What theory of truth supports the Christian worldview?

[scourge99]

three things are undermining Christianity/church:

1. the dominance of the evidentiary epistemological model

http://debatingchristianity.com/forum/v ... highlight=

Here's the atheists actual "soft spot" when it comes to debate: they limit themselves to the "evidence theory" of truth and use it as a sledgehammer against all literal or unsupported truth claims.

http://debatingchristianity.com/forum/v ... highlight=


Question for debate: what other epistemological models or theories of truth can be shown to accurately reflect reality? Specifically, how can it be verified or shown that these alternatives accurately reflect reality?

Can other models or theories:
1) make predictions that can be verified and reproduced independently?

2) conform to the preponderance of evidence of reality?

3) remain consistent and coherent?

[McCulloch]

...solipsism invalidates both the atheistic worldview and the Christian worldview...

How does solipsism invalidate the atheistic worldview?

Solipsism does not invalidate the atheistic worldview.

What is the atheistic worldview?

The official creed of all atheists consists of two parts. Part one: There are no gods. Part two: There is no God.
Atheists are free to hold a variety of worldviews.

Solipsism is the most parsimonious explanation available to the atheist--but not to the theist.

Parsimony should only be invoked when deciding between two alternatives of equal explanatory power.

[ChaosBorders]

Question for debate: what other epistemological models or theories of truth can be shown to accurately reflect reality? Specifically, how can it be verified or shown that these alternatives accurately reflect reality?

Depending on the person, pragmatism may be one model. Personally I prefer a blended approach.

Can other models or theories:
1) make predictions that can be verified and reproduced independently?

To some extent. If the predictions are short-term and wrong that can typically be verified quite easily. If the predictions are far enough in the future though, typically they cannot be verified.

2) conform to the preponderance of evidence of reality?

Can, but quite often don't.

3) remain consistent and coherent?

Certainly, but again many do not.

[EduChris]

...Parsimony should only be invoked when deciding between two alternatives of equal explanatory power.

Agreed. And since solipsism is the most parsimonious and the least problematic of all (equally explanatory) non-theistic worldviews, atheists should adopt it. That they do not accept it in greater numbers demonstrates that atheists (and most people generally) tend to believe whatever they want to believe. No one has any objective epistemological ground to stand on, but if you want to believe that there is more to the world than mere illusion, then God is the inference to the best explanation.

[Zzyzx]

.

...Parsimony should only be invoked when deciding between two alternatives of equal explanatory power.

Agreed. And since solipsism is the most parsimonious and the least problematic of all (equally explanatory) non-theistic worldviews, atheists should adopt it.

The term Atheist does not imply or include a worldview " but simply denotes a refusal to accept unverified opinions and tales about gods? It does not require, but MAY include (for some individuals), denial of gods. Non-belief does not constitute a worldview, and individuals who do not believe in gods have no unifying concepts or beliefs.

This appears to be difficult for some (most?) theists to understand, particularly if they base their worldview on belief in gods and project that onto others.

That they do not accept it in greater numbers demonstrates that atheists (and most people generally) tend to believe whatever they want to believe.

Leaders in the believe whatever they want to believe are those who worship invisible, undetectable gods that they read about in ancient texts.

The term Atheist is decidedly NOT a belief " but a disbelief. There is no dogma associated with Atheism.

Most of us do not believe in leprechauns. Does that somehow become a belief or does it identify our worldview? Do all of us who are A-leprechaunists share values, characteristics, and worldview?

No one has any objective epistemological ground to stand on, but if you want to believe that there is more to the world than mere illusion, then God is the inference to the best explanation.

God is the best explanation for god-worshipers.

I see no reason to concoct or accept an explanation based upon the writings of people from an era characterized by ignorance of nature.

A rational alternative to explaining based on guesswork and made up stories is, in my opinion, to simply acknowledge, I dont know. I see no validity in offering explanations that cannot be checked for truth and accuracy in the real world.

[scourge99]

...solipsism invalidates both the atheistic worldview and the Christian worldview...

What is the atheistic worldview?

TO be exact I should have said was was a "commonly held atheist worldview". E.G., Buddhism, materialism. As opposed to Raelienism or Scientology.

Most theists I have debated don't feel the need to nit-pick unless there is a valid point to be made. Perhaps you were simply curious.

IMO, an atheistic worldview is any worldview not based on a belief in god(s).

How does solipsism invalidate the atheistic worldview?

Zzyzx's response is best: Solipsism, if accepted, invalidates ANY world view other than one centered upon the self.

Solipsism is the most parsimonious explanation available to the atheist--but not to the theist.

I am also in agreement with McCulloch: Parsimony should only be invoked when deciding between two alternatives of equal explanatory power.

Denying the existence of other minds and the objective world requires inordinately contrived explanations. Solipsism may be an alternative but it does not have equal explanatory power.

[theopoesis]

What would be something that science cannot detect or observe? Something imaginary? I.E., something that exists only as a product of your mind?

I think dark matter and dark energy are two examples of unobservable entities in science that have been postulated nonetheless due to indirect deduction and mathematical calculation.

Which raises an interesting question and dilemma: In light of postulates like dark matter and energy, can we say that evidentiary epistemological models...

[quote="scourge99']
1) make predictions that can be verified and reproduced independently? [/quote]

What is the nature of the "evidentiary epistemological model" in regard to its predictions? In recent years, philosophers of science have certainly questioned the independent reproduction of scientific testing. This is because the results depend upon particular interpretive decisions of outcome, underlying assumptions of experimentation, and methodologies of measurement. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions suggests that particular paradigms guide all conclusions of tests until a crisis is reached. Until that crisis emerges, existing experiments and theories will be reinterpreted and accommodated, i.e. predictions will be reproduced because the system exists, rather than the other way around. In this case, the laws of physics and the cosmological models of the big bang compel astronomers to postulate undetectable "dark matter" and "dark energy" because the mathematical, physical, and cosmological models do not work otherwise. Or, perhaps, we are simply on the verge of a new scientific revolution. The point is, "independent" reproduction is impossible in that all scientists repeating a test are already dependent in that they share the same paradigm.

A thought experiment might illustrate the point: Were Aristotle, Newton, Einstein, and Steven Hawking to replicate an identical experiment independently of one another (i.e. in their own eras within their own scientific culture) we would likely have very similar measurable outcomes, but very differently resulting conclusions and resulting theories. These conclusions and theories would then shape the scientist to derive different predictions and tests for the future course of study.

What about criteria two? Does the evidentiary model...

2) conform to the preponderance of evidence of reality?

What, then is reality, and what portion of the "preponderance of evidence" will be accepted? Heisenberg has shown us (if nothing else) that to study reality inevitably taints the results of our examination. Can we use an evidentiary epistemology to unearth the "preponderance" of evidence without simultaneously shaping that preponderance of evidence? Is admissible evidence weeded out according to what supports the dominant paradigm, as scientist Michael Polanyi claims in Knowing and Being? Does the evidence support our conceptions of reality, or does reality conform to the theories of it which we postulate insofar as our evidence is tainted therein? Perhaps we could go to the extreme end of scientific relativism with Paul Feyerabend and say Farewell to Reason. Or perhaps we must recognize that there is no unmediated reality.

If reality is as you say, "something that exists independently of ideas concerning it" then it is utterly unknowable to us. As soon as we label it with particular nomenclature, interpret it with our particular theories, or discuss it with our particular language (yes, even Neitzsche's somewhat outdated perspectivism comes in to play here - our very language limits the conceptual framework within which interpretation can occur), it is no longer independent of ideas. It is mediated through them. Reality exists to us as ideas in our minds, or as perceptions of our senses (which are inextricably linked with our ideas). Which brings us around to criteria three. Does the evidentiary epistemological model...

3) remain consistent and coherent?

Consistency and coherence are tricky. Consistent according to what? Coherent according to what? I believe that the object of these questions is clear: according to the mental heuristic or framework within which we interpret reality and through which all perception and scientific study is mediated. But insofar as these mental constructs are built not by the external world, but by our minds, or, more appropriately, by the collective minds of our society and culture, they are not external to us and observable for experimentation. They are internal to us and subject to the same degree of psychological and sociological manipulation ala Peter Berger, for example.


Here's the rub:

In asking that other theories and epistemological models meet these three criteria, you are assuming that an evidentiary epistemological model does so. There are certainly reasons to question this. Perhaps EduChris's turn to solipsism is valid insofar as it tells us that any epistemological model requires leaps of faith, because complete proof beyond the world of solipsism is a devilishly tricky thing to complete for theists and atheists alike.

IMO the reason secular evidentiary epistemologies are seen as more coherent to the modern mind is that the separation of the cultures of Christianity and secularity (e.g. science, business, and politics) has rendered the modern mind more prone to influence from the secular evidentiary heuristic than to any theistic counterpart. The evidence has been the same for all of history, the society is what has changed.

With this in mind, perhaps an alternate epistemology to consider is fideism. After all, are the other models particularly distinct from fideism anyway?[/i]

[Slopeshoulder]

I wrote the posts you quote in the OP.

Your question is circular because it assumes and priviledges evidentiary epistemology and uses it to set terms. So the thread is invalid.

As a practical matter, I also priveledge evidentiary epistemology in 99% of all things. But there are other epistemologies that are intriguing, and more suited to (non-evidentiary) religion, that religion that makes no claims regarding objective reality. This is not a back door way to make or skirt evidentiary imperatives; rather it is to say that human experience and discourse can be neither circumscribed nor accounted for entirely within this one paradigm. For this reason, and in a desire to get evidence-obsessed fundies to raise their game, I alerted people in the HH to other epistemological ideas. I don't think many people (anyone) acted upon it.

But the OP is circular and so misses the point. It's a basic category error. It's like asking how is an orange an apple when alerted to the existence of oranges in appletown. I say eat what you like.

[Slopeshoulder]

IMO the reason secular evidentiary epistemologies are seen as more coherent to the modern mind is that the separation of the cultures of Christianity and secularity (e.g. science, business, and politics) has rendered the modern mind more prone to influence from the secular evidentiary heuristic than to any theistic counterpart. The evidence has been the same for all of history, the society is what has changed.

With this in mind, perhaps an alternate epistemology to consider is fideism. After all, are the other models particularly distinct from fideism anyway?[/i]

TP,
Good use of heuristic in a sentence.
Good use of poesis in a name.
Now I have go re-look them up.
WELCOME to the forum. I look forward to reading a lot more.
BTW, I like the fideism of DZ Philips myself.

[scourge99]

I don't think you ever answered these questions:
1) what other epistemological models or theories of truth can be shown to accurately reflect reality?
2)Specifically, how can it be verified or shown that these alternatives accurately reflect reality?

You have presented some valid problems with the evidentiary epistemological model. But you still fail to address the most important questions which are stated above.

Is fideism your answer? Do you intend to defend fideism?

What would be something that science cannot detect or observe? Something imaginary? I.E., something that exists only as a product of your mind?

I think dark matter and dark energy are two examples of unobservable entities in science that have been postulated nonetheless due to indirect deduction and mathematical calculation.

what is "indirect deduction"? That you can't directly sense something with your human senses therefore its "indirectly deduced"? That puts us in quite a quandary with "indirectly deduced" theories relating to radio waves, infrared light, x rays, and other such things. Do you reject these theories?

The theory on dark matter and energy are the bleeding edge of physics. I wouldn't be surprised if much revision occurs for such new theories.

Which raises an interesting question and dilemma: In light of postulates like dark matter and energy, can we say that evidentiary epistemological models...

Perhaps you should pick physics theories that are widely established and believed rather than cherry-picking fairly new ones? That might give you a more accurate view into the scientific process.

1) make predictions that can be verified and reproduced independently?

What is the nature of the "evidentiary epistemological model" in regard to its predictions? In recent years, philosophers of science have certainly questioned the independent reproduction of scientific testing. This is because the results depend upon particular interpretive decisions of outcome, underlying assumptions of experimentation, and methodologies of measurement. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions suggests that particular paradigms guide all conclusions of tests until a crisis is reached.

IOW, until previously established theories stop making accurate predictions or do not account for the evidence then there is no reason to discard or revise them. What's wrong with that exactly?

Until that crisis emerges, existing experiments and theories will be reinterpreted and accommodated,

why would anything need to be reinterpreted or accommodated if there is no crisis?? The existing theories and experiments which have been established through rigorous testing and verification already have been validated. Unless new data or reason indicate revision or removal, on what basis should they be?

Do you believe that some alternate theory better:
1) Explains the evidence
2) Makes predictions
3) Is not complex beyond necessity

i.e. predictions will be reproduced because the system exists, rather than the other way around.

what is the "other way around"?

In this case, the laws of physics and the cosmological models of the big bang compel astronomers to postulate undetectable "dark matter" and "dark energy" because the mathematical, physical, and cosmological models do not work otherwise.

I'm not a cosmologist but I think I can answer this one.

The evidence for theories such as the big bang DOES compel physicists to conform additional theories to the Big Bang, not because of some "conservative" or "traditionalist" dogma but because the evidence supports the big bang so strongly. If new evidence arrived that better supported some new theory and discredited the big bang then things would change rapidly. This underlying notion that you indirectly put forth that physicists are dogmatic is absurd as it is wrong. Have you been watching "expelled"? Do you believe there is a conspiracy to peddle false or dogmatic science?

The point is, "independent" reproduction is impossible in that all scientists repeating a test are already dependent in that they share the same paradigm.

this is true only if misunderstand the purpose of independent reproduction and verification within the scientific community.

Independent reproduction does not catch (most) methodological flaws. Peer review is established for that purpose.

Just because I reproduce another's experiment does NOT mean it validates or supports the proposed theory.

A thought experiment might illustrate the point: Were Aristotle, Newton, Einstein, and Steven Hawking to replicate an identical experiment independently of one another (i.e. in their own eras within their own scientific culture) we would likely have very similar measurable outcomes, but very differently resulting conclusions and resulting theories. These conclusions and theories would then shape the scientist to derive different predictions and tests for the future course of study.

You overlook WHY they would come to different conclusions. And that is because scientists in different eras have access ONLY to the cumulative scientific data of their time. Its no surprise hawking would develop different and BETTER conclusions when he has access to magnitudes greater of data points and works than newton and even Einstein. The increase at which scientific data is accumulated is NOT linear!!

What about criteria two? Does the evidentiary model...

2) conform to the preponderance of evidence of reality?

What, then is reality, and what portion of the "preponderance of evidence" will be accepted? Heisenberg has shown us (if nothing else) that to study reality inevitably taints the results of our examination. Can we use an evidentiary epistemology to unearth the "preponderance" of evidence without simultaneously shaping that preponderance of evidence?

At best this is a poor analogy. Uncertainty is relevant ONLY at a quantum level. Metaphysical concepts such as evidentiary epistemology weren't applicable to discussions of particles at a quantum level.

Does the evidence support our conceptions of reality, or does reality conform to the theories of it which we postulate insofar as our evidence is tainted therein?

One cannot analyze evidence without some framework to anaylze from. This is exactly why I stated the question in the OP. If you have a BETTER method please present it. Merely positing the idea that there MAY be a better method is NOT a substitute for presenting that method.

Perhaps we could go to the extreme end of scientific relativism with Paul Feyerabend and say Farewell to Reason. Or perhaps we must recognize that there is no unmediated reality.

Do you wish to defend such notions? What position does that support exactly?

If reality is as you say, "something that exists independently of ideas concerning it" then it is utterly unknowable to us.

Wrong. That something may not be absolutely provable does not mean knowledge of it is unattainable. Knowledge is merely justified.

3) remain consistent and coherent?

Consistency and coherence are tricky. Consistent according to what?

itself and the facts surrounding it.

I believe that the object of these questions is clear: according to the mental heuristic or framework within which we interpret reality and through which all perception and scientific study is mediated. But insofar as these mental constructs are built not by the external world, but by our minds, or, more appropriately, by the collective minds of our society and culture, they are not external to us and observable for experimentation. They are internal to us and subject to the same degree of psychological and sociological manipulation ala Peter Berger, for example.


Here's the rub:

In asking that other theories and epistemological models meet these three criteria, you are assuming that an evidentiary epistemological model does so. There are certainly reasons to question this. Perhaps EduChris's turn to solipsism is valid insofar as it tells us that any epistemological model requires leaps of faith, because complete proof beyond the world of solipsism is a devilishly tricky thing to complete for theists and atheists alike.

solipsism is a dead-end.

Its nothing but a red-herring here; it does not answer the OP. I often refer to it as a "philosophical kamikaze attack".

IMO the reason secular evidentiary epistemologies are seen as more coherent to the modern mind is that the separation of the cultures of Christianity and secularity (e.g. science, business, and politics) has rendered the modern mind more prone to influence from the secular evidentiary heuristic than to any theistic counterpart. The evidence has been the same for all of history, the society is what has changed.

or, the simplest answer might be that it best conforms and predicts REALITY.

With this in mind, perhaps an alternate epistemology to consider is fideism. After all, are the other models particularly distinct from fideism anyway?[/i]

Fideism??? I've got a mountain of criticism for that thanks to Catholic philosophers who slayed that beast long ago.

[EduChris]

1) what other epistemological models or theories of truth can be shown to accurately reflect reality?
2)Specifically, how can it be verified or shown that these alternatives accurately reflect reality?...

But that's the whole problem. We have no way of knowing whether anything that flits through our minds "accurately reflects objective reality." Humans don't seem to have any way to verify anything in an objective sense. We can't even tell whether our little spot in the universe is comprised of three dimensions, or only two.

The only epistemology any of us humans really have is this: "faith seeking understanding." Religious folks are more aware of this than irreligious, but so far no one has managed to attain any firm foundation or neutral point from which to dispassionately observe and critique "objective reality."