Can Atheism ground objective morality?

[The Tanager]

In my exploration and discussions, I have not seen an atheistic worldview be able to logically account for morality being objective. The closest I've seen is an atheistic platonic kind of moral system, but while that seems to be able to account for the existence of 'good' and 'evil', it still doesn't seem to account for why humans would be obligated to choose Good over Evil. I'd love to hear cases from those who think atheism can account for objective morality to make sure I haven't missed (or misunderstood) thoughts in my exploration.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to bluegreenearth in post #75]

So, if I've understood correctly, you are using a proprietary definition of "objective" that was purposefully and conveniently designed to accommodate an exemption specifically for the mind of your god?

Are you sure this is the definition of "objective" you want to use?

No. If God exists, then the objective shape of the earth is still contingent on a mind and objective.

Hang on. So if God exists then the world is an oblate spheroid. But if He doesn't then it isn't?

That can't be what you're saying.

I think you've both misunderstood.

I’m saying that if (a) ‘objective’ means “something that exists in reality such that its properties are not contingent on a mind?” then (b) that would mean that if theism is true, the shape of the earth would be subjective rather than objective since that property (the shape of the earth) would be contingent on the creator’s mind.

(b) is obviously false. Assuming theism is true, we would still say the shape of the earth is objective, while saying other things are subjective. Via modus tollens, (a) is false and we need a different definition of ‘objective’.

I offered a different definition. I don't see how it provides an exemption for my God in how it is phrased. In my framework, morality is also independent of the opinions of God as an observer. Therefore, it is leaving the God question as a separate one, begging it neither way.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Bradskii in post #77]

In the examples that you gave there will be an objectively correct answer (whether we actually know what it is or not). I can't prefer that humans and apes are descended from a common ancestor. That we did is an objective fact.

Yes, that’s my point. You said “If someone asks for a view on a moral problem then we give our position on it. It cannot therefore, in that case, be an objective position.” If it’s because it’s a moral problem, then you are clearly just begging the question against morality. But if you are making a general principle, then it will work against things like the origin of the Big Bang or common ancestry of humans and apes being objective.

So, you either must drop your stated principle (and realize you were conflating two senses of subjective or try some other principle to maintain your definition of subjective as valid) or claim that common ancestry cannot be an objective position.

Now it probably seems wrong to you that my position is that there is no objectively correct answer to what icecream you choose, but that there is also no objectively correct answer as to whether Joe assaults someone.

Well, yes, I think you are wrong on that, but that hasn’t been my point here. My point here is that you are saying this while acting like there is an objectively correct answer concerning the assault.

But...what we can do is take it a step further and ask 'Is there any harm done in choosing chocolate?' The obvious answer is no. But is there any harm done if Joe prefers to assault his daughter? And the answer is obviously yes. So I have no interest in preventing someone choosing chocolate, but I have a moral objection to what Joe wants to do.

But there are competing ideas of harm at play because Joe believes he is being harmed by not being allowed to pursue his preference for assault and the benefit he believes he will get out of it.

Are you saying there is only one actual harm involved in this question (or even that one harm is objectively worse than the other)? If so, why? And even if you can justify that, aren’t we still left with your preference to limit harm butting up against another’s preference to ignore harm for self benefit?

If there is something beyond the preferences, then why isn’t that objectivism? If not, then you haven’t actually taken this a step further; we are still at different preferences. A true subjectivist doesn’t say one preference is better than another, they are just different.

There's just the one question. I'm using a common means of punishing a child as an example because parents would most agree that it's a standard means of trying to persuade a child that she has done wrong. The moral question is not should we do it - I'm assuming that it's a given that it would be acceptable. The moral question is: For how long is it acceptable? Two hours? Two weeks? Any specific time between those two? It's obviously on a continuum. And it would depend on the age of the child. The conditions in the room. The mental state of the child. There are an infinite number of conditions that we'd have to consider. And let's say that we were absolutely specific regarding every one of them. Then who says it's wrong or right?

How do we know that in an exact, specific one in a gazillion set of circumstances that it's objectively right or wrong? Short answer is: We don't. Not because it's unknowable (although it most definitely is). But because there is no objectively correct answer.

Can you offer the reasoning that leads to the short answer?

[Bradskii]

Yes, that’s my point. You said “If someone asks for a view on a moral problem then we give our position on it. It cannot therefore, in that case, be an objective position.” If it’s because it’s a moral problem, then you are clearly just begging the question against morality. But if you are making a general principle, then it will work against things like the origin of the Big Bang or common ancestry of humans and apes being objective.

If you ask me about a fact regarding evolution, I can't give my opinion on it. I can't say 'It's my personal opinion that apes and humans descended from a common ancestor'. Just like I can't say that it's my opinion that there's a wooden Buddha sitting on the table as I write this. Facts are objective. But you can have an opinion on what the facts might mean. I can't have an opinion that it's sunny at the moment. It is an objective fact. But I can then have an opinion as to whether this will mean there'll be more people on the beach.

If I give my opinion on a moral matter, then I don't say it's not an objective opinion simply because it's a moral matter. I've already run through why I think objective morality doesn't exist. It's for those reasons I say it's not objective.

Well, yes, I think you are wrong on that, but that hasn’t been my point here. My point here is that you are saying this while acting like there is an objectively correct answer concerning the assault.

It's my personal opinion to whether I think it's correct or not. That doesn't make it the objectively correct answer. If everyone on the planet agreed with me, then it still wouldn't make it objectively correct. We can all vote to decide if something is correct. But we can't all vote to decide if it's objectively correct.

But there are competing ideas of harm at play because Joe believes he is being harmed by not being allowed to pursue his preference for assault and the benefit he believes he will get out of it.

Correct.

A true subjectivist doesn’t say one preference is better than another, they are just different.

Good grief, no. I've just spent some time explaining that that is NOT the case. If they are preferences, then they are, by definition, subjective. That doesn't make them all equal. Who says that they do? Where are you getting this from? Can you quote somebody that says this? It's nonsense.

Can you offer the reasoning that leads to the short answer?

I just did. That question above was in response to the reasoning I just gave.

[Bradskii]

I think you've both misunderstood.

I’m saying that if (a) ‘objective’ means “something that exists in reality such that its properties are not contingent on a mind?” then (b) that would mean that if theism is true, the shape of the earth would be subjective rather than objective since that property (the shape of the earth) would be contingent on the creator’s mind.

(b) is obviously false. Assuming theism is true, we would still say the shape of the earth is objective, while saying other things are subjective. Via modus tollens, (a) is false and we need a different definition of ‘objective’.

No, there is no 'then' after the first (a), which makes it all something of a mess. You have two proposals:

(a) ‘objective’ means “something that exists in reality such that its properties are not contingent on a mind”
(b) if theism is true, the shape of the earth would be subjective rather than objective since that property (the shape of the earth) would be contingent on the creator’s mind.

You've put forward an either/or question. And I don't agree with either. You are dealing with a fact - the shape of the earth. Now maybe the shape happened naturally or maybe God decided it should be that shape. Either way, we have a fact that the earth is round. Facts are objective.

[Mr E]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #1]

In my exploration and discussions, I have not seen an atheistic worldview be able to logically account for morality being objective. The closest I've seen is an atheistic platonic kind of moral system, but while that seems to be able to account for the existence of 'good' and 'evil', it still doesn't seem to account for why humans would be obligated to choose Good over Evil. I'd love to hear cases from those who think atheism can account for objective morality to make sure I haven't missed (or misunderstood) thoughts in my exploration.

I would say that you are still searching. There are no "good" arguments that can account for good objectively, without God at the center. The best alternative possibility that atheists can construe as any kind of nebulous explanation ultimately ends up with a question mark that they substitute for God. They fixate upon their atheistic (without God) foundation and insist that although they can offer no plausible replacement for God and that they really don't know how or why it exists, the reason couldn't possibly be God. So when you offer God as the answer to their question mark, they stubbornly reject it and cling to that question mark. It's what scripture calls stiff-necked, or hard-hearted and though the answer shouts through nature and science and even mathematics, they can't get their heads around it.

It's a mind-trap they have yet to escape.

[bluegreenearth]

I’m saying that if (a) ‘objective’ means “something that exists in reality such that its properties are not contingent on a mind?” then (b) that would mean that if theism is true, the shape of the earth would be subjective rather than objective since that property (the shape of the earth) would be contingent on the creator’s mind.

(b) is obviously false. Assuming theism is true, we would still say the shape of the earth is objective, while saying other things are subjective. Via modus tollens, (a) is false and we need a different definition of ‘objective’.

Please explain how (b) would be obviously false if the god exists. It seems to logically follow that, if the god created the Earth, its shape was subject to the creator's mind. Are you saying that if the god exists, it would have been impossible for such a creator to make anything but a spherical planet?

I offered a different definition. I don't see how it provides an exemption for my God in how it is phrased. In my framework, morality is also independent of the opinions of God as an observer. Therefore, it is leaving the God question as a separate one, begging it neither way.

Below is the definition you are referencing:

It needs to be something more like “...such that its properties are independent of the observer’s opinions.”

So, according to your proprietary definition, "objective" mean something that exists in reality such that its properties are independent of the observer's opinions. Since morality is an entirely conceptual phenomenon and doesn't actually exist in reality, how could it have objective properties that exist independently of an observer's opinions?

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Bradskii in post #83]

Yes, that’s my point. You said “If someone asks for a view on a moral problem then we give our position on it. It cannot therefore, in that case, be an objective position.” If it’s because it’s a moral problem, then you are clearly just begging the question against morality. But if you are making a general principle, then it will work against things like the origin of the Big Bang or common ancestry of humans and apes being objective.

So, you either must drop your stated principle (and realize you were conflating two senses of subjective or try some other principle to maintain your definition of subjective as valid) or claim that common ancestry cannot be an objective position.

If I give my opinion on a moral matter, then I don't say it's not an objective opinion simply because it's a moral matter. I've already run through why I think objective morality doesn't exist. It's for those reasons I say it's not objective.

So perhaps we were talking past each other a bit Thanks for clarifying.

A true subjectivist doesn’t say one preference is better than another, they are just different.

Good grief, no. I've just spent some time explaining that that is NOT the case. If they are preferences, then they are, by definition, subjective. That doesn't make them all equal. Who says that they do? Where are you getting this from? Can you quote somebody that says this? It's nonsense.

Two things here: what counts as a preference and things being equal.

Joe says the earth is flat. Joe says chocolate tastes better to him than vanilla. Joe says he should be allowed to assault his daughter. Why are the last two ‘preferences’ while the first one isn’t?

On the second, I’m following the logic of the position. On ice cream flavor, subjectivists believe that (in the general sense) chocolate is neither better nor worse than vanilla. If something is neither better nor worse, then it is equal…those are the only three logical options.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Bradskii in post #84]

[Replying to bluegreenearth in post #86]

I think you've both misunderstood.

I’m saying that if (a) ‘objective’ means “something that exists in reality such that its properties are not contingent on a mind?” then (b) that would mean that if theism is true, the shape of the earth would be subjective rather than objective since that property (the shape of the earth) would be contingent on the creator’s mind.

(b) is obviously false. Assuming theism is true, we would still say the shape of the earth is objective, while saying other things are subjective. Via modus tollens, (a) is false and we need a different definition of ‘objective’.

No, there is no 'then' after the first (a), which makes it all something of a mess. You have two proposals:

(a) ‘objective’ means “something that exists in reality such that its properties are not contingent on a mind”
(b) if theism is true, the shape of the earth would be subjective rather than objective since that property (the shape of the earth) would be contingent on the creator’s mind.

You've put forward an either/or question. And I don't agree with either. You are dealing with a fact - the shape of the earth. Now maybe the shape happened naturally or maybe God decided it should be that shape. Either way, we have a fact that the earth is round. Facts are objective.

I think you are still misunderstanding what is going on here. (a) is a definition and (b) involves what would follow from that definition, if theism were true. It doesn’t matter what the fact of the shape of the earth really is, whether theism or atheism is true, or anything like that.

If the definition bluegreenearth asked me about was the definition of ‘objective’ and theism were true, then, by definition, the shape of the earth would not be objective (i.e., it would be subjective) because that property was contingent on a mind (God making it that way). But to be subjective, that would mean the shape of the earth actually differs based on who we are talking about; it's spherical for you and flat for me or something like that. Therefore, the definition is a bad one.

Please explain how (b) would be obviously false if the god exists. It seems to logically follow that, if the god created the Earth, its shape was subject to the creator's mind. Are you saying that if the god exists, it would have been impossible for such a creator to make anything but a spherical planet?

Yes, it was subject to the creator’s mind, but it’s also the same shape for everyone. It’s an objective feature of reality…it’s the same for everyone. It’s not actually spherical for one person and actually flat for another. Analogically, it’s not that chocolate is good to one person and disgusting to another.

So, according to your proprietary definition, "objective" mean something that exists in reality such that its properties are independent of the observer's opinions. Since morality is an entirely conceptual phenomenon and doesn't actually exist in reality, how could it have objective properties that exist independently of an observer's opinions?

What do you mean that it is an entirely conceptual phenomenon?

[Bradskii]

Two things here: what counts as a preference and things being equal.

Joe says the earth is flat. Joe says chocolate tastes better to him than vanilla. Joe says he should be allowed to assault his daughter. Why are the last two ‘preferences’ while the first one isn’t?

Joe says he'd prefer the world was flat rather than round.
The shape is an objective fact. He doesn't have a choice about it (making a choice here meaning to express a preference).

Joe says he'd prefer chocolate rather than vanilla.
He has a choice. He can express a preference.

Joe says he'd prefer assaulting his daughter rather than watching the game.
He has a choice. He can express a preference.

Are these moral choices? Well, we need to decide if harm is going to be done by acting on the preferences. In the first, there is no preference. There's no harm in the second so I've no further input. There obviously will be in the last case, so I need to decide what to do about it. I need to make a personal decision and I will then act on my preference.

[Bradskii]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #1]

In my exploration and discussions, I have not seen an atheistic worldview be able to logically account for morality being objective. The closest I've seen is an atheistic platonic kind of moral system, but while that seems to be able to account for the existence of 'good' and 'evil', it still doesn't seem to account for why humans would be obligated to choose Good over Evil. I'd love to hear cases from those who think atheism can account for objective morality to make sure I haven't missed (or misunderstood) thoughts in my exploration.

I would say that you are still searching. There are no "good" arguments that can account for good objectively, without God at the center. The best alternative possibility that atheists can construe as any kind of nebulous explanation ultimately ends up with a question mark that they substitute for God. They fixate upon their atheistic (without God) foundation and insist that although they can offer no plausible replacement for God and that they really don't know how or why it exists, the reason couldn't possibly be God. So when you offer God as the answer to their question mark, they stubbornly reject it and cling to that question mark. It's what scripture calls stiff-necked, or hard-hearted and though the answer shouts through nature and science and even mathematics, they can't get their heads around it.

We're talking about morality (objective facts obviously exist - the buddha on my table again). But there's no question mark as regards objective morality. I appreciate that Christians submit God as the basis for objective morality, but that makes no sense to me. Something that I consider not to exist can't be the reason for anything.

That's why you haven't seen 'an atheistic worldview be able to logically account for morality being objective.' As there's nothing on which to base objective morality, it simply doesn't exist. There's nothing to logically account for.