Are Gods physical?

[ytrewq]

In a previous thread I was astounded to hear the claim that Gods are not physical, presumably meaning they do not consist of physical matter. How any theist could actually claim to know that is a mystery, but never mind. The question being asked here is :-

Are Gods made from physical matter, and if they are not, then what are they made from.

If they are able to think and do stuff, then presumably they must be made of something.

By physical matter, I mean the physical stuff within our Universe from which everything else is made from, which includes atoms, sub-atomic particles, and to be fair I suppose we must include dark matter as well.

But there are other classes of things that undeniably exist, that are not physical matter as such, that perhaps Gods could be made of. Here is a list of stuff that definitely exists, and thus Gods might potentially be made of :-

(a) Physical matter, including atoms, sub-atomic particles, and dark matter

(b) Electromagnetic radiation and other forms of radiation, energy and fields. For example, light and radio waves.

(c) Human (or animal) feelings, emotions, thoughts, love, hate jealousy, intelligence, stupidity, truth, dishonesty, spirituality and so on. All of these can be said to exist, but not in a physical form.

(d) Similar to (c), morals, legal or scientific laws, stories, information, principles, and so on. As with (c), all of these can be said to exist, but not in a physical form, although the media that encodes them may be physical, such as a book or CD.

OK. So what are Gods made from? Certainly not anything in the (c) or (d) category, which do not physically exist in their own right and are not capable of performing physical feats on their own. That is, it makes no sense to say that a God (or anything else) is made from love, or justice or logic or spirituality. These are attributes of something that physically exists.

I have heard it said that Gods are not physical, but spiritual. Spiritual is an adjective, an attribute of something that exists, so it makes no sense to say that a God is made of spirituality, any more than saying it is made of love. So sure, Gods probably are very spiritual things, but that says nothing of what they are made from, which is the topic of this thread.

So what is left? Within the realms of human knowledge, and Im not interested in just making stuff up, then I must conclude that Gods (if they exist) are made of the same stuff that everything else in the Universe is made of, being categories (a) and (b).

Anyone agree or disagree with the above?

[1213]

For simplicity, I suppose we should restrict ourselves to just the Christian God, and William's pantheistic "God". Does that sound sensible?

That is ok to me.

And you have found from the Bible that not only is God spirit, but he also is Love. Maybe we are taking the Bible too literally. Maybe what is really meant is that God is both spiritual and loving. Is that possible? It certainly seems to make no sense saying that he is spirit and he is love.

By my experience, it is better to just take it as it is written. If we begin to change words and meanings on our own, many problems can later occur.

[ytrewq]

[Replying to post 24 by William]

That is why I often refer to GOD as "Consciousness" ......

I have now read your posting in more detail.

My post #29 discussed your (odd to me) concept that God is "Consciousness" .

Your thoughts are interesting, but we would need to argee on / resolve the questions I raised in my post #29 before proceeding further.

And if Mithrae is there, I also thank you for your reply. I'll concentrate first on Williiam's thoughts, as that may take a while, and my brain is too small to do justice to discussing with you both at once.

Cheers.

[Goose]

At this point, all you are doing is repeating endlessly that the question is incoherent, while giving no explanation of why it is incoherent.

Ive explained why in each post.

Why is the question incoherent?

Because the question, when applied to the Christian view of God, implies a contradiction. Of what is X made, when X is not made.

It cant be properly answered by a Christian any more than the question, what does a square circle look like?

Why is it unreasonable to ask for the material composition of your God, that exists and has the capacity to think and perform physical feats?

Because it misrepresents the Christian view of God and thereby places the Christian in the position of trying to answer a contradiction. To ask what is the composition of God is to ask of what is God composed? To ask of what is God composed, is to ask of what is God made? To ask of what is God made implies God has a maker. To attempt to answer the question tacitly implies God has a maker.

For anything else that exists and can think and perform feats, then I'm sure you would agree that the question is perfectly reasonable.

Yes, because on the Christian view everything else that exists and can think and perform feats was made, created, composed, etc. by God.

Why should we make exceptions for you?

Because God was not made, created, composed, etc.

You keep repeating that your god was not "made", but so what? Even if it has existed for all time, it's still gotta consist physically of something, doesn't it?

Why is it the case that something which has existed for all time must consist physically of something?

So let's assume your God was not made, and has existed for all time.

I think you mean to say God has existed eternally. To say God has existed for all time is to say God had a beginning since time and space as we understand it had a beginning.

It's easy to show that it's still perfectly acceptable and logical to ask what it physically consists of. Here is an example.

For centuries, most scientists believed that the Universe was timeless and not "made", just as you claim for your God. It was believed the universe 'just was" and had always been, and forever would be. OK. Now by your reasoning, it would therefore have been ridiculous to ask whether the matter within the universe was physical, or what the objects and matter within the universe were made of. By your reasoning, that would be an "incoherent" question, because it was accepted that the universe was not 'made" but had existed for all time.

Um, what! Really? You gotta be kidding me. Why would it be an "incoherent" question? Nobody else thought it was. Of course people asked that question, and progress was made on the answer, too, though that's not actually relevant to the discussion.

As seen clearly in the example, what you are saying just does not make sense.

Your analogy here does nothing to undermine my position. Its irrelevant that people who held to an eternal not made universe didnt bother to think logically and recognize the contradiction in asking, of what is a not made universe made? In fact, it weakens the position of one who holds to an eternal universe. The moment anyone who holds to an eternal not made universe attempts to answer the question, of what is the universe made, they unwittingly imply the universe was made. The only way out of this is to insist on a contradiction where the universe is made but not made. Its worth noting Christian theology has never held to an eternal universe.

Edit. And BTW, your example of "what a square circle looks like" is an example of a contradiction.

Correct. Just like its a contradiction to ask, of what is a not made thing made?

Everyone agrees on what is a circle and what is a square, and If something is circular, then it is not square.

Right. Just like something which is not made cannot be made.

But there is nothing that I have said that is contradictory, so your analogy is irrelevant.

Well, if after all Ive written you still cant see how you are misrepresenting the Christian view of God and creating a contradiction with the way in which youve framed the question for debate, I dont know what more can be said.

[Mithrae]

[Replying to post 43 by Goose]

I'm sorry to say it, but these responses do give an impression of being semantic sophistry. I think I might know what you mean though: To say that chairs are made of wood or ladders are made of metal is to describe them as consisting of things which can be conceived and can exist without the chairs and ladders at all. Wood and metal therefore have an ontological priority over chairs and ladders.

I'd suggest that the same might be said in the case of an eternal universe; if we said it was made of quarks, leptons and gauge bosons for example, they can be readily conceived and may well exist independently of at least this universe. An ontological priority would still be implied, even without a temporal priority.

But in the case of (some) Christian theologies it would be incorrect to assert that God consists of something which could exist or can even be conceived independently of God. What God consists of, is God.

Is that close to the mark?



And if so, wouldn't that imply panentheism as a necessary consequence of that Christian theology? Because supposing that our universe consists of a different type of stuff, distinct from God, would by the same reasoning entail an ontological equivalence with God.

[Tcg]

God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth.
John 4:24

Unlike some Christians here, 1213 isn't afraid to state what God is made of. His quote shows that the author a John didn't shy away from that challenge either.

However, when asked what this means, we pretty much get this:



I suppose this explains why some avoid addressing the straightforward question the OP asks.

[Mithrae]

I suppose this explains why some avoid addressing the straightforward question the OP asks.

Or perhaps folk who imagine that the question "What is the ultimate nature of reality / what does it consist of?" is a straightforward one have not yet had even the glimmers of understanding that some others might have for the scope and depth of the issue

[Goose]

I'm sorry to say it, but these responses do give an impression of being semantic sophistry.

Im certainly willing to accept the charge this is a semantic issue. However, the charge of sophistry is unfounded. Nowhere have I attempted to deceive through fallacious argumentation.

I think I might know what you mean though: To say that chairs are made of wood or ladders are made of metal is to describe them as consisting of things which can be conceived and can exist without the chairs and ladders at all. Wood and metal therefore have an ontological priority over chairs and ladders.

I dont disagree here.

I'd suggest that the same might be said in the case of an eternal universe; if we said it was made of quarks, leptons and gauge bosons for example, they can be readily conceived and may well exist independently of at least this universe. An ontological priority would still be implied, even without a temporal priority.

Im not so sure about quarks, leptons and gauge bosons existing independently of this universe. But I think I can agree that there would be implied some kind of ontological priority over other entities.

But in the case of (some) Christian theologies it would be incorrect to assert that God consists of something which could exist or can even be conceived independently of God.

Yes, I would agree with that.

What God consists of, is God.

I suppose one could answer this way - with a tautology - and it would, strictly speaking, be a correct answer. But would such a tautology really be a proper answer? I suppose if its correct then its proper. But will such an answer satisfy the one asking, of what does God consist? Im not so sure it will. Then again, whether the one asking the question feels satisfied with the answer is irrelevant.

Is that close to the mark?

Its close enough, I think.

And if so, wouldn't that imply panentheism as a necessary consequence of that Christian theology?

I dont see how it would. In fact, I think that kind of Christian theology must necessarily deny pananetheism. How could it not when it asserts God is the creator of this universe?

Because supposing that our universe consists of a different type of stuff, distinct from God, would by the same reasoning entail an ontological equivalence with God.

Youll have to flesh this one out because Im not really sure what you mean by ontological equivalence here. Nor am I seeing how it follows especially if God is the creator of the universe's stuff.

[Mithrae]

I'm sorry to say it, but these responses do give an impression of being semantic sophistry.

Im certainly willing to accept the charge this is a semantic issue. However, the charge of sophistry is unfounded. Nowhere have I attempted to deceive through fallacious argumentation.

No, but a casual reader could easily come away with the impression that it was just empty word-play. It took me a good while to try to piece together the ideas which might have lain behind your posts, and even then I consider myself lucky to have been "close enough, I think"

And if so, wouldn't that imply panentheism as a necessary consequence of that Christian theology?

I dont see how it would. In fact, I think that kind of Christian theology must necessarily deny pananetheism. How could it not when it asserts God is the creator of this universe?

Because supposing that our universe consists of a different type of stuff, distinct from God, would by the same reasoning entail an ontological equivalence with God.

Youll have to flesh this one out because Im not really sure what you mean by ontological equivalence here. Nor am I seeing how it follows especially if God is the creator of the universe's stuff.

The reasoning above rejects the answer of a God consisting of matter or 'spirit' even though - God being eternal and uncaused - that matter of which he consists would not have any chronological or causal priority. Chronological or causal priority are obviously not the problem here; simply ontological priority in that matter can be conceived and potentially exist independent of God. Hence supposing that our universe consists of anything which can be conceived and potentially exist distinct from God would be granting an ontological equivalency between those two types of stuff, the God-stuff and the universe-stuff. God would be the supreme cause, but only co-equal in terms of being; obviously a problematic conclusion.

The only acceptable resolutions I can see would be to either A) abandon that reasoning/objection to the question 'what is God made of' altogether or B) following through with that reasoning, recognize that as supreme being it follows that there can be nothing ontologically distinct from God; everything that is, is in God (cf. Acts 17:28).

[ytrewq]

[Replying to post 43 by Goose]

Why is the question incoherent?

Because the question, when applied to the Christian view of God, implies a contradiction. Of what is X made, when X is not made.

Yes, that is indeed your reasoning in a nutshell, and it is pure semantics. Empty word play. Or in common parlance, complete nonsense.

But with some help from Mithrae, apparently that was not your argument at all! Just as well for that.

Edit. But as friends, let me whisper in your ear that if you allow yourself to be gently led by the hand by Mithrae, you will likely end up not with a Christian argument, but a case for Panentheism.

[William]

[Replying to post 45 by Tcg]

Whereas...