Kalam Cosmological Argument

[rikuoamero]

A certain user (who will go unnamed) has promised to discuss the Kalam Cosmological Argument, but has so far failed to do so. I thought I might as well introduce it, defeat the argument and so get it out of the way.
The original cosmological argument is thus
P1: Everything that exists must have a cause.
P2: If you follow the chain of events backwards through time, it cannot go back infinitely, so eventually you arrive at the first cause.
P3: This cause must, itself, be uncaused.
P4: But nothing can exist without a cause, except for God.
Conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

Sharp readers will notice that P3 and P4 contradict P1 (God, an uncaused cause, somehow exists despite the fact that P1 doesn't allow for such a thing), so William Lane Craig introduced the KCA.
Here is the KCA

P1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause
P2: The universe began to exist
Conclusion: Therefore, the universe has a cause
and we are led to believe that that universe-causer is God.
William Lane Craig is famous for using the KCA, and in order to demonstrate the soundness of P2, he offers the following in defense

(2.1) An infinite temporal regress of events would constitute an actual infinite.
(2.2) An actual infinite cannot exist.
(2.3) Therefore an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.

Eagle eyed readers will spot a problem in 2.2. An actual infinite cannot exist? That right there refutes the notion of God, who is often described as being an infinite mystery.

Another way to defeat the argument is to show that the conclusion is in the premises. The Kalam arguer says that everything that begins to exist has a cause. So what about things that do not begin to exist? Oh they don't have causes, says the arguer.
Okay. Give me an example of a thing that does not have a cause.
The only thing the Kalam arguer will say is God. There is nothing else that does not have a cause.
So basically, there are two sets or two types of things, objects that begin to exist and objects that do not begin to exist. However, the ONLY example for the second group that the Kalam arguer will say is God, so the second group might as well simply be labelled God (why bother with the longer label?)

So if we plug that into the KCA
P1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause. Whatever does not begin to exist does not have a cause (this second sentence was implied in P1 of the original form of the KCA above)
P2: The universe began to exist.
Conclusion: The universe has a cause and that cause is God.

Now...
P1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause. God does not have a cause.
P2: The universe began to exist
Conclusion: The universe has a cause and that cause is God.

Wait what? Look what happened there. The conclusion is in the premise, thus making it an invalid logical argument, just like the Modal Ontological Argument, which had the god it was trying to prove exists as being unable to fail to exist in the preface to the argument (thus making it rigged).

[Kenisaw]

[Replying to post 52 by Blastcat]

liamconnor wrote:

I have not studied the kalam argument. I have studied Aquinas' demonstrations, however. Whether or not your summary does justice to Kalam, it does not to Aquinas.

P1: is not that everything has a cause. That would obviously be silly, and Aquinas was far from silly. The argument is empirical--everything in our experience has potency--a technical term for which we might substitute "is liable to change".

IF we include God into that "everything"... then god can change too.

That is a typical response from people who have not studied philosophy or logic.

God is not a part of "everything in our experience". As I mentioned lower, we are talking about the world as revealed by the senses.

As I said also, the argument does not necessarily lead to God. It leads to an entity outside of space and time. What the argument does is demolish naturalism.

Maybe as had to be done in the MOA thread, someone needs to define the characteristics of the god creature. The god was supposedly everywhere at the same time, and therefore would be in all our experiences. If you say it is not, then what can it do? Is it all knowing, all powerful, all benevolent, everywhere at once? Tell us what critter we are talking about Liam...

Not everyone would agree with that, of course. Let's have the mathematicians and theoretical physicists decide that one, shall we?

Physicists (as a I pointed out below---do you read posts first, or just start firing away?) do. Mathematicians hold to an infinitity of numbers. Numbers are not contingent upon each other.

Right. If they were we'd have number lines...oh, wait....

[historia]

The only alternative I'm aware of to having no beginning is to exist infinitely back in time.

If God had no beginning, then he existed infinitely back in time.

The KCA holds an infinite regression to be impossible correct?

Therefore God must have had a beginning,

I don't think it makes sense to say that something without a beginning existed "infinitely" back in time. Such a view seems to depend on the notion that time is infinite.

However, past time appears to be finite. The space-time universe is 'only' 13.8 billion years old. And there was apparently no time 'before' then.

Perhaps it would be be better to say, then, that, if something had no beginning, then it existed timelessly or atemporally at the moment the universe (and thus time itself) came into existence.

Since this premise appears faulty, the conclusion ("therefore God must have had a beginning") must be deemed so as well.

and this beginning must have been uncaused, and if God was the first "something" in existence, then it means He came into existence uncaused from nothing.

I don't quite see why it makes more sense to say this happened to God instead of the universe.

Why is it not possible for the beginning of the universe to have been uncaused and for causes to have taken place from that point onward?

If something is "uncaused," then it doesn't make sense to me to say it had a "beginning" or that it "came into" existence "from" anything. Rather, that thing would just permanently exist. It would be eternal.

If the universe is "uncaused," then it would be eternal. And, if the universe is eternal, then past time would also be eternal, since time is part of the universe. But, as I mentioned above, we observe that time is finite, so it appears we cannot ascribe this property to the universe.

[historia]

If it turns out that Iron Chariots have an incorrect version of Kalam on their website, then what I have done on this thread is useless.

The version of the kalam argument you posted was fine.

It's just that, by way of introducing the kalam argument, you also included an inaccurate version of the "original" cosmological argument.

As those introductory remarks were, at any rate, unnecessary (and thus something of a red herring), we can simply dispense with that part of the OP and continue discussing the kalam argument on its own.

The universe existed in a static, absolutely immobile state from eternity and then inexplicably, without any conditions whatsoever, a first event occurred...such a picture of the universe is singularly unconvincing.

Wouldn't this be a description he'd hold true of his god? His god, existing in a static, absolutely immobile state from eternity and then inexplicably, without any cause from anything external, he causes the universe?

No. And this is, in fact, precisely why Craig argues that the cause of the universe must be a personal being rather than some kind of eternal, impersonal force. In Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (2003), pg. 480, he writes:

If the cause of the origin of the universe were an impersonal set of necessary and sufficient conditions, it would be impossible for the cause to exist without its effect. For if the necessary and sufficient conditions of the effect are timelessly given, then their effect must be given as well.

The only way for the cause to be timeless and changeless but for its effect to originate anew a finite time ago is for the cause to be a personal agent who freely chooses to bring about an effect without antecedent determining conditions.

Back to your objections:

To postulate multiple causes rather than a single cause for that event seems unnecessary. Or as Hume put it, "To multiply causes, without necessity, is indeed contrary to true philosophy."

That is something that holds true (generally) for within the universe. However, the supernatural realm that Craig et al believes exists...what are its rules? For all we know, Occam's Razor doesn't apply there or isn't useful there.

I'm not sure where this objection would leave us. It seems to me that, in this thread, we are examining arguments to the best explanation -- the 'best' being ideally the simplest and most probable explanation.

Here you've introduced a possible explanation with an ad hoc supposition, which renders the explanation unnecessarily complex, and thus weaker. So, for the purposes of our discussion (if nothing else), we should reject it in favor of simpler explanations.

Otherwise, you're basically saying that philosophy, science, and logic have no bearing in our discussion. There may well be aspects of reality where those tools fail us, but I see no reason to give them up so readily, as you have here.

Your comment about time not being a problem for Kalam is intriguing. Care to explain a bit more please?

I'm afraid I'm not sure what comment you are referring to here.

The kalam argument concerns itself with the temporal ordering of causes

Which is a problem when we're talking about what happened 'before' the universe. The very concept of 'before' makes no sense when talking about this, since time itself began at the Big Bang.

I agree that, if time itself began at the Big Bang, it would be nonsensical to talk about events 'before' then. I just don't understand why that is a problem for the kalam argument.

Whatever caused the universe happened simultaneously with the effect, meaning there is no way to distinguish between the cause and the effect.

I don't think this is true at all. Causes and effects often occur simultaneously, and we can, in those instances, still distinguish between the two.

Kant provides the classic example here. Consider a heavy ball resting on a soft cushion and creating a depression in that cushion. The cause (the ball) and effect (the depression in the cushion) are simultaneous.

Even if we imagine the ball and cushion existing eternally, so that there was never a time when they did not rest together, we can clearly see which is the cause and which is the effect. The cushion does not create the roundness of the ball, but rather the ball creates the concavity in the cushion.

[rikuoamero]

[Replying to post 72 by historia]

then it existed timelessly or atemporally at the moment the universe (and thus time itself) came into existence.

Given that we recognise existence as meaning existing within a set of dimensional co-ordinates (typically 4 dimensional), this would be an equivocation fallacy. What does it mean to 'exist' 'before' time itself, to 'exist' timelessly and space-leslly?

The only way for the cause to be timeless and changeless but for its effect to originate anew a finite time ago is for the cause to be a personal agent who freely chooses to bring about an effect without antecedent determining conditions.

I challenge this. How is it that 'personal agent' is the ONLY way for the cause to be timeless and changeless, but its effect to be a finite time ago?

Otherwise, you're basically saying that philosophy, science, and logic have no bearing in our discussion.

This is something I see quite a lot of, when it comes to talking about God. Science cannot touch God, or talk about God, or whatever, according to many proponents. God is love, God is just, no matter what God does, it automatically is or becomes just, even though logically speaking this would mean there is no line to be crossed from just to unjust.
Have you seen the modal ontological argument thread? There, we've got its proponent claiming he can conceive of a being that necessarily exists in all possible worlds, even in those worlds that have no beings. This being is God, this being somehow can exist despite being a logical contradiction.

I agree that, if time itself began at the Big Bang, it would be nonsensical to talk about events 'before' then. I just don't understand why that is a problem for the kalam argument.

Because, as I understand it, cause and effect are states that follow one another in time. Without time, there is no difference between the cause and the effect, the concepts break down. Normally, we'd have two states, State 1, followed by State 2.
However, since we're talking about the universe, and time starting with the universe, State 1 (the universe did not begin to exist) happens simultaneously with State 2 (the universe began to exist) - a logical contradiction. In other words, the universe both exists and doesn't exist.
Your ball example here doesn't work, since the theist proposing Kalam is trying to show there was a state where there was no universe 'then' there was. However, your ball example here is atemporal.

Even if we imagine the ball and cushion existing eternally, so that there was never a time when they did not rest together, we can clearly see which is the cause and which is the effect.

How can we tell that the ball causes the depression in the cushion, if they have existed together for eternity? Suppose for a moment this is the ONLY example of a ball on a cushion I have ever, and will ever, examine. In such a state, it might be that the cushion naturally has a depression in it, that the ball naturally fits into. How would we be able to tell that the ball is the cause, unless we are able to remove the ball and examine the cushion ball-less?

[jgh7]

If something is "uncaused," then it doesn't make sense to me to say it had a "beginning" or that it "came into" existence "from" anything. Rather, that thing would just permanently exist. It would be eternal.

If the universe is "uncaused," then it would be eternal. And, if the universe is eternal, then past time would also be eternal, since time is part of the universe. But, as I mentioned above, we observe that time is finite, so it appears we cannot ascribe this property to the universe.

Let me try a different approach as I have trouble grasping the concept of "existing without a beginning".

If God is said to have no beginning, is He able to recall how long He has been existing for? If not, then how far back is He able to recall before it becomes impossible to recall?

[marco]

I'm not sure where this objection would leave us. It seems to me that, in this thread, we are examining arguments to the best explanation -- the 'best' being ideally the simplest and most probable explanation.

I have sympathy with riku's point. Occam draws its excellence from the idea that in our world it is reasonable to discount the extraordinary until we have ruled out simpler explanations. This procedure will generally produce good answers.

When we move from the routine where we exist into the complex where we don't it is not correct to assume that the simple answer is the right one. Why should it be? People in the past opted for the simple explanation of the sun being a god, but that was wrong. So the application of Occam's razor does not have the same justification outside our observed universe.

[Justin108]

I have sympathy with riku's point. Occam draws its excellence from the idea that in our world it is reasonable to discount the extraordinary until we have ruled out simpler explanations. This procedure will generally produce good answers.

When we move from the routine where we exist into the complex where we don't it is not correct to assume that the simple answer is the right one. Why should it be? People in the past opted for the simple explanation of the sun being a god, but that was wrong. So the application of Occam's razor does not have the same justification outside our observed universe.

Occam's exact quote was "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" which roughly translates to "More things should not be used than are necessary."

A popular interpretation of this is that "the simplest explanation is often the best" but many others interpret it as meaning "the explanation with the fewest assumptions is the best" . Going with the latter understanding, Occam's razor would not support the explanation that the sun is a god as this explanation assumes the sun is a living entity without any justification for that assumption

[marco]

A popular interpretation of this is that "the simplest explanation is often the best" but many others interpret it as meaning "the explanation with the fewest assumptions is the best" . Going with the latter understanding, Occam's razor would not support the explanation that the sun is a god as this explanation assumes the sun is a living entity without any justification for that assumption

He also said: pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate which amounts to the same thing. I was answering the question about simplicity rather than plurality, and the supposition of a god is pretty simple.
In any event I was dismissing the use of Occam's razor in matters to do with the divine and supernatural (I believe Occam himself did as well, believing God could do as he pleased). But thanks for your observation.

[Inigo Montoya]

If something is "uncaused," then it doesn't make sense to me to say it had a "beginning" or that it "came into" existence "from" anything. Rather, that thing would just permanently exist. It would be eternal.

If the universe is "uncaused," then it would be eternal. And, if the universe is eternal, then past time would also be eternal, since time is part of the universe. But, as I mentioned above, we observe that time is finite, so it appears we cannot ascribe this property to the universe.

Let me try a different approach as I have trouble grasping the concept of "existing without a beginning".

If God is said to have no beginning, is He able to recall how long He has been existing for? If not, then how far back is He able to recall before it becomes impossible to recall?

This reminds me of a story i read once that points out an eternally existing god would have no knowledge of what it was like to not exist. As it couldn't have experience of being born or dying, it followed that there are at least two things it didn't know, and couldn't therefore be all knowing.

As for this Kalam business, some posters are being awfully generous with what we think we can guess at whilst approaching a gravitational time suspending singularity in reverse, then being equally liberal finding ways for a grossly hypothetical timeless and spaceless agent to fit in, completely ignoring the implications of that kind of existence. Finding a mystery to slip God into and then ditching the party before it has to make any sense. Good times.

I notice Craig (philosopher, not cosmogonist) is being propped up here right down to the ball and cushion example he loves. Yes it's probably Kant's, but Craig loves it. Did anyone see his debate against Sean Carroll when Sean actually had Alan Guth in the audience? Even after it is pointed out Guth thinks the universe is eternal, and is IN THE AUDIENCE, Craig goes on to say Guth probably tainted his own conclusion with a personal hope. This is after Craig misrepresented Guths findings, of course.

Great debate. Highly recommend. Carroll is all over Billy.



2 hours of awesome. Sean's opening turn is great.