The Modal Ontological Argument

[For_The_Kingdom]

Before I begin the actual argument, a few terms/concepts must be addressed. One of those concepts involves possible world semantics. What is a possible world (PW)?

A PW is a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be true, or could be falseor a set of circumstances or any proposition that could be necessarily true, or necessarily false.

Example: Barack Obama is the President of the United States.

If this statement is true, then there is a possible world at which Barack Obama is President of the United States. However, since Barack Obama could very well NOT be the President of the U.S., then it follows that there is a possible world at which Barack Obama isnt President of the U.S.

So, in essence, there is a possible world (set of circumstances) at which Barack Obama is the President of the U.S. (and vice versa). In other words, its possible.

That being said; lets turn our attention to the difference between contingent truths, and necessary truths. Contingent truths are circumstances or propositions that could be true, but could also be equally false (such as the example above).

Necessary truths are truths that are either true or false REGARDLESS of the circumstances. So in essence, necessary truths are true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. Good examples of necessary truths are mathematical truths, such as 2+2=4 <--- this is true in all possible circumstances and can never be false under any circumstance.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

The four "omni's"that you see above, those are what we'd called "great making properties." A person is considered "great" based on accomplishments, power, influence, character, etc.

Being a maximally great being, all of those great-making properties are maxed out to the degree at which there isn't anything left to add. It is virtually impossible to think of a "greater being" than one that is all-knowing, all powerful, present everywhere, and the ultimate source of goodness.

Now, the Modal Ontological Argument makes a case that it is possible for such a being to actually exist. In other words; there is a possible world at which a MGB exists.

On to the argument..

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world (our world).

5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

Of course, most of you will agree that it is possible for a MGB to exist. The problem is, once you admit that it is possible for a MGB to exist, you are essentially saying It is possible for a necessary being to exist.

Well, if it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then it follows that such a being must ACTUALLY exist. Why? Because a proposition cannot be possibly necessarily true, but actually false (because if the proposition is actually false, then it was never possibly necessarily true).

Again, most of you admit that it is possible for God to exist. Well, if it is possible for God to exist, then God must actually exist, because Gods existence would be one of necessity, and no necessary truth can be possibly true, but actually false.

And under the same token, if it is possible for God to NOT exist, then it is impossible for God to exist. So, Gods existence is either necessarily true, or necessarily false. And again for the third time, at some point in each and every one of your lives, youve admitted that it is possible for God to exist.

Therefore, God must exist. And as I close this argument, just for the record, it will take more than you people putting your hand over your ears and shouting The argument is not valid or whatever you like to say when a theist bring forth an argument.

You actually have to address the argument (1-5), and explain why any of the premises are false. But I dont think that you can, can you?

[Bust Nak]

Throughout the thread I provided support.

Which in your own words "isn't sufficient." These are all the support you presented in this thread for P1:

1) Claiming that is what Christians believe.
2) Assuming that we will just go along with it.
3) Pointing out that some atheists did in fact just went along with it.
4) Questioning if we have any good reason to deny P1.
5) Delaying further support P1 for another thread.

Not good enough, these doesn't demonstrate the truth of P1. Support your premise. Show us how a necessary God is possible.

Fine...create a thread on the topic and I will be there.

We are not done with this one yet. The validity and soundness of the problem of evil is not relevant here. The mere fact that atheists have appealed to it, is enough to prove that we have contested the possibility of God long before the modal logic was formalised, long before Plantinga was born, before when the modal ontological argument was conceived, and of course before you started this thread.

Your claim that most of us have shifted position as a response to the MOA, or more laughably as a response to your thread, isn't justified.

Ok, the problem of evil is ONE argument...while Plantiga gave about two dozen or so arguments for the existence of God.

Are you suggesting that the side which gave the most amount of arguments wins? How many arguments Plantinga gave is irrelevant to my point. We have argued using the problem of evil, therefore we have argued against the possibility of God.

Who is begging the question? P1 is true.

So you would like to us to believe. Demonstrate the truth of P1. Until you do, the MOA is question begging.

Well, if you admit that it spelled it out, what is the problem? What is your beef? It is almost as if you are criticizing me for not spelling it out, but at the same time giving me props for spelling it out.

I am criticizing you for not putting the definition of God forward as part of the syllogism. I am also acknowledging that you could have done much worse, but refrained from it.

I thought I was challenging the relevance of the question of "Why must God be necessary?" as opposed to "What is the definition of God".

Let me correct that misconception right now. You were being challenged on the truth of P1. Is it so surprising that explaining why P1 is true would be part of the package? Is it so surprising that the definition of God would come into play in such an explanation?

I gave the definition of a certain being, and stated that it is possible for the being to exist as P1 of the argument.

P1 is either true, or false. Throughout this thread of 20+ pages, I've given reasons as to why P1 is true.

So called "reasons" anyway. Christians believe P1 therefore it is true? Atheists might go along with P1 therefore it is true? You can prove P1 later with KCA therefore it is true? Tell me again if you think these are sufficient or not.

Don't know what more you want.

I want sufficient support for P1.

If the KCA is false, then the MOA is false.

You aren't addressing my point. You are affirming that MOA cannot stand on it's own without KCA, that makes it is useless as an argument. Good for entertainment though.

That is why you read the entire thread instead of bits and pieces.

Reading the entire thread is why I can justify accusing you of begging the question. The implication that I have only read bits and pieces, is unfounded.

I did?

Yep, and I quote, post#200: "so before this thread was posted, how many of you can honestly say that prior to this thread, your contention was that 'God cannot possibly exist?'

"but now, since you realize the implications of such a statement, now it is cool to just deny the possibility altogether, which means that the argument is definitely working...and that is obvious that it is working if you have to adjust to it, as opposed to the argument adjusting to you."

Followed up with an "as obvious as the nose on Pinocchio's face after he lied to the grand jury" in post#237.

Oh, I didn't know that.

Kinda odd for a Christians to not know that. Whatever, you do now.

That is why I said we have to be honest with ourselves and ask how many of us denied the impossibility of God existing before they heard of the MOA.

Those of us who appealed to the problem of evil. If you could stop questioning our honesty, that would be nice too.

I told you that such a question will be answered in the KCA thread...but that has absolutely NOTHING to do with the truth value of the proposition "It is possible that a MGB exist".

That's the same red herring as before. Granted, why something is true, is indeed a separate question as to whether it is true. But when you are trying to convince us that P1 is true, explaining why you think so would of course be part of the deal.

Perhaps an analogy is in order:

A: "Quarterback is defined as carrot eater, as such 1) a quarterback is someone who eats carrots; 2) John eats carrots; 3) therefore John is a quarterback."
B: "Why would you think eating carrots makes you a quarterback?"
A: "I don't see the relevance. The "why" has NOTHING to do with the truth value of the proposition 'a quarterback is someone who eats carrots.' Here you are asking me about the definition of quarterbacks."

I don't want you to think I am being facetious here, either. I just don't see the relevance...I mean here I am saying that "It is possible for a MGB to exist"

Is it? Prove it.

and here you are saying "Why define a MGB that way"?....well, WHY NOT, if that is the case.

I'll tell you why not, it is because dude, it takes more than just merely stating the premises... You actually have to give evidence that support the premises. The premises has to be supported... I can define you as a necessary being, but does it follow that you are actually one? No...

Hmm, sounds familiar, doesn't it?

Not that it can't be answered, either...it is just a question that is irrelevant to what the argument is seeking to demonstrate.

I hope my analogy made it clear why it is relevant.

How am I catching them off guard when "God" is defined in the OP? It is right there!! Yet, they are caught off guard?

They are partly to blame too. They agreed to something without paying attention, agreed to something that they have good reasons to reject.

Ok...what does this have to do with a MGB, whose existence is necessary in all possible worlds? Nothing.

Not so fast. A MGB's existence is only necessary in all possible worlds if it exists in any possible world at all. My proof shows that MGB does not exist in any possible world as no beings has necessary existence. Did you perhaps missed the "for all X?"

[Artie]

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

Sorry if this has been answered but why exactly couldn't such a being fail to exist?

Oh I just got it... you have defined a MGB to be a being present everywhere. And to be present everywhere the being has to exist in the first place. So because you have defined a MGB to be an existing being a MGB can't fail to exist or it wouldn't be a MGB as you have defined it. Very clever.

[Kenisaw]

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

Sorry if this has been answered but why exactly couldn't such a being fail to exist?

Oh I just got it... you have defined a MGB to be a being present everywhere. And to be present everywhere the being has to exist in the first place. So because you have defined a MGB to be an existing being a MGB can't fail to exist or it wouldn't be a MGB as you have defined it. Very clever.

It's too bad he shot himself in the foot with the same post listing all those false logic loop omni-thingies

[For_The_Kingdom]

A logically sound objection, no matter the size, is still a valid objection, correct? I thought so.

It was a bad choice of a word.

Your MGB, as defined by you, can't be what you claim it is, therefore it can't possibly exist. Your premise is rejected.

Of course it is.

Is free will absurd? Because your MGB doesn't have that either. If it can't change the future it also can't change the present.

Non sequitur.

If it knows all then it can't change its mind when the future becomes the present.

Ok, so can you think of a being that would be able to do such a thing? If you can't, then it can't be done...if you can, then God can do it.

An MGB cannot ever make a decision based on its own free will because it can't possibly have one. Fascinating.

It is a fascinating non sequitur.

Too bad it can't actually make that choice, seeing as how it doesn't have any free will. Bummer for the MGB.

When a premise of an argument is false, then every premise/conclusion that is drawn based on that false premise is also false..and that is the case here. You are putting the MGB in a scenario to do something that is logically absurd...and that isn't what omnipotent means.

Not that it matters anyway, because your MGB is shooting hoops with an imperfect creation. How goes a MGB create something that isn't maximally great?

I've already answer that question. If God choose to miss a free throw, that doesn't diminish his greatness as long as he maintains the ability to NOT miss the free throw..the missing of the free throw is not based on his lack of ability, but rather, the choice that he made.

If it exists everywhere then part of its existence isn't maximally great now...
Your premise is rejected.

Of course it is, when you don't understand what "maximum greatness" implies.

While you are trying to figure out how an MGB can't have free will

Yet I gave a logically conceivable scenario at which a MGB can freely choose to do something while not diminishing his greatness.

, maybe you can also figure out how an MGB can be everywhere at the same time

I don't know "how" a MGB can be everywhere at the same time, but what I do know is that it is conceivable...God knows everything that happened, can happen, and will happen...in every part of the world, at the same time, and his presence is everywhere, at one time.

But do I know "how"...no. But it is conceivable.

and be "omni benevolent" while there is evil in the world.

The problem of evil already assumes the existence of objective moral values...but do we need to take it there on a MOA thread?

[Kenisaw]

A logically sound objection, no matter the size, is still a valid objection, correct? I thought so.

It was a bad choice of a word.

Happens to all of us.

Your MGB, as defined by you, can't be what you claim it is, therefore it can't possibly exist. Your premise is rejected.

Of course it is.

Great. If P1 is false then we can close this thread.

Is free will absurd? Because your MGB doesn't have that either. If it can't change the future it also can't change the present.

Non sequitur.

No. You said: "So, apparently, the changing of the future is thereby impossible...and no one is claiming that even with an attribute such a omnipotence, that a MGB can do something that is logically absurd." My comment above directly deals with this omni-stuff, so it logically follows.

If your MGB is all knowing than it cannot have free will. I haven't seen anyone try to claim free will is absurd, and in fact the inerrant word of your particular god says it exists. But if that god is all knowing then it can't. Seems to be quite the dilemma. I look forward to you sorting it out for us.

If it knows all then it can't change its mind when the future becomes the present.

Ok, so can you think of a being that would be able to do such a thing? If you can't, then it can't be done...if you can, then God can do it.

Your god can't seem to do much of anything given all its omni powers...

Too bad it can't actually make that choice, seeing as how it doesn't have any free will. Bummer for the MGB.

When a premise of an argument is false, then every premise/conclusion that is drawn based on that false premise is also false..and that is the case here. You are putting the MGB in a scenario to do something that is logically absurd...and that isn't what omnipotent means.

No, you put the MGB in this scenario. The Bible puts the MGB (your god) in this scenario. I didn't list what this thing can do, you did and the bible did. The claims being made about the properties and abilities of the MGB are logically absurd. The MGB/god creature cannot possibly exist.

Not that it matters anyway, because your MGB is shooting hoops with an imperfect creation. How goes a MGB create something that isn't maximally great?

I've already answer that question. If God choose to miss a free throw, that doesn't diminish his greatness as long as he maintains the ability to NOT miss the free throw..the missing of the free throw is not based on his lack of ability, but rather, the choice that he made.

Except as I already explained the MGB can't have free will and therefore can't choose to do anything. Free will must be a logical absurdity, eh?

If it exists everywhere then part of its existence isn't maximally great now...
Your premise is rejected.

Of course it is, when you don't understand what "maximum greatness" implies.

Ahh, but we all notice you fail to describe, in technicolorly detail, what it is I fail to understand. Please explain to us how something maximally great can exist everywhere in something that is no longer maximally great. I'm all ears...

While you are trying to figure out how an MGB can't have free will

Yet I gave a logically conceivable scenario at which a MGB can freely choose to do something while not diminishing his greatness.

Except it had to miss that free throw, because it already knew it was going to miss that free throw. No choice there. Solve the dilemma.

, maybe you can also figure out how an MGB can be everywhere at the same time

I don't know "how" a MGB can be everywhere at the same time, but what I do know is that it is conceivable...God knows everything that happened, can happen, and will happen...in every part of the world, at the same time, and his presence is everywhere, at one time.

But do I know "how"...no. But it is conceivable.

Except for all the illogical contradiction of it, which I have detailed out for you multiple times above and in previous posts, which you have not rectified. I've also explained to you that just because something is conceivable doesn't make it possible, and gave an example of that (it was either a square circle or an unstoppable force meets an immovable object, maybe even both now that I think about it). It appears you are repeating yourself and running around in a circle a little bit.

and be "omni benevolent" while there is evil in the world.

The problem of evil already assumes the existence of objective moral values...but do we need to take it there on a MOA thread?

That was not my point. If there is an all good god creature that exists everywhere all the time, how can evil exist in its existence? (Not to mention how a maximally great all good being even makes something that can be evil (us) when it changed its perfect existence by creating an imperfect world)...

I don't envy the work you've got ahead of you....

[Furrowed Brow]

Then simply give me a possible world/scenario at which 2+2=7.

2 + 2 = 4 is a tautology, thus 2 + 2= 7 fails to understand the meaning of each term. But premise 1 is not a tautology and neither is the S5 axiom <>p -> []<>p (possibly implies necessarily possible), or the S5 theorem <>p => <>[]p. If you keep seeing the implication as tautological that is because you only see one definition of necessity.

If you can't do that, then you should be able to see the nature of necessity, and how necessary truths are true in all possible words...and anything less than that is contingent.

False. Please take time to appreciate there are different modal systems, why they have different axioms and different set of theorems. I should not have to justify them to you as they already exist in the field of modal logic and it is you who are invoking modal logic whilst ignoring what is already well accepted.

You claim the truth of the MOA is unassailable despite it being pointed out several times that that positions goes way beyond Plantinga and that modal logic is not confined to the definition you are using. You have been given counter examples but you breeze past them.

I'll try again. What counts as necessity in modern modal logics is defined by the accessibility relationship and what may be accessed or not accessed between worlds. Here is a simplified example. Imagine there are only a million alternative worlds. In one world we shall call w it is only possible to access half of all the worlds and half a million are inaccessible i.e. half contain something not possible in w. Let's say the speed of light is variable in half the worlds and world w cannot access the half which have a variable speed of light because the speed of light has to be constant in w. In this scenario the speed of light is constant in w the speed limit is necessarily the case because it is not open to revision, yet the speed of light is not constant in all worlds. Those other worlds with a variable speed of light may not be possible from the perspective of w but that does not mean they are not possible worlds. They may be fully consistent and possible by a set of laws and principles not compatible with w. Under the definition of necessity you are sticking to the constant speed of light in w is not necessarily true despite no other speed being allowed, and no world accessible form w having a different speed of light. To be consistent you must be lead to conclude the alternative worlds with variables speed limits are not just inaccessible to w but impossible worlds full stop. The history of modal logic has found the definition of necessity you are insisting on inadequate to explain the kinds of counter examples, and that is why the definition you stick to does not account for all the nuances if what might be meant by necessity.

You keep talking about all of these different definitions of necessity, yet, you cannot apply any of those definitions to the actual scenario......of how there is only one way to look at necessity...and that is acknowledging the fact that 2+2 will always equal 4...no matter what definition of necessity that you use.

To repeat 2 + 2 = 4 is true by definition. Possibility implies possible necessity is not tautological.

I think Lewis entertained the idea that necessity just meant tautology but the field of modal logic has moved well beyond that, and so have you if you are insisting <>p -> <>[]p is a necessary truth, or are you saying possibility implies possible necessity is a tautology. The latter is a difficult point to sustain given the dozens of modal logics for which this propositions is not an axiom or theorem.

You keep talking about all of these different definitions of necessity, yet, you cannot apply any of those definitions to the actual scenario......of how there is only one way to look at necessity...and that is acknowledging the fact that 2+2 will always equal 4...no matter what definition of necessity that you use.

2 + 2= 4 is not the actual scenario. The analogy is erroneous.

To be clear is it generally accepted a tautology is necessarily true, but the reverse implication is not accepted. A necessary truth does not have to be a tautology, and the accusation is that premise 1 is not a tautology. therefore there is no point demanding what is true for a tautology is true for premise 1.

.and I simply challenge you to give me any other definition of necessity that will undercut this truth.

I gave an example in the other post - post 268 and you say...

I am not going to pretend like I understand this...

I have given what I hope is a simpler formulation in this post.

The challenge is there for all to see...so what are you gonna do?

I have done that at post 191 when I pointed out the problems with S5's definition of necessity that includes the Euclidian property, and shown why this was a commitment to a break down in irreversible properties, that it lacked an arrow of time, failed to support cause and effect etcetera. So my preferred definition of necessity lacks the Euclidean property. For the purposes of this thread we'll say I prefer system S4 (there is another system which is too complicated to introduce here I actually prefer but it lacks the currency of S4, so S4 will do).

If something is true in every conceivable world then it is surely necessary. But there are other definitions of necessary your definition does not include.

Like what?

The obvious answer is necessity as defined by the axioms and theorems of S4. A system in which the Moa is invalid. but I'm repeating myself. Unless of course you are asking me to explain S4. The major feature of S4 is that it is transitive and it is dense, whilst not being Euclidean. the technical definition of these terms are given in logical notation and listed here on wiki. S4 an S5 are related systems. What is true in S4 is true in S5 but as S5 includes an additional axiom everything true in S5 is not true in S4. I have given reason in post 191 why S5 is moot and why something less and maybe approaching S4 is more reasonable.

However, since there is at least one possible world at which I am NOT able to travel faster than the speed of light (the actual world), that would mean that my traveling faster than the speed of light (or ability to) is not necessary..but rather, contingent.

If you are in the world with the speed limit you are unable to break the speed limit because under the set of principles that define this world it is not possible to go faster. Thus the limit is a necessary truth because it is not open to change.

Here is another example to the same effect: imagine a country called France where no one speaks any language other then French and another country Germany where no one speaks any language other than German. You may speak both French and German but if you want to order your toast in France it has to be asked for in French and there is no other option, and in Germany you have to ask in German. Under your preferred definition of necessity it is not necessarily the case that if you want French toast in France you have to ask in French, despite no other language accepted.

The point applies to premise 1 if we think of the MGB as possibly necessary. You conclude the if it is necessary it must be true in every world. But that is just one definition of necessity. Necessity may be better defined in such a way that it allows for localised necessity. there are many characteristics definable as conditions on Kripke frames that we may chose as properties of necessity and there is some argument as to which are most apt. But on one reading - hopefully illuminated by the above examples - something necessary in one world does not have to be true in every world.

There are still more nuances to the definitions of necessity. So many it lead Bertrand Russell to complain about the difficulty with defining necessity. The relevant point here is that the definition you prefer is not the master definition. It is one definition amongst many, and as such you cannot claim any conclusion that follows from the definition is inevitable. To be inevitable all the other alternative systems of modal logic have to be shown to be wrong.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Sorry if this has been answered but why exactly couldn't such a being fail to exist?

A necessary truth would not be true if and only if it wasn't possible for it to be true...but the existence of a MGB IS possible...and all possible necessary truths must be true.

[Divine Insight]

Sorry if this has been answered but why exactly couldn't such a being fail to exist?

A necessary truth would not be true if and only if it wasn't possible for it to be true...but the existence of a MGB IS possible...and all possible necessary truths must be true.

Actually the existence of an MGB as defined in the OP is impossible in any world where a non-benevolent actions could occur because that would require a logical contradiction:

You have have defined the MGB as follows in the OP.

Next, Id like to turn the attention to the definition of God. God, at least as defined by Christian theism, is a maximally great being (MGB). By maximally great, we mean that God is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), omnipresent (present everywhere at any given time), and omnibenevolent (the ultimate source of goodness)an ultimately, such a being is necessary in its existence (such a being cannot fail/cease to exist).

A God that is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent cannot simultaneously be omnibenevolent in any world where every action is not a benevolent action. So this would rule out your God from existing in any world where there were non-benevolent actions. Therefore your God, by your definition, cannot exist in our world, unless you want to argue that every action in our world is a benevolent action.

[For_The_Kingdom]

1) Claiming that is what Christians believe.

I mentioned this because you people were acting like the definition of God that I gave came out of left field or something. This is the traditional definition of the Judeo-Christian God...not something I just came up with.

2) Assuming that we will just go along with it.

I was wrong for assuming that you all would go along with..however, I think that I am accurate in my assessment; if anyone had asked any of you is it possible that the Judeo-Christian God (MGB) existed prior to the argument that I laid out, I think the majority of you would have given an undoubted "yes".

3) Pointing out that some atheists did in fact just went along with it.

Cuz they did.

4) Questioning if we have any good reason to deny P1.

If you do, then present it.

5) Delaying further support P1 for another thread.

I wouldn't say "support"...more like "corroborate". The MOA doesn't need "support" from the KCA or vice versa...but it is corroborated by it.

Not good enough, these doesn't demonstrate the truth of P1. Support your premise. Show us how a necessary God is possible.

I already stated that the reason P1 is true is because based on the definition of a MGB, there is no logical contradiction based on the definition. The concept of a MGB is internally coherent, which is why a MGB can be easily conceived.

The concept of a MGB is not absurd...it doesn't defy logic...therefore, it is possible. The only way P1 would be false is if one can point out a logical absurdity within the definition...which hasn't happened yet.

We are not done with this one yet.

I agree, which is why a thread for the KCA haven't been created as of yet.

The validity and soundness of the problem of evil is not relevant here.

LOL validity and soundness of the problem of evil.

The mere fact that atheists have appealed to it, is enough to prove that we have contested the possibility of God long before the modal logic was formalised, long before Plantinga was born, before when the modal ontological argument was conceived, and of course before you started this thread.

Well, I guess we will have to wait until you post that thread for me to demolish the argument.

Your claim that most of us have shifted position as a response to the MOA, or more laughably as a response to your thread, isn't justified.

It is an actual factual.

Are you suggesting that the side which gave the most amount of arguments wins? How many arguments Plantinga gave is irrelevant to my point. We have argued using the problem of evil, therefore we have argued against the possibility of God.

I am using the amount of arguments in this context to be synonymous with the amount of evidence on each side...in other words, the preponderance of evidence.

And I am saying that based on the preponderance of evidence, theism is giving atheism a good ole' fashioned spanking.

So you would like to us to believe. Demonstrate the truth of P1. Until you do, the MOA is question begging.

I can and I did.

I am criticizing you for not putting the definition of God forward as part of the syllogism.

Oh, I see. And to your credit, I have to admit that I've seen some versions of the MOA that have had the definition of God in the actual syllogism.

Let me correct that misconception right now. You were being challenged on the truth of P1. Is it so surprising that explaining why P1 is true would be part of the package?

Actually, now that I think about it...you notice that in the beginning of the thread, there were a few posts that said something along the lines of "just because a MGB is possible, that doesn't mean that it exist.".

Do you remember all of those? Well, it is almost as if they were granting P1 to be true, doesn't it? Hmmm.

So, that is why P1 wasn't explained, because of just that.

Is it so surprising that the definition of God would come into play in such an explanation?

Again, that is why you read the entire post, not just one sentence or paragraph. It is in there, just not where YOU'D like it to be.

So called "reasons" anyway. Christians believe P1 therefore it is true?

Nowhere have I said nor implied such a thing.

Atheists might go along with P1 therefore it is true? You can prove P1 later with KCA therefore it is true? Tell me again if you think these are sufficient or not.

No, I don't think that those are sufficient...I guess that is why I never said any of it in the first place.

I want sufficient support for P1.

Yeah, becuz you know the implications of a true P1 in this argument, don't you?

You aren't addressing my point. You are affirming that MOA cannot stand on it's own without KCA, that makes it is useless as an argument. Good for entertainment though.

The KCA corroborates the MOA and vice versa.

Those of us who appealed to the problem of evil.

I eat the problem of evil for breakfast.

If you could stop questioning our honesty, that would be nice too.

If the shoe fits..

That's the same red herring as before. Granted, why something is true, is indeed a separate question as to whether it is true. But when you are trying to convince us that P1 is true, explaining why you think so would of course be part of the deal.

But I did.

Perhaps an analogy is in order:
A: "Quarterback is defined as carrot eater, as such 1) a quarterback is someone who eats carrots; 2) John eats carrots; 3) therefore John is a quarterback."
B: "Why would you think eating carrots makes you a quarterback?"
A: "I don't see the relevance. The "why" has NOTHING to do with the truth value of the proposition 'a quarterback is someone who eats carrots.' Here you are asking me about the definition of quarterbacks."

That analogy won't work...because even if I answered "I don't know" to B, that has absolutely no relevance to whether the syllogism is true or false.

The question of "why" is about as useless as a mouth-less dog in a frisbee contest.

I'll tell you why not, it is because dude, it takes more than just merely stating the premises... You actually have to give evidence that support the premises. The premises has to be supported... I can define you as a necessary being, but does it follow that you are actually one? No...

Hmm, sounds familiar, doesn't it?

I see what you did there, too. P1 has now been supported. See above. I mean, not that it has been unsupported all the way through almost 30 pages...but since you keep asking for it as if it hasn't...there it is.

I hope my analogy made it clear why it is relevant.

Looking in hindsight...it didn't. LOL.

They are partly to blame too. They agreed to something without paying attention, agreed to something that they have good reasons to reject.

Perhaps they should read between the fine print before they go signing their lives away LOL.

Because once you grant P1, whewww, you are locked in to the point of no return.

Not so fast. A MGB's existence is only necessary in all possible worlds if it exists in any possible world at all.

And?

My proof shows that MGB does not exist in any possible world as no beings has necessary existence. Did you perhaps missed the "for all X?"

Then P1 would be false...but it isn't false, it is true. I need direct refutations of the premises, not some hand-me-down counter arguments that really don't accurately reflect or any any way undermine the actual MOA.

[For_The_Kingdom]

Oh I just got it... you have defined a MGB to be a being present everywhere. And to be present everywhere the being has to exist in the first place. So because you have defined a MGB to be an existing being a MGB can't fail to exist or it wouldn't be a MGB as you have defined it. Very clever.

I can define you, Artie, as "being present everywhere"...but if it isn't possible for you to exist everywhere, then I guess it doesn't really matter how you were defined, does it?

No, it doesn't. So if that line of reasoning won't work with you, why think it works with this argument?

It doesn't. This just goes with the typical "you are defining God into existence" nonsense that makes up about 70% of the objections to the argument. Not only are these objections demonstrably false...but they are also demonstrably false.

LOL.