God Must Exist: Infinite Regression is Impossible

[We_Are_VENOM]

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First off, by "universe", I mean all physical reality govern by natural law. This would include universes that we know/don’t know about.

1. If God does not exist, then the universe is past eternal.

Justification: We know that the universe exist, and if there is no transcendent supernatural cause, then either

A. the universe either popped into being, uncaused, out of nothing.
B. OR, it has existed for eternity.

I think we can safely remove posit A from the equation (unless there is someone who thinks it is a plausible explanation).

Let’s focus on posit B.

Based on posit B, we need not provide any naturalistic explanation as to the cause of our universe, considering the fact that the term “universe” applies (as mentioned earlier) to all physical reality, which means that any naturalistic explanation one provides is already accounted for as “eternal”.

And if God does not exist, then physical reality (the universe) is all there is, and thus must be eternal.

2. If the universe is not past eternal, then God exists.

Justification: If the universe (all physical reality) is NOT eternal, then it had a beginning.

Since natural law (mother nature) cannot logically be used to explain the origin of its own domain, then an external, supernatural cause is necessary.

If “nature” had a beginning, one cannot logically use nature to explain the origin of nature, and to do so is fallacious.

So, where nature stops, supernatural begins.

3. The universe is not past eternal.

Justification: If the universe is past eternal, then the causal chain of events (cause and effect) within the universe is infinite. But this is impossible, because infinity cannot be traversed or “reached”.

If the past is eternal, that would mean that there are an infinite amount of “days” which lead to today. But in order for us to have “arrived” to today, an infinite amount of days would have to be traversed (one by one), which is impossible, because infinite cannot be “reached”.

Consider thought analogy..

Sandman analogy: Imagine there is a man who is standing above a bottomless hole. By “bottomless”, of course if one was to fall into the hole, he would fall forever and ever and ever.

Now, imagine the man is surrounded by an infinite amount of sand, which is at his disposal.

Imagine if the man has been shoveling sand into this hole for an infinite amount of time (he never began shoveling, or he never stopped shoveling, he has been shoveling forever).

Imagine if the man’s plan was to shovel sand into the hole until he successfully filled the sand from the bottom, all the way to the top of the hole.

How long will it take him to accomplish this? Will he ever accomplish this task? No. Why? Because the sand is bottomless, so no matter how fast he shoveled, or how long he shoveled, the sand will never reach the top.

So lets put it all together…

The sand falling: Represents time travel, and the trajectory of the sand falling south of the top represents time traveling into the past, which is synonymous with past eternity.

The man shoveling: Represents the “present”, as the man is presently shoveling without halt. This is synonymous with our present causal reality. We are presently in a state of constant change, without halt.

Conclusion: If the sand cannot reach the bottom of the hole (because of no boundary/foundation) and it can’t be filled from the bottom-up to the present (man), then how, if there is no past boundary to precedent days, how could we have possibly reached the present day…if there is/was no beginning foundation (day).

However, lets say a gazillion miles down the hole, there is a foundation…then the hole will be filled in a finite amount of time, and it will be filled from the bottom-up.

But ONLY if there is a foundation.

Likewise, we can only reach today if and ONLY IF there is a beginning point of reference, a foundation in the distant past.

4. Therefore, an Uncaused Cause (UCC) must exist: As explained, infinite regression is impossible, so an uncaused cause is absolutely necessary.

This UCC cannot logically be a product of any precedent cause or conditions, thus, it exists necessarily (supplementing the Modal Ontological Argument).

This UCC cannot logically depend on any external entity for it’s existence (supplementing the Modal Ontological Argument).

This UCC is the foundation for any/everything which began to exist, which included by not limited to all physical reality…but mainly, the universe an everything in it.

This UCC would also have to have free will, which explains why the universe began at X point instead of Y point...and the reason is; it began at that point because that is when the UCC decided it should begin...and only a being with free will can decide to do anything.

This UCC would have to have the power to create from nothing (as there was no preexisting physical matter to create from, before it was created).

So, based on the truth value of the argument, what can we conclude of the UCC?

1. It is a supernatural, metaphysically necessary being
2. A being of whom has existed for eternity and can never cease existing
3. A being with the greatest power imaginable (being able to create from nothing)
4. A being with free will, thus, a being with a mind

This being in question is what theists have traditionally recognized as God. God exists.

In closing, I predict the whole "well, based on your argument, God cannot be infinite".

My response to that for now is; first admit the validity of the presented argument, and THEN we will discuss why the objection raised doesn't apply to God.

[The Tanager]

Okay, so why did say I was begging the question when I said that it was a fine to begin with the assumption that infinity (or an infinite wall) isn't incoherent?

I didn’t say that. We’ve moved past the definition, which assumes no incoherency, to the question of whether such a thing could exist in reality. You either (1) understood I had moved on or (2) thought we were still talking about the definition. If (2), then you have misunderstood me. We have done (1). When I’ve asked you whether such a thing can exist in reality, you have pointed to the definition being accepted by mathematicians. That is what I said begs the question. Not the question at (2), but at (1).

Correct, as opposed to it does exist in reality.

Possibly existing in reality is different from being a logically possible concept. I’m talking about the first not the second. The definition assumes the second, not the first.

Also I still want to know if you assumed a square circle is both a square and a circle?

As a definition, yes.

It's both, the number of assumptions alone isn't enough to determine which scenario is simpler, we also need to check the relative simplicity of the assumptions themselves. And in this particular case, checking number of assumptions doesn't help at all, because that both scenario makes one assumption: "There is one" vs "there is none."

I don’t see an argument there, just a statement. But let’s assume you are right to move on.

Atheism can be said to be a simpler answer to the question of, say, the existence of the universe, because it shares with theism all the various scientific laws and other assumptions, yet theism posits an additional entity that atheism doesn’t. So, for argument’s sake, 252 is less than 253.

The center isn’t a thing like that. Between “no-center” and “yes-center” there isn’t a difference of entities or parts. It’s still 253 to 253. All “no-center” is changing is a comment about how those 253 things are arranged.

That's not how I remembered it, try this:

C1 - premise 2.1 is faulty because of blah, blah, blah

C2 - But for 2.1 to be faulty for the reason you said, this would mean there has to be a lowest P

C3 - There can’t logically be a lowest P in an actually infinite series by definition and C1 does not contradict that

C4 - That there can't logically be a lowest P is exactly the point, this means 2.1 can't be faulty for the reason you said.

C5 - that we can count to 2 by starting at any P doesn't imply we can count to 2 without starting at all

C6 - that's what the proof is for, to bridge the gap between "we can count to 2 by starting at any P" and "we can count to 2 without starting at all."

Hold up on C4, then. Why do you think my C1 requires there to be a lowest P? We’ve already had this part of the discussion, but maybe it’s worth bringing it back up to make sure we are understanding each other. My basic point was that an actual infinite series, by definition, couldn't have a lowest P and that C1 doesn't contradict that. You think my C1 leads to there having to be a lowest P. Why?

[Bust Nak]

I didn’t say that. We’ve moved past the definition, which assumes no incoherency, to the question of whether such a thing could exist in reality. You either (1) understood I had moved on or (2) thought we were still talking about the definition. If (2), then you have misunderstood me. We have done (1). When I’ve asked you whether such a thing can exist in reality, you have pointed to the definition being accepted by mathematicians. That is what I said begs the question. Not the question at (2), but at (1).

How is it question begging to go from "definition being accepted by mathematicians" to "definition is coherent a posteriori, (as opposed to assumption of coherency a priori)"

Possibly existing in reality is different from being a logically possible concept.

What's the difference? I think they are the same thing.

As a definition, yes.

Then what's wrong with assuming that infinity is a quantity?

I don’t see an argument there, just a statement. But let’s assume you are right to move on.

Atheism can be said to be a simpler answer to the question of, say, the existence of the universe, because it shares with theism all the various scientific laws and other assumptions, yet theism posits an additional entity that atheism doesn’t. So, for argument’s sake, 252 is less than 253.

The center isn’t a thing like that. Between “no-center” and “yes-center” there isn’t a difference of entities or parts. It’s still 253 to 253. All “no-center” is changing is a comment about how those 253 things are arranged.

Arranging those 253 things creates this new thing - the center, that's makes 254.

Hold up on C4, then. Why do you think my C1 requires there to be a lowest P?

Premise 2.1 says it is possible to count from any p < X, through X, up to 2. If that premise is not true, if it was impossible to count from some p < X, through X, up to 2, then there are one particular p (the lowest of all p where it was possible to count from,) lower than which where it is impossible to count from, through X, up to 2.

[The Tanager]

How is it question begging to go from "definition being accepted by mathematicians" to "definition is coherent a posteriori, (as opposed to assumption of coherency a priori)"

Bolded emphasis mine. We are moving from the definition to the reality, not staying in just the definition. It’s question begging to go from the definition being accepted by mathematicians to the concept so defined being coherent in reality.

What's the difference? I think they are the same thing.

Perhaps the phrasing is wrong, so I’ll restate my point. The definition of actual infinity assumes logical possibility. If that assumption is granted, then what follows from the concept being true is logically possible. But that’s a big if that needs to be supported. Appealing to the definition that assumes it is supported is not actual support.

Arranging those 253 things creates this new thing - the center, that's makes 254.

No, it doesn’t. The center isn’t an additional thing, it’s just a concept. If we are talking about explanations “yes-center” and “no-center” are both added explanations.

Premise 2.1 says it is possible to count from any p < X, through X, up to 2. If that premise is not true, if it was impossible to count from some p < X, through X, up to 2, then there are one particular p (the lowest of all p where it was possible to count from,) lower than which where it is impossible to count from, through X, up to 2.

Premise 2.1 doesn’t talk about counting through X up to 2. Here is the proof again:

S = start counting from X
E = end at some specific number after X (*I changed this from Last Sunday to keep it more consistent)
P = prior members before X
B = start from any P and end at X
W = without starting at X (no mention of P. It’s not equivalent "without starting at all")
T = count through X
I = without starting at all
“For all x” = in every circumstance all values of X could find themselves in

1) For all x: You can S and E (premise)
2) For all x: There are P (premise)
2.1) For all x: If there are P, then you can B (premise)
2.2) For all x: If you can B and S and E, then you can W and T and E (premise)
2.3) For all x: You can B (from 2 and 2.1)
2.4) For all x: You can B and S and E (from 1 and 2.3)
3) For all x: You can W and T and E (from 2.2 and 2.4)
4.1) If not (can I and E) then there exist X where cannot W and T and E. (premise)
4.2) not (exist X where cannot W and T and E) (from 3)
4.3) Not not (can I and E) (from 4.1 and 4.2)
5) You can I and E

As I’ve looked back over this, I think we need to revisit what “for all x” means. Does it mean for all values X could have or does it mean for any series X (which could be any value) finds itself in?

[Bust Nak]

Bolded emphasis mine. We are moving from the definition to the reality, not staying in just the definition. It’s question begging to go from the definition being accepted by mathematicians to the concept so defined being coherent in reality.

Why though? Used by mathematicians therefore coherent doesn't assume coherence.

Perhaps the phrasing is wrong, so I’ll restate my point. The definition of actual infinity assumes logical possibility. If that assumption is granted, then what follows from the concept being true is logically possible. But that’s a big if that needs to be supported. Appealing to the definition that assumes it is supported is not actual support.

I am appealing to mathematicians using the definition.

No, it doesn’t. The center isn’t an additional thing, it’s just a concept. If we are talking about explanations “yes-center” and “no-center” are both added explanations.

Additional concept then instead of additional thing. Same argument applies, more concepts therefore more complex.

As I’ve looked back over this, I think we need to revisit what “for all x” means. Does it mean for all values X could have or does it mean for any series X (which could be any value) finds itself in?

For all X means means you can substitute any integer into X. It's short hand for the following infinitely many statements:
...
If there are numbers less than 3, then you can count from any of those numbers up to 3
If there are numbers less than 2, then you can count from any of those numbers up to 2
If there are numbers less than 1, then you can count from any of those numbers up to 1
If there are numbers less than 0, then you can count from any of those numbers up to 0
...

[The Tanager]

Why though? Used by mathematicians therefore coherent doesn't assume coherence.

But it’s axiomatic to those mathematicians. That means they knowingly just assume the definition is coherent and see what happens mathematically. So, yes, this instance of “used by mathematicians” does assume coherence, by their own process.

Additional concept then instead of additional thing. Same argument applies, more concepts therefore more complex.

But “no center” isn’t the absence of any concept; it’s a concept itself, so it’s not a difference in number of concepts.

For all X means means you can substitute any integer into X. It's short hand for the following infinitely many statements:
...
If there are numbers less than 3, then you can count from any of those numbers up to 3
If there are numbers less than 2, then you can count from any of those numbers up to 2
If there are numbers less than 1, then you can count from any of those numbers up to 1
If there are numbers less than 0, then you can count from any of those numbers up to 0
...

Okay, so that’s what I mean by “for all values of x”. I started critiquing your proof via that route, claiming the premises narrowed down the series we were talking about and your responses lead us (possibly through misunderstanding of what you were saying on my part alone) to saying “for all x” meant the other thing and me rejecting premise 2.1. So, let’s use “for all values of x”. My disagreement won’t be at premise 2.1.

S = start counting from X
E = end at some specific number after X (*I changed this from Last Sunday to keep it more consistent)
P = prior members before X
B = start from any P and end at X
W = without starting at X (no mention of P. It’s not equivalent "without starting at all")
T = count through X
I = without starting at all
“For all x” = in every circumstance all values of X could find themselves in

1) For all x: You can S and E (premise)

I agree. For all values of X you can start at X and reach an E. Whenever you do this, you are creating a series with a beginning and an end, in this case, one like this: {X, …, 2}.

2) For all x: There are P (premise)

I agree. For all values of X there are prior members to X because of the very nature of numbers.

2.1) For all x: If there are P, then you can B (premise)

I agree. For all values of X, you can start at P and end at X. Whenever you do this, you are creating a series with a beginning and an end, in this case, one like this: {P, …, X, …, 2}.

2.2) For all x: If you can B and S and E, then you can W and T and E (premise)

I agree. For all values of x, if you can start at P and end at X and start at X and end at E, then you can, without starting at X, count through X, and end at E. In other words there are series in which you can reach 2 without starting at X.

2.3) For all x: You can B (from 2 and 2.1)

I agree. For all values of x, you can start at P and end at X, thus creating a series of this type {P, …, X}

2.4) For all x: You can B and S and E (from 1 and 2.3)

I agree. For all values of X, you can start at P, end at X, start again at X and end at E, thus creating a series of this type {P, …, X, …, 2}

3) For all x: You can W and T and E (from 2.2 and 2.4)

I agree. For any value of X, you can, without starting at X, you can count through X and end at E, by creating a series such as this {P, …, X, …, 2}. This does not say that all series will allow you to W and T and E; it says that you can create a series for every value of X in which you can, without starting at X, reach E.

4.1) If not (can I and E) then there exist X where cannot W and T and E. (premise)

I agree.

4.2) not (exist X where cannot W and T and E) (from 3)

I agree, there is no value of X where you can’t create a series where you cannot W and T and E. This doesn’t mean any series created will allow this, it simply means that you can put X, whatever its value, in a series where you can W and T and E, such as this series {P, …, X, …, 2}

4.3) Not not (can I and E) (from 4.1 and 4.2)

I agree.

5) You can I and E

I agree.

Nowhere in this proof is the move that says either (1) in every series you can put any X in, you can W and T and E or (2) that beginningless series are one of the types from which you can W and T and E. All you've done is show that some series exist in which we can do this. And I never disagreed with that.

[William]

From the OP:

Except for direct quotes, I'll be using my own terms as emphasis...

Infinite regression is impossible

Okay.

So we look at the available data.

There sits the universe. Pretty and ugly, and almost as big as the pretty thing's hindquarters, but don't tell her I said that last part there, cause I was sposed to bushhog the back, but spent the day building a dam down at the creek, only don't it beat all, Godzilla came and kicked it down and flooded the town down stream, and aw lawd what a tragedy.

In considering currently popular scientific thinking, there is some evidence to conclude the universe started from an initial point (or size) such that it's a whole bunch bigger now, than it was before. Some folks refer to this notion as 'The before and after the wedding' hypothesis.

Then there's the 'God mustadunnit' hypothesis. I find such lacking because it disregards that god's nature. That God must be sentient enough to think, "I'm gonna make me this universe, cause Miss god's gone to fetch groceries, and I ain't got me nothing better to do". It also puts on that God the property of having a force / power, such that kinda just thinking something makes it happen. But it fails to address that all current evidence indicates that sentience is the product of a physical brain, and if by just thinking it, pretty thing there wouldn't get mad for me putting my feet up on the coffee table I bought, in the house I bought, but don't tell her that last part there.

So the 'Godmustadunnit' hypothesis fails to, or refuses to, consider how that god's properties came about.

Strictly speaking, when either mr or mrs god are naked, no one can see them. They don't even see each other.
So "dress-ups" became the rage.

Like how pretty thing dresses you up to be what she wants, and you go along with her because you don't know any better. But can also be yourself in secret [don't tell her I told you that] and be who you are, 'specially when "she" is out shopping...it just seems safer al 'round to do things in that order. You can pretend and she can pretend that she don't see you pretending.

So anyhoo, I see no reason why this here one physical universe didn't make some mind for itself way back before mrs god became involved, and same for mr god since they both came from the same process...emerged into sentience and took a look 'round and thought "hey look what I made!" taking the credit, since they could and who else was around to tell them otherwise?

All this woulda bean happe'n way back nearer the beginning, as things were forming separation occurred and 1 became 2 et al happened, producing "things" which minds could play with.

So on to how this all process could be said to stretch into the infinite past of regression when there is an obvious beginning to it and a probable end - the obvious choice is that the two became One Mind again...eventually - but that hasn't happened yet - it is just obvious that it eventually will happen.

Perhaps in this future-merging, ma and pa god retain their individual-ness and simply find a way to agree and then, at whatever point after that, use their minds more effectively and at the very end when all matter finally gets-gone neked and invisible - they will "look at each other" in the mind and always say the same thing ever time...

"That was AWESOME! Lets do it again! Only "differently"!

[and away "they" go]

That Mind then seeds the quantum world of particles with new instructions and "BANG!" off it goes again...and probably stopped counting how many times It has done this stuff...'cause it ain't important in the grand scheme of "things"...

In this argument, the infinite regression stops at, "There's ol God there, and I'm here to tell you what, he's as uptown as they get!"

From where did this god arise?

"He was always there."

Is no better an answer than saying the universe was always there, if in one form or the other'n. Only in this case, we don't have to imagine Sasquatch's involvement in any of it.


Infinite regression?

Such is mere speculation, an interesting, and fun mental exercise (with pologizies to physicasists and the pretty thing,cause it's been long enough now, I gotta be me treading mud with er for something).

As for me, I see no reason to conclude religious proponents have them a better speculator in this regard.

Yea...about that...the fact that it can be a mental exercise of the mind, allows me to understand how a mind might be, in such a situation as I explained above...

Hush now! Hear She Comes!

[JoeyKnothead]

Stuff

As always, your posts invoke much thought. I need to gnaw on this a spell to give the response it deserves.

Or I'm a coward.

It's the observer's call

I'll asap, friend.

[William]

Stuff

As always, your posts invoke much thought. I need to gnaw on this a spell to give the response it deserves.

Or I'm a coward.

It's the observer's call

I'll asap, friend.

All good friend. I thought your post was interesting and deserved some "stuff" in return...and the thread could do with some windows being opened and some fresh air and humor blowing through the rooms.

[Bust Nak]

But it’s axiomatic to those mathematicians. That means they knowingly just assume the definition is coherent and see what happens mathematically. So, yes, this instance of “used by mathematicians” does assume coherence, by their own process.

It is axiomatic that infinity is a quantity, but that's not the same thing as infinity is coherent, they begin with the assumption that it is coherent, (as you would with square circles,) look at the implications if it is, see that they can find no contradiction, (unlike square circles) then conclude that it is indeed coherent posteriori, as one would with any concepts.

But “no center” isn’t the absence of any concept; it’s a concept itself, so it’s not a difference in number of concepts.

One less instance of a concept then, why is this such a sticking point?

E = end at some specific number after X (*I changed this from Last Sunday to keep it more consistent)
I = without starting at all

5) You can I and E

I agree.

Nowhere in this proof is the move that says either (1) in every series you can put any X in, you can W and T and E or (2) that beginningless series are one of the types from which you can W and T and E. All you've done is show that some series exist in which we can do this. And I never disagreed with that.

I don't know what you think you are agreeing to, but that conclusion says you can without starting at all, count to 2. What series other than a beginningless one would allow for "without starting at all?"

[The Tanager]

It is axiomatic that infinity is a quantity, but that's not the same thing as infinity is coherent, they begin with the assumption that it is coherent, (as you would with square circles,) look at the implications if it is, see that they can find no contradiction, (unlike square circles) then conclude that it is indeed coherent posteriori, as one would with any concepts.

They assume it is coherent. Then the mathematical implications lead to some weird stuff to the point that they have to redefine or add new concepts in order to make it coherently fit. At no point does this process offer proof that these concepts can really exist in reality; it’s all abstract.

One less instance of a concept then, why is this such a sticking point?

It’s not one less instance of a concept; it’s just another concept in its place. This is a sticking point because you are claiming it is one less when it’s not.

I don't know what you think you are agreeing to, but that conclusion says you can without starting at all, count to 2. What series other than a beginningless one would allow for "without starting at all?"

Ah, yes, I was misunderstanding “I” there. So, I disagree with premise 4.1.

4.1) If not (can I and E) then there exist X where cannot W and T and E. (premise)

Why would not being able to reach E without starting at all mean that there is a value of X which you cannot create any series where, without starting at X, you can count through X to E?

4.2) not (exist X where cannot W and T and E) (from 3)

I agree with this, if I understand it correctly.

4.3) Not not (can I and E) (from 4.1 and 4.2)

With 4.1 in doubt, we can’t have 4.3.

5) You can I and E

With 4.1 in doubt, we can’t conclude this.