The Coherence of Naturalism (Atheism)

[Haven]

One of the major criticisms of metaphysical naturalism (and by extension, atheism) is that it is logically inconsistent, with some even going as far as to say that it is self-undermining. This criticism, which comes primarily from Reformed Christian thinkers such as Cornelius Van Til, Alvin Plantinga, John Frame, and our own theopoesis, is due to the fact that (according to Reformed thinkers) naturalism cannot account for several features of human existence, such as (objective) morality, existential meaning, consciousness, free will, and aesthetic taste.

Plantinga goes further, saying that a combinstion of evolution and naturalism would lead us to develop cognitive faculties geared for survival rather than truth, meaning that, on naturalism, we would be unable to know whether or not any of our beliefs -- including naturalism itself -- are true, meaning naturalism defeats itself.

As an alternative to naturalism, Reformed thinkers believe Christian theism can account for true cognitive faculties, teleology, morality, beauty, etc., and that it should therefore be preferred over atheistic naturalism. They use a presuppositional approach to illustrate this, arguing that Christian presuppositions are required for a coherent worldview.

Atheists, in my experience, rarely respond to these criticisms. When they (we) do, they tend to defend a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability while writing off morality, aesthetics, knowledge, etc. as subjective or illusory. Naturalistic thinkers also tend to point toward philosophical problems with theism, such as Michael Tooley's (2008) update of the problem of natural evil. Additionally, one major naturalistic response to this comes from philosopher Feng Ye, who attempts to give a naturalistic account of cognitive reliability. The book "Naturalism Defeated?" (2001) was written in response to Plantinga's argument.

Debate question: Are the Reformed thinkers right? Is naturalism coherent? Can atheists account for morality, purpose, etc. on naturalism? Are Christian presuppositions necessary for a coherent worldview? Does Plantinga's argument succeed? Is theism coherent?

[Mithrae]

Sure, and I'm willing to stake a claim on it, that any ontological commitment which leads to reason being grounded in the reasonless is an epistemic non-starter.

It's probably too simplistic but isn't reason being grounded in reason circular?

Human reason being grounded in a reasoning reality is not circular. Human reason being grounded in a reasonless reality does seem quite dubious.

I don't understand, how is "nature is all there is" not a positive ontological claim?

I'm not as versed in philosophy as Aquinas is, but is that any different from "stuff is all there is" or "reality is all there is"? We conceive nature/reality/stuff either with reference to theories/speculation/presuppositions, or with reference to our currently favoured knowledge. As Haven explained it...
an ontological commitment to the existence of only objects and forces describable by science and mathematics and abstract objects
...naturalism defines 'nature' according to certain types of currently favoured knowledge. That looks like an ontological limitation on epistemic grounds - not a positive ontological claim.

[Bust Nak]

Human reason being grounded in a reasoning reality is not circular. Human reason being grounded in a reasonless reality does seem quite dubious.

What is a reasoning reality? Reality have a pattern, that is good enough to base reason on.

I'm not as versed in philosophy as Aquinas is, but is that any different from "stuff is all there is" or "reality is all there is"? We conceive nature/reality/stuff either with reference to theories/speculation/presuppositions, or with reference to our currently favoured knowledge. As Haven explained it...
an ontological commitment to the existence of only objects and forces describable by science and mathematics and abstract objects
...naturalism defines 'nature' according to certain types of currently favoured knowledge. That looks like an ontological limitation on epistemic grounds - not a positive ontological claim.

This I can see. In a way naturalism doesn't talk about what exist, it talks about the nature of the stuff that does exist.

[LiamOS]

Determinism is self-refuting:

1) If one's thoughts are determined by prior blind causal chains beyond one's control, then one's reasoning process is also determined by such causal chains.

2) Any beliefs one forms on the basis of reason will be the result of such deterministic forces, as reason entails thought.

3) Deterministic physical forces have no end or goal, but are simply combinations of chance and necessity.

4) Chance and necessity are purposeless, while reaching truth is a purpose.

5) Therefore, there is no reason for one to believe that any of her beliefs -- including her belief in determinism -- is true.

Even if determinism were true, it would be irrational for one to accept it.

I don't think this is correct. As a preface, too, I'm not actually a determinist.

I contend that fundamental interactions, be they deterministic or random, account for reasoning.
Your contention is that they cannot, due to them not necessarily being capable of reaching truth on their own.
I contend that, through the formation of the mind, these fundamental interactions have formed a system capable of determining 'truth'. That they fundamentally are incapable of doing this does not mean that they can create a process capable of doing so. Whether this truth is truly objective, we cannot know; the same problem is present within Theism, however.

[AquinasD]

It's probably too simplistic but isn't reason being grounded in reason circular?

I'm not trying to ground the reason of humans in the reason of humans. I think the arche must be itself the paradigm of reason, and this grounds the ability of any creature to reason. And this arche would be God.

If you're interested in a detailing of this argument, I could start another thread, I don't want to derail this thread on naturalism.

I don't understand, how is "nature is all there is" not a positive ontological claim?

It doesn't provide an explanation of what kinds of things those might be. Does "nature" include minds, abstracta, numbers, angels, gods, atoms, quantum foam, causality, what? Unless it is stated as an ontological principle of what can be grounded in some definite thing that is (i.e. the mental, which would be an idealism), then it fails to make any positive ontological commitment.

I don't understand this either, all statements modal or otherwise are abstract. It's the mind that gives it meaning, right?

Sure, but a way that minds can know meaning must also be supplied. What Haven has offered could fit with verificationism, though I doubt he wants to be committed to that sort of epistemological-metaphysical framework since it would preclude his asking about these sorts of metaphysical problems.

[Goat]

It's probably too simplistic but isn't reason being grounded in reason circular?

I'm not trying to ground the reason of humans in the reason of humans. I think the arche must be itself the paradigm of reason, and this grounds the ability of any creature to reason. And this arche would be God.

I am sure your reason made you come to that conclusion, but how can you show that conclusion is reasonable? People 'reason' incorrectly all the time. People use 'reason' to construct arguments that are totally incorrect all the time. However, reality doesn't seem to care what humans 'reason', .. what is true is true no matter what man thinks or reasons.

If you're interested in a detailing of this argument, I could start another thread, I don't want to derail this thread on naturalism.

I don't understand, how is "nature is all there is" not a positive ontological claim?

It doesn't provide an explanation of what kinds of things those might be. Does "nature" include minds, abstracta, numbers, angels, gods, atoms, quantum foam, causality, what? Unless it is stated as an ontological principle of what can be grounded in some definite thing that is (i.e. the mental, which would be an idealism), then it fails to make any positive ontological commitment.

I don't understand this either, all statements modal or otherwise are abstract. It's the mind that gives it meaning, right?

Sure, but a way that minds can know meaning must also be supplied. What Haven has offered could fit with verificationism, though I doubt he wants to be committed to that sort of epistemological-metaphysical framework since it would preclude his asking about these sorts of metaphysical problems.

When it comes to examining the nature of reality, how can you be sure that the mental construction has anything to do with reality except by verification? How would you KNOW your mental constructions correspond to reality? What is your methodology?

[Haven]

Verificationism is self-stultifying because the statement "all propositions require external verification" would itself require external verification, and no such manner in which to verify that statement exists.

[Furrowed Brow]

Verificationism is self-stultifying because the statement "all propositions require external verification" would itself require external verification, and no such manner in which to verify that statement exists.

It would be helpful if you could tell us which philosopher associated with verificationism gave the formulation or said anything like - "all propositions require external verification". The formulation you provide appears to be an attempt to make verification appear self stultifying.

Whilst I think you might find some comfort in the early Wittgenstein and the TLP I dont think you would be able to marshal Wittgenstein in support.

[Goat]

Verificationism is self-stultifying because the statement "all propositions require external verification" would itself require external verification, and no such manner in which to verify that statement exists.

But, when it comes to a statement that can not be verified, how do you know it reflects reality? What other way do you have for that? I don't care about 'self stulifying or not'. I just care about 'what works'.

What works for me is that when someone makes a statement about the physical universe (such as how it's formed.. or the claim of a 'supernatural deity', I want so see something more than human imagination, and making things up as you go along.

Of course, that only has validity when it comes to claim about the physical world.

There is a huge amount of human activity that is not covered by 'naturalism'... except perhaps to explain WHY it might be a concern for humans. For example, it might explain WHY there is a system of ethics for man, but it can not answer the question of 'What those ethics should be'.

The issue that I personally have with much of metaphysics is the claim there is 'knowledge' beyond science, yet they can not show that this knowledge is anything more than speculation, imagination, and unsupported claims.

[Haven]

It would be helpful if you could tell us which philosopher associated with verificationism gave the formulation or said anything like - "all propositions require external verification". The formulation you provide appears to be an attempt to make verification appear self stultifying.

A.J. Ayer -- a 20th-century philosopher and proponent of verificationism -- made a similar formulation. In fact, the reason why verificationism (and logical positivism in general) was rejected in academia was that it was self-stultifying.

[Haven]

But, when it comes to a statement that can not be verified, how do you know it reflects reality?

One can know such a statement is true either via direct experience, scientific / theoretical inference, or logical deduction. I can't verify that I currently have a headache, but I know I do via direct experience. We cannot directly verify a multiverse, but we can infer one through mathematics.

What other way do you have for that? I don't care about 'self stulifying or not'. I just care about 'what works'.

That sounds like a radical form of philosophical pragmatism and/or scientism. So you're willing to abandon the rules of logic (self-refuting statements cannot be true according to logic) in order to go with "what works?"

Keep in mind that "what works" does not always equate to "what is true." I can think of several situations in which something that is completely false "works" (produces a beneficial outcome). Consider this: to borrow Plantinga's example, one who wants to be eaten by a tiger may believe the best way to accomplish that is to run away from it. His beliefs "work" in that they allow him to survive, but they are patently false.

Strong pragmatism is not a path to truth or rationality, conversely, it is the abandonment of the search for truth and the relegation of rationality to strong scientism. It is not philosophy, but the rejection of philosophy.