Where is the Mind?

[harvey1]

In another thread QED and I were discussing IGUSes (information gathering & utilizing systems: a term that physicist James Hartle articulated), and there's one issue I'd like to hear back from materialists of the mind. Where is the mind? By that I mean let's suppose that humans can only "see" atoms and sub-atomic particles (e.g., electrons). That's all that we can see. Now, using this illustration, please tell me in conceptual terms where the mind is. For example, if we look at a computer, we can see the operating system as atoms in energized states on what we normally see as a disk drive. We see how atoms are energized, how electrons flow, etc., upon the booting up of that computer, and we see why the computer works at an atomic level. However what we don't see--can never see--is anything but atoms and sub-atomic particles being shifted about inside the machine. So, I think we can quite naturally conclude that the computer has no internal state that is "non-atomic" in nature. That is, the computer has no awareness of itself, and no feelings, etc. (i.e., qualia).

So, being that we humans have this subjective inner state, I'd like to hear how materialists and identity theorists of mind (i.e., mind=brain) can conceptually account for the mind solely in terms of atomic and sub-atomic particles. Where is it among the stew of particles?

[Furrowed Brow]

Hi skepticFromTX

We have a rich set of concepts to describe our mental life (feelings, attitudes, opinions, intentions, experiences, beliefs...) and an equally rich set to describe the physical world around us.

A major philosophical movement in the last fifty years recognizes that most of the words we use to describe the mind e.g. opinions, intentions, hopes, desires, wishes, thoughts etc, derive their sense and meaning from social contexts. This way of talking about the mind is sometimes dubbed folk psychology. The point is that any mind described in these terms is not in the head, because the sense and meaning of folk psychological terms are not derived from what is inside the head. On this view the mind is a folk/social construction. It does not actually exist at all as one might normally think of the mind existing.

Most of what passes as feeling, attitudes, opinions etc ain't in the head and ain't in the mind. They are a way of talking that allows us to to predict and evaluate behavior in a social context.

The "problem of consciousness" is just that our conceptual framework is not powerful enough to capture the relationship between the physical and the mental realm.

Well if you mean a realm of opinions,desires, wishes wants etc, I'd say their is no such realm, the sense and meaning of these words are social. Moreover there is a large philosophical precedent that says this way of thinking about the problem is a mistake. Starting with guys like Wittgenstein (later period) and then Gilbert Ryle.However I do think causal/materialistic explanations will always systematically fail to capture two important aspects of consciousness.
If you go here you'll find me struggling to get my head around what this is

[skepticFromTX]

Howdy Furrowed Brow,

Previously at 321 Furrowed Brow wrote:
"A major philosophical movement in the last fifty years recognizes that most of the words we use to describe the mind e.g. opinions, intentions, hopes, desires, wishes, thoughts etc, derive their sense and meaning from social contexts."

But aren't the words and the senses and meanings attached to them themselves the products of mentation in the speakers and hearers? Not to mention social contexts.

"This way of talking about the mind is sometimes dubbed folk psychology."
You make it sound like such a bad thing.

"The point is that any mind described in these terms is not in the head, because the sense and meaning of folk psychological terms are not derived from what is inside the head. On this view the mind is a folk/social construction. It does not actually exist at all as one might normally think of the mind existing."

If one wishes to think normally about the mind's existence then how does one go about it?

Furrowed Brow also wrote: "Most of what passes as feeling, attitudes, opinions etc ain't in the head and ain't in the mind. They are a way of talking that allows us to to predict and evaluate behavior in a social context."

So what, then IS inside "the head"? Does it contain any kind of mind at all? And while we're at it, what IS the head, anyway? Sounds kinda like jargon that refers to something specific. If you'd care to elucidate then please do so.

Is modern philosophy inside the head?

[skepticFromTX]

Furrowed Brow: "However I do think causal/materialistic explanations will always systematically fail to capture two important aspects of consciousness."

I'd go so far as to say that causal/materialistic explanations of the mind have succeeded spectacularly at not explaining any significant aspect of mind. Someday a physical theory of consciousness may be worked out. But if it is, our whole notion of the physical will have undergone a radical transformation first.

Cheers!

[Furrowed Brow]

Furrowed Brow: "However I do think causal/materialistic explanations will always systematically fail to capture two important aspects of consciousness."

I'd go so far as to say that causal/materialistic explanations of the mind have succeeded spectacularly at not explaining any significant aspect of mind. Someday a physical theory of consciousness may be worked out. But if it is, our whole notion of the physical will have undergone a radical transformation first.

Cheers!

Hi skepticFromTx

I'd say before science gets its teeth into the problem, philosophy has had quite a lot to say about folk psychology. If you go with a fair proposition of those guys you ain't going to see a material explanation for opinions, wishes, desires etc, because to even try would be guilty of falling into a conceptual confusion. Admittedly some philosophers like Davidson have argued that reasons can be causes, but why burden ourselves with explanations we don't need.

So perhaps the first question should not be where is the mind, but what is it? To answer that, perhaps we need to boil the answer down to what is absolutely necessary to constitute consciousness. I'd say subjective experience and Free will. All the stuff that falls under folk psychology we don't actually need a physical theory for.

[skepticFromTX]

Howdy again, Furrowed

"If you go with a fair proposition of those guys you ain't going to see a material explanation for opinions, wishes..."
Of course not. There's no expectation of a physical theory of opinions or wishes, any more than a biological explanation of soccer. They're only mentioned as some of the things that consciousness does. As the products of something that stands in need of explanation.

"So perhaps the first question should not be where is the mind, but what is it?"
This thread started out asking where, but it seems to have drifted into what. It does seem to be the more interesting and relevant question.

"To answer that, perhaps we need to boil the answer down to what is absolutely necessary to constitute consciousness. I'd say subjective experience and Free will."
I'm tempted to say 'self awareness', but then again I dunno. Don't you think that consciousness will turn out to be a spectrum? Apes and dolphins seem to have it... less so in dogs and cats and some of the guys in my old neighborhood. Maybe there are gradations thru the insects and all the way down to bacteria, although that seems unlikely. And the "strong AI" bunch thinks you don't even need a biological system to instantiate it.

And free will? You'd have to define it before making it a requirement for consciousness.

Ciao, y'all.

[Furrowed Brow]

Hi skepticFromTX

"If you go with a fair proposition of those guys you ain't going to see a material explanation for opinions, wishes..."

Of course not. There's no expectation of a physical theory of opinions or wishes, any more than a biological explanation of soccer. They're only mentioned as some of the things that consciousness does. As the products of something that stands in need of explanation.

Good we're agreed. But I want to make sure the door is bolted shut. This is where philosophy at times has got its knickers in a twist. Supervenience is one idea. It goes something like: mental states are supervenient upon physical states. The physical state is the causal state. but there is another way of describing that physical state, a description using terms like desires, intentions, wants etcs. The mental state is not causal, yet tracks or corresponds to a physical state, so it is supervenient. If true then we need to unpick our folk psychology and find where these terms, or bundle of terms, have a physical token in the brain.

I don't buy into that idea at all. Words like desires, wishes, wants play a role in language, narrative, and social context. It would be like trying to take the nick names of the soccer players to deduce the rules of soccer, that then reduce to biology. In fact it is worse than that. It like trying to explain the rules of soccer from the etymology of the nick names. It is just a bad play, and conceptual muddle. So there is no mental realm in the way us common folk might normally be inclined to think.

I'm tempted to say 'self awareness', but then again I dunno.

I'm tempted too. So that could be three things.

Don't you think that consciousness will turn out to be a spectrum? Apes and dolphins seem to have it... less so in dogs and cats and some of the guys in my old neighborhood. Maybe there are gradations thru the insects and all the way down to bacteria, although that seems unlikely. And the "strong AI" bunch thinks you don't even need a biological system to instantiate it.

Personally I think stepped gradation, and gradation within each step, is the right way to look at it. I think there may be certain brian functions that have to be achieved to get say self awareness, or the ability to do numbers, or calculus or have empathy.

And free will? You'd have to define it before making it a requirement for consciousness.

I've started a topic in Random Ramblings on Free Will. Again philosophy is perhaps guilty of watering down the concept of Free Will. I would say I go for, for want of a better term, Strong Free Will. Definable as the ability to act or think without prior cause. Difficult circle to square? Perhaps.
Check this out

[QED]

QED: "We might however presume that evolution solved the problem of consciousness in getting us to where we are."

And THAT is also an interesting thought. But now think about this: Evolution was only working with stuff it found laying around: atoms and energy. OK, as far as we know.

Yes, I think it's very important to keep in mind the fact that new scientific discoveries are bound to be made as we continue to investigate nature. I see Evolution conducting similar investigations in the very early stages -- making most breakthroughs before things had advanced much further than beyond the cell.

With the cell as a basic building block evolution could then go on to discover various structures for them. Of most interest to us here are would be the primitive nervous systems of the sensor->processor->motor type which are still the basic model for today, except for in their numbers. I don't think it's particularly difficult to see evolution discovering these control loops -- for example, the most appropriate movement away or towards threats or opportunities will soon get sorted out in evolving populations.

But people will then ask when or where does the upgrade from these "robotic" control loops into our familiar sense of awareness happen? They ask because they're sure that they have this awareness and that their Robonova-I (in case anyone wants to get me something for xmas ) doesn't. I would agree that the robot's experience of awareness is incomparable, but I fail to see how we could be sure that it wasn't only so in terms of quantity and not quality.

And evolution may not have had to solve the problem of consciousness anyway. Because we can, using just the conceptual set that we have, pretty much account for the physical world, including the complexity of our central nervous systems. And that complexity is incredible and awesome (as has been pointed out already in this thread).

Yet people will still say that just invoking complexity won't get you out of jail. I say it would if the quality of "awareness" could be present in microscopic amounts. This seems to offend almost everyone because they automatically think it implies "sentient atoms" or something equally silly. But I think this comes of not attempting to divide down their own highly developed sense of awareness into any conceivable sub-units. I do hope, however, that if someone can explain any problem with this view that they will do so because it's clearly a tricky area to be pondering.

[skepticFromTX]

Hallo Furrowed

"Supervenience is one idea. It goes something like: mental states are supervenient upon physical states. The physical state is the causal state..."
I parse this as: "physical states cause mental states..." Yes/no?
How about: "mental states are, in some way, caused by physical states..." Better/worse?

"The mental state is not causal, yet tracks or corresponds to a physical state, so it is supervenient."
I don't understand the "yet". Why not "but rather"?
And also, first you said that mental states supervene on (are caused in some way by) physical states. Now it sounds like they just correlate with physical states, which is 'way different.

"...but there is another way of describing that physical state, a description using terms like desires, intentions, wants etcs."
I guess I could say something like "when George intends to speak, neurons 500 thru 899 in his brain area X fire rapidly." I could even connect a tiny wire to each one and display all their firings individually on an oscilloscope with 400 channels, revealing all at once the whole grand pattern of neuronal firings (i.e. the physical state) upon which George's intention to speak... supervenes. But could I point to that oscilloscope screen and say: "There, thats it! A picture of the electrical activity that causes George to intend to speak!" and not sound like an idiot?

One of the most immaterial things we can concieve of (intentions) ...caused by something very recognizably material (little bits of electrified protein)?
Seems to me something's missing.

"I would say I go for, for want of a better term, Strong Free Will."
When Mozart composed his music, was he being creative or was he exercising free will?

[Bugmaster]

But could I point to that oscilloscope screen and say: "There, thats it! A picture of the electrical activity that causes George to intend to speak!" and not sound like an idiot?

Well, no, because the picture is not what causes George to speak. The picture is George speaking.

One of the most immaterial things we can concieve of (intentions) ...caused by something very recognizably material (little bits of electrified protein)?

I don't really see intentions as being immaterial. I think that if you were able to produce -- and, more importantly, understand -- the full picture of George's brain as he's speaking, you could point out the electrical signals that are George's intentions. Of course, realistically, you wouldn't do that, you'd probably use some higher-level representation, in the interests of saving time -- for the same reason that most people program in Java or Python, and not in binary code. But, the basic principle's the same.

We can already accomplish this with more coarse-grained aspects of the "mind", such as basic emotions (fear, happiness, anger); basic perceptions (hearing, vision), and we are even able to fix potentially deadly malfunctions, such as epilepsy (and working on Alzheimer's now). I simply don't see any evidence to believe that there's anything immaterial, or spiritual, going on inside our heads.

[Furrowed Brow]

Hi skepticFromTX

Supervenience is one idea. It goes something like: mental states are supervenient upon physical states. The physical state is the causal state..."

I parse this as: "physical states cause mental states..." Yes/no?

Hmm. Well. You see.. Hmmm Well. I'd say no. But I think this is where supervenience is a muddle. Lets put is this way.

Changing the subject slightly. Frege talked about meaning and sense. There is the planet Venus, then there is the morning star and the evening star. All the same thing. Just different ways of talking about a physical state. Now say you want to call the planet Venus something else. Lets call it the planet of love. And when love shines love is awake. So there would be a causal state i.e. the planet venus travelling with momentum, and following the laws of gravity, reflecting sun light etc. And then there is love, which has changed the subject, and is not the causal state; but love shining is supervenient upon a physical process.

Ok you can say that example is not very good. But then I've just got up. So I don't mean to parse that one to bits. It's just an attempt to get an idea across that may itself be a bit of muddle, and one I disagree with anyway.

How about: "mental states are, in some way, caused by physical states..." Better/worse? [/quote]

The problem with talking this way at all, is that it leads into a way of thinking that says mental states are "states" which in turn implies they are entities, albeit ones with a special status of being mental, or being immaterial.

The problem as I see it is that language is getting in the way, and our natural folk way of speaking imposes a model of mental realms or mental entities on us that is useful in Dennet's sense, but not real in a similar way earth, air, fire and water, were an attempt to describe the fundamental elements, but as a model of the universe just not real. The only difference being that you might not understand the chemical nature of air or water or fire but you don't mistake what they are when you are swimming, or breathing etc. Much of what passes in the language of the mental (folk psychology) on the other hand are terms which have, when analysed, nebulous meanings and senses; for the reason they cover a wide non discrete messy imbroglio of human behaviors.

I guess I could say something like "when George intends to speak, neurons 500 thru 899 in his brain area X fire rapidly." I could even connect a tiny wire to each one and display all their firings individually on an oscilloscope with 400 channels, revealing all at once the whole grand pattern of neuronal firings (i.e. the physical state) upon which George's intention to speak... supervenes. But could I point to that oscilloscope screen and say: "There, thats it! A picture of the electrical activity that causes George to intend to speak!" and not sound like an idiot?

Well there have been some philosophers (Churchlands) who have argued that we should and eventually will dispense with folk psychology in favour of a a more accurate and conceptually correct language that says things like "Everyone shut up I think George's neurons 500 thru 899 are firing, let him speak". Hey what happens to poetry then I don't know. And then Dennet's point kicks in - Folk psychology is an excellent short hand, that allows for much quicker evaluation of behavior.

One of the most immaterial things we can concieve of (intentions) ...caused by something very recognizably material (little bits of electrified protein)? Seems to me something's missing.

Hmmm. Yes. but do we go off hunting down immaterial mental realms or say hang on - is that a fools errand?

"I would say I go for, for want of a better term, Strong Free Will."

When Mozart composed his music, was he being creative or was he exercising free will?

For a bunch of reasons that I probably will sound a bit incoherent if I try to articulate, I think creativity and free will, emerge out of the same pot. So Mozart's music was a result of his creative-freedom.