Which Worldview is Supported by Evidence?

[Jester]

Each of us has a worldview.
That is, each of us have a list of beliefs that get us through our day, on which we base our practical and ethical decisions and by which we find some sense of purpose in life.

I have noticed that many claim to have rejected all forms of theism on the grounds that they feel there is little or no evidence supporting it.
Assuming this is the case, which worldview (or weltanschauung) is supported by evidence?
And, of course, what is that evidence?

[Goat]

Can you show another source of information that you can verify to be true? How do you distinguish between something exists, or if something is either an emotional reaction, or totally conceptual? I am not saying that emotional reactions or conceptions are without value, I am distinguishing between something that physically exists, and something that exists only conceptually or an emotional reaction.

I'm aware that this is what you are saying. I, however, see no reason to believe with your claims about where lines ought to be drawn.
On what grounds do you conclude that offering physical existence and "only conceptually or emotional" as options is not simply a false dilemma?
How have you determined that there is no possibility of a thing being objectively real without being physical?

I don't. I just see have not seen any way to determine that if something is 'objectively real' without it. Can you show me a way to determine this? How do you know? DO you have something more than a feeling? Do you have something that is consistent?

Other than that, the idea of 'receiving in information n other than the senses,', I don't know what that means. Since ideas and emotions exist, and we do have information from our senses . Since you are claiming 'information' from other than our senses, I would have to say you have to support it that is other than an idea or an emotion. There is a difference between something that actually exists, and something that exists conceptually. There are a lot of ideas and concept that Do have value to a person, and to society, or smaller groups of people.. but that does not mean ti is more than a repeated meme.

Is your own unique idea 'information'?? Only if you can communicate it clearly an distantly to other people. Can you show that 'idea or concept or feeling' originated from an outside source? You might be able to convince yourself, but you have not been able to demonstrate it to anybody else. Does that make it less important.. to you personally?? No, it does not.

What is the way you distinguish an idea or emotion that is self generated, or something that comes via an outside source? Do you have a way? Can you figure out a way to show others that it wasn't your own ideas or emotion, but came externally?

Can you support the feeling of certainer you have about 'objective morality' is not an emotional reaction or an internally generated concept? The method I have distinguishes between something exists externally verses conceptually. That is a repeating methodology that works for me.. and no one has been able to show a better way. Do you have a suggestion?

This seems a very long argumentum ad ignoratium position. It is logically contradictory to claim, without physical evidence, that we should not accept a claim as objectively true unless it is supported by physical evidence.
Yes, we need to look at other alternatives, but we, clearly can reject this verificationism.

Again, how do you know? What method do you use to distinguish from 'making it up as we go along' from reality? Verification is the only way I have been able to determine between something that objectively exists and is conceptual. Do you have a way that is consistent , and that can be convincing to others. What other method do you have.. that not only you can do, but others can too? I would be more than interested in seeing your proposal. Mine is via quantification and verification.. and it can be utilized by anybody who cares to use it, and is consistent. If you have an alternative, I would love to see it.. and try it out for myself.

For me, it's not enough 'well maybe'. There has to be something better than metaphysical innuendos and hints at 'if then maybes'. Do you have anything that can replace my methodology that is consistent?

I am not saying that concepts and emotions do not have value. I am specifically addressing 'objectively' existing verses conceptually. What method do you have that can demonstrate to others (not just convince yourself) that something exists externally to yourself?

I can demonstrate that the criterion you mentioned earlier is self-contradictory.
Beyond that, I'm not yet convinced that the ability to share information is a necessary requirement for belief. I couldn't, for instance, demonstrate for you that I had a headache earlier today. That doesn't make me irrational to believe that I did, in fact, have one.

Yet, often we can actually determine the cause of a head ache. There are many causes, so it might not be able to determine that cause that that particular one, but there are physical and chemical causes. These can often be tracked down.

The pain of a headache is subjective.. but quite often, a physical cause can be discovered.

Well, that method is a CONCEPT.. .. it doesn't objectively exist. It is a methodology. Do you see the difference? If you want to reject it, that's up o you. However, when it comes to the claim "Objective Morals" exist, if you can't provide a methodology to demonstrate it to me, why should I accept ? At least with my concept, I can show you that things that I can measure objectively exists.

Actually, I don't know what you mean by the difference.
If this concept does not objectively exist in the sense of being objectively true, then there is no reason why I should believe it.
If, however, a concept can be objectively true without existing in some other sense, then I see no reason why this wouldn't also apply to morals.

What kind of concept can be 'objectively true'. Can you give an example? How do you know that it is 'objectively true'? I would love to see an example rather than talking about it in vague terms.

Sure, something else might exist objectively, but I can't show myself that, much less someone. Can you provide a better way? I would be open to suggestions.

My first suggestion would be to adopt a consistent standard that doesn't have separate rules for claims of truth and claims about existence - or, at least, to provide a reason for why there should be separate systems.

ANd, how does that work??? What is 'truth". When something can not be verified, how do you know it's "Truth". That sounds so very subjective to me.

Experts on epistomology agree on the proper basicality of moral experience. If you wish to argue a minority position, these contradictions would need to be addressed.

So, you got some people who play word games. They make lots of claims.. but how do I know their claims are true? Can they show that the 'moral experience' is objective, not subjective? Care to prove what they think, and their arguments on it? OF course, an argument is not evidence.. it is just , in my mind, often word games.

As far as I can see, the 'moral experience' is a culturally conditioned response. That does not exist... as a concept. But, the inclination to morals is the same as the inclination to language. The inclination is there. but what language you speak is influenced by your culture.

[Jester]

Just to make sure I got your position right, do correct me if I got it wrong. You are saying it is self-evidently true that "murder is wrong" for example, and this is independent of tradition and upbringing.

And as something that is self-evidently true, one can varify the truth of this without appealing to our sense, and dismissed the call for measuring morality.

You also how that you varified the truth of this the same way you determine that the physical universe exists.

I think this is an existential claim, I determind the physical universe exist with my senses.

My epistemological claim is that acceptance of a claim as true should be based on our experience, including moral experience.
Yes, I would also draw existential conclusions from that - just as a person who accepts the epistemology that sensory experience is the only reliable indicator of truth will draw existential conclusions from such a position.

I think something either self-evident, or can be sensed directly would both be considered properly basic.

I would not disagree with this, but merely add that I see no reason to reject moral experience as self-evidently valid. I believe that one's experience should be trusted until one has a good reason to doubt it.

[Jester]

How have you determined that there is no possibility of a thing being objectively real without being physical?

I don't. I just see have not seen any way to determine that if something is 'objectively real' without it. Can you show me a way to determine this? How do you know? DO you have something more than a feeling? Do you have something that is consistent?

My moral experience is as consistent as my sensory experience. I see no reason to reject my experience based simply on the epistemological assertion that I should do so.

Yes, we need to look at other alternatives, but we, clearly can reject this verificationism.

Again, how do you know? What method do you use to distinguish from 'making it up as we go along' from reality? Verification is the only way I have been able to determine between something that objectively exists and is conceptual. Do you have a way that is consistent , and that can be convincing to others. What other method do you have.. that not only you can do, but others can too?

I wasn't speaking about verification, but verificationism. Simply insisting that I should not hold a belief unless I can demonstrate the claim does not address the plain contradiction inherent in the logical positivism you seem to be supporting.
Rather, I accept the majority position that properly basic beliefs are valid to hold.

For me, it's not enough 'well maybe'. There has to be something better than metaphysical innuendos and hints at 'if then maybes'. Do you have anything that can replace my methodology that is consistent?

If this truly is your position, then I don't see why you accept verificationism. It is not itself verified. It is a metaphysical position that is very much a "well maybe". I've read much on the subject, and never seen a bit of verification for it.
That being the case, I simply don't see how one can be a verificationist and claim either to be consistent or to reject "well maybe" thinking.

I couldn't, for instance, demonstrate for you that I had a headache earlier today. That doesn't make me irrational to believe that I did, in fact, have one.

Yet, often we can actually determine the cause of a head ache. There are many causes, so it might not be able to determine that cause that that particular one, but there are physical and chemical causes. These can often be tracked down.

The pain of a headache is subjective.. but quite often, a physical cause can be discovered.

That doesn't, however, make it irrational to believe that someone has a headache before we have tracked down a physical cause for it.
This is the simple assertion that, because we can sometimes track physical causes, we should reject all other forms of knowing. I see no reason for that.

If this concept does not objectively exist in the sense of being objectively true, then there is no reason why I should believe it.
If, however, a concept can be objectively true without existing in some other sense, then I see no reason why this wouldn't also apply to morals.

What kind of concept can be 'objectively true'. Can you give an example? How do you know that it is 'objectively true'? I would love to see an example rather than talking about it in vague terms.

I've already claimed that moral experience was one such concept.
Also, you seem to claim that verificationism is objectively true. That is, you seem to think it is a valid principle.
Is there a reason why yours is a valid principle, but mine is not? What is that reason?

Sure, something else might exist objectively, but I can't show myself that, much less someone. Can you provide a better way? I would be open to suggestions.

My first suggestion would be to adopt a consistent standard that doesn't have separate rules for claims of truth and claims about existence - or, at least, to provide a reason for why there should be separate systems.

ANd, how does that work??? What is 'truth". When something can not be verified, how do you know it's "Truth". That sounds so very subjective to me.

It is definitely no more subjective than the unverified claim that a claim should be verified by the senses before being accepted.

But, how do I know? As you point out, there is no such thing as absolute certainty in life. Hence I do not know absolutely, I accept that which is most likely - based on my experience.

But, to demand that verificationism is somehow an improvement with regard to this problem is deeply inconsistent.

Experts on epistomology agree on the proper basicality of moral experience. If you wish to argue a minority position, these contradictions would need to be addressed.

So, you got some people who play word games. They make lots of claims.. but how do I know their claims are true? Can they show that the 'moral experience' is objective, not subjective? Care to prove what they think, and their arguments on it? OF course, an argument is not evidence.. it is just , in my mind, often word games.

It is extremely anti-intellectual to reject a popular position of academics based on nothing more than the demand that, if they accept your personal criterion for evidence, their conclusion will be rejected.
This is doubly true when the criterion in question is self-contradictory.

No, they cannot "prove what they think" or "show" you the objectivity of their experience, and neither can you. We have seen no physical evidence at all that your verificationism is correct. It is horribly inconsistent, then, to suddenly demand physical evidence of others.

As far as I can see, the 'moral experience' is a culturally conditioned response.

Is there evidence for this? What experiment was performed in order to justify this position? Which laboratory did the testing? What tools did they use?
If I were to practice verificationism, I would want answers to all these questions before accepting what you say.

As it is, however, I could as easily claim that your attachment to verificationism is culturally conditioned. You seem to have come from a culture which often slips into scientism, promotes materialism in many ways, and you certainly weren't born believing in the idea. If you can't answer my questions above, should I conclude that it is simply a culturally conditioned opinion?

[Bust Nak]

My epistemological claim is that acceptance of a claim as true should be based on our experience, including moral experience.

Ok, but what isn't clear is whether you think moral claims such as "murder is wrong" is properly basic because it is self-evidently true (axiom like re: self-evidently valid in in final paragraph,) or because it can be observed with your senses (which is what seem to be what you are saying re: existential conclusion below.) Can you expand more on what you mean by moral experience?

Yes, I would also draw existential conclusions from that - just as a person who accepts the epistemology that sensory experience is the only reliable indicator of truth will draw existential conclusions from such a position.

As with any existential claim, how you do measure morality with your senses?

I would not disagree with this, but merely add that I see no reason to reject moral experience as self-evidently valid. I believe that one's experience should be trusted until one has a good reason to doubt it.

Well no one is asking you to reject whatever morality you hold to be true, i.e. I am not saying you should think murder is right. I am asking you how you know this? Your previous answer was the same way you know the universe exist, which suggest you can measure morality objectively as one would with the universe.

[Jester]

Greetings once again!

Just to make sure I got your position right, do correct me if I got it wrong. You are saying it is self-evidently true that "murder is wrong" for example, and this is independent of tradition and upbringing.

I feel that I have a sense of what ought to be that is as basic as my sense of what is. From another perspective, one might say that I have a sense of ethics analogous to my sense of hearing.
I apologize if that is vague - but I'm not quite certain where to draw the line between direct sensation and self-evident truth. I understand the difference, but there does seem to be a gray area here.

You also how that you varified the truth of this the same way you determine that the physical universe exists.

I think this is an existential claim, I determind the physical universe exist with my senses.

That is an epistemological claim. Any "how do you know" question is, by definition, epistemological.

To claim that the physical experience is more basic than moral experience is a minority epistomological position among those trained in philosophy. This, of course, does not make it wrong - but I see no reason to accept it based simply on a claim.

I think something either self-evident, or can be sensed directly would both be considered properly basic.

I would agree with this.

[Bust Nak]

I feel that I have a sense of what ought to be that is as basic as my sense of what is. From another perspective, one might say that I have a sense of ethics analogous to my sense of hearing.

How close an analogy? I can build a machine to detect sound waves for example.

I apologize if that is vague - but I'm not quite certain where to draw the line between direct sensation and self-evident truth. I understand the difference, but there does seem to be a gray area here.

I suggest this apparent gray area is evidence that your moral experience is subjective.

That is an epistemological claim. Any "how do you know" question is, by definition, epistemological.

Right, and your answer were the same way one know the universe exist. Which goes back to the original question. How do you measure this with your senses? That your moral experience is consistent with your senses doesn't answer that question.

[Jester]

I feel that I have a sense of what ought to be that is as basic as my sense of what is. From another perspective, one might say that I have a sense of ethics analogous to my sense of hearing.

How close an analogy? I can build a machine to detect sound waves for example.

Not so close that I would claim morals to be physical objects.
So no, building a detection device would not be possible.

I suggest this apparent gray area is evidence that your moral experience is subjective.

You are free to suggest that. In fact, I'd agree with the notion that all experience is, to some degree, subjective.
However, the fact that culture affects how one perceives color doesn't incline me to think that there is no such thing as light.
It is difficult to say, in a philosophically precise way, whether I see the physical universe as self-evident, or accept it based on experience. Properly basic beliefs are difficult to categorize in this way.
Morality is no different.

That is an epistemological claim. Any "how do you know" question is, by definition, epistemological.

Right, and your answer were the same way one know the universe exist. Which goes back to the original question. How do you measure this with your senses? That your moral experience is consistent with your senses doesn't answer that question.

I didn't make any case based on my moral senses being consistent with my physical senses (though I would say that they are).
Rather, I made the case that I experience morality as directly as I experience the physical universe, and have been given no defeater for either of these beliefs.

To put it in more concrete terms, I have a direct sense that the Crusades were immoral. I would need a good argument supporting the idea that its proponents' ethical system is equally as valid as my own before accepting that idea as fact.

[Goat]

I feel that I have a sense of what ought to be that is as basic as my sense of what is. From another perspective, one might say that I have a sense of ethics analogous to my sense of hearing.

How close an analogy? I can build a machine to detect sound waves for example.

Not so close that I would claim morals to be physical objects.
So no, building a detection device would not be possible.

I suggest this apparent gray area is evidence that your moral experience is subjective.

You are free to suggest that. In fact, I'd agree with the notion that all experience is, to some degree, subjective.
However, the fact that culture affects how one perceives color doesn't incline me to think that there is no such thing as light.

Yet, no matter how the cultural influences are when it comes to perceiving light, you can measure light. And, it doesn't matter if one is blind or not, light can still be used to power electrical appliances via solar cells. You can't do that with a moral.

It is difficult to say, in a philosophically precise way, whether I see the physical universe as self-evident, or accept it based on experience. Properly basic beliefs are difficult to categorize in this way.
Morality is no different.

Trying to equate a moral to something that can physically influence the world around it , and is not dependent on human perception is quite a difference. Even without human perception, wind will blow, rain will fall, and stars will burn their fuel up.

That is an epistemological claim. Any "how do you know" question is, by definition, epistemological.

Right, and your answer were the same way one know the universe exist. Which goes back to the original question. How do you measure this with your senses? That your moral experience is consistent with your senses doesn't answer that question.

I didn't make any case based on my moral senses being consistent with my physical senses (though I would say that they are).
Rather, I made the case that I experience morality as directly as I experience the physical universe, and have been given no defeater for either of these beliefs.

You made that claim. However, you have not shown a method that you can use to distinguish between something that objectively exists, and an emotional reaction, or a culturally conditioned response.

To put it in more concrete terms, I have a direct sense that the Crusades were immoral. I would need a good argument supporting the idea that its proponents' ethical system is equally as valid as my own before accepting that idea as fact.

And, how do you distinguish between a 'sense' that the Crusades were wrong, and a culturally conditioned response? Why is their response different?

How does your sense of morality be different than proclaiming 'I am right, they are wrong, because I said so'?

[scourge99]

I feel that I have a sense of what ought to be that is as basic as my sense of what is. From another perspective, one might say that I have a sense of ethics analogous to my sense of hearing.

How close an analogy? I can build a machine to detect sound waves for example.

Not so close that I would claim morals to be physical objects.
So no, building a detection device would not be possible.

I suggest this apparent gray area is evidence that your moral experience is subjective.

You are free to suggest that. In fact, I'd agree with the notion that all experience is, to some degree, subjective.
However, the fact that culture affects how one perceives color doesn't incline me to think that there is no such thing as light.
It is difficult to say, in a philosophically precise way, whether I see the physical universe as self-evident, or accept it based on experience. Properly basic beliefs are difficult to categorize in this way.
Morality is no different.

That is an epistemological claim. Any "how do you know" question is, by definition, epistemological.

Right, and your answer were the same way one know the universe exist. Which goes back to the original question. How do you measure this with your senses? That your moral experience is consistent with your senses doesn't answer that question.

I didn't make any case based on my moral senses being consistent with my physical senses (though I would say that they are).
Rather, I made the case that I experience morality as directly as I experience the physical universe, and have been given no defeater for either of these beliefs.

To put it in more concrete terms, I have a direct sense that the Crusades were immoral. I would need a good argument supporting the idea that its proponents' ethical system is equally as valid as my own before accepting that idea as fact.

And you believe your "experience" of morals is more accurate than other's experience because?

[Jester]

You are free to suggest that. In fact, I'd agree with the notion that all experience is, to some degree, subjective.
However, the fact that culture affects how one perceives color doesn't incline me to think that there is no such thing as light.

Yet, no matter how the cultural influences are when it comes to perceiving light, you can measure light. And, it doesn't matter if one is blind or not, light can still be used to power electrical appliances via solar cells. You can't do that with a moral.

I've never disagreed with the idea that morals can't be measured.
Are you saying that we should reject any claim that cannot be measured?

Trying to equate a moral to something that can physically influence the world around it , and is not dependent on human perception is quite a difference. Even without human perception, wind will blow, rain will fall, and stars will burn their fuel up.

I've not remotely tried to equate the moral with the physical. I was merely pointing out a similarity.
Here, you have claimed that the physical universe exists independent of human perception. I agree on that point.
However, this does not contain an argument that nothing else exists. Simply demanding that I accept verificationism does not answer my earlier questions regarding it.

You made that claim. However, you have not shown a method that you can use to distinguish between something that objectively exists, and an emotional reaction, or a culturally conditioned response.

This is more verificationism.
I mentioned experience. If you are simply insisting that sensory data is the only acceptable experience, then you need to provide an argument in support of that claim.

To put it in more concrete terms, I have a direct sense that the Crusades were immoral. I would need a good argument supporting the idea that its proponents' ethical system is equally as valid as my own before accepting that idea as fact.

And, how do you distinguish between a 'sense' that the Crusades were wrong, and a culturally conditioned response? Why is their response different?

How do you distinguish between your sense that the sky is blue and that the ancient Greeks were wrong to classify it as bronze?
That someone does not share one's experience is not a reason to reject it.

But, if you wish to argue that the proponents' of the Crusades have a moral system that is as valid as our own, I would like an argument in support of that. Simply telling me that they were as justified in killing as we are in, say, giving to charity does not establish that this is the case.