The Trinity and Personhood

[theopoesis]

A few weeks back I discussed briefly the doctrine of the Trinity with McCulloch. I lacked the time then to fully provide an acceptable level of attention to the matter, but have taken some time now. Please forgive the length of the OP, but I need to present an idea before I can ask the questions necessary.

I believe that the writings of John Zizioulas, a contemporary Orthodox theologian, might shed some interesting light on the doctrine of the Trinity. Or, perhaps it will be pointless. Regardless, here is discussion of Zizioulas' Being as Communion. I will follow up my discussion of Zizioulas with some brief comments on Constantin Scouteris.

The Language:

Theology has traditionally claimed that the Trinity is the notion of a God of one substance/being (ousia) but three persons (hypostases). This is in the creeds, and Zizioulas takes it as granted. He also notes that the development of the philosophical idea of the "person" originated in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers in their attempt to understand the three hypostases or persons in the Godhead.

The East/West Dispute:

Zizioulas points to the division between conceptions of the Trinity in the East among the Orthodox, and in the West among Catholics and Protestants. In the East, the Person of the Father is the source of the Son and the Spirit. The Second and Third Persons of the Trinity find their being in and through the First Person, the Father, who is the unifying principle. In the West, the unifying principle is being. The son is from the Father, and the Spirit from the Son and the Father, but all tend to be conceptualized as arising out of a nature or being - God. This seems trivial, but to Zizioulas, it is critical to understand. Zizioulas suggests correct theology is only done by the Orthodox in this area.

Personhood

To Zizioulas, to be a person or hypostasis is to exist in relation to others on one's own terms, separate from the other and yet capable of experiencing the other positively. In a biological sense, Zizioulas suggests that personhood is impossible insofar as the person is a product of biological nature. The ontological ground of "personhood" is the biological nature of the person. This is true in that the biological "person" comes to exist through a biological act of procreation, and in that the "person" ceases to exist when the biological substance of that "person's" body itself ceases to function. The will and identity of the "person," biologically speaking, is constrained by the nature of that "person" genetically, hormonally, mentally, bodily, etc.

Socially, one might also try to construct a conception of the person, but the "person" here exists only artificially. Rather, the "person" is in fact reduced to the social nature. This is true insofar as the social "person" exists in a role (plumber, architect, trend setter, outcast) only as a result of that individual's participation in the nature of society itself. Though in a small degree, an individual might influence society, society as a whole seems the stronger influence on the identity and will of the "person" itself. Thus, the "person" only exists as a manifestation of a particular social current. Here again, personhood collapses into nature/being.

Ecclesially, however, Zizioulas argues that it is possible to be a person through the theological concept of the Trinity as understood by the Eastern Church. In the Trinity, the first person of the Trinity, the Father, acts by will to eternally beget the Son and to send forth the Spirit. The Spirit and Son maintain the full nature or being of the Father, but this being or nature is not the determinative principle. Differentiation of personhood is possible through the Father's sovereign will despite the perfect identity of nature. Whereas a human being is differentiated through biological diversity or through divergent social roles and positions, the Father and Son are differentiated not by differences in nature but by will. And therefore, through the eternal begetting of the Father, within the Godhead itself three persons exist which can relate to one another on their own terms, separate from one another and yet capable of experiencing one another positively through love. The diversity of the Godhead conversely allows for unity and authentic relationship insofar as the nature of the three persons is identical. Were there no similarity of nature, there would be no basis for communication or communion.

Through participation in the divine communion (the Greek term for this is theosis or theopoiesis - from which my name is derived) the Christian, theologically speaking, claims to develop an identity through a "rebirth" in relation to God. The Son, Jesus Christ, through assuming the human nature, offers the opportunity for that nature to come into communion with the nature of the Father, thereby establishing the grounds for relationship despite the infinite divide between the infinite, eternal God and the human being. This relationship is continually unfolding, but offers the eschatological hope of personhood, wherein the human being relates to God as other in an unconstrained way, effected no longer by biological determinism (the body) or by social location (society itself having ceased to exist). Rather, the human exists independently, willingly, and autonomously, and yet is capable of relation to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through love as a result of the assumption.

Therefore, to Zizioulas, the primary question is not "how can something be three persons in one nature?" Instead, the question becomes, how can the concept of "person" have any meaning if the "person" can be reduced to an epiphenomenon of biology or sociology or some other nature?

I might point out that I have just summarized chapter 1 of Zizioulas's book, just one of many solid books on the Trinity. But this brief introduction is sufficient for now in terms of Zizioulas.

Here I would add a few brief points from another Orthodox thinker, Constantine Scouteris in his book Ecclesial Being. Scouteris notes several points worth considering. Salvation when understood as a restoration to true personhood involves not simply a rational understanding of the work of Christ, but a participation in that work unto restored personhood. Therefore, the Church itself is not the gathering of those who share a set of ideas, but rather is the union of those beings which are saved into a communion of persons. Jesus restores the image of God onto humanity through defeating the sinful nature as represented in the biological and social and even spiritual nature of human beings, but this defeat entails both the offering of a new nature which is shared among all believers and also the creation of humans as persons in communion, no longer constrained to finitude as a result of their impending biological death, nor constrained to social inequality, but subsisting eternally in equality as independent wills and not as social roles, biologically determined bodies, or otherwise as a result of natures.

I hope these thoughts will be helpful. If nothing else, they would seem to open up a host possible of debate topics:

(1) If personhood is not grounded in being, is it illogical to speak of one being subsisting in three persons?
(2) Can personhood exist when grounded in being? How might we define this personhood?
(3) Can a non-Christian affirm or explain personhood apart from the Trinity?

[Cathar1950]

Ree masks

The Christian view of persons as in the Trinity is more of a mask or emanation as a mask an actor might use on stage TO REPRESENT A character.

Absolutely incorrect. What you are describing is called Modalism, and is not an accepted doctrine that falls within the pale of Christian orthodoxy.

Would you care to cite a widely accepted orthodox (lower case "o") creed, synod or confession to support your claim?

You are absolutely incorrect and you are misunderstanding what I said.
I was assuming the trinity which was three persons or distinct mask of the same substance or god-stuff making up the Godhead. You projected Modalism in there as I never said there was just one mask.

I projected nothing. You described Modalism to a tee. Then you said it is the Christian view. You are wrong on all counts.

Who said anything about one mask? In Modalism, there are three "masks."

No I didn't, I described Masks or persons, not modes, three masks as I explained in my last post so you didn't misunderstand as I was assuming the Trinity.
So that would be Three Masks and one substance all being equal.

[fewwillfindit]

The Christian view of persons as in the Trinity is more of a mask or emanation as a mask an actor might use on stage TO REPRESENT A character.

Absolutely incorrect. What you are describing is called Modalism, and is not an accepted doctrine that falls within the pale of Christian orthodoxy.

Would you care to cite a widely accepted orthodox (lower case "o") creed, synod or confession to support your claim?

You are absolutely incorrect and you are misunderstanding what I said.
I was assuming the trinity which was three persons or distinct mask of the same substance or god-stuff making up the Godhead. You projected Modalism in there as I never said there was just one mask.

I projected nothing. You described Modalism to a tee. Then you said it is the Christian view. You are wrong on all counts.

Who said anything about one mask? In Modalism, there are three "masks."

No I didn't, I described Masks or persons, not modes, three masks as I explained in my last post so you didn't misunderstand as I was assuming the Trinity.
So that would be Three Masks and one substance all being equal.

I'm trying to tell you that what you are describing is Modalism.

Wiki: Modalism

[EduChris]

...Three Masks and one substance all being equal.

Whatever it is that you think you mean, you are definitely describing modalism.

If modalism is not what you mean, perhaps you could try describing in some way that is different from the way modalism is described.

[Cathar1950]

...Three Masks and one substance all being equal.

Whatever it is that you think you mean, you are definitely describing modalism.

If modalism is not what you mean, perhaps you could try describing in some way that is different from the way modalism is described.

No three distinct masks or persons and one substance.

I am not describing modal-ism.

Modalism denies the distinctiveness of the three persons in the Trinity even though it retains the divinity of Christ
This is not what the Trinity is. The correct teaching of the Trinity is one God in three eternal coexistent persons:
http://carm.org/modalism

[theopoesis]

In defense of Cathar, the Greek word prosopon initially meant mask. In patristic thought, the prosopon was more developed. Ironically, in Zizioulas' book he addresses this entire process. Prosopon was the mask in Greek tragedy wherein the human attempted to transcend his nature only to fail and die (think Oedipus Rex). The Cappadocians developed the idea of the prosopon and the hypostasis into the modern philosophical conception of the person as that which transcends essence/being into a subsistence through will and relationality.

To be fair, though, the objection against Cathar is valid insofar as he takes Cappadocian terms like prosopon but applies an anachronistic meaning ("mask") to them. The Trinitarian formula is not three masks, but three persons. Three masks does seem to imply modalism as the mask is only a false attempt to transcend being.

That being said, we're on page three without a single response to the questions in the OP. Lots of discussion on modalism, whether Jesus was the only begotten son, and "masks" vs. "persons", but does the Cappadocian definition of a person exempt the Trinity from accusations of being illogical?

[EduChris]

...does the Cappadocian definition of a person exempt the Trinity from accusations of being illogical?

The following does indeed solve a logical problem: "If personhood is not rooted in being, 3 persons need not equal three beings...If three persons need not equal three beings, 3 persons = 1 being is not illogical."

The question is, will any non-Christian agree that personhood is not grounded in being? Will they understand what you are saying? And why should they bother trying to understand a new concept that might undermine one of their favorite criticisms of Christianity?

I'd actually be interested in hearing from a Muslim on this matter, but we seem to be fresh out of those around here...Murad?

[EduChris]

...does the Cappadocian definition of a person exempt the Trinity from accusations of being illogical?

Yes, but so does the analogy of the two-dimensional "flatlander" who can't quite grasp the concept of a "cube," which consists of multiple distinct "two-dimensional" squares all comprising a single "three-dimensional" object. While the flatlander can understand two dimensions, she can't quite grasp the implications of three dimensions.

[Zzyzx]

.

...does the Cappadocian definition of a person exempt the Trinity from accusations of being illogical?

Yes, but so does the analogy of the two-dimensional "flatlander" who can't quite grasp the concept of a "cube," which consists of multiple distinct "two-dimensional" squares all comprising a single "three-dimensional" object. While the flatlander can understand two dimensions, she can't quite grasp the implications of three dimensions.

It would be very simple to SHOW the "flatlander" a cube. Cubes exist and can be demonstrated. They are not imaginary or hypothetical.

Can the same be said for a "triad god"?

[Cathar1950]

The Trinity isnt so much irrational as much as it is rationalization of a paradox their doctrines placed them in the struggles over the divinity of Jesus and his relationship to God and the Father with the Holy Spirit more of an afterthought further complicating the paradox they created and inherited from the Greek Church Fathers.
It is a mystery because it doesnt make sense no matter how you define persons, after all arent corporations persons? Maybe you could use some analogy of corporations to defend or explain the Trinity?
Of course Arianism and its Trinitarian concept was the default position until Athanasius of Alexandria and any reading of the early church fathers or scriptures is going to be selective as it has been in its historical defenses.

[theopoesis]

The Trinity isnt so much irrational as much as it is rationalization of a paradox their doctrines placed them in the struggles over the divinity of Jesus and his relationship to God and the Father with the Holy Spirit more of an afterthought further complicating the paradox they created and inherited from the Greek Church Fathers.

So you are granting the Cappadocian definition of the Trinity as not involving a logical contradiction? I see the accusation of logical contradiction all across the forum, and that accusation in another thread led to this OP in this thread. If you grant that there is no logical contradiction, my current purpose is done.

It is a mystery because it doesnt make sense no matter how you define persons, after all arent corporations persons? Maybe you could use some analogy of corporations to defend or explain the Trinity?

Corporations are "persons" in a legal sense, but not a philosophical sense. This is equivocation and is irrelevant to the scope of the OP. It is also trite dismissal of a serious philosophical and theological tradition. You are entitled to dismiss, but your objections to the Trinity will be taken less seriously for having done so.

Of course Arianism and its Trinitarian concept was the default position until Athanasius of Alexandria and any reading of the early church fathers or scriptures is going to be selective as it has been in its historical defenses.

So in essence, your position is correct and any argument to the contrary is necessarily incorrect?

I wouldn't say the Trinity was fully developed before Arianism, but I would say Arianism was the greater deviation from the historical trajectory of theology. But again, this is tangential to the OP and is, seemingly, automatically dismissed, so I'll withhold my historical analysis for now.