I am seriously questioning my atheism

[Haven]

Disclaimer: This post may be out of place on the Christianity and Apologetics forum (even though it does have some relation to Christianity), if it is, I apologize and ask that it be moved to a more appropriate place on the forum. However, I do intend this thread to be a discussion, if not a debate, so I felt this was the best place for it.

As many of you know, I am an ex-evangelical Christian and a current atheist. By "atheist," I mean I lack belief in god(s) of any kind, although I do not assert that there are definitely no gods. Since departing from Christianity, everything has made so much more sense: an eternal Universe (defined as the totality of natural existence) explained existence, evolution explained the diversity of life on earth, the absence of god(s) explained the problems of evil, inconsistent revelation, and so on.

However, there is one thing that I have been unable to account for under atheism: morality. Atheists almost invariably state that moral values and duties are not objective facts, but are simply subjective statements of preference and have no ontological value. That is, of course, until we are presented with cases of true evil, such as the Holocaust, the atrocities of Pol Pot, or the horrible psychopathic serial killings of individuals like Jeffery Dahmer. Then we as atheists tacitly appeal to objective moral values and duties, saying that individuals who commit should be severely punished (even executed) for doing "evil," saying that they "knew right from wrong." But if right and wrong are simply statements of subjective opinion, then how can we say that others knew "right from wrong" and are accountable for their actions? If relativism is true, they simply had differing opinions from the majority of human beings. However, it seems obvious to me (and to the vast majority of others, theist and atheist alike) that this is absurd -- the monsters who carried out the aforementioned acts really, objectively did evil.

Given this, the only reasonable conclusion is that moral facts and imperatives exist.

However, atheism appears to offer no framework for moral facts. Because of this, a few weeks ago, I started up a discussion on Wielenbergian moral realism, which states that objective moral values are simply "brute facts" that exist without any explanation. However, others rightly pointed out that the existence of "brute facts" is ontologically problematic and that the best explanation (on atheism) is that morality is simply subjective. Additionally, even if atheistic moral facts existed, the Humeian problem of deriving an "ought" from an "is" would preclude them from acting as moral imperatives; commands which human beings are obligated to follow.

In light of these airtight logical objections to atheistic moral realism, I was forced to abandon my position on moral facts and tentatively adopt moral relativism. However, relativism still seems problematic. After all, if morality is subjective, no one person can accuse another of failing to recognize the difference between "right and wrong," however, it is obvious to me (and, I would suspect, to other atheists as well) that right or wrong really objectively (not subjectively) exist.

The only rational conclusion I can seem to come up with is that there is a (are) transcendent moral lawgiver(s) who both grounds moral facts and issues binding moral commands on all humanity; i.e., God(s). This echoes evangelical Christian philosopher William Lane Craig's moral argument, which syllogism reads:

Premise 1: If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
Premise 2: Objective moral values and duties do exist
Conclusion: Therefore, God exists

Premises 1 and 2 seem bulletproof -- (1) was demonstrated earlier in this post, leaving (2) as the only premise to attack. However, (2) seems to be as obvious as a hand in front of my face. The conclusion necessarily follows from (1) and (2), so is there any rational reason for me to reject the conclusion of the argument?

Remember, I am no believer of any kind. I am a staunch, educated, informed atheist, and I am well aware of the philosophical arguments against God(s), such as the problem of evil, the dysteleological argument, the problem of omniscience, etc. I'm also well aware of the plentiful empirical evidence against the existence of God(s), for instance, evolution, mind-body physicalism, etc. These are the reasons I reconverted from Christianity in the first place. However, I don't see way around this problem other than to accept either that our apparently obvious sense of moral facts is somehow mistaken, or that (a) theistic being(s) exist.

Debate question: Are my issues with atheism legitimate? Can atheism provide a coherent moral framework other than nihilism, relativism, or subjectivism? Do these problems really present evidence for theism? Is William Lane Craig right? Is this a real problem for atheism, or are my (our) emotions simply overriding my (our) rationality?

Feel free to present evidence for or against atheism, Christianity, or any religious or nonreligious perspective in this thread.

[Autodidact]

There's no such thing as moral beliefs other than as a human invention otherwise monkeys wouldn't exhibit moral behavior such as empathy and compassion. Unless you think monkeys have a belief system? Morals are simply a result of evolution just as our bodies are.

"I ought to respect the lives of others" or "I ought to treat others as I would like to be treated" are moral beliefs. Are you saying neither of these beliefs have a truth value, that both of these beliefs are false, or something else?

What I'm saying is, if you want to live a happy and fulfilling life, then you ought to do these things.

[Mithrae]

Why ought this morally corrupt nature be eliminated? Either we're compelled to act in a certain way, with no free will - in which case 'ought' is as meaningless a concept as saying a rock ought to fall when dropped - or we have a choice to make which can be informed by facts of circumstances, context and consequences, but not determined by them - in which case 'ought' is a value judgement of which facts will most consistently sway our decisions. The supposed existence of a deity who formed us and the nature and development intended for us may be pretty good motivating factors; but so are the supposed existence of millions of years of evolution which formed us and the nature with which we've been left as a result.

Why ought we seek out some kind of theistic moral system?

"Ought to" doesn't imply "ability to." As to why we ought to eliminate our corrupt natures or seek out a theistic moral system, I've already answered that. We're responsible to God because God created us to be responsible. It's a part of our identity. Responsibility presupposes a sovereign to whom one is responsible, not a free will. And again, this whole discussion is tied to one's epistemic views. I wouldn't make any of these claims if I didn't think they weren't grounded in Scripture, the presupposition of my own epistemic views.

Responsibility involves obligation and accountability for actions, which doesn't solve the problem I mentioned above: We wouldn't say that a rock is obliged to fall when dropped, or accountable for having done so. Granted, in everyday language we might sometimes project some of our own attributes onto objects due to our close relationship to them: For example, that my computer is 'responsible' for transmitting my thoughts to you through the internet. If that's the kind of situation you're describing regarding God's relationship to us, I'd say that you're misusing the word responsible to imply obligation or accountability where they're really not meaningful terms.

To the extent that responsibility is a meaningful concept for this dicussion, it would have to imply choices which we are obligated and accountable to God for making or not making. But even that doesn't give any truth value to why we ought to make one choice over the other. It's like saying we ought to keep breathing or eating. God created me to be obligated to him? Okay, but why ought I fulfill that obligation? Once again, if we're compelled 'ought' is a meaningless concept, but if we have a choice it's simply a value judgement on which facts will most consistently sway our decisions.

There's differences between the two views, certainly, though in general terms I believe that central element of empathy as expressed in the Golden Rule is common to all moral systems.

How would you want to be treated if you were a criminal?

Hard to say. I've heard that some repeat offending criminals may want to return to the stability of prison life. Some religious criminals seek martyrdom and/or media recognition of their cause. But in general criminals presumably want to be treated well, just like the rest of us. Or probably better than the rest of us, no doubt sometimes with more fear, respect or the like.

In other words, both views are quite similar in their basis for morality - our nature as human beings and the reason why this is so - and in both views there will be some (or many?) in society who reject or distort the consensus moral views.

Could you expand on what you mean by "basis," particularly as it does or doesn't relate to the concept of the justification of one's morality?

I'm not sure I can, particularly without some further clarification what you mean by justification. "We're responsible to God because God created us to be responsible" does not seem a particularly compelling justification to me - or at least, no more so than "we're responsible to our communities because evolution has made us responsible."

A God-centered approach to morality would therefore seem to be
- a little more selfish in seeking God's approval and merely presuming that's the best course with regards to others also
- a much more obscure and uncertain quest in discovering what this deity actually requires from amongst the myriad of competing claims on the subject, rather than formulating our own codes of behaviour
- and likely to be more resistant to change and persistent in error.

I don't see how it is selfish for a servant to want the approval of his master. Also, while your second point may be true for someone like Haven who is (or was, I guess) moving from ethics to theology rather than vice versa, it will not hold true for those who work the other way around. And I think this thread is a good example of why I would disagree that theists will be "more... persistent in error." I've not always been a Calvinist, you know.

But from the implication that unlike Haven you began with theology, presumably you have always been a Christian? From what I know, Calvin's doctrines are a compelling conclusion if and only if the writings of Paul are taken to be God's own truth. Any non-Calvinist reading Romans 9 will likely see a deity who by human understanding is quite monstrous, creating living thinking beings only for the express purpose of destroying them in order to exalt its own glory and 'mercy' shown to certain others among its playthings. While it's possible that someone might indeed reach the conclusion that we're playthings of a cruel and whimsical deity, I can't imagine that anyone would consider this to be a justifiable basis for human morality except by taking Paul's views as God's own - and even then, most Christians balk at the notion. However if my guess is correct, that would mean that before before becoming a Calvinist you believed Paul's letters to be God's own word, yes? Honestly, I don't think that biblicists becoming Calvinists is evidence that they're less persistant in error; on the contrary, it's simply following a previous error to an even more extreme conclusion which, in my opinion, debases or eliminates any moral inspiration or value of this God and of humanity itself.

Doing what it's in our nature to do - to have and express empathy for others - would seem to be the simpler, more obvious and potentially more beneficial choice regardless of 'oughts.'

Is that in our nature? I would contest that. Why do we have so many criminals in our society if you're right? My little brother knows how to lie pretty well. Did he learn that or does he realize that because it in not his interest not to get in trouble and to tell the truth would get him in trouble, not telling the truth is the "more beneficial" option? Self-interest rather than empathy pervades our culture.

In what way do your little brother's lies show a lack of empathy? I specifically said that we're motivated by self-interest, and that ultimately empathy for others promotes our self-interest at the level of families and communities. Lying to protect himself from harm is not the same as lying specifically in order to hurt others, is it? Does your little brother do the latter also?

And what percentage of criminals, do you suppose, don't love their children, their wives or their friends? Again, I specifically stated that this process of empathy begins with how we want to be treated, then extends to our family, then the community... and apparently we really haven't grasped it at the level of our species yet. Even at the community or national level our ability to reflect on how our actions impact others is far from perfect, as the examples of criminals, greed-driven corporate executives and all the rude or inconderate people we meet on a day-to-day basis show. Heck, even in the closest family units there are conflicts of interest; no-one ever said that our desire for other people's good will always over-rule our desire for our own good.

But, as the experiment with monkeys which I posted suggests, empathy is indeed part of our nature as primates.

[Knight]

Responsibility involves obligation and accountability for actions, which doesn't solve the problem I mentioned above: We wouldn't say that a rock is obliged to fall when dropped, or accountable for having done so. Granted, in everyday language we might sometimes project some of our own attributes onto objects due to our close relationship to them: For example, that my computer is 'responsible' for transmitting my thoughts to you through the internet. If that's the kind of situation you're describing regarding God's relationship to us, I'd say that you're misusing the word responsible to imply obligation or accountability where they're really not meaningful terms.

I am in complete agreement with your definition.

To the extent that responsibility is a meaningful concept for this dicussion, it would have to imply choices which we are obligated and accountable to God for making or not making. But even that doesn't give any truth value to why we ought to make one choice over the other. It's like saying we ought to keep breathing or eating. God created me to be obligated to him? Okay, but why ought I fulfill that obligation? Once again, if we're compelled 'ought' is a meaningless concept, but if we have a choice it's simply a value judgement on which facts will most consistently sway our decisions.

Our responsibility to God is simply a facet of our being. There is nothing contradictory about this. God didn't just create me to be obligated. He actually created me such that I am obligated, regardless of my response to that fact.

Also, determinism doesn't preclude choice.

Hard to say. I've heard that some repeat offending criminals may want to return to the stability of prison life. Some religious criminals seek martyrdom and/or media recognition of their cause. But in general criminals presumably want to be treated well, just like the rest of us. Or probably better than the rest of us, no doubt sometimes with more fear, respect or the like.

Would not a criminal like to be treated with mercy? As a sinner, that is my preference.

I'm not sure I can, particularly without some further clarification what you mean by justification. "We're responsible to God because God created us to be responsible" does not seem a particularly compelling justification to me - or at least, no more so than "we're responsible to our communities because evolution has made us responsible."

You said both views are similar in their basis for morality. Is this referring to the justification or reasons each view would provide for the moral beliefs each has?

Evolution isn't a thinking entity with purposes and intentions. How would you even be able to infer that, then? It's not analogous to a revelational epistemology.

[quote="

But from the implication that unlike Haven you began with theology, presumably you have always been a Christian?

Impossible. No one is born a Christian.

From what I know, Calvin's doctrines are a compelling conclusion if and only if the writings of Paul are taken to be God's own truth. Any non-Calvinist reading Romans 9 will likely see a deity who by human understanding is quite monstrous, creating living thinking beings only for the express purpose of destroying them in order to exalt its own glory and 'mercy' shown to certain others among its playthings.

Well, I am in full agreement with everything you say here. Paul himself says as much (not to be anachronistic).

While it's possible that someone might indeed reach the conclusion that we're playthings of a cruel and whimsical deity, I can't imagine that anyone would consider this to be a justifiable basis for human morality except by taking Paul's views as God's own - and even then, most Christians balk at the notion.

Nothing in Romans 9 implies God is whimsical. God acts necessarily. You would have to expand on what you think cruelty entails and why you think such is immoral, however.

However if my guess is correct, that would mean that before before becoming a Calvinist you believed Paul's letters to be God's own word, yes? Honestly, I don't think that biblicists becoming Calvinists is evidence that they're less persistant in error; on the contrary, it's simply following a previous error to an even more extreme conclusion which, in my opinion, debases or eliminates any moral inspiration or value of this God and of humanity itself.

I would say that for Haven to abandon his moral intuitions and embrace moral relativism would be the clear example of debasement of "moral inspiration." I find it sad that you would consider the side that actually attempts to justify their dogmatic moral beliefs is the side which debases moral inspiration. Almost every atheist here has recommended that Haven accept that no one "ought" do anything (in the appropriate sense of the word you mention in your first part above). That is the extremist view. That is the erroneous view.

In what way do your little brother's lies show a lack of empathy?

For starters, he blames my little sister for doing the troublesome things he did.

Lying to protect himself from harm is not the same as lying specifically in order to hurt others, is it? Does your little brother do the latter also?

Yes, and if you think this is uncommon, I would question to what level you are "socially dense," i.e. involved in society. Especially among people my age and younger, picking on others is very common.

And what percentage of criminals, do you suppose, don't love their children, their wives or their friends? Again, I specifically stated that this process of empathy begins with how we want to be treated, then extends to our family, then the community... and apparently we really haven't grasped it at the level of our species yet. Even at the community or national level our ability to reflect on how our actions impact others is far from perfect, as the examples of criminals, greed-driven corporate executives and all the rude or inconderate people we meet on a day-to-day basis show. Heck, even in the closest family units there are conflicts of interest; no-one ever said that our desire for other people's good will always over-rule our desire for our own good.

But if we haven't "grasped it at the level of our species yet," that begs the question: how can you claim that it is part of our nature?

But, as the experiment with monkeys which I posted suggests, empathy is indeed part of our nature as primates.

As I've pointed out to others, this is effect to cause and correlation = causation reasoning.

[Janx]

Agreed. It is in our nature to have certain desires. Morality helps us meet those desires. Thus we are moral because we want to be.

I assume you agree with the part you emboldened, which would be good. But to clarify, wouldn't you agree that there are immoral desires too? If so, there would be no moral way to meet those desires.

Indeed. A desire that, if met, breaks the social contract will be deemed immoral. For example a desire to kill other members of a society that sees murder as immoral will result in immoral action if fulfilled.

Seeking approval implies want of payment (approval) for one's actions. This is in contrast to benevolence or charity where one does good for the sake of doing good (because it feels good).

Unless you think that one can do good for no reason or purpose (I don't), whatever reason you provide as to why one does good could be viewed as a quid pro quo.

I think we can do good for no reason but that would make the action irrational

In a sense I agree, but it takes one less step to gain personal validation from charity than seeking approval.

I see that our motives are always personal. Empathy allows us to recognize that others share our desires and emotions. We benefit from social co-operation. It is logical to have concern for others because their existence and health determines our own personal success at achieving goals and meeting needs. It is not surprising then that human beings who showed greater empathy and social cohesion survived longer and reproduced more. Thus morality is perfectly compatible with the natural evolutionary process.

We have immorality because a certain level of it is still beneficial to the individual. There are many moral strategies one can apply. The criminal strategy is to be moral enough for acceptance in society while being immoral enough to gain an advantage. This strategy is risky but clearly works well enough to continue it's propagation.

This presupposes that morality is tied to survival or empathy. I think quite a few atheists in this thread beg this question. Why ought anyone live or empathize?

We ought live because we want to live. There is a mechanism within our brain (or soul if you prefer) which makes us desire this state. We are motivated by desires - life is one such desire - thus we move towards this goal.

We empathize as we breathe, it's a natural reflex - we are aware of other people's moods, emotions, body language, even iris dilation. We "see" that other people are like us. Empathy is not a choice.

Even if atheists could account for why we believe what we believe in respect to morals, they could not state those beliefs are true.

If there is a reason for why we behave a certain way how is that not truth?

Cheers

[spayne]

I wasn't addressing the Euthyphro dilemma in my response. However, I do think that the Bible addresses/resolves this. In the Bible morality is not defined by God's commands; but rather it is rooted in God's nature and character of absolute goodness and holiness. This identity of holiness then expresses itself through God's commands to present a moral order that is objectively good (because its source is objectively good). The goodness of God is understood to be a foundation of his character, not simply that God is equal to or is being compared in some way to what good is. God simply IS good.

I agree that this concept -- morality rooted in the character of a necessary being -- gets around the Euthyphro dilemma. However, the god of the Bible is far from "objectively good," in fact, he can be considered monstrously evil. All it takes is one look at the Old Testament to see that.

Hmmm...I look at the Old Testament and I see a God who is loving and merciful, but also slow to anger and committed to ending injustice and brutality. A God who is only loving but who will not or can not uphold justice and firmly establish control over evil is insincere and ineffectual, don't you think?

[Knight]

Indeed. A desire that, if met, breaks the social contract will be deemed immoral. For example a desire to kill other members of a society that sees murder as immoral will result in immoral action if fulfilled.

Are you suggesting that morality is predicated on the majority opinion of a society?

I think we can do good for no reason but that would make the action irrational

In a sense I agree, but it takes one less step to gain personal validation from charity than seeking approval.

Is an extra step relevant?

We ought live because we want to live.

Are you using "ought to" as synonymous with "should" or "have a duty to"? If so, what you said doesn't follow. If not, your understanding of "ought" isn't relevant to a discussion about morality and really is only going to cause confusion.

We empathize as we breathe, it's a natural reflex - we are aware of other people's moods, emotions, body language, even iris dilation. We "see" that other people are like us. Empathy is not a choice.

That's a broad universal statement. How can you justify it?

If there is a reason for why we behave a certain way how is that not truth?

Explaining why we behave as we do does not mean that we ought to do what we do.

[Fuzzy Dunlop]

I wasn't addressing the Euthyphro dilemma in my response. However, I do think that the Bible addresses/resolves this. In the Bible morality is not defined by God's commands; but rather it is rooted in God's nature and character of absolute goodness and holiness. This identity of holiness then expresses itself through God's commands to present a moral order that is objectively good (because its source is objectively good). The goodness of God is understood to be a foundation of his character, not simply that God is equal to or is being compared in some way to what good is. God simply IS good. Finally, the Bible says that we are made in his image and that we have his word written in our hearts. The conclusion therefore is that humans have the moral intuition to recognize his laws as being objectively good.

How is this different from the second horn of the dilemma?

When you say:
"This identity of holiness then expresses itself through God's commands to present a moral order that is objectively good (because its source is objectively good)"

It seems equivalent, based on your terminology, to:

"This identity of holiness then expresses itself through God's commands to present a moral order that is objectively good (because its source is God)"

But I'm confused because you're talking about holiness, which is a term I think you would need to define.

[JoeyKnothead]

From Post 195:

Hmmm...I look at the Old Testament and I see a God who is loving and merciful, but also slow to anger and committed to ending injustice and brutality.

Given the common declaration that this god is infinite in regards to time, I propose that any action he may take may be considered both "slow" and "fast". That's the beauty of the god concept - it's all things to all people.

A God who is only loving but who will not or can not uphold justice and firmly establish control over evil is insincere and ineffectual, don't you think?

Ask the starving, the prayerful, the lacking.

[spayne]

From Post 195:

Given the common declaration that this god is infinite in regards to time, I propose that any action he may take may be considered both "slow" and "fast". That's the beauty of the god concept - it's all things to all people.

That's an acceptable proposition. But I also think that the beauty of God is that he is extremely personal, and so he speaks to us in terms we will understand. So when he says slow he means slow.

Ask the starving, the prayerful, the lacking.

Yes, I'm sure it's no coincidence that the starving, the prayerful and the lacking understand the goodness of God.

[spayne]

I wasn't addressing the Euthyphro dilemma in my response. However, I do think that the Bible addresses/resolves this. In the Bible morality is not defined by God's commands; but rather it is rooted in God's nature and character of absolute goodness and holiness. This identity of holiness then expresses itself through God's commands to present a moral order that is objectively good (because its source is objectively good). The goodness of God is understood to be a foundation of his character, not simply that God is equal to or is being compared in some way to what good is. God simply IS good. Finally, the Bible says that we are made in his image and that we have his word written in our hearts. The conclusion therefore is that humans have the moral intuition to recognize his laws as being objectively good.

How is this different from the second horn of the dilemma?

When you say:
"This identity of holiness then expresses itself through God's commands to present a moral order that is objectively good (because its source is objectively good)"

It seems equivalent, based on your terminology, to:

"This identity of holiness then expresses itself through God's commands to present a moral order that is objectively good (because its source is God)"

But I'm confused because you're talking about holiness, which is a term I think you would need to define.

I think the Christian would understand the holiness of God to mean that he is transcendentally separate or set apart; that there is nothing or no one like him. And this would include his absolute moral purity. He is literally incapable of doing anything but good.