Difflugia wrote:
Goose wrote:Of course you
think they are contradictory, others disagree. But I asked if there are any
explicit logical contradictions (such as
A and ~A). Those I would consider beyond rational justification. If they are some kind of
implicit contradiction then the one arguing for the contradiction bears the burden to prove the contradiction. It's a lot harder to prove an implicit contradiction than one might think.
And that's what youve been arguing for at length in this thread (and others),
implied contradictions. For those arguments to hold as contradictions the underlying assumptions must necessarily be the case.
I'll agree that the contradictions are implicit rather than explicit in the sense that magic unicorns are possible rather than impossible.
What on earth is that supposed to mean? Why are you talking about magic unicorns all of a sudden?
Look, the bottom line here is that when asked if there were any explicit logical contradictions (such as
A and ~A) in the Bible
you replied that, I think [the birth narratives and the Petrine denials are] both logically contradictory.
In regards to the Petrine denials you simply failed to show a logical contradiction such that
A and ~A. I showed how the Petrine denials are a case of
A and B. And thats not a contradiction.
What is implicit in the contradictions I raised is the way the authors use language.
But the way they use language doesnt yield a logical contradiction. Youve yet to show that.
It may be possible that the authors meant something else, but I think it's very, very improbable.
That you happen to think another meaning is very improbable is irrelevant. The bottom line is that you failed to show a contradiction such that
A and ~A.
Goose wrote:And I think those assumptions are often highly questionable if not outright false in some cases.
Perhaps they often are, but do you think so in this case? Are my assumptions about the authors' uses of language "highly questionable" or "outright false"?
Yes. I showed that.
Goose wrote:This assumes that Mark (and Matthew) necessarily meant a female
and only a female approached Peter the second time. It further assumes that Luke necessarily meant that a male
and only a male approached Peter the second time. Of course this in not necessarily the case at all.
I'll agree, but I think we're in magic unicorn territory.
Back to magic unicorns again. But at least you agree. Good. That means you agree your assumptions are not necessarily the case. Were almost done here with the Petrine denials, I think.
I think it's unreasonable to suggest that it's at all likely that Mark had in mind an exchange initiated by a woman to which Peter replied, "Man, I am not." Of course, it is possible. It's possible that Peter knew that a woman was asking, yet chose to be insulting in his response. I think, however, it's beyond any reasonable exegesis to suggest either of those in any seriousness.
Youre knocking down a strawman here if this is intended to be directed at my arguments. I made no such suggestion.
Goose wrote:It is not the case the second denial
must be to someone who is both a woman and a man. It could also be the case that the second denial was to a woman (or women)
and a man (or men).
If we're playing logic games with language, I don't think it could. The response in Luke is to a single person, a man. Even if God were here to explain His rules of inerrancy logic, though, I think it's clear that we've gone well beyond the realm of author intention. We are no longer reading the text to divine the intent of the authors, but to satisfy a particular notion of verbal inerrancy.
Theres no logic games with language or inerrancy logic here. Its just logic. Basic logic, actually. You claimed the second denial
must be to someone who is both a woman and a man. I showed that is not necessarily the case.
In the context of my original question, how would you rank an author's likely intent compared to an interpretation that preserves verbal inerrancy?
We should always try our best to understand the authors intention. The intention of the author should inform our interpretation, not the other way around.
How unlikely must a reading be that otherwise preserves inerrancy before it should be discarded?
A reading that one thinks is unlikely enough to warrant discarding ought to be discarded. Preserving inerrancy has nothing to do with it as far as Im concerned.
My inclination is to find a way to harmonize texts if possible because I think it more reasonable to move towards preserving history so we can learn from it rather than move towards destroying history. That goes for secular and other religious texts as well.
Is literal impossibility your only threshold?
Not sure what you mean by literal impossibility being my only threshold. If you are referring to what I said in
this post, that was in context to answering your OP question and what I would consider beyond rational justification.
Goose wrote:And I think the evidence supports the latter especially when we consider all four Gospels have more than one male and more than one female at the scene in each respective narrative.
I think "the evidence supports" is an odd choice of phrase. I would consider the primary evidence to be a plain reading of the authors' words.
But a plain reading of the authors words doesnt get you a logical contradiction such that
A and ~A. I showed that.
My original point is that expanding the meaning of "possible" in our present context has the effect of rendering nearly any text as potentially inerrant.
Okay, so lets say nearly any text is
potentially inerrant. Whats the problem with that? You do understand theres a difference between
potentiality and
actuality, right?
In fact, I'd go so far as to say that by your rules, a text that could be demonstrated to be errant would be extremely rare.
Sure, if my only rule for demonstrating that a text was errant were the presence of an explicit logical contradiction within the text. But I didnt say that. In fact, come to think of it, I dont recall making any claims about inerrancy at all. The only time I mentioned it was to ask if taking it down inerrancy was your ultimate end game. Youre the one who has been going off on the tangent of inerrancy. Ive been addressing your question about what is considered unjustifiable when it some to dismissing
contradictions.
Thus, claiming that atheists haven't found any contradictions in the Bible is either meaningless or equivocating;
Youre knocking down a big fat strawman here. I didnt claim that. I
asked you if there are any explicit logical contradictions in the Bible (such as
A and ~A)? You responded that you think there are. You tried to argue, as an example, the Petrine denials are logically contradictory. I showed they arent.
...either contradictions are so rare in any document that their lack is only the feeblest evidence of any veracity (let alone inspiration), or one claiming a lack of contradictions is intentionally implying a much broader and more meaningful definition of "contradiction" before narrowing it to where it loses any diagnostic power at all.
Im working within the standard definition of what constitutes a
logical contradiction. You said you think the Petrine denials are, and I quote, logically contradictory.
But it seems to me, you want to broaden the definition of what constitutes a logical contradiction to such a point that
A and B are a contradiction.
Goose wrote:Furthermore, if you wish to argue for a contradiction here at the second denial you must explain why Luke would intentionally contradict Mark on the second denial when Lukes tendency, when he reworked Mark, was to amend Mark for his own purposes and not outright contradict Mark. Why contradict Mark on this seemingly obscure and trivial detail?
I expect that Matthew and Luke changed Matthew for the same reason. Mark's first two contradictions were to the same person, so could conceivably be rolled into the same denial. Matthew simply changed "the servant" into "another."
I dont know what you mean by Mark's first two contradictions were to the same person. There doesnt seem to be anything contradictory in Marks account in and of itself. Are you suggesting Matthew and Luke had some reason to think Mark was wrong and thats why they changed Mark?
Luke made the same kind of change, but added language to space the denials out in time.
But that doesnt explain why they would make the change.
Luke contradicted Mark on a number of details (at least by normal rules; Jesus having last words, the women having spices prepared beforehand, two men in the tomb) as part of his overall reworking, so I don't see this as an anomaly.
You are arguing in a circle here. These other details you point to here arent contradictions by the
normal rules of what constitutes a contradiction. They are contradictions by
your rules. So, yes, it would be an anomaly if Luke outright contradicted Mark.
Goose wrote:Lastly, lets assume this second denial example is a bonafide contradiction. What, exactly, do you think this implies let alone proves? Please dont tell me all your effort amounts to an end game of merely attempting to take down the doctrine of inerrancy. Hopefully, you are going for some higher hanging fruit here?
My button (trolls, take note) is apologists claiming that the Bible has no contradictions as though that's evidence that it's special, but then defining contradiction to the point that the term is absolutely meaningless.
So your end game is taking down apologists who push your button. That's going after some low hanging fruit, bro.
And you dont seem to have a problem with hyper sceptics who define a
contradiction in such way as to allow virtually any differences in the text no matter how trivial thereby making the claim the Bible has numerous contradictions absolutely meaningless.
My goal, quixotic though it might be, is to ask apologists to examine their own rules such that they might see that inerrancy is something they're imposing upon the Bible, rather than something that can be inferred from the state of the text itself.
So in the end, it is all about taking down inerrancy after all.
Okay, so let me ask again because you didn't really answer this question. Lets say youve shown a contradiction and taken down the doctrine of inerrancy. What does that prove aside from the doctrine of inerrancy is false? Where are you going with this? Because it kinda seems like you arent really going anywhere with it.