Can Atheists be Moral? Can the Religious?

[Purple Knight]

Question for Debate: Can Atheists be Moral? Can the religious be moral?

I've heard the idea that atheists can't be moral, because physically, we're all just selfish apes, protecting and increasing our genes, and without some supernatural addition to this formula, good is not possible. The ape mother protects her child because that increases her genes. This act, the idea goes, is not moral, but selfish. Any time a human helps another human, this idea would apply.

I've also heard that religious people can't really be moral because whatever they do that is supposedly moral, they don't do it for its own sake, but for the reward. I've even heard that religious people can't be moral because their morality is unthinking. Random total obedience is morally neutral at best, so, the idea goes, if you're just blindly trusting somebody, even a powerful entity, that's not really morality.

Both of these ideas frankly seem to hold water so I'm curious if anyone can be moral.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #199]

The advantage/disadvantage is unverifiable, so you can’t conclude there is no difference and I have already said that I’m not asserting there is a verifiable difference. You are arguing a straw man.

[William]

[Replying to The Tanager in post #201]

If your asserted advantage is unverifiable, then it cannot ground any argument about who can be moral. The OP asks whether atheists and the religious can be moral not whether Christians have an invisible, undetectable Spirit. Since you admit no observable difference, your assertion appears to be irrelevant to the thread.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to William in post #202]

I never offered it as a reason to ground any argument. You wanted to explore what we both meant when we said that our knowledge of good and evil is what makes morality so problematic. I even said that this may be a tangent from the OP. I explained what I meant, but wasn’t offering an argument for that meaning to reflect reality or for it to be a reason to think atheists can or can’t be moral or for it to be a reason for my claim in this thread that atheism doesn't seem to have a way to account for objective morality.

[William]

[Replying to William in post #202]

I never offered it as a reason to ground any argument. You wanted to explore what we both meant when we said that our knowledge of good and evil is what makes morality so problematic. I even said that this may be a tangent from the OP. I explained what I meant, but wasn’t offering an argument for that meaning to reflect reality or for it to be a reason to think atheists can or can’t be moral or for it to be a reason for my claim in this thread that atheism doesn't seem to have a way to account for objective morality.

I agree. Also, I am not convinced it is a tangent so much as it may be a coherent growth from something otherwise. We understand that the "isms" which are ordinarily opposing and generally irreconcilable share the field of morality.
One side says "God does it" and the other say's "We see no God doing it".

I myself see GOD doing it through nature. The sighting from the bridge.

[Difflugia]

I’m trying to summarize and make this more manageable. If I’ve missed something important, please just bring it back in.

I’m not saying that one should believe in God because they want objective morality to be true or because they want to believe someone is at the wheel. I’m not saying that atheists should pick morality from a theistic framework because the gods might exist. I’m also not asserting that morality is objective. I’m not arguing that there is a Platonic ideal and that it is inaccessible to us except through divine revelation. I’m not talking about epistemology, but ontology. If objective morality is true, then, yes, both theists and atheists could derive moral truths without taking the priests’ word for it. I’m not talking about the epistemological issue of morality, but the ontological one (the baking in). I’m not saying atheists can’t do moral things.

This is extraordinarily helpful and is clearer than I have been.

My main point is that there are no objective standards on atheism. That doesn’t mean people can’t choose to share goals and work towards those. That doesn’t mean evolution can’t account for moral instincts. Evolution doesn’t account for those moral instincts being how a species should act, though. That’s not defining anything away, but distinguishing what morality is if atheism is true versus objective morality.

I actually mostly agree with this. Hopefully living up to the spirit of your previous paragraph, I'm making two main claims:

First, whether atheist or theist, human reason is the best we have. Even if your proposed theistic morality is ontic, our evaluation of it is still filtered through human reason, our own or that of someone else.

Second, human reason is sufficient for determining a "should," or "ought" in the classic is/ought philosophical question.

You and Johnny are together in the cold. You have fire, you have shelter, you found some food but it’s not much. Your goal may be for both of you to survive. Johnny’s goal may be for him to survive.

The problem I see here is that you're trying to define away even the possibility of moral action by the description of the problem. If we're discussing morality, then Johnny and I must have the goal to be moral. If instead, we each have only the goal to survive, then it doesn't matter whether the source of morality presumes divinity.

Johnny may come to a decision point to kill you or keep you alive to try to reach his goal. If atheism is true, there is no objective standard to judge your differences against. There will be an objective answer (in principle at least) to how to best reach your goal. There will be an objective answer to how to best reach Johnny’s goal. Those could be the same or they could be different. But there is no way to judge one as better than the other.

Even if we rewrite this so that Johnny's and my goals are to be moral, this is still a valid question. There's also a valid answer. All nontrivial moral questions involve a tradeoff of values. This is true whether gods are real or not. Whether we ground our morality in a set of feelings, a set of objectively defined criteria, or what we believe that a god thinks, selfish actions are often in conflict with moral actions. If morality is valid as a concept, then humans can define a profane morality that is otherwise indistinguishable from a holy one. Since you earlier denied claims about epistemology, then the argument between atheism and theism can't be one of certainty or alignment with a universal morality, because we can't know that independently of senses and reason. We, as humans, either value morality as a concept or we don't. The grounding is certainly shallow, but it's no different than grounding knowledge empirically. You can claim that there are more turtles than that, but in a practical sense, all the turtles beneath our human abilities are at least unknowable and perhaps imaginary.

Unless you want to reconsider your claim about epistemology, then the only ways to distinguish one moral action or code from another are identical whether there is ontically an objective morality. The difference between "in principle" and "in practice" here absolutely relies on human reason. If that reason is good enough to make moral choices based on a perfect code that we don't know, it's good enough to evaluate one that we do know, even if it's imperfect or suboptimal.

I agree that some theistic models don’t result in objective morals. Mine does, though. And mine wasn’t ever presented as claiming that God’s judgments as represented by his priests makes the source objective. It was His act of creation including giving us moral agency as part of who we are designed to be.

Again, you claimed that your claims didn't involve epistemology, but how do we with our moral agency engage with what you claim is God's moral creation?

As to the ice cream analogy, my point is that consistent, rational atheists wouldn’t trust the feelings they do have about murder, theft, rape, etc., as, logically, they should feel the same way about those as they do about ice cream differences.

You've here framed it as the unsupported assertion that it is. Empirically, it's false. Atheists don't feel the same way about murder as they do about ice cream. By what criterion are you asserting that we should? Since the argument seems to be that we should in order to dismiss that as inferior to a theistic should, then you'll have to explain to me why your atheistic should isn't a straw man.

As to Numbers 5, the text doesn’t specify that this dust was a cesspool of disease. The tabernacle had different areas. The priests were regularly in these areas and not dying off. But this is tangential to our discussion.

Farmers are around their animals, too, but they don't regularly drink potions made from floor dust. If they did, would you expect them to get sick or not? You're right in that this is more about biblical interpretation than strictly about morality, but I'd urge you to think your argument through. Your earlier claim is that the dirty water test wasn't a trial by ordeal because it wasn't dangerous. Now, you're in the position of arguing that the dirty water wasn't dangerous because the dirt came from a different part of the tabernacle that remained sanitary, despite being at most a hundred and thirty cubits from where animals were slaughtered and butchered.

As to Romans 14, you seem to be talking about absolute morality rather than objective morality. The absolutist says the question of “should Suzie eat the hoopoe” must always have the same answer. A situationist says the answer depends on the situation. A subjectivist says the answer depends on the subject. I’m saying that Paul is a situationist.

I understand the distinction that you're making, but I think you're wrong about two things.

First, "situationist" is only objective in the moral sense here if no details of the "situation" rely on anyone's thoughts or feelings. I think you're trying to include feelings and beliefs within the situation, but still label the overall framework as objective.

Second, even within that framework, Paul's clear statement is that if you believe something to be unclean, then for you it is unclean. That's not situationist, but subjective.

I don't necessarily disagree with any particular moral code because it may be subjective by that definition; I've already said that I think a legitimate human moral framework can at least begin with shared feelings. It does, however, fail to be "objective" in the way that we were discussing it in this comment.

[The Tanager]

[Replying to Difflugia in post #205]

First, whether atheist or theist, human reason is the best we have. Even if your proposed theistic morality is ontic, our evaluation of it is still filtered through human reason, our own or that of someone else.

Second, human reason is sufficient for determining a "should," or "ought" in the classic is/ought philosophical question.

I mainly agree. Even if Christianity is true, reason is still the main route for moral decisions, but I do think God could guide people to the right moral decision through direct non-rational means. By that I mean God would be guiding them to a rational decision, but just through other means.

The problem I see here is that you're trying to define away even the possibility of moral action by the description of the problem. If we're discussing morality, then Johnny and I must have the goal to be moral. If instead, we each have only the goal to survive, then it doesn't matter whether the source of morality presumes divinity.

You would both phrase it as the moral goal, though. You two disagree on what goal is moral. I don’t see how an atheistic worldview would adjudicate between the two.

You've here framed it as the unsupported assertion that it is. Empirically, it's false. Atheists don't feel the same way about murder as they do about ice cream. By what criterion are you asserting that we should? Since the argument seems to be that we should in order to dismiss that as inferior to a theistic should, then you'll have to explain to me why your atheistic should isn't a straw man.

I’m saying they logically should because of their own worldview since all preferences result from socio-biological evolution. What grounds this category of "moral preferences" that can be treated differently and that, say, murder preferences fit there while ice cream preferences don't?

First, "situationist" is only objective in the moral sense here if no details of the "situation" rely on anyone's thoughts or feelings. I think you're trying to include feelings and beliefs within the situation, but still label the overall framework as objective.

I don’t think that definition of subjectivism is correct. Subjectivism is that each person’s own feelings/subjects determine what is true for them to where it’s different for different people. If the shape of the Earth truly resulted from Johnny’s opinion, then it would still be an objective fact for everyone being based on an objective feature of reality (Johnny’s actual opinion); that's not the shape being subjective.

Second, even within that framework, Paul's clear statement is that if you believe something to be unclean, then for you it is unclean. That's not situationist, but subjective.

But it’s two different “unclean” judgments because he already said no food is unclean. I think the best thing that makes sense of that is that Paul thinks it is not immoral to eat hoopoes, but it is immoral to willfully do something you think is wrong (including if you wrongly think it is immoral to eat hoopoes).

[Purple Knight]

You claim fairness is 'easily obtainable knowledge' while goodness is not. But fairness is a moral concept. Saying 'like cases should be treated alike' is not a fact of physics - it's a moral judgment. Why should we treat like cases alike?

I'm not saying we should treat people alike. I'm just saying that when we do treat people alike, it is fair. Is fairness righteous? There's no way to know. I can say God is unfair and I don't like it, but that's as far as I can go. If God wants to, he can make people evil and then torture them for it. It's not fair (assuming he doesn't torture everybody) but it might be righteous. If it is, I don't want to orient myself by what is righteous.

We have our wit. That's it. And our wit says: a 12-year-old's brain development matters. That judgment may be wrong from God's perspective - but we have no way to know that, because God is silent. So we act on the best knowledge we have.
A theist cannot tell us how we ought act re God's morality.

The debate "can atheists be moral?" becomes trivial. Of course they can. Everyone uses the same tools. The theist just adds a (perhaps) unverifiable label.

The theist can do something the atheist cannot, but only in the case that morality ends up being destructive. If morality ends up being destructive, and it is revealed to the theist through God, the universe, whatever... the theist can follow that morality. The atheist doesn't believe in god so he can't. It seems like the political Left can do this without god, but they shouldn't be able to. For example, an examined atheist has no choice but to leave peaceful racists alone.

WE cannot just assume that because different countries have different laws, that this in itself means any one country is true or truer than every other country. This applies to politics and religion and individuals.

It's only because two people can have diametrically opposed beliefs about morality and both be absolutely certain they are right, that I conclude that the certainty itself means little to nothing.

Don't steal and don't kill are selfish.

How does one reach that conclusion without morals?

I'm not saying "don't kill" and "don't steal" aren't moral. They might be. I'm simply pointing out that unless I want a fight, it's in my interest to want a world where stealing and killing are banned. If I can group up with individuals who think the same, and ban those things, I will. This transfers power from the strong to the many. The strong will say yes stealing, and yes killing, but they are few.

That kind of world appears to be a world where morals are not considered because they are not required because nobody thinks of doing such things.
So what about our world makes us want to contemplate let alone commit those things?

Because we have people of vastly different cleverness to one another and some people think they can get away with stealing and/or killing and benefit by it. They're often right. I don't think they're wrong to do those things. But they are like the strong: They are few. If it is possible to band together with other less clever people who probably won't get away with it, and ban stealing and killing, and enforce it, punish people who try to get away with it, then I will. And this is where people of high intelligence but low cleverness find a great place: They can play against the clever, and try to catch them cheating. This is precisely me. I know who is cheating and how. But people don't believe me when I'm telling the truth, let alone lying. The only way I can avoid being punished is to prove deductively I haven't done anything wrong.

And how can we change our world into the one you want without morals?

All I have to do is convince other less clever people to put their lot in with mine and help to ban killing and stealing. It's to their benefit, so they ought to do it. We can't get away with it. We'll be punished for doing things like that even if it's legal. So it's in our interest if nobody is allowed to do it. Those who can get away with it are few, and we are many.

The alternate argument is why did God create this world and not one which such things are not considered let alone done?

The Abrahamic argument is that it is not the world we live in which "makes" us think about or actual commit these acts.

It is "because" Adam chose to use his own wit instead of continuing a relationship with God.

The world functions as created. The problem is relational.

Why do we steal? Not because the world (nature) is broken. WE steal because we have inherited system which act against nature. Those systems make humans earn their right to life on the planet. As a result, this produces have-nots who act (naturally enough) as if they have been duped/ripped off.
Human values (money) monetizing human energy blah blah et al... envy, murder, the need to marry, produce off-spring, jealousy, fear of being ousted for another, and even being among the "haves" doesn't eliminate these desires to act against a perceived injustice or opportunity to get what one haver has and add it to ones own pile one has.

Morality alone won't fix it - but neither will pretending morality doesn't exist. We need both: moral reasoning to identify injustice, and structural change to remove the incentives for harm.

I just see it as self-interest. And I hope if we met each other at the end of the world, you'd know we were alike. Neither of us want to kill or steal or cheat, even though we have different philosophies about why. We (hopefully you do too) want to exclude people who will do those things. And if we work together, we can exclude them. We can cooperate, and cheaters cannot. Cheaters can never trust each other. So even if they have equal numbers, we are stronger if we lock arms. And we don't have equal numbers. There are more of us.

You just need to navigate - with integrity, using the best knowledge available, and without being paralyzed by the fear of being wrong or disliked or persecuted or killed.

The garden gate is closed. The workbench is open. And what others think about your work is not primarily your business.

I do think that's good advice. But there's always a little guy on whichever shoulder he's supposed to be on (can't tell) who says, "Well, those other people know better than you. You know that. They have morality all figured out. They are certain. You are not. You do have a way to be moral, and it's by focusing on them and what they think. See how they pat one another on the back? You don't get that, because you aren't moral. But if you imitate them, do as they do, think as they think, then you might be able to achieve that."

You presented saving the drowning child as moral, so I assume you would do that. Is it because you believe it is moral, or because society does?

Neither. I would think it would be a thoughtless act in the moment and in that, it would depend on the exact circumstance unfolding at the time.

We don't need to solve moral epistemology to save a drowning child.

But when we decide to save him, we then have to take that into account when trying to solve moral epistemology.

If I just go by this in the moment philosophy, I'd save a horrible evil person who was drowning. The only way I'd reconsider is if it was someone who had hurt people I know, or had hurt me. If I thought I could get them to stop, I'd still save them. If I knew them personally enough to know they were the kind of person who would keep taking advantage, I probably wouldn't.

[William]

[Replying to Purple Knight in post #207]

I do think that's good advice. But there's always a little guy on whichever shoulder he's supposed to be on (can't tell) who says, "Well, those other people know better than you. You know that. They have morality all figured out. They are certain. You are not. You do have a way to be moral, and it's by focusing on them and what they think. See how they pat one another on the back? You don't get that, because you aren't moral. But if you imitate them, do as they do, think as they think, then you might be able to achieve that."

That reminds me of the old cartoons - the devil on one shoulder, the angel on the other.

Both arguing and using my head as a medium for their disagreement.

I finally figured it out. I evicted them. Told both of them to get off and sort their disagreement out elsewhere.

That is similar to what happened in this thread with The Tanager. He wanted me to host his assumption - objective morality, undefined and undefended - and then judge whether atheism could ground it. The angel (objective morality must exist) and the devil (atheism cannot ground it) are an imaginary conflict, demanding one pick a side.

I refuse to be the medium.

I asked Tanager to sort out his definitions first - starting with what "objective morality" could possibly mean in the absence of all consciousness.

If shoulder guys want to argue, they will - but I have no interest in accommodating. My interest is in questioning the very concepts designed for conflict without possibility of resolution.