. Unless we postulate that there's an eternal entity that isn't temporal, whatever that means, which I guess passes your sniff test and isn't special pleading at all.

We may be talking past each other a bit here. Why do you think eternal things are a logical impossibility? I agree that one sense of 'eternal thing' is logically impossible (temporal things existing for an actual infinite amount of time), but not another sense (things existing outside of time). To avoid an infinite regress there has to be a timelessly eternal thing. This isn't special pleading, but logical analysis of the concepts themselves.

[William]

[Replying to EarthScienceguy in post #167]

We are physically real beings that exist individually. And the only way to be individual beings is for a creator God to create the beings.

Nonetheless, and despite your personal comments - there is no difference between existing in a created thing and existing in a simulation.

Correctly, most THINK they are physically real beings and yes - their subjective experience is unique to themselves BUT the billions of unique experiences are still involved with a collective shared reality.
The "beings" are simply a human experience and this creates human personalities which can be harvested and inserted into other simulations (think "Heaven" et all) and while we appear to agree that we exist within a created thing, we disagree as to what that actually means.

The created things are temporal - further adding support that these can be understood as "simulations" which are experienced as real because that which is experiencing them is what is actually real.

Perhaps you are confused about the idea of simulations re your mention of "The Matrix" - which in itself is a fictional representation which need not be taken seriously even that it might be loosely modelled on religious mythologies.

So we are not so much "physically real beings" as we are real beings (consciousness) having an experience of what we think of as a physical experience and which is temporary at that. We think this way because the simulation is that good and because we entered into it willingly even that we understood that any prior experience would be exempt from our immediate awareness, while undertaking the experience.

It can even be argued that WE created this simulation for that very purpose - to allow us to forget what we were prior to entering it for the experience and that in doing so we could effective grow personalities which were genuine rather than contrived, and that the whole operation being temporary - would allow us to return to the fullness of the knowledge of our prior selves WITH the addition of the grown human personality.

This would mean that, although we exist within a created thing, the creators of that thing, are the "God" that created that thing.

[Difflugia]

I said the only cosmologies that will work have to have low-entropy initial states.

I don't know that you said it before now, but it's the one thing you've said here that's true.

That is actually another problem.

No, that's the single problem that we've been discussing for some time.

Why is the initial state of the universe so low? And even if it is low, there is the Boltzmann Brain paradox.

They are one and the same. The problem is that all else being equal, high-entropy states vastly outnumber low-entropy states. One solution offered is that given an eternity in which to fluctuate, a dynamic high-entropy state will eventually, through random chance alone, pass through a low-entropy state. From that low-entropy state, the Big Bang (or something like it) can occur, leading thence to the normal evolution of a universe like ours.

The Boltzmann brain paradox is that if that's our solution, then Boltzmann brains are vastly more likely, just through random chance, than low-entropy states ready for a Big Bang. The key is to figure out why all else isn't equal, so we can find a better and more satisfying solution.

What this is saying

No. What you wrote has absolutely nothing to do with what this is saying.

What Yasunori wrote is that we'll take as given that we already have an observer. If the further probability that the observer sees an ordered universe like ours is much less than 100%, then Boltzmann brains are a problem.

In other words, a satisfying cosmology should predict that the vast majority of universes evolve from low entropy to high entropy. The one that relies on random chance to evolve a low-entropy state out of a high-entropy one doesn't predict that, so the solution is unsatisfying. In such a cosmology, Boltzmann brains will statistically be much, much more likely than universes like the one we know and love.

The Boltzmann brain paradox is a thought experiment from physics, not a literal theory, used to test cosmological models. It highlights a statistical problem: in an eternally old, high-entropy universe, random fluctuations make it exponentially more probable for a single, conscious brain with false memories (a "Boltzmann brain") to form than the complex, ordered universe we observe.

May want to lay off the AI.

William's AI has a much better handle on what's going on here than you do.