If God wants to destroy evil...

[Zarathustra]

God created everything that has been, is, and is going to be in existence. He created the Earth and the Heavens. He created the Lake of Fire in which he casts sinners. He created Good, and He created evil. Does not the old adage says "I have created you, and so can I destroy you"?

If God wanted to, couldn't He, in theory, destroy evil with no need for the battle of the apocalypse?

[spetey]

Hi again!

There's a great deal of work in foundational physics that indicate that physics might be constrained by logic.

<sigh> Are you claiming that God would have had to break a law of logic in order to prevent the tsunami? Would you deny geological institutions grants to study ways to ease tension in tectonic plates, since it's logically impossible according to you to prevent tsunamis? If so, why? If it's not logically impossible, then God could do it--right? Can we please agree once and for all whether God had the power to stop the tsunami had God so chosen, so that we don't have to keep discussing this part?

At any rate, we have agreed that God could have prevented that tsunami, so in that important sense was unconstrained. You have to show that God didn't prevent that tsunami, then, because the tsunami was (all-things-considered) good. This is a strange thing to argue and still stands in serious need of support.

Why is it strange? I can say with all honesty that it is good that the U.S. didn't nuke Rowanda to stop the slaughter of innocents. That doesn't mean the slaughter of innocents was a good thing. But, the U.S. could have nuked Rowanda, and the Rowanda tragedy could probably have been immediately stopped, but that would not have been a good thing.

The disanalogy is glaring to anyone without your bias. In the case of nuking a country in order to stop genocide, the solution is obviously no better than the problem. In the case of a tsunami killing hundreds of thousands, there is no obvious problem that tsunami solved, and there is no obvious problem not having the tsunami would cause. (Or do you think that it's a horrible problem there hasn't been another tsunami lately?)

I only expect an all-powerful being to be able to do whatever is possible for an all-good, all-powerful being to do. I don't expect an all-good being to lie to save people. That would not be an all-good being, but it might be an all-pragmatic being.

Ugh! Of course an all-good being wouldn't lie, though an all-powerful being would have the power to do it, right?! It is possible for God to lie, according to the standard story--God just doesn't lie because God is also good. It's not like God tries to lie but finds God's self magically unable to.

To you it is "intuitively obvious" that the world will have a happy ending and that the horrific drowning of hundreds of thousands is all for the best. This is a strange intuition that I don't share. My guess is that most people don't find it intuitively obvious that the tsunami was a necessary evil. So I ask you for reason to believe this, since appeal to your own (unusual) intuition does not have power as a reason for others to believe.

If you want to discuss reasons for an all-good, all-powerful God, then we should discuss this topic which I lightly discussed with QED. If you want to discuss that argument, then I would suggest a different thread to go over the "God as truth" argument.

I responded to that "argument" (really a credo) in this post. Here is the relevant portion:

Of course if God=truth (strict identity), then truth (not the concept of truth, but truth itself) implies the existence of God straightforwardly. But is this a strict identity you'll stand by? As you say, truth seems to be a relational property that holds between a representation and the world. Is that what God is, according to you? A relational property between representations and the world? Is this relational property intelligent? Did it die for our sins?

You never responded to this. You are quick to say that God is identical to x for various x (the universe / laws of physics / truth ...). But identity is a very strict relation. If x=y then every property x has, y has too, and every property x doesn't have, y doesn't have.

By "brute fact" do you mean you can give no reason? It's just a "brute fact" that God is good and that God permits "random" events to kill hundreds of thousands, even though these two claims stand in obvious conflict? Again, appeal to such a "brute fact" is no more helpful as a reason than appeal to your strange intuition is. Instead, it looks like a simple appeal to faith: "I don't know how or why, I just believe."

I am not suggesting that it is a brute fact that God permits random events. I am suggesting that random events are a brute fact and if God were to prevent a certain level of randomness (e.g., make the coin flip tails more than heads), then this might be in violation of the natural laws that might require them to be on average indeterministic (e.g., spontaneous symmetry breaking, quantum wavefunction collapse, etc.).

Might be. Why think this? Why think even God could not have prevented that tsunami? It seems conceivable that someday we humans will be able to.

This has been an old pattern. You consistently say it was impossible for God to stop the tsunami when I ask you why it was good for God to permit the tsunami. Then when I press you on whether it was really impossible for God to stop the tsunami, you start saying it was possible but not good. I need you to commit to one of these answers so we can answer it without your contradicting yourself further. Once you commit, we can go on to one of these topics instead of wavering between them:

• If it was possible for God to stop the tsunami, why didn't God? How was it good to permit? Why are you so sure that this tsunami was a necessary part of God's plan to make sure everything works out happily ever after?
• If it was impossible, on what grounds do you say this? Would it be impossible for humans ever to do? (Would you deny, on such conceptual grounds, any money to geologists who want to try?) If it's possible for humans to do, but impossible for God to do, in what sense is God all-powerful?

spetey

[harvey1]

Hello Spetey,

Okay, let me provide this first draft outline so that you can see the whole structure of my argument. I think this is where it is getting confusing...

(I)Rules of existence:

1. God is all-powerful meaning that God is ultimate power
2. Alpha state is how the universe can begin
3. Omega state is how the universe can come to a final eternal "end"
4. God is all-good meaning that God's existence is consistent with there being all-good in the Universe
5. God is the laws of physics
   1. The laws are based on a hierarchy where lower laws are lower functions of God's mind, higher laws are higher functions of God's mind
   2. The Lord: The higher functions of God's mind is what we normally mean by "God," but to avoid confusion, let's call these higher functions the "Lord"
   3. The Lord's Moral Constraint: The Lord is all-good meaning that the Lord would do nothing to bring harm to creation and would work only for good in the Universe
   4. The laws refer only to the ultimate true laws which may not match our current understanding
   5. Our current understanding of the laws refer to mainly the lower functions of God's mind
   6. In order to be a law (i.e., refer to God), the laws must all be necessitated laws
   7. "Laws" not necessitated are not true laws, but may only refer to a true necessitated law
   8. All laws (i.e., necessitated laws) must be consistent and cohere with each other. The Lord cannot violate the lower laws.
   9. Physical Constraints:The lower laws might have some pretty specific constraints (i.e., based on our current understanding this appears to be the case). For example, the lower laws must be described as minimum laws, conservation principles must apply, spontaneous symmetry breaking must be characteristically indeterminate, etc..
   10. Physical Loopholes:In order for the Lord to affect consequences generally forbidden by the lower laws, a loophole must be found in the lower laws that allow the Lord to affect the lower laws without violation of the consistency of those lower laws. The loopholes in the lower laws might include using the minimum principle to reach the goals of the Lord through the process of time, the Lord might use quantum laws to temporarily violate conservation laws, the Lord might statistically meet the requirements of spontaneous symmetry breaking by selecting the time and place of intervention of the Lord's will very selectively.
   11. Law of Statistical Averaging:In the case of statistical averaging to satisfy the lower laws, the lower laws may require statistical averaging that includes other universes besides our own.

(II)Rules for Allowing Evil

1. The Lord's constraints mean that evil is allowed in the temporary timeframe so that the Lord's will can be accomplished without violation of those constraints
2. Violation of the constraints could lead to a paradox
   1. Some potential (in principle) violations might be paradoxial to both physical and moral constraints, or paradoxial to physical but not moral, or paradoxial to moral but not physical
   2. There may exist violations that are near paradoxial but cannot become paradoxes because paradoxes are not allowed (or simply are not physically possible due to the constraints make it impossible), so therefore something else undesirable takes place which are not paradoxial but allow paradoxes to be avoided, and hence are required
3. The Lord may allow evil (e.g., tsunamis) because:
   1. To stop a tsunami means violating a physical constraint (e.g., the lower laws require a tsunami to happen)
   2. To stop a tsunami means violating a moral constraint (e.g., if the Lord uses an opportunity to fix the dice to stop the tsunami, then the law of statistical averaging (see above) may require that more damage is done because the Lord is constrained to act in more morally pressing situations in other parts of the Universe
4. We do not live in the best of all possible universes since our universe might be (and probably is) just one member of an ensemble universe (metauniverse) where evils are statistically averaged and we see approximately similar amounts of evil and good as the other universes (i.e., the paths between Alpha state and Omega state)
5. We do live in the best possible Universe, and that is because it is the only possible Universe (i.e., any other potential possibilities are ruled out because they lead to paradox and therefore are prevented from existing since they do not reach the Omega state).

There's a great deal of work in foundational physics that indicate that physics might be constrained by logic.

<sigh> Are you claiming that God would have had to break a law of logic in order to prevent the tsunami?

See Rules for Allowing Evil I.3 above. Preventing a tsunami is either in violation of physical laws and/or moral laws.

Would you deny geological institutions grants to study ways to ease tension in tectonic plates, since it's logically impossible according to you to prevent tsunamis? If so, why?

God is the laws of physics, not separate from them, so if you ask me if it is possible for the laws of physics to ease tension in tectonic plates my answer is "yes" but only if conservation laws are maintained. How would you account for conservation laws to be maintained if suddenly they magically began to have their tension eased in an apparent conflict with the physics involved? If this cannot happen in a natural process (i.e., an ultimate type of naturalism which may be beyond our current level of science), then it is a logical violation of the laws.

If it's not logically impossible, then God could do it--right? Can we please agree once and for all whether God had the power to stop the tsunami had God so chosen, so that we don't have to keep discussing this part?

Please study my outline.

The disanalogy is glaring to anyone without your bias. In the case of nuking a country in order to stop genocide, the solution is obviously no better than the problem. In the case of a tsunami killing hundreds of thousands, there is no obvious problem that tsunami solved, and there is no obvious problem not having the tsunami would cause.

A violation in the physics would be much worse than not having a tsunami happen since this would cause a paradox and perhaps everything would disappear (or, it just couldn't ever happen even in principle in which case we can't even entertain the possibility that the laws stop working consistently as they do).

(Or do you think that it's a horrible problem there hasn't been another tsunami lately?)

The laws do not require for there to be a tsunami, or if the lower laws did, God was able to avert it by exercising a physical loophole (see Rules of Existence I.5.j above).

Ugh! Of course an all-good being wouldn't lie, though an all-powerful being would have the power to do it, right?! It is possible for God to lie, according to the standard story--God just doesn't lie because God is also good. It's not like God tries to lie but finds God's self magically unable to.

It would be inconsistent for God to lie or break the laws of physics, to do so would be paradoxial (again, assuming that in principle a paradox could potentially happen).

I responded to that "argument" (really a credo) in this post. Here is the relevant portion: "Of course if God=truth (strict identity), then truth (not the concept of truth, but truth itself) implies the existence of God straightforwardly. But is this a strict identity you'll stand by? As you say, truth seems to be a relational property that holds between a representation and the world. Is that what God is, according to you? A relational property between representations and the world? Is this relational property intelligent? Did it die for our sins?" You never responded to this. You are quick to say that God is identical to x for various x (the universe / laws of physics / truth ...). But identity is a very strict relation. If x=y then every property x has, y has too, and every property x doesn't have, y doesn't have.

God is not the relational property that holds between a representation and the world. Rather, God is what makes the relational property meaningful between a representation and the world. Truth is a relational property as you pointed out, however it is a meaningful relational property. Any ole' relational property will not do. We specifically require that the relational property in question satisfies the relation between the representation and world. If the relational property does not satisfy this relation, then it is not truth.

As for identity, you are being too much of a reductionist with regard to this issue. For example, if we say that truth is just a relational property between the representation and the world, then that doesn't work since something could be false and have a relational property in place between representation and world (we could just call it a false relational property). So, what makes a true relational property the truth? Easy. The only relational property that really is the relational property between the representation and the world. So, truth is a holistic term actually incorporating meaning (or interpretation according to mind) in its definition. The identity with God=truth is just a change in coordinate systems. Instead of saying a truth relation exists between a representation and the world, I am saying that a God understands and agrees a relation exists between the representation and the world because it is meaningful to a mind that is in position to know (and will know) if something is true, hence because this relation exists of God knowing a representation and the world make a "match," we can say that a truth relation exists. Humans don't need to ask God, though, to know if something is true. We can know if something is true by using our mind to see if a relation exists between a representation and the world, and if we clearly recognize that relation exists, we say the representation is true of the world. Of course, we might be mistaken, so we say this with a sense of fallibility. Whereas God is not in a position where God can be wrong, so if God believes something is true, it is true because that's ultimately what is meant by truth. God knows it to be true (or, in your case, if a God did exist, and knew it to be true, then it would be true). Without a concept such as satisfaction, I'd be interested to know how you can say a truth relation exists...

I am suggesting that random events are a brute fact and if God were to prevent a certain level of randomness (e.g., make the coin flip tails more than heads), then this might be in violation of the natural laws that might require them to be on average indeterministic (e.g., spontaneous symmetry breaking, quantum wavefunction collapse, etc.).

Might be. Why think this? Why think even God could not have prevented that tsunami? It seems conceivable that someday we humans will be able to.

Humans are not the laws of physics. If we were the laws of physics, then we'd have to be mighty careful that we didn't accidentally do something different in our governing. Since we are subject to the laws without volition, we are in no danger of doing anything in this world that could really screw things up (worse than what we are doing by our actions with the enviroment, if that is possible...). In the case of God, God cannot act inconsistently with the physical principles that govern the world. Unfortunately, I don't know all the in's and out's of those physical constraints with regard to the laws. The issue of the minimum principle, conservation laws, spontaneous symmetry breaking, etc., do appear to me to be real constraints on God, however I can't be sure. I can only pose them based on the way those laws appear to be constraints to how nature operates. I'm of course assuming those constraints are deep constraints at some fundamental level with regard to how God governs the world, but I think this is a good assumption since these laws are popping naturally out from mathematical equations, and therefore these mathematical results are the very best gauge we have to know what possibly can limit God. If mathematics doesn't limit God to some extent, then I throw up my hands as to what does or could.

The key here, Spetey, is that I believe we have sufficient reason to believe a God of this type exists, and I believe we have sufficient reason to believe these constraints are deep constraints in nature (guided by mathematical reasoning), so I have no problem concluding that God has very fundamental constraints that would prevent a series of divine actions that would remedy every wrong that happens.

This has been an old pattern. You consistently say it was impossible for God to stop the tsunami when I ask you why it was good for God to permit the tsunami.

See the Physical Constraints in I.5.i above.

Then when I press you on whether it was really impossible for God to stop the tsunami, you start saying it was possible but not good.

See the Lord May Allow Evil in II.3.b above.

I need you to commit to one of these answers so we can answer it without your contradicting yourself further. Once you commit, we can go on to one of these topics instead of wavering between them:

As my rough draft outline shows, I'm not contradicting myself. Rather, I am merely pointing out a straightforward and consistent line of reasoning that begins with the notion that paradox might be constraining God (which is something that is to be expected if God is the laws of physics as I and many others believe).

If it was possible for God to stop the tsunami, why didn't God? How was it good to permit? Why are you so sure that this tsunami was a necessary part of God's plan to make sure everything works out happily ever after?

See the outline, however as a short reply (repeating my answers before), it was necessary for God to permit the tsunami to satisfy physical and/or moral constraints as shown in the outline.

If it was impossible, on what grounds do you say this? Would it be impossible for humans ever to do? (Would you deny, on such conceptual grounds, any money to geologists who want to try?) If it's possible for humans to do, but impossible for God to do, in what sense is God all-powerful?

God is all-powerful since God is the laws of physics and, as Lord, the divine will is accomplished in this world at the very end. Nothing can stop God's will from being accomplished. Geologists, on conceptual grounds, are able to prevent some of these evils since geologists are not the laws of physics and there is no danger of them violating the laws. So, it is natural for God to inspire humans to do necessary work in the world (e.g., preach the Gospel) since the constraints on God prevent God from saving the world in a manner that would violate the physical or moral constraints that God is working under.

[spetey]

Hey folks, hey Harvey, it's been a while.

Harvey, this is another credo from you, not an argument. I know you think these things. I know you think that there is this ideal state toward which we're headed, and that somehow this ideal state requires killing hundreds of thousands of innocents in tsunamis, and that you think that somehow the laws of physics, though created by God (and at the same time, in other moods of yours, part of or even identical with God), constrains God in such a way that God must kill innocents painfully. I know you think that part of making an ideal Universe is to make a universe where people are killed in this way. I have a pretty good sense of what you think. What I want to know is why you think it.

I am a person who doubts that a happy ending is guaranteed. I am a person who thinks that the tsunami was not part of some grand plan to ensure everyone magically ends up happy. What reason might you give me to change my mind?

Perhaps it'll help to be clear on the possibility stuff. Let's look at it more closely.

• Do you agree that it's possible that humans could prevent earthquakes someday? Or would you prevent funding to earthquake prevention technology, on the grounds that it is logically impossible for humans to do it? (If so, what grounds are those?)
• Do you agree that if it's possible for humans to perform action A, then any omnipotent being could also perform A?

If you agree preventing the tsunami was possible in this sense for an omnipotent being--as I think you do--then I want to know why a being that would permit this horrific disaster is all-good. If I met a human who could easily have prevented the tsunami, and didn't, I would think that human was horribly evil--unless, of course, I had good reason to think the human was preventing something far worse by permitting the tsunami.


spetey

[spetey]

One more quick response about identity. I think this is important, since you (Harvey) are quick to say God is identical to various implausible things.

God is not the relational property that holds between a representation and the world.

Good! Let me interrupt there. If God is not a relational property, and truth is, then it follows deductively that God is not identical to truth. Right?!

Truth is a relational property as you pointed out, however it is a meaningful relational property. Any ole' relational property will not do.

No, of course not. A chair is a piece of furniture but that does not mean any old piece of furniture counts as a chair. Similarly truth is a relational property, but it's not any relational property! x is taller than y is a relational property that obviously is not truth.

As for identity, you are being too much of a reductionist with regard to this issue. For example, if we say that truth is just a relational property between the representation and the world, then that doesn't work since something could be false and have a relational property in place between representation and world (we could just call it a false relational property).

Just as you say above, not any relational property counts. x could be taller than y, that doesn't mean x is true or that the ordered pair <x,y> is part of the truth relation.

So, what makes a true relational property the truth? Easy. The only relational property that really is the relational property between the representation and the world.

What "really is the" relational property between representations and the world? Here's a relational property between representations and the world: x is a representation that is expressible in English and when written up in Times New Roman 12point font takes up less space than physical object y. Elements of this relation include <"Snow is white", the Egyptian pyramids> and do not include <"Snow is white", this quark here>. Of course this isn't the truth-relation. It's a relation. It's no help to say that the truth relation is the one that "really is the" relation between representations and the world.

It's not so "easy"!

The identity with God=truth is just a change in coordinate systems.

I have no idea what that means. I hope it's another way to say that the identity is simply, straightforwardly false.

Without a concept such as satisfaction, I'd be interested to know how you can say a truth relation exists...

Of course the truth relation can exist without any concepts at all; things were true even when there were no thinkers. But if you mean, how can truth exist without satisfaction of predicates by objects (as per Tarski), perhaps it can't. But that has nothing to do with whether God exists. I know you think that God watches over the truth relation and guarantees it or makes it meaningful in some way. But first, I've seen no reason to think this, and second, this is very different from saying that God is truth. Presumably you think God watches over you and makes you meaningful too, but you would not assert the identity that God = Harvey.


spetey

[harvey1]

Hey folks, hey Harvey, it's been a while.

Hey, Spetey. Good to hear from you.

I know you think that part of making an ideal Universe is to make a universe where people are killed in this way.

It's not an ideal situation that people are killed this way, it just happens to be the way things are. Fortunately, there is an all-good and all-powerful God who can wipe away all tears at the end of this journey. That's the good news.

I am a person who doubts that a happy ending is guaranteed. I am a person who thinks that the tsunami was not part of some grand plan to ensure everyone magically ends up happy. What reason might you give me to change my mind?

Well, first we'd have to go into why atheism should be ruled out and why a belief in all-knowing God is by far the most superior belief about why there is a world such as ours.

[*] Do you agree that it's possible that humans could prevent earthquakes someday? Or would you prevent funding to earthquake prevention technology, on the grounds that it is logically impossible for humans to do it? (If so, what grounds are those?)

I think in principle advanced human societies can prevent earthquakes. Of course, I have no idea if such is really possible or not. We might find that we can't afford to prevent earthquakes, etc..

[*] Do you agree that if it's possible for humans to perform action A, then any omnipotent being could also perform A?

In principle, an omnipotent being could prevent earthquakes of any magnitude or any location in space or time. However, in principle, the nuclear powers of the world could stop local genocide anywhere on the planet by nuking the heck out of the offenders of international law. In principle that could happen. The problem with doing it is that it may and most likely would be far worse of a world than had the nuclear powers done nothing and just let the genocide happen. Or, preferably, we could exercise limited powers that are in-line with international law. Similarly, God could in principle smash evil whereever it exists, however violating laws of nature could conceivably lead to paradox, and that's just not going to happen.

If you agree preventing the tsunami was possible in this sense for an omnipotent being--as I think you do--then I want to know why a being that would permit this horrific disaster is all-good. If I met a human who could easily have prevented the tsunami, and didn't, I would think that human was horribly evil--unless, of course, I had good reason to think the human was preventing something far worse by permitting the tsunami.

Well, what if you were told that the military had such technology, and they could have prevented the tsunami, however they know for a fact that such advanced technology would kill most of the sea life in the oceans which would eventually lead to far worse complications. Would you think the military evil for not utilizing such technology? I hope not.

[harvey1]

God is not the relational property that holds between a representation and the world.

If God is not a relational property, and truth is, then it follows deductively that God is not identical to truth. Right?! (...) Similarly truth is a relational property, but it's not any relational property! x is taller than y is a relational property that obviously is not truth.

The identity with God=truth is just a change in coordinate systems.

I have no idea what that means. I hope it's another way to say that the identity is simply, straightforwardly false.

Truth is about the phenomenon, whereas God is about the noumenon. The phenomena and noumena are different coordinate systems, but a statement in one coordinate system can be translated into a statement into the other coordinate system (thus, God=Truth). When the ordered pair <x,y> is part of a truth relation, the phenomena x and phenomena y satisfy the connectiveness as a phenomena. Likewise, there exists a theory of explanation of <x,y> that provides a rationality to their connectiveness. "God" is the underlying explanation. However, this God explanation is why there is a Truth relation. If no God explanation, then no Truth relation, and vice versa. The identity holds since both express the same property of a thing just in different contexts. That is, talk about the phenomena (Truth) is equivalent to talk about the noumena (God) if the context is "exactly how it is." As we learn more and more of the Universe, talk about the truths of the Universe is talk about God. Likewise, talk about the God of the Universe is talk about the truths of the Universe (e.g., physics).

Of course this isn't the truth-relation. It's a relation. It's no help to say that the truth relation is the one that "really is the" relation between representations and the world. It's not so "easy"!

I'm referring to "exactly how it is" and not anything you want to throw out there.

But if you mean, how can truth exist without satisfaction of predicates by objects (as per Tarski), perhaps it can't. But that has nothing to do with whether God exists. I know you think that God watches over the truth relation and guarantees it or makes it meaningful in some way. But first, I've seen no reason to think this, and second, this is very different from saying that God is truth. Presumably you think God watches over you and makes you meaningful too, but you would not assert the identity that God = Harvey.

From what I gather, you think object A and object B have some truth relation, and that this relation is satisfied (perhaps in some a la Tarski fashion) by the mere fact that that they have this relation. This relation doesn't need to be understood, it doesn't need anyone or anything to know the relation even exists. Is that right?

Let me frame that kind of thinking as a phenomena-centered view. That is, a truth relation exists because there is a phenomena that makes it a relation, and in fact, the relation doesn't exist on its own, rather it exists as a result of a phenomena. All statements of truth reduce to the phenomena those statements ultimately refer to. Truth is an invented term like Yahtzee!.

I don't think any of us think that Yahtzee! is a relation that exists on its own out there. The game maker Milton Bradley invented a game called Yahtzee, and the relation Yahtzee! is just something they coined to make the game more fun when people yell it out before someone else musters up the word. Is that more or less how you would consider something that is labelled as true?

[spetey]

It's not an ideal situation that people are killed this way, it just happens to be the way things are. Fortunately, there is an all-good and all-powerful God who can wipe away all tears at the end of this journey. That's the good news.

Yes, you seem to believe this! You have stated so many times! Now, please: why should someone believe this? Do you have any reason that might appeal to someone who doesn't already believe it?

I am a person who doubts that a happy ending is guaranteed. I am a person who thinks that the tsunami was not part of some grand plan to ensure everyone magically ends up happy. What reason might you give me to change my mind?

Well, first we'd have to go into why atheism should be ruled out and why a belief in all-knowing God is by far the most superior belief about why there is a world such as ours.

Okay, let's look at the argument for a second. These three sentences are inconsistent, and so to be consistent one of them must be abandoned:

1. If there is an all-good, all-powerful entity, there is no unnecessary evil.
2. There is unnecessary evil, like the tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands of innocents.
3. There is an all-good, all-powerful entity.

To believe all three of these at once would be contradictory, agreed? That is, it's impossible for all three to be true, right? The problem is: which of these three should we throw out?

Now, I say that of the three, (c) is the easiest to throw out given all our other reasons for belief. You say that no, you have such excellent reasons for (c) that they outweigh the very plausible claim (b). Right? But these had better be darn good reasons! Because it is a very strong intuitive view that the tsunami was a horrible disaster that did not have any great purpose. So to show that (c) is more plausible than (b) is a huge burden. But I have yet to hear reasons to believe (c) anywhere, let alone reasons that are so knock-down convincing that they make (c) more plausible than (b)! Can you start to reveal some of your reasons for (c) that are so convincing that they make it plausible to say the tsunami was a good thing after all?

In principle, an omnipotent being could prevent earthquakes of any magnitude or any location in space or time.

Good! At last, we have agreed that it is possible for an omnipotent being to stop tsunamis and earthquakes. You'll commit to this, right?

However, in principle, the nuclear powers of the world could stop local genocide anywhere on the planet by nuking the heck out of the offenders of international law. In principle that could happen. The problem with doing it is that it may and most likely would be far worse of a world than had the nuclear powers done nothing and just let the genocide happen.

Of course, obviously. That A is possible to do does not mean that A is good to do. These are two very different questions. You say that it is possible for God to stop a tsunami. So since the tsunami wasn't stopped, you have to say (to defend an all-good, all-powerful God) that it was good God didn't stop the tsunami (the same way it's good not to nuke a country committing genocide). And this is what I want to know about. Why do you think it was good not to stop the tsunami?

Similarly, God could in principle smash evil whereever it exists, however violating laws of nature could conceivably lead to paradox, and that's just not going to happen.

First, careful about this "paradox" stuff. Here it sounds like you're saying it would be paradoxical for God to prevent the tsunami. This is tantamount to saying it's strictly impossible for God to do so. But we should be very clear that you don't mean this--you mean it's possible but not good, right? (Or are you contradicting yourself on this matter again? Either it was possible for God to prevent this tsunami, or it wasn't! Please commit!)

Now, "paradox" stuff aside, what you presumably mean is that it for God to prevent the tsunami would be possible but would have worse consequences of some kind. And as I have said many times, it is possible that permitting the tsunami prevented some worse evil. Again I ask: why think this is actually the case? The mere fact that (b) might be false is not enough to single it out for rejection. (a) and (c) might also be false. So we have to consider which is most likely to be false. What reason do you have to think that (b) is the culprit?

If you agree preventing the tsunami was possible in this sense for an omnipotent being--as I think you do--then I want to know why a being that would permit this horrific disaster is all-good. If I met a human who could easily have prevented the tsunami, and didn't, I would think that human was horribly evil--unless, of course, I had good reason to think the human was preventing something far worse by permitting the tsunami.

Well, what if you were told that the military had such technology, and they could have prevented the tsunami, however they know for a fact that such advanced technology would kill most of the sea life in the oceans which would eventually lead to far worse complications. Would you think the military evil for not utilizing such technology? I hope not.

Yes, again: then it would be possible, but bad, and these are two different questions. In this case, as you have set it up, we would have reason to think that something worse would happen if we prevented the tsunami. What reason do you have to think that God's allowing the tsunami prevented something worse? Absent one, why do you believe it was good for God to do (given that it was possible)?


spetey

[spetey]

Hey again!

The identity with God=truth is just a change in coordinate systems.

I have no idea what that means. I hope it's another way to say that the identity is simply, straightforwardly false.

Truth is about the phenomenon, whereas God is about the noumenon. The phenomena and noumena are different coordinate systems, but a statement in one coordinate system can be translated into a statement into the other coordinate system (thus, God=Truth).

Uh-huh. And what do you mean by "phenomenon" and "noumenon" here? What are the quantifiable dimensions they determine to make a coordinate system? And how does shifting coordinate systems make two things identical even though they differ in their properties, contrary to basic principles of identity? This is all so very mysterious that one might almost suppose you're making stuff up in order to save an exraordinarily implausible claim.

When the ordered pair <x,y> is part of a truth relation, the phenomena x and phenomena y satisfy the connectiveness as a phenomena.

Whoa, I thought the first element of the ordered pairs of the truth relation were representations, not "phenomena", and I thought the second element was the world (or some part or set of worlds), not more "phenomena". Have you changed your mind about what truth is?

Likewise, there exists a theory of explanation of <x,y> that provides a rationality to their connectiveness. "God" is the underlying explanation.

Okay--er... even if that made sense, it seems to grant that God explains the truth relation, and it seems that to explain x is not the same as to be x.

If no God explanation, then no Truth relation, and vice versa.

1. And why think that?
2. Even with good reason to think this, it again seems to grant that God is not equal to Truth (since it is the God explanation and not God's self that is mutually dependent with truth according to you).

As we learn more and more of the Universe, talk about the truths of the Universe is talk about God. Likewise, talk about the God of the Universe is talk about the truths of the Universe (e.g., physics).

That seems more plausible with the claim that God=Universe, not God=Truth. (Though of course I don't think the former is a plausible identity either.)

From what I gather, you think object A and object B have some truth relation, and that this relation is satisfied (perhaps in some a la Tarski fashion) by the mere fact that that they have this relation.

No, that's nonsense, and therefore not what I think! For one thing, Tarskian satisfaction is a formal notion that is quite different from what you discuss here.

This relation doesn't need to be understood, it doesn't need anyone or anything to know the relation even exists. Is that right?

Well, maybe not. I think at least some things are the way they are independently of the way they're represented. However if truth is indeed a relation between representations and the world, then perhaps truth requires (actual, not merely potential) representations which in turn requires representers (thinkers). Of course having representations is different from representing the truth relation itself; the former is not required for the latter. (Dogs probably represent truly, at least sometimes, but do not have a representation of truth.)

Let me frame that kind of thinking as a phenomena-centered view. That is, a truth relation exists because there is a phenomena that makes it a relation, and in fact, the relation doesn't exist on its own, rather it exists as a result of a phenomena.

Uh... huh? What's "a phenomena", and how does it "result" in the truth relation?

I don't think any of us think that Yahtzee! is a relation that exists on its own out there.

Yahtzee! isn't plausibly a relation of any kind--it's not a set of n-tuples. It is an exclamation.

Is that more or less how you would consider something that is labelled as true?

Since I have no idea what the view you're professing is here, I can't say whether it's mine, but I highly doubt it.

Harvey, I recommend you let the identity of "God=Truth" go rather than go to such extremely implausible lengths to try to rescue it.


spetey

[McCulloch]

God is the laws of physics

Perhaps a deist sort of God is the laws of physics but I cannot help but notice that the biblical representation of God seems to have created the laws of physics and occasionally breaks them.

[harvey1]

Truth is about the phenomenon, whereas God is about the noumenon. The phenomena and noumena are different coordinate systems, but a statement in one coordinate system can be translated into a statement into the other coordinate system (thus, God=Truth).

Uh-huh. And what do you mean by "phenomenon" and "noumenon" here? What are the quantifiable dimensions they determine to make a coordinate system? And how does shifting coordinate systems make two things identical even though they differ in their properties, contrary to basic principles of identity? This is all so very mysterious that one might almost suppose you're making stuff up in order to save an exraordinarily implausible claim...

When the ordered pair <x,y> is part of a truth relation, the phenomena x and phenomena y satisfy the connectiveness as a phenomena.

Whoa, I thought the first element of the ordered pairs of the truth relation were representations, not "phenomena", and I thought the second element was the world (or some part or set of worlds), not more "phenomena". Have you changed your mind about what truth is?

Phenomena is the outward description and noumena is the inward norm that explains or proves the phenomena to be the phenomena that it is. So, a representation of any thing that exists is a phenomena that can have a truth value. So, if x=y, then it is true that talk of phenomena x is identical talk of phenomena y. However, that does not tell us why x=y (or why talk of one is talk about the other). However, if you can show why x=y, then you have, in other words, showed that x=y. In other words, you have proved x=y to be true. That is, talk that proves a theorem is also talk of representations being true. The proof is what we ultimately mean by truth, and truth is ultimately what the proof is. The context of noumena is roughly the context of why/how, and the context of phenomena is roughly what/who/when. When framed in the ultimate sense of the word (i.e., why is it really that way, or how is it really the case, or what is it actually, or who really did it, or when did it really happen), the phenomena and noumena are equivalent. Let me give an example.

1. "Is it really true that the Universe is a multiverse?" (Phenomena question: does reality of the Universe really match up exactly with the representation of the multiverse)
2. "Why is the Universe really a multiverse?" (Noumena question: why does reality of the Universe really match up exactly with the representation of the multiverse?)

In the case of [A], this is a question of truth. In the case of , this is not a question of truth but wanting to know if something can be shown to be the case. However, if you show then you have answered [A]. If you cannot show , then you cannot answer [A]. Likewise, if the answer to [A] is false, then cannot be shown. If [A] is true, then the only way it can be true is if has some "why" attached to it (even if we cannot know the answer due to our limitations). Talk of one is talk of the other. That is, they are ultimately equivalent terms when framed in the "just the way it is" sense.

Okay--er... even if that made sense, it seems to grant that God explains the truth relation, and it seems that to explain x is not the same as to be x.

It is the same since the truth relation is an identity relation, but identity is also a structure that connects <x,y> which, to be a sensible structure, must have an explanation attached to it. Just saying x=y is true is non-sense unless the structure that connects x to y is the kind of structure performs that role of connecting x to y. This, ultimately, is what it means to say that x=y.

If no God explanation, then no Truth relation, and vice versa.

[*] And why think that?

Truth to be a truth by definition requires there to be a demonstration/proof/reason/explanation/cause that shows the truth relation to exist. If no such demonstration/proof/reason/explanation/cause exists, then there's no truth relation.

[*] Even with good reason to think this, it again seems to grant that God is not equal to Truth (since it is the God explanation and not God's self that is mutually dependent with truth according to you).

God is the explanation. This is what I'm trying to tell you. God is a mind, but the reason God is a mind is because without the aspect of mind there is no truth of the matter. Ultimately, all truths are equivalent to God's mind believing something is so.

I think at least some things are the way they are independently of the way they're represented. However if truth is indeed a relation between representations and the world, then perhaps truth requires (actual, not merely potential) representations which in turn requires representers (thinkers). Of course having representations is different from representing the truth relation itself; the former is not required for the latter. (Dogs probably represent truly, at least sometimes, but do not have a representation of truth.)

I see that you don't want to commit to any particular view of truth. You just want to use the term and you have no idea what you mean by that term?

The way I see it, truth is either a consequence of a fact of matter (e.g., snow is white therefore someone says "snow is white" happens to be what we mean by true), or a relation that is not fully dependent on a fact of matter as a brute fact but as a consequence of another truth relation that has yet to be disclosed (e.g., snow is white because snow is formed of crystalized ice molecules and the nature of these crystals have a scattering light effect, which produces a white color). In the first case, truth requires thinkers as a relation, but as you say, the truth relation itself does not require a mind to make it a truth relation since snow just happens to be white. The second case is a little more tricky. There's no mind needed to make light scatter to make the "snow is white" relation as true, however if every explanation in the Universe is required to make a true relation possible, then ultimately you get to a basic set of truths in the universe that instantiate the physical universe (i.e., there's another truth relation to be disclosed that doesn't involve the material universe being a brute fact). How does the satisfaction relation play the satisfaction role when the truths of the universe are not consequences of any material fact of matter?