There are a lot of people on this site...Why is that?

[Visionary]

People are very...very strange creatures. Every question ever asked has a non-subjective 'best' answer. Now, assuming that is a true statement, why not always yield to the 'best' possible answer; thus, negating the debate process completely?javascript:emoticon(':-k')

[Ragna]

He doesn't just ask the question. He makes the exclusionary statement that questions of that subsection have no meaning as they have no real answers. This by default excludes universal based moral argument, or theological premises from being postulated.

He actually replied to an statement which said "most" and "probably" or something alike in contrast to "all", but that's not too important anyways. What is important is the order. They don't have meaning as long as they have no real answers. They will have real answers when they are defined meaningfully, that is, in a logically consistent way, whether or not the answer is obtainable. It's different asking about a round square than asking the number of grains of sand in a beach. The second is impractical, but meaningful because it is defined in such a way as for having a meaningful real answer.

The reason the question itself falls into the same criticism is that his question has no answer unless you apply the same level of wish-thinking or vagueness he criticizes the philosophical/theological question of having. In order to answer the question you have to make a foundational assumption that x means x and y means y and define the realm of the question, in the exact way you have to ask philosophical question. In fact, the question itself is an epistemological question, which is a philosophical question in and of itself.

Don't mix up skepticism with ignosticism. Ignosticism does not fall that deep into the epistemological level because it's implicitly grounded in logic, and so in meaning. Certainly accepting meaning entails accepting that some combinations of words might be implicit or explicit logical contradictions, lacking it.

With the possibility of meaninglessness, it is to be expected that questions which are not defined meaningfully won't have a meaningful answer, and this is a notion already present in logic. Ignosticism simply extends it to a common ground where assumptions are easily made, and so the error is common as well.

Is God Real? must define what makes a god a god.

Must define what is meant by "God".

As an analogy, is the immutable ever-changing lizard real? Anyone would accept that this question is meaningless within the existent logical framework we use. This is what ignosticism is about. Take the word "god" in many different contexts and you will see some of them might be contradictions of this kind.

Can questions of a theological nature be answered? must define what makes an answer an answer.

We already work within the logical framework. We're questioning the nature of questions within the framework, not the framework itself.

Or do you think that our current logical framework doesn't allow for contradictions (here I mean that it's possible to make them, not everything is valid logic)? Where do all fallacies come from then? Language is too flexible and the mind easy to trick.

[james.hoggatt]

He doesn't just ask the question. He makes the exclusionary statement that questions of that subsection have no meaning as they have no real answers. This by default excludes universal based moral argument, or theological premises from being postulated.

He actually replied to an statement which said "most" and "probably" or something alike in contrast to "all", but that's not too important anyways. What is important is the order. They don't have meaning as long as they have no real answers. They will have real answers when they are defined meaningfully, that is, in a logically consistent way, whether or not the answer is obtainable. It's different asking about a round square than asking the number of grains of sand in a beach. The second is impractical, but meaningful because it is defined in such a way as for having a meaningful real answer.

The reason the question itself falls into the same criticism is that his question has no answer unless you apply the same level of wish-thinking or vagueness he criticizes the philosophical/theological question of having. In order to answer the question you have to make a foundational assumption that x means x and y means y and define the realm of the question, in the exact way you have to ask philosophical question. In fact, the question itself is an epistemological question, which is a philosophical question in and of itself.

Don't mix up skepticism with ignosticism. Ignosticism does not fall that deep into the epistemological level because it's implicitly grounded in logic, and so in meaning. Certainly accepting meaning entails accepting that some combinations of words might be implicit or explicit logical contradictions, lacking it.

With the possibility of meaninglessness, it is to be expected that questions which are not defined meaningfully won't have a meaningful answer, and this is a notion already present in logic. Ignosticism simply extends it to a common ground where assumptions are easily made, and so the error is common as well.

Is God Real? must define what makes a god a god.

Must define what is meant by "God".

As an analogy, is the immutable ever-changing lizard real? Anyone would accept that this question is meaningless within the existent logical framework we use. This is what ignosticism is about. Take the word "god" in many different contexts and you will see some of them might be contradictions of this kind.

Can questions of a theological nature be answered? must define what makes an answer an answer.

We already work within the logical framework. We're questioning the nature of questions within the framework, not the framework itself.

Or do you think that our current logical framework doesn't allow for contradictions (here I mean that it's possible to make them, not everything is valid logic)? Where do all fallacies come from then? Language is too flexible and the mind easy to trick.

From the top down,

All questions must have defined boundaries whether inferred or not. His statement is that the majority of philosophical questions have no objective factual answer as their nature is immaterial and often said to be 'unanswerable'. As I said, this is the ignostic position, however; he extends it by affirming that they have no objective answer on face, thus meeting my criticism. You are misconstruing semantics and structure.

Ignosticism is a wholly ignostic question, saying it isn't is a profoundly untrue statement,as the idea of ignosticism is just a theological flavor of non-cognitivism. Extended to the philosophical, it is in fact non-cognitivism prima facia and thus an epistemological question. In order for your comment on questions requiring meaning, to have meaning, you must have subjectively defined meaning. Currently I have no idea what you define as meaning, thus your comment to bites the criticism he applies. There isn't a bright line for the style of criticism which is its ultimate weakness. When you extend non-cognitivism to the idea of questions then you have warped the entire concept of the theory. It is only to apply to statements, questions open a can of worms, which is what this debate is.

I'm fine with questioning whether the mode of questioning is ideal, but misusing non-cognitivism is dangerous logically. Criticisms of questions must be different than criticisms of truth claims. Blurring them does logic a disservice.

[Ragna]

Ignosticism is a wholly ignostic question, saying it isn't is a profoundly untrue statement...

I remain ignostic that this statement refers to something meaningful. I therefore can't judge it as true or false. What do you mean by "ignosticism is an ignostic question"?

As I said earlier, you seem to have conflated skepticism and ignosticism and are still mixing them. Ignosticism is over non-cognitivism in general because it doesn't ban meaning, it requires meaning, which therefore implies meaning as existent. If you have to ask for the meaning of meaning, you are the one falling into a skeptical's non-cognitivist point of view.

Ignosticism, as I said, rests in logic and applies it properly, it doesn't question the nature of a framework but rather if some questions apply it properly. It's quite a sensible position for the critical mind.

If the word "God" is used in such a way it renders any concept illogical or logically impossible, it's but the rational approach to recognize it doesn't convey meaning and therefore being a meaningless question (or a statement, which underlies any question). This is an application of logic, a reasoning, not a question about the validity of logic, which would be much more epistemological and subject to your criticism.

His statement is that the majority of philosophical questions have no objective factual answer as their nature is immaterial and often said to be 'unanswerable'. As I said, this is the ignostic position, however; he extends it by affirming that they have no objective answer on face, thus meeting my criticism. You are misconstruing semantics and structure.

I have clearly made a distinction in my previous post between "unanswerable in practice" and "unanswerable from its very definition". Ignosticism deals with the second kind only, so I don't see how I have misconstructed anything.

Why would you hold that something which is defined in a self-contradictory way can have a meaningful answer? It's mere void words. This is what logic tells us, ignosticism uses logic. In your approach, would you question logic, wasn't that what you are criticizing that you think they do?

I'm fine with questioning whether the mode of questioning is ideal, but misusing non-cognitivism is dangerous logically. Criticisms of questions must be different than criticisms of truth claims. Blurring them does logic a disservice.

Are you fine with questioning whether a question is properly valid in a logic system we're applying? This is ignosticism.

But, on a further research, I see that we both have made a mistake. We should have remained ignostic about the meaning of ignosticism. I see that it has two definitions:

It can be defined as encompassing two related views about the existence of God:

1. The view that a coherent definition of God must be presented before the question of the existence of god can be meaningfully discussed. Furthermore, if that definition is unfalsifiable, the ignostic takes the theological noncognitivist position that the question of the existence of God (per that definition) is meaningless. In this case, the concept of God is not considered meaningless; the term "God" is considered meaningless.
2. The second view is synonymous with theological noncognitivism, and skips the step of first asking "What is meant by 'God'?" before proclaiming the original question "Does God exist?" as meaningless.

If I'm working with 1 and you're working with 2, we would indeed be having a meaningless discussion, since we would be making logical strawmen by referring (unawarely) to things the opponent does not hold. Not only as a clarification, I introduce this example as a perfect illustration of why ignosticism is a logical position. We can't discuss meaning with terms which don't carry them, we must be careful to define every word we use, because void words are void and lead nowhere.

Meaning can be taken as "carrying information". A logical contradiction does not carry information. I usually hold an ignostic position against non-defined terms which are brought up for discussion if a definition is not provided and until it is. This usually happens in theology and in philosophy I don't know much, but in fact it's very useful as a reminder that not every single word we utter makes sense.

[james.hoggatt]

Ignosticism is a wholly ignostic question, saying it isn't is a profoundly untrue statement...

I remain ignostic that this statement refers to something meaningful. I therefore can't judge it as true or false. What do you mean by "ignosticism is an ignostic question"?

As I said earlier, you seem to have conflated skepticism and ignosticism and are still mixing them. Ignosticism is over non-cognitivism in general because it doesn't ban meaning, it requires meaning, which therefore implies meaning as existent. If you have to ask for the meaning of meaning, you are the one falling into a skeptical's non-cognitivist point of view.

Ignosticism, as I said, rests in logic and applies it properly, it doesn't question the nature of a framework but rather if some questions apply it properly. It's quite a sensible position for the critical mind.

If the word "God" is used in such a way it renders any concept illogical or logically impossible, it's but the rational approach to recognize it doesn't convey meaning and therefore being a meaningless question (or a statement, which underlies any question). This is an application of logic, a reasoning, not a question about the validity of logic, which would be much more epistemological and subject to your criticism.

His statement is that the majority of philosophical questions have no objective factual answer as their nature is immaterial and often said to be 'unanswerable'. As I said, this is the ignostic position, however; he extends it by affirming that they have no objective answer on face, thus meeting my criticism. You are misconstruing semantics and structure.

I have clearly made a distinction in my previous post between "unanswerable in practice" and "unanswerable from its very definition". Ignosticism deals with the second kind only, so I don't see how I have misconstructed anything.

Why would you hold that something which is defined in a self-contradictory way can have a meaningful answer? It's mere void words. This is what logic tells us, ignosticism uses logic. In your approach, would you question logic, wasn't that what you are criticizing that you think they do?

I'm fine with questioning whether the mode of questioning is ideal, but misusing non-cognitivism is dangerous logically. Criticisms of questions must be different than criticisms of truth claims. Blurring them does logic a disservice.

Are you fine with questioning whether a question is properly valid in a logic system we're applying? This is ignosticism.

But, on a further research, I see that we both have made a mistake. We should have remained ignostic about the meaning of ignosticism. I see that it has two definitions:

It can be defined as encompassing two related views about the existence of God:

1. The view that a coherent definition of God must be presented before the question of the existence of god can be meaningfully discussed. Furthermore, if that definition is unfalsifiable, the ignostic takes the theological noncognitivist position that the question of the existence of God (per that definition) is meaningless. In this case, the concept of God is not considered meaningless; the term "God" is considered meaningless.
2. The second view is synonymous with theological noncognitivism, and skips the step of first asking "What is meant by 'God'?" before proclaiming the original question "Does God exist?" as meaningless.

If I'm working with 1 and you're working with 2, we would indeed be having a meaningless discussion, since we would be making logical strawmen by referring (unawarely) to things the opponent does not hold. Not only as a clarification, I introduce this example as a perfect illustration of why ignosticism is a logical position. We can't discuss meaning with terms which don't carry them, we must be careful to define every word we use, because void words are void and lead nowhere.

Meaning can be taken as "carrying information". A logical contradiction does not carry information. I usually hold an ignostic position against non-defined terms which are brought up for discussion if a definition is not provided and until it is. This usually happens in theology and in philosophy I don't know much, but in fact it's very useful as a reminder that not every single word we utter makes sense.

If we are using competing versions of ignosticism then I concede the debate moot at its core, with neither of us gaining any ground, however; I still would hold that the ignostic position portrayed in the answer I critiqued is in fact an exclusionary system, which is not truly ignostic by either definition. It seems I was arguing specific to the use in the post, and you were arguing generally.

[Ragna]

If we are using competing versions of ignosticism then I concede the debate moot at its core, with neither of us gaining any ground, however; I still would hold that the ignostic position portrayed in the answer I critiqued is in fact an exclusionary system, which is not truly ignostic by either definition. It seems I was arguing specific to the use in the post, and you were arguing generally.

Ok, nice, confusion cleared up.

Let's focus if you wish on that instance. The context adds many information.

The problem possibly is that many questions, particularly those pertaining to philosophical and theological matters are arguably incapable of having actual answers.

Emphasis mine.

I think here "arguably" is key and protects the statement from the criticism, because it means that a debate or an opportunity to provide meaning is implicit.

Do you mean that we have no realistic hope of achieving answers, or that most of the questions are meaningless?

Here it is asked to clear up the distinction between "in practice unanswerable" and "intrinsically unanswerable (illogical)".

That most questions are probably meaningless.

This is the response to the above.

As you can see it came from a context which I think applies the more "general" ignostic approach. Did the context go unnoticed by you when you responded to the final part of it, or you still think it's 100% non-cognitivist?

[james.hoggatt]

If we are using competing versions of ignosticism then I concede the debate moot at its core, with neither of us gaining any ground, however; I still would hold that the ignostic position portrayed in the answer I critiqued is in fact an exclusionary system, which is not truly ignostic by either definition. It seems I was arguing specific to the use in the post, and you were arguing generally.

Ok, nice, confusion cleared up.

Let's focus if you wish on that instance. The context adds many information.

The problem possibly is that many questions, particularly those pertaining to philosophical and theological matters are arguably incapable of having actual answers.

I think it exists in a pseudo grey-area.

Emphasis mine.

I think here "arguably" is key and protects the statement from the criticism, because it means that a debate or an opportunity to provide meaning is implicit.

Do you mean that we have no realistic hope of achieving answers, or that most of the questions are meaningless?

Here it is asked to clear up the distinction between "in practice unanswerable" and "intrinsically unanswerable (illogical)".

That most questions are probably meaningless.

This is the response to the above.

As you can see it came from a context which I think applies the more "general" ignostic approach. Did the context go unnoticed by you when you responded to the final part of it, or you still think it's 100% non-cognitivist?

[Curious]

People are very...very strange creatures. Every question ever asked has a non-subjective 'best' answer. Now, assuming that is a true statement, why not always yield to the 'best' possible answer; thus, negating the debate process completely?javascript:emoticon(':-k')

Because that would be like saying what's the best angle to kick a ball to score a goal.

[Overcomer]

Visionary wrote:

Every question ever asked has a non-subjective 'best' answer. Now, assuming that is a true statement, why not always yield to the 'best' possible answer;

Let's not make this more difficult than it really is. The answer to your question is really very simple. People don't agree on the "best" possible answer so they enter into debate.

And yes, that's MY best answer!!!