Omnipotent and Omniscient w/o Contradiction

[NoisForm]

A couple of different threads about omniscience and its various implications led to the following thoughts, which have been changing quite a lot as of late.

I think it's important we try and decide whether or not any proposition about the future can be said to be true, in advance of that event. This whole question of foreknowledge comes only after this question is answered IMO. Though ironically, in this thread specifically, either option available seem to lead to the same conclusion - that there is no contradiction between omnipotence and omniscience.
Specifically, when one says;

If 'x' in the future is known with certainty by an omniscient entity (o.e.), then the o.e. cannot change this, and therefore is not omnipotent.

I tend to disagree with this notion as I think it's logically flawed. Or at best, the definitions of omnipotence and/or omniscience are unreasonable as presented.

I believe we could safely conclude from;
"o.e. knows 'x' about the future with certainty",
that,
" 'x' in the future, is true".

It wouldn't be possible to know something with complete certainty if it were in fact not true.
The o.e. in this case needn't even be in the equation to make this point. It seems either some proposition about a future event can either be true before it actualizes, or it can't - whether or not any one is privy to the information.

The ability to have certain knowledge about said future event could only follow from the idea that a future proposition can be said to be true.
With that said...


Scenario one;

'a proposition about a future event cannot be said to be true before it is actualized'

...then it is unreasonable (illogical, I think) to assume that any being would have foreknowledge of it, omniscient or no.
You are requiring that this o.e. know (have a 'justified true belief' about) something, that is in fact, not true. This is incoherent.

I believe this is why the (reasonable) caveat of 'knowing all that can be known' is often inserted into this argument. It's not reasonable to presume that an entity - even an omniscient one - could know something to be true, that isn't. If a proposition about the future cannot be said to be true in advance, as in this scenario, then it's safe to say that future events are in the set of things that 'cannot be known'.

Much like when it comes to omnipotence arguments, only things that are 'logically possible' are allowed as part of the equation. Most who argue this seem to accept that the o.e. (even 'God') works within the confines of logic. (Incidentally, if one insists this entity not be bound by logic, then all debates on the subject are utterly pointless.)

Knowledge, as with power, is constrained by logic. Not only could the omnipotent entity not 'create a square-circle', due to the logical absurdity of the task, they could also not 'know' what a square-circle looks like. Both omni qualities have their logical limits.

So in this first scenario, with true propositions about the future having been omitted (i.e., not possible), 'omniscience' would not (could not) include perfect foreknowledge, and therefore not be in conflict with omnipotence (specifically, the ability to change the 'known future', because it simply isn't and cannot be known).
This entity would still 'know all things that can logically be known', and could still be 'all powerful' (perform all logically possible acts) with no logical conflict.

Scenario two;

'a proposition about the future can be said to be true before it is actualized'

First, something cannot be 'known with certainty', unless it is actually true. I think while presuming omniscience necessarily includes perfect foreknowledge, one also has to assume that the future is essentially 'true, now'.
I believe the notion that it 'cannot be changed' follows logically from this. Not, mind you, because the omnipotent entity lacks 'the power' to change it, but that it is not logically possible.

In this case, insisting that the o.e. should be able to change the future outcome that it 'knows with certainty' because of it's 'power to bring about anything that is logically possible', is asking for the realization of a logical contradiction. It's nonsensical.

You end up arguing that this o.e. must be able to make something that is true, be untrue. I find it similar to saying that because an entity is omnipotent, they should be able to make A somehow not equal A. A=A is simply true. If propositions about the future can be stated (and known by this entity), then the future is similarly, 'true'.

Mind you, I claim that the truth of this future is 'necessarily' so here, precisely because in this scenario, it can be said to be 'known with certainty' in advance. That is, it's the very certainty that this type of omniscience entails that makes the future proposition logically necessary, and therefore not in conflict with an omnipotent being that can do 'anything that can logically be done'.



So, a couple of questions;

1) Do you believe that any proposition about the future can be said to be 'true' in advance of that event? I'm speaking of True with a capital T. No possibility of another outcome. As true as something that has already happened.
1b) What implications does your answer have for the notion of an omniscient being?

2) Do the above scenarios demonstrate that when one states;
'an omniscient entity knows some future event with certainty, but being omnipotent, should be able to change it'
they are being logically incoherent, similar to asking that the entity create a 'square-circle'?


...or any other thoughts you may have on the subject.

[NoisForm]

Wow - first, sorry for the massive delay! Somehow, I seem not to receive prompts about this post, and didn't realize there were responses.

First, I think you meant to say that the untrue propositions about the future would be omitted. What good is omniscience if you can't know what's true?

No, 'true propositions being omitted' was what I meant in this example. Many theists seem to accept a definition of omniscience to be knowing 'all that it is possible to know', and I accept that. In other words, they often concede that their god is governed by, or at least operates within, the confines of logic.

Unless I'm mistaken, which I very well may be, you're saying that an omniscient being can only know what is true

Correct (I would go further and say that it isn't possible for any being to know something that isn't true).

However, an o.e. would know any possible change to what is true that takes place.

I don't believe any thing could change with respect to what is actually true in this example. I'm looking at this with a rather binary bent - on or off, true or not true. If something in the chain of events 'alters' some future state, then that state was never 'true' in the past.

Let me put it this way: if the o.e. knows that it's going to sneeze in the next 30 seconds, then it will have already known about every action taken to prevent the sneeze.

Not to be nit picky, but if the o.e. knows that it will sneeze in 30 seconds, it seems unlikely it would attempt not to.

If he stopped the sneeze, then he would have known what wasn't true.

Either, it was never actually true that (he) would sneeze, or he would not stop it in this example. That is, if he has the ability to stop it, it was not true in the past that he would indeed sneeze.

It would take into account every true action in between point A and point C. If the o.e. got B wrong, then he would have known something that wasn't true.

I'm not clear, if we are assuming that it can indeed know these events in advance, how it is possible for it to have gotten anything wrong.

So when you say that the o.e. only knows what will truly happen, it sets in stone what will happen.

Suffice to say, I don't believe it is the knowledge of future events that would 'set them in stone', but rather the other way around - the events would need be 'set in stone' for them to be known in advance. Thus my attempts to figure out if events can in fact said to be true in advance of their actualization. I think perfect foreknowledge could only follow from a 'yes' to this question.

This is the contradiction: not that the o.e. can't do things that are logically impossible, but that it can't change what it already knows.

Well, yes. But I'm not sure we're saying something is different here. I just traced it back to the logic involved (I think). From your "it can't change what it already knows", I simply asked, why? I contend that it is because what it knows would necessarily be 'true' (in this case). It cannot, I contend, know (have a justified, true belief about) something that is not true, else there would be a logical contradiction.

If an o.e. cannot know what it will do before hand, then it isn't true. Thus, the o.e. would have been mistaken, making it not omniscient.

Ah, but this is the heart of the matter. If it cannot know in advance, because said thing is not yet true, then I contend this would not diminish its omnipotence at all.
Omnipotence does not include having knowledge of things that are not true. One cannot have knowledge of something that is not true (omnipotent or not). It would be a contradiction in terms (i.e., the square-circle).

If it doesn't know what will happen, like scenario one, then it isn't omniscient by definition.

Well again, I think this is only the case if something is genuinely 'true' in advance of its actualization, and the entity still doesn't know it. Then it could safely be disqualified from being omniscient.

If it knows what will happen with certainty, then it is the most limited thing in existence.

This is an interesting idea to explore. I would have to think on that a bit. My scope was deliberately quite narrow - challenging the idea that 'an omniscient being should be able to change the future that it has certain knowledge of, and if can't, the qualities omniscience and omnipotence are incompatible'.
I think what you touch on is a bit out of the scope I presented here, but it's certainly worth investigating.

If it is, then it is limited in both free will and power.

Quite possibly. I can imagine a retort something like "god, being the creator of all, omnipotent, etc., created everything and made all decisions that it would ever make, instantaneously at the moment of 'creation'.
Admittedly though, I think that would still require that this entity came into existence at some point, and would rule out an eternal being. The op didn't actually specify an infinitely existing being, so it's at least logically feasible I think.

...but scenario one isn't actually omniscience, at least by definition.

I used to hold that view, and I understand why you might. I caution you though, that the majority of theists I've dealt with will reject a definition of omniscience that insists god know 'everything, including false propositions' (and, I think with good reason).

They generally acknowledge that this entity works within the bounds of logic (whether by choice or necessity isn't clear to me). Omnipotent then, is being able to do 'all things it is logically possible to do', and omniscience is knowing 'all things it is logically possible to know'.
I don't see this as some sort of 'backpedaling' on their definition of the terms, more a clarification of them (and incidentally, one that goes back centuries - it isn't some modern apologist's answer to a fly in their ointment).

[NoisForm]

That does not contradict the free-will of man...

I'm not actually arguing for or against human free will in the face of an omniscient entity here (the post has nothing to do with free will). But for the record, I agree - the existence of an omniscient entity in and of itself doesn't necessarily conflict with the notion of human free will.

Supposing he changes something- for example he knows that a meteoroid is going to hit earth, but that will only hit earth if he does not stops it. He knows the possibility of it, but can change the event from his free-will being sovereign. It does not contradict logic.

But there is a problem here. Namely, he either understands this future event as a mere possibility*, or he knows it will happen. It is an either-or proposition, both is not a possibility.
If he has the potential and will to change it, then he does not know that it will happen. If he has the knowledge that it will happen, the potential to change it, but not the will to do so (the only way he could have the knowledge that it 'will' happen), then there is no possibility that it will not happen.

*If so, this would mean that nothing is actually written in stone - no future proposition can be said to be true in advance of its actualization. This would of course negate his ability to know it in advance, calling into question the idea that his foreknowledge is 'certain'.

Either way (because I'm not really arguing for either here), I don't see a contradiction - that is, a logical problem with his ability to 'change a future event' and his omniscience. Seems to work either way so long as logic stays in the equation.

[NoisForm]

If you accept that propositions are abstract entities, like sets or numbers, then it follows that they are atemporal...
...Every proposition is either true or false. (Law of the Excluded Middle)

While I'm not actually arguing for either of the two positions here, I disagree with the stance you take on the truth values of future propositions. My position is pretty well covered here under 'Proposal Three'.
That said, my goal here wasn't to question either scenario, but rather to argue that neither seem to clash with the idea of an omniscient and omnipotent entity being logically possible.

It is possible that a being exists that can know the truth value of all propositions. ...
If OE knows X is true, then it must be that X is actually true. Which means that not-X is necessarily false.
Logically, it is incoherent to expect omnipotence to include the ability to make X and ~X both true. (Same thing as OE making a taco so hot he can't eat it, etc.)

I think we actually agree that there is no contradiction then - though we get there by very different means to be sure!

[Goat]

If you accept that propositions are abstract entities, like sets or numbers, then it follows that they are atemporal...
...Every proposition is either true or false. (Law of the Excluded Middle)

While I'm not actually arguing for either of the two positions here, I disagree with the stance you take on the truth values of future propositions. My position is pretty well covered here under 'Proposal Three'.
That said, my goal here wasn't to question either scenario, but rather to argue that neither seem to clash with the idea of an omniscient and omnipotent entity being logically possible.

It is possible that a being exists that can know the truth value of all propositions. ...
If OE knows X is true, then it must be that X is actually true. Which means that not-X is necessarily false.
Logically, it is incoherent to expect omnipotence to include the ability to make X and ~X both true. (Same thing as OE making a taco so hot he can't eat it, etc.)

I think we actually agree that there is no contradiction then - though we get there by very different means to be sure!

On the other hand,.. just because you know what the choices are doesn't mean you forced the choices yourself.. perfect knowledge of what the choices are going to be means the choice is already predetermined.

[NoisForm]

On the other hand,.. just because you know what the choices are doesn't mean you forced the choices yourself.. perfect knowledge of what the choices are going to be means the choice is already predetermined.

I don't quite understand how this is a response to what I said here. It almost sounds like a response to a omniscience/free will argument (?). If so, I'm not arguing that. I do mean to make my way over to that post too, though.

[ScotS]

If you accept that propositions are abstract entities, like sets or numbers, then it follows that they are atemporal...
...Every proposition is either true or false. (Law of the Excluded Middle)

While I'm not actually arguing for either of the two positions here, I disagree with the stance you take on the truth values of future propositions. My position is pretty well covered here under 'Proposal Three'.
That said, my goal here wasn't to question either scenario, but rather to argue that neither seem to clash with the idea of an omniscient and omnipotent entity being logically possible.

I'm not sure why you disagree with me, but say you agree with Swartz. I hold the same views as he does (that propositions about the future have truth values today.)

It is possible that a being exists that can know the truth value of all propositions. ...
If OE knows X is true, then it must be that X is actually true. Which means that not-X is necessarily false.
Logically, it is incoherent to expect omnipotence to include the ability to make X and ~X both true. (Same thing as OE making a taco so hot he can't eat it, etc.)

I think we actually agree that there is no contradiction then - though we get there by very different means to be sure!

I agree with you that there is no logical contradiction. Swartz' writings are very illuminating. This is a better article that he wrote for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy that covers the subject pretty well. He also has a number of related books that he has written that are available for free.

[Heal The World]

But there is a problem here. Namely, he either understands this future event as a mere possibility*, or he knows it will happen. It is an either-or proposition, both is not a possibility.
If he has the potential and will to change it, then he does not know that it will happen. If he has the knowledge that it will happen, the potential to change it, but not the will to do so (the only way he could have the knowledge that it 'will' happen), then there is no possibility that it will not happen.

*If so, this would mean that nothing is actually written in stone - no future proposition can be said to be true in advance of its actualization. This would of course negate his ability to know it in advance, calling into question the idea that his foreknowledge is 'certain'.

Either way (because I'm not really arguing for either here), I don't see a contradiction - that is, a logical problem with his ability to 'change a future event' and his omniscience. Seems to work either way so long as logic stays in the equation.

I am taking the -He knows it for sure- with his perfect infallible knowledge. Similarly the way you "know" for certainty that the ball will hit the ground unless you catch it, you change the future. - I fail to see that If he(God) changes the future event, he does NOT know that the event would happen with certainty. I dont see logical problem here, you may elaborate if you still hold that view.

(Even yourself as imperfect know that the ball will hit the ground )

[Ragna]

So, a couple of questions;

1) Do you believe that any proposition about the future can be said to be 'true' in advance of that event? I'm speaking of True with a capital T. No possibility of another outcome. As true as something that has already happened.
1b) What implications does your answer have for the notion of an omniscient being?

2) Do the above scenarios demonstrate that when one states;
'an omniscient entity knows some future event with certainty, but being omnipotent, should be able to change it'
they are being logically incoherent, similar to asking that the entity create a 'square-circle'?


...or any other thoughts you may have on the subject.

1) I do believe a proposition about the future is either true or false, this is a little strange when talking about human things but take for example "The sun will explode into a supernova". This can just be true or false, now, when it happens, after it happens and when the sun was being born. I'm a determinist so I guess if you say it's not yet false or true you would have to include some sort of chance or free will (chance with the sun, free will with people). In my opinion, Caesar's assassination was always True.

1b) Omniscience is available to a certain degree through prediction. But actual omniscience is impossible (technically); I would have no problem to admit an omniscient being exists if I were a theist, but I would have to exclude free will so I would immediately have to be a deist instead. But since I'm an atheist I don't think such a being exists, though if we only took the omniscience part it would be logically coherent with determinism.

2) I think it's incoherent, because he wouldn't be "changing" it at all, just doing what he knew that would happen (according to definition). Just a thing, if you imagine such a being as a post-human with incredible prediction powers, he could never have true omniscience. Because when he knew everything he would have to calculate how this knowledge would affect his/her behavior, and so on forever.
When talking about a god-like being I think he would already know whatever miracles he would do and who would go to hell/be saved since he created the universe, so the word "change" is meaningless here.

[Goat]

On the other hand,.. just because you know what the choices are doesn't mean you forced the choices yourself.. perfect knowledge of what the choices are going to be means the choice is already predetermined.

I don't quite understand how this is a response to what I said here. It almost sounds like a response to a omniscience/free will argument (?). If so, I'm not arguing that. I do mean to make my way over to that post too, though.

Let's futher take that to you know what everyone is going to do.. including yourself.


does that mean you can't change what you know someone is going to do do? Would not being able to change what someone is going to do a violation of being omnipotent.

Would changing the course of what you know must be be a violation of omniscience?

[charris]

First, I think you meant to say that the untrue propositions about the future would be omitted. What good is omniscience if you can't know what's true?

No, 'true propositions being omitted' was what I meant in this example. Many theists seem to accept a definition of omniscience to be knowing 'all that it is possible to know', and I accept that. In other words, they often concede that their god is governed by, or at least operates within, the confines of logic.

So you're saying that true propositions are ignored from the future? Yet, these propositions that are omitted are known? How is that possible? To know something you don't know?

Unless I'm mistaken, which I very well may be, you're saying that an omniscient being can only know what is true

Correct (I would go further and say that it isn't possible for any being to know something that isn't true).

I agree, and this is the main point on which I base my explanation on.

However, an o.e. would know any possible change to what is true that takes place.

I don't believe any thing could change with respect to what is actually true in this example. I'm looking at this with a rather binary bent - on or off, true or not true. If something in the chain of events 'alters' some future state, then that state was never 'true' in the past.

I know. You've basically repeated what I've said. O.e. would know absolutely everything, including any attempts to change the future. (Meaning that the future is still set, just like we've both said).

Let me put it this way: if the o.e. knows that it's going to sneeze in the next 30 seconds, then it will have already known about every action taken to prevent the sneeze.

Not to be nit picky, but if the o.e. knows that it will sneeze in 30 seconds, it seems unlikely it would attempt not to.

Here's an analogy that I heard about this topic:
A woman walks up to you and says that she can make you levitate. You say, "Show me and I'll believe you! I think it would be fascinating!." She replies, "I don't want to." Does this mean she can't make you levitate and she is screwing with you? Or can she really make you levitate but simply doesn't want to? Just because she doesn't want to, doesn't mean she can.
The same applies to this: just because the o.e. may not want to try and change the future, doesn't mean it can't.

If he stopped the sneeze, then he would have known what wasn't true.

Either, it was never actually true that (he) would sneeze, or he would not stop it in this example. That is, if he has the ability to stop it, it was not true in the past that he would indeed sneeze.

Then he would know a false future and therefore not be omniscient, or he would not be omnipotent (see analogy above).

It would take into account every true action in between point A and point C. If the o.e. got B wrong, then he would have known something that wasn't true.

I'm not clear, if we are assuming that it can indeed know these events in advance, how it is possible for it to have gotten anything wrong.

That's my point, it can't. It just makes it the most limited being in existence and therefore is not omnipotent.

So when you say that the o.e. only knows what will truly happen, it sets in stone what will happen.

Suffice to say, I don't believe it is the knowledge of future events that would 'set them in stone', but rather the other way around - the events would need be 'set in stone' for them to be known in advance. Thus my attempts to figure out if events can in fact said to be true in advance of their actualization. I think perfect foreknowledge could only follow from a 'yes' to this question.

Works for me. But if you know with 100% certainty that the future will turn out a certain way, then it cannot change, thus meaning you do not have the power to change the future, making you not omnipotent.

This is the contradiction: not that the o.e. can't do things that are logically impossible, but that it can't change what it already knows.

Well, yes. But I'm not sure we're saying something is different here. I just traced it back to the logic involved (I think). From your "it can't change what it already knows", I simply asked, why? I contend that it is because what it knows would necessarily be 'true' (in this case). It cannot, I contend, know (have a justified, true belief about) something that is not true, else there would be a logical contradiction.

Exactly, meaning you don't have omnipotence. If you don't have the power to do something, then you aren't omnipotent. You could get by with, like the analogy, it just doesn't want to. But, also like in the analogy, that doesn't mean it can change the future.

If an o.e. cannot know what it will do before hand, then it isn't true. Thus, the o.e. would have been mistaken, making it not omniscient.

Ah, but this is the heart of the matter. If it cannot know in advance, because said thing is not yet true, then I contend this would not diminish its omnipotence at all.
Omnipotence does not include having knowledge of things that are not true. One cannot have knowledge of something that is not true (omnipotent or not). It would be a contradiction in terms (i.e., the square-circle).

Yeah I agree. But what you just described doesn't have omniscience then. You're basically saying, o.e. has all the power to do only what it is forced to do. Well yeah, in that case everyone and everything is both omnipotent and omniscient.

If it doesn't know what will happen, like scenario one, then it isn't omniscient by definition.

Well again, I think this is only the case if something is genuinely 'true' in advance of its actualization, and the entity still doesn't know it. Then it could safely be disqualified from being omniscient.

If it knows what will happen with certainty, then it is the most limited thing in existence.

This is an interesting idea to explore. I would have to think on that a bit. My scope was deliberately quite narrow - challenging the idea that 'an omniscient being should be able to change the future that it has certain knowledge of, and if can't, the qualities omniscience and omnipotence are incompatible'.
I think what you touch on is a bit out of the scope I presented here, but it's certainly worth investigating.

Well just think, if the o.e. knows event P, it has to know A-O as well. Within A-O are any attempts to change P. He would know how he exercised his ability to change the future before he actually did it.

If it is, then it is limited in both free will and power.

Quite possibly. I can imagine a retort something like "god, being the creator of all, omnipotent, etc., created everything and made all decisions that it would ever make, instantaneously at the moment of 'creation'.
Admittedly though, I think that would still require that this entity came into existence at some point, and would rule out an eternal being. The op didn't actually specify an infinitely existing being, so it's at least logically feasible I think.

...but scenario one isn't actually omniscience, at least by definition.

I used to hold that view, and I understand why you might. I caution you though, that the majority of theists I've dealt with will reject a definition of omniscience that insists god know 'everything, including false propositions' (and, I think with good reason).[/quote]
I'm not saying that the o.e. knows false propositions. That's where the paradox lies: he knows only what is fact and true, and is thus limited to do this. You can't both know what the future holds and be able to change the future without already knowing you would change the future.

They generally acknowledge that this entity works within the bounds of logic (whether by choice or necessity isn't clear to me). Omnipotent then, is being able to do 'all things it is logically possible to do', and omniscience is knowing 'all things it is logically possible to know'.
I don't see this as some sort of 'backpedaling' on their definition of the terms, more a clarification of them (and incidentally, one that goes back centuries - it isn't some modern apologist's answer to a fly in their ointment).

So in other words, since we aren't talking about god but o.e., it just does what it would already do? Sure, but then it isn't omnipotent.