The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

[For_The_Kingdom]

Most of us agree with P1? Well, I went back and did a count - 4 out of 13 people accepted P1, one of whom have since stated he changed his mind. Granted it is sometimes hard to tell if someone is accepting or rejecting P1 if they don't explicitly states so, but it's pretty conclusive that it is not most of us.

Ok, so before this thread was posted, how many of you can honestly say that prior to this thread, your contention was that "God cannot possibly exist?"

Most of you had no problem at least accepting that it is POSSIBLE for God to exist...but now, since you realize the implications of such a statement, now it is cool to just deny the possibility altogether, which means that the argument is definitely working...and that is obvious that it is working if you have to adjust to it, as opposed to the argument adjusting to you.

Besides, regardless of how many us agree with P1, if you accepted that you didn't give support to P1, and the whole thing hinges on that unsupported premise, then my original counter-argument holds - the Modal Ontological Argument is question begging, and depends entirely on defining God as a necessary being.

I've already supported the notion that all possible necessary truths must be actually true, and I haven't see anything that has under-minded that FACT as of yet.

Once you admit that God possibly exists, you are stuck like chuck, with no way out.

[Inigo Montoya]

[Replying to For_The_Kingdom]



Straightforward, direct question.

Why is the conclusion (God) necessary besides you defining it to be such?

Where is it demonstrated its existence is necessary apart from you just saying so?

[For_The_Kingdom]

So earlier, you said that an MGB can time travel. It would be one of the abilities you would give to an MGB.
But now it can't? Now it can't change the future?
Besides, changing the future is NOT logically absurd. There are many modes of thought devoted to that subject. Such as the multiverse hypothesis (why does the word multiverse ring a bell? Why is it I have this strange feeling someone I know has been talking about it all week?)

The point is; God cannot change something that he already knows will happen. If God knows that you will be born on 2-5-78, then there is nothing that can happen that will change what God already knows.

The future only reflects what God knows will happen.

[For_The_Kingdom]

[quote="Blastcat"

Hi, For_The_Kingdom [/quote]

Hola.

[quote="Blastcat"
But agreeing that P1 is true doesn't DO much if we can ALSO agree that the OPPOSITE of P1 is true. [/quote]

A necessary proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true as equally as it can be possibly necessary false. If it is possibly necessarily true, then it cannot even potentially be possibly necessarily false.

[quote="Blastcat"
There is a possible world where MGB exists
There is a possible world where MGB doesn't exist. [/quote]

Do you not see how the truth value of one of those propositions excludes the other one, necessarily? If there is a possible world where a MGB DOES exist, then the second proposition above is necessarily false...and vice versa.

One of those propositions is necessarily false, and we both know which one it is.

When you think of a MGB, think of it in terms of:

A.) If a MGB exists, then it is impossible for it to not exist...
B.) If a MGB doesn't exist, then it is impossible for it to exist.

[quote="Blastcat"
If you would change P1 to:

There is a possible world where MBG exists but there is NO possible world where MGB doesn't exist.

I could not agree with that P1 at all. [/quote]

I'm sorry, I don't quite follow.

[quote="Blastcat"
So, I can agree with your original P1 on condition that we run the argument with the Negative of P1. The argument only gets us to GOD exists on CONDITION that we don't use the negative case for MGB existing in some possible world.

So, if we completely IGNORE that MGB might NOT exist in some possible word, then we are way more likely to conclude that it MUST exist in some possible world.
[/quote]

But see, as I keep emphasizing; a necessary proposition cannot be possibly true as just as equally as it can be possibly false. That only works with contingent propositions....but we are talking about necessary propositions, and that is a whole nother' ball game.

[For_The_Kingdom]

But agreeing that P1 is true doesn't DO much if we can ALSO agree that the OPPOSITE of P1 is true.

There is a possible world where MGB exists
There is a possible world where MGB doesn't exist.

Do you not see how the truth value of one of those propositions excludes the other one, necessarily? If there is a possible world where a MGB DOES exist, then the second proposition above is necessarily false...and vice versa.

One of those propositions is necessarily false, and we both know which one it is.

When you think of a MGB, think of it in terms of:

A.) If a MGB exists, then it is impossible for it to not exist...
B.) If a MGB doesn't exist, then it is impossible for it to exist.

So, I can agree with your original P1 on condition that we run the argument with the Negative of P1. The argument only gets us to GOD exists on CONDITION that we don't use the negative case for MGB existing in some possible world.

So, if we completely IGNORE that MGB might NOT exist in some possible word, then we are way more likely to conclude that it MUST exist in some possible world.

But see, as I keep emphasizing; a necessary proposition cannot be possibly true as just as equally as it can be possibly false. That only works with contingent propositions....but we are talking about necessary propositions, and that is a whole nother' ball game.

[rikuoamero]

So earlier, you said that an MGB can time travel. It would be one of the abilities you would give to an MGB.
But now it can't? Now it can't change the future?
Besides, changing the future is NOT logically absurd. There are many modes of thought devoted to that subject. Such as the multiverse hypothesis (why does the word multiverse ring a bell? Why is it I have this strange feeling someone I know has been talking about it all week?)

The point is; God cannot change something that he already knows will happen. If God knows that you will be born on 2-5-78, then there is nothing that can happen that will change what God already knows.

The future only reflects what God knows will happen.

Or if he knows that Adam and Eve will eat the forbidden fruit, thus introducing sin, there is nothing that can happen that will change that. God then ends up impotent, reduced to nothing more than a puppet, playing out a set role.
Much like how Doctor Manhattan acted in Watchmen.

[Blastcat]

[Replying to post 200 by For_The_Kingdom]


Hi, For_The_Kingdom

P1 has to be true in some possible world, therefore P1 is true.

Ok, so before this thread was posted, how many of you can honestly say that prior to this thread, your contention was that "God cannot possibly exist?"

So, true, I think that God can possibly exist, and Santa, the FSM, and my good friend and talented wizard, Harry Potter.

Once you admit that God possibly exists, you are stuck like chuck, with no way out.

Once you admit that Santa might exist... well, you see the problem. Santa is the maximally greatest Xmas elf that can be imagined. So, he exists too.

And what about poor old Harry? Well, some would say that HE is the greatest wizard imaginable, so.. therefore, exists.

What we have to make sure of though, is the being we want to prove exists MUST exist by definition, in P1. Because, if we aren't begging the question, the argument isn't valid, as I think riku, the maximally greatest debater that can be imagined has pointed out.

[Bust Nak]

But the argument isn't " God is defined as a necessary being, therefore, God must exist"

Incorrect, that is exactly what the argument is. All the extra steps about possible worlds are there to disguise that fact. "God is defined as a necessary being, here is some modal logic... therefore, God must exist." You cannot define God into existence.

That isn't the argument, is it?

Of course it is, if God is not a necessary being as the definition provided suggests, then step 3 becomes non sequitur. God existing in one possible world would no longer implies God exists in all possible worlds.

No, it isn't. Yet, that is the contention of your above quote, which doesn't reflect the actual argument.

I don't know why you'd think that. It is quite obvious that the whole thing hinges entirely on God being a necessary being, without it the argument isn't even valid. If you understood why your example of defining blastcat as necessary fails, you ought to understand why the modal ontological argument fails.

You are still misrepresenting the argument...see, you said it again; "God is necessary, therefore, God exists".

And i'll keep saying it until you understand, you cannot define God as a necessary being without support, and if you could support God as a necessary being then you can just jump to the conclusion that God exists without using modal logic. I wasn't trying to represent let alone misrepresent the modal argument. I was offering a quick alternative.

That isn't even the argument...that isn't even one of the PREMISES of the argument.

I know that, that's why I said I was way ahead of you. To support the definition of God used in the modal ontological argument, you need to prove that God is necessary. And if you could prove God necessary, then you may as well use that as a premise and conclude God exists straight away like my argument. That the PREMISES aren't even the same should have been all the clue you need to work out I wasn't trying to reproduce the modal ontological argument. Do you really think I would mess up the premuses like that? Come on, give me more credit than that. If anyone is guilty of misrepresentation, it would be you.

[rikuoamero]

[Replying to post 200 by For_The_Kingdom]

Most of you had no problem at least accepting that it is POSSIBLE for God to exist...

As was pointed out to you before by I can't remember who, those who said this meant a different kind of possible than what you meant.

Once you admit that God possibly exists, you are stuck like chuck, with no way out.

That video of WLC I linked to before, the one where I mentioned it having an overlay where it's goal is apparently to get the atheist to say "God is possible"?
You seem to be doing it right there. Rather than lead us to some new understanding, you just want to make us stuck, trap us by getting us to say a phrase you want us to say.

[Blastcat]

[Replying to post 203 by For_The_Kingdom]

Hi, For_The_Kingdom
I've noticed in my life's journey that:

Possible doesn't usually imply necessary

But agreeing that P1 is true doesn't DO much if we can ALSO agree that the OPPOSITE of P1 is true.

There is a possible world where MGB exists
There is a possible world where MGB doesn't exist.

Do you not see how the truth value of one of those propositions excludes the other one, necessarily? If there is a possible world where a MGB DOES exist, then the second proposition above is necessarily false...and vice versa.

Yes, one does exclude the other.
You are very perceptive.

If there is a possible world where MGB does not exist, then MGB doesn't exist in any possible world.

One of those propositions is necessarily false, and we both know which one it is.

WE DO?

Both can possibly be true. It's just that they are mutually exclusive, as you so rightly pointed out.

When you think of a MGB, think of it in terms of:

A.) If a MGB exists, then it is impossible for it to not exist...
B.) If a MGB doesn't exist, then it is impossible for it to exist.

Yes, that was exactly my point.
In situation B, no MGB can exist.

So, I can agree with your original P1 on condition that we run the argument with the Negative of P1. The argument only gets us to GOD exists on CONDITION that we don't use the negative case for MGB existing in some possible world.

So, if we completely IGNORE that MGB might NOT exist in some possible word, then we are way more likely to conclude that it MUST exist in some possible world.

But see, as I keep emphasizing; a necessary proposition cannot be possibly true as just as equally as it can be possibly false.

Ahhh ok, I stand corrected.
So, the possible MGB turns into a NECESSARY MGB right before our very eyes.

If necessary means that it must exist, then p1 begs the question. P1 seems to make it necessary that MGB exists, doesn't it?

So, it's not that an MGB POSSIBLY exists, but that MGB exists NECESSARILY.

You might as well go out and say that God exists in P1 and be done with it.
Here's the shorter, but clearer version of your argument:

God necessarily exists, therefore, God exists.

OR.... I could change the argument against MGB's existence by saying that :

P1 ( revised ) There is a possible world where MGB isn't a necessary being, but just another run of the mill ordinary contingent being.

That only works with contingent propositions....but we are talking about necessary propositions, and that is a whole nother' ball game.

The question begging ball-game, I'm afraid.