Is it possible to build a sapient machine ?

[Bugmaster]

Topic

Many threads regarding dualism, theism, and philosophy in general, often run into this topic. Is it even hypothetically possible to build a computer that will be sapient -- i.e., an artificial being that will think, feel, and socialize as humans do ? Well, here's our chance: to resolve this debate once and for all ! Smoke 'em if you got 'em, people, this post is gonna be a long one.

I claim that creating Strong AI (which is another name for a sapient computer) is possible. We may not achieve this today, or tomorrow, but it's going to happen sooner rather than later.

First, let me go over some of the arguments in favor of my position.

Pro: The Turing Test

Alan Turing, the father of modern computing (well, one of them), proposed this test in ages long past, when computers as we know them today did not yet exist. So, let me re-cast his argument in modern terms.

Turing's argument is a thought experiment, involving a test. There are three participants in the test: subject A, subject B, and the examiner E. A and B are chatting on AIM, or posting on this forum, or text-messaging each other on the phone, or engaging in some other form of textual communication. E is watching their conversations, but he doesn't get to talk. E knows that one of the subjects -- either A or B -- is a bona-fide human being, and the other one is a computer, but he doesn't know which one is which. E's job is to determine which of the subjects is a computer, based on their chat logs. Of course, in a real scientific setting, we'd have a large population of test subjects and examiners, not just three beings, but you get the idea.

Turing's claim is that if E cannot reliably determine which being -- A or B -- is human, then they both are. Let me say this again: if E can't tell which of the subjects is a computer, then they're both human, with all rights and privileges and obligations that humanity entails.

This seems like a pretty wild claim at first, but consider: how do you know that I, Bugmaster, am human ? And how do I know that you're human, as well ? All I know about you is the content of your posts; you could be a robot, or a fish, it doesn't really matter. As long as you act human, people will treat you as such (unless, of course, they're jerks who treat everyone like garbage, but that's another story). You might say, "well, you know I'm human because today's computers aren't advanced enough to post intelligently on the forums", but doesn't prove much, since our technology is advancing rapidly all the time (and we're talking about the future, anyway).

So, if you're going to deny one of Turing's subjects his humanity, then you should be prepared to deny this humanity to everyone, which would be absurd. Therefore, a computer that acts human, should be treated as such.

Pro: The Reverse Turing Test

I don't actually know the proper name for this argument, but it's sort of the opposite of the first one, hence the name.

Let's say that tomorrow, as you're crossing the street to get your morning coffee, you get hit by a bus. Your wounds are not too severe, but your pinky is shattered. Not to worry, though -- an experimental procedure is available, and your pinky is replaced with a robotic equivalent. It looks, feels, and acts just like your pinkie, but it's actually made of advanced polymers.

Are you any less human than you were before the treatment ?

Let's say that, after getting your pinkie replaced, you get hit by a bus again, and lose your arm... which gets replaced by a robo-arm. Are you human now ? What if you get hit by a bus again, and your left eye gets replaced by a robotic camera -- are you less human now ? What if you get a brain tumor, and part of your brain gets replaced ? And what if your tumor is inoperable, and the doctors (the doctors of the future, of course) are forced to replace your entire brain, as well as the rest of your organs ? Are you human ? If so, then how are you different from an artificial being that was built out of the same robotic components that your entire body now consists of ?

Note that this isn't just idle speculation. People today already have pacemakers, glasses, prosthetic limbs, and yes, even chips implanted in their brains to prevent epileptic seizures (and soon, hopefully, Alzheimers). Should we treat these people as less human than their all-natural peers ? I personally don't think so.

Ok, I know that many of you are itching to point out the flaws in these arguments, so let me go over some common objections.

(to be continued below)

[harvey1]

Still mad at me?

I actually think you're making my point here. The feeling of pain has been evolved. You question the level of intensity, but we know that evolution will make it sufficient to alter the animals behaviour when said animal has any volition in the matter (what a pity nature can't tell the difference between avoidable intrusions vs unavoidable).

Is it your point, though? I thought one of your major points was that qualia don't exist. If pain actually exists, then how is it that you can explain its existence?

Here's the kind of answer that I seek. I explained to Bugmaster how emergent behavior can explain consciousness and pain by treating these phenomena as attractors. The lower physical layers (e.g., neurons, synapses, etc.) self-organize into "block neuron" behavior, and this block neuron behavior exhibits unique properties that self-organize to a higher layer, and so on. At the higher layers we are talking about meta attractors (e.g., pain, beliefs, awareness, etc.), and those meta attractors interact with other meta attractors and so on. Natural selection can test whether attractors are fit for the environment, so animals possessing an attractor that allows the whole meta-meta-attractor organism to feel pain is more likely to survive and reproduce. Therefore, this particular quale attractor is more likely to be selected for in the gene pool. That is, genetic material that reproduces organisms that produce those quale attractors are more likely to survive, therefore natural selection will select those organisms. The qualia that emerges from all those attractors is real. The functions exist. I am not denying that qualia is real. (That is, unlike you and Bugmaster who need to deny qualia since you have no AI logical approach explanation.)

Now, an important difference between my viewpoint and your viewpoint is that mine is based on metaphysical holism. I don't think you can explain the feeling of pain based on the behavior of neurons, even in principle. In order to explain the feeling of pain, we must explain the phenomena in terms of the "wholes" that emerge as a result of self-organization happening at lower layers. The "wholes" (e.g., the feeling of pain) is only explainable by the events happening at the higher level. So, for example, if someone cuts in front of us in traffic making us angry, then we cannot somehow explain, even in principle, by showing how the neurons were operating at the neuron level. The explanation is to show how we happen to have a personality that is short tempered (or what have you), and how we have built up a habit of letting people affect us in this way. The firing of the brain's neurons are explained by the higher levels. The neurons explain why the higher layers (e.g., meta-attractors) are possible, but they cannot explain why it is that certain attractors are found favorable over others.

So, I understand that you want to say that the feeling of pain evolved from primitive reactions, etc., however that doesn't support your position that all of our mental reactions are explainable in principle at the neuron level. You could never have such an explanation for qualia and consciousness since all you would be looking for is a reason as to how this neuron can produce a quale by the collective action of other neurons. This is exactly what programmers try to do with data structures, and it doesn't produce feelings of anything as witnessed by the lack of algorithms showing how this is possible in principle.

my position is that it is always present in everything by some degree.... Obviously the way I am looking at this there is no actual switch-on point. Indeed I might just as easily declare us all to be dead -- but that would look too repulsive for some so I say that everything is living (to a degree) instead.

I don't see your logic here. We have qualia or not? If so, then how does it come about? I understand that you say it is present in some degree, but that doesn't show how it is a feeling versus a register flag. If you wish to justify it as a feeling, then you must show how it comes about in principle (like I provided to you and Bugmaster).

Clearly then, from my point of view, there is no psuedo code that can show this as there is no algorithm at work. Either you can think of it as the life already being present in the components, or that we are all dead!

It doesn't seem logical to me what you are saying. It seems that you wish to treat qualia as a premise of being a "thing," but do rocks have qaulia? If so, what kind of qualia do you think they experience? If a thermostat has qualia, then how do you differentiate a data structure from a quale? If you don't differentiate it, which seems to be your argument, then why do we have different kinds of qualia? How do you differentiate one quale from another type of quale?

All I have done is followed the logical path through the behaviour of single to multicellular organisms and asked at what point consciousness might kick-in. This is one of those mutations that I can't see happening and so I start wondering if all these nano-engineered robots are somehow experiencing the exact same things that my robot vision system is experiencing.

That doesn't make any sense to me! I'm sorry, I have to be honest. Are you saying that it is impossible for a robot to exist having no qualia--no feelings? Humans can find certain things more painful than other things. How is that the case for a robotic arm that is packing stuff in packages. Does it experience different levels of fatigue as it operates throughout the day? What you are saying is so bizarre that it's hard for me to grasp that it is you saying it. Has someone stolen your login id?

I then take a step back and ask if my own experience as a human might not simply be the way it feels to be a uber sophisticated collection of such subsystems. Thus the realization that the classic distinction between alive and dead might be what's misleading us into looking for some elusive algorithm.

Notice how different this is from the explanation that I provide based on well-known science. There's no mystical robots laughing it up underneath all that electronics. Rocks aren't in misery when a volcano erupts. I know that I'm way over exaggerrating what you are saying, but deep within your argument is this presumption that quale have no explanation other than being some primitive invisible and undetectable property. Sounds to me like a big step back to anyone really trying to understand how the mind works.

[Bugmaster]

Ok, harvey1, I think you've missed the entire point of the questions I asked you.

That sounds like a bit of a contradiction. You're extending the principle of charity to me, and other forum posters, because I act human -- whereas modern computers do not. However, should computers advance to the point where they can behave as humans do, you will stop extending the principle of charity to them -- but, since you don't know who they are, you'll have to assume that everybody on this forum is likely to be a computer.

Yes, I probably would take that conservative position, so I might seek out forums that authenicate the poster with their human i.d. or something like that. The reason is that using existing AI strategies a computer would be just programmed to optimize certain competing strategies, so I would think I would be wasting my time if I didn't agree with their programmed interpretation of the rules.

What competing strategies ? What rules ? In my scenario, the humans and computers are talking on this forum, and it's your task to determine who is made of silicon, and who's not. Sure, there are rules on this forum, but the humans here break them all the time, so they're not relevant to your task (and the rules don't even apply in the general chat forums).

With respect to the rules of philosophy, the rules would be too abstract for a computer to consider unless the computer could comprehend what the rules meant.

Agreed, and it is my position that a computer can comprehend what the rules meant. Modern computers can already comprehend the much simpler rules of math, for example; this is how Fermat's Last Theorem was solved.

It couldn't tell the difference between p-consciousness experiences and p-astrall experiences. So, by rules of logic it would state that neither p-astralness or p-consciousness is a valid property.

You're losing me here with all the new terms. What's "p-astral", and why does it matter at all ?

Of course, the rules and constructs are what are subject to interpretation, so the computer would be a very poor philosopher, having no knowledge of how it was in error (its only knowledge of being in error would be a flag that indicated that its rules were not followed).

Take a look at these forums, harvey1. Better yet, take a look at most other internet forums (since these ones are actually pretty decent). Don't you think that some humans here would qualify as "very poor philosophers", who have "no knowledge of being in error" ? Why do you insist on applying stronger standards to the computer ?

Since computers don't have the function of understanding what it is that is recorded in memory, I am justified in denying them an extension of charity since they cannot know what it is like to be p-conscious, or what it is like to be in pain, etc..

Again, remember our scenario: let's pretend that, in the distant future, some posters on this forums are computers, and you don't know which ones. All you can know about them is the content of their posts, that's it. You also know that the forum pupulation offers a pretty balanced mix between computers and humans. Now... which forum users do you deny the principle of charity to ?

The tag would alert us that we are talking to an idiot savant. If we didn't know that, we would gradually become frustrated and more frustated until we realized that we had completely wasted our time trying to get through to the idiot savant computer.

This is irrelevant to my argument. Remember that, according to the Turing Test scenario, the computer behaves just as a biological human would. Thus, by definition, talking to the computer would not make you any more frustrated than talking to a human -- and possibly less frustrating, depending on which humans you compare it to.

If there were many such gadgets around, then the probability of always engaging in undesirable discussions with such idiot savants would be too great.

What do you mean by "undersirable" ? Are you afraid that, one day, your favorite email pen-pal from Australia would turn out to be a computer -- and thus you'd want to know ahead of time ? But why ? Would it be as devastating for you if you found out he was an uploaded human, a la our Claire Danes scenario ? I don't think you're being consistent.

The situation is similar to the counterfeiting problems that we face with money. If we are dupped by accepting false money then what happens?

This is a false analogy, because money doesn't behave like a human being, whereas our androids do. Money is also a form of property, whereas human social interactions are not, and neither are they mandated by the government. Yet.

The paper might respond identically to a human, but the behavior is a counterfeit reaction to how real human feelings cause humans to react.

That is a self-contradiction. If the paper "responds indentically to a human," then it, by definition, reacts how real humans would react.

I would phrase it that there is a difference between being a gadget and being a sentient agent. If a gadget can be pawned off as a sentient agent, then the trick that was accomplished amounted to mere counterfeit.

A counterfeit item is, by definition, inferior to the real one. It's missing some functionality. The AI, however, behaves just as a biological human being would; it is missing no functionality. Even if you a priori define all AIs as being conterfeit, you still wouldn't be able to tell which being is an AI (without doing some heavy dissection, which could be very expensive if you're wrong), and thus your "conterfeit" label becomes a bit useless. Let me refer you to one of your later questions:

Huh, if that's all you want, then get yourself a Sony Aibo or some equivalent Chinese knockoff. It's at least as smart as a rabbit... well... maybe a hamster. Hamsters are pretty stupid, you know.

They still feel pain from what we can tell, and there's no program existing today that shows how to make an computer feel pain.

From what we can tell. Exactly.

The analogy wasn't to highlight the similarity of power saw behavior with AI behavior. The analogy was to highlight the identical nature of their non-sentient properties.

Ok, but since I'm claiming that behavior is sufficient for sentience, this analogy does not convince me.

In that sense, an AI gadget is no different than befriending a power saw if you wish to share sentient experiences. It's a one way exchange (i.e., human to AI gadget, or human to power saw).

Again, this is false. The power saw does not talk to me, whereas the AI does. It makes intelligent (or seemingly intelligent, whatever) comments based on my input, it offers its own insights, and it does everything else that a semi-decent human being does.

I want the replicas, but I would only want them under circumstances that I felt that I had some control. If I couldn't have that control, then I think I would speak for most people in that I wouldn't want idiot savants to be walking around freely (especially the kind that can re-program themselves without restraint by a human). Talk about a Terminator/Matrix future.

Eh, now you're just being randomly alarmist. I am personally a lot more worried about biologically human people walking around with guns and bombs. Remember, if our hypothetical AIs indeed behave as humans do, then the proportion of muderers, terrorists, and crazy people among them would be equal to the proportion of muderers, terrorists, and crazy people among the biologically human population.

Well, let's not talk about real people in that case since that's a lilttle morbid for me. Let's call person X as being someone who is uploaded to a computer. If X has their qualia, p-consciousness, and other mental properties intact, then they are not dead.

Ok, so will their "qualia, p-consciousness, and other mental properties" remain intact after uploading ? Remeber, I don't share your worldview, so I really can't answer this question. You can always remain agnostic if you choose to, of course.

The question, one that I cannot answer, is if they are the same person. It would seem that they cannot be since uploading our contents is not the same as uploading the individual (presumably you could make a large country of such AI copies). In any case, the AI uploadings would be alive.

So, this uploading of X, who acts exactly as X would act, and is alive, is nonetheless not the same person as X. That doesn't sound reasonable to me:

Well, you know that if you meant a computer program that was meant to duplicate you behavior that they wouldn't be you, right?

Wrong. Why wouldn't they ?

If you saw their code, and you knew for a fact that all the inputted data structures were placed there by someone who knew you pretty well, would you think that they made "you"?

Yeah, I'd say that program was pretty much "me" -- maybe 98.7% "me" -- depending on how closely it duplicated my behavior.

2) What theoretically explains for the realization of pain

Er, I have difficulty parsing this question...

Since it cannot be shown with any kind of analytic demonstration on how the firing of neurons explain pain from a theoretical point of view...

Whoa there. Remember, I believe that the firing of neurons is pain, so that's not a problem for me. In fact, we are able to suppress certain kinds of pain today, by targeting it with Advil and such.

Given our fundamental lack of understanding and our understanding that every phenomena has an explanation, we have every reason to believe that the experience of pain has an explanation.

Why the need for all this mystery ? Neuron firing == pain, suppress the firing and you suppress pain, stimulate the firing and you create pain. I like my worldview better: it's simpler, and it explains just as much as yours. But this is a topic for our other thread, let's continue it there.

That is, medicines aren't sophisticated enough to interfere with the generation of the feeling that occurs from their being inflammation.

I actually don't know how Advil works, so you might be right. Other drugs, however, do interfere wiht the generation of pain directly; morphine is one of them. AFAIK, morphine directly replaces some of the neurotransmitters involved in the generation of pain.

What is the programming that gives the spam filter the feeling that it understands what new spams are trying to do? Can you honestly say with a straight face that your spam filter thinks it understands?

I would say that my spam filter understands "spam vs. non-spam" at least as well as the paramecium understands "too much acid vs. not enough acid". Can my spam filter discuss philosophy with me ? No, it's not complex enough for that.

That is why I say that you need to show how the function of being conscious (or at least feeling conscious) is programmable in principle. Show me how this can be done in principle without requiring magical beliefs to somehow to have this feeling to emerge without having programmed for it.

Firstly, the magical emergence is your province, not mine -- remember, I believe that consciousness is purely mechanical (chemical, atomic, quantum, whatever) in nature. Secondly, I claim that we judge people by their behavior alone; if an entity behaves as though it was human, we would be logically justified in accepting it as human. Thus, a computer that acts human is human. You propose that there are other qualities that make one human -- qualities which cannot, in principle, be observed. Thus, the burden of proof is on you.

In my view, higher levels are bounded by the lower levels....

Your theory of mind is somewhat confusing, and it lacks any kind of justification, so I can't respond to it directly. However, I'd like to point out that your theory of mind sounds a lot like a high-level description of an algorithm. With a bit more work (ok, a lot more work), we could use your design document to construct an AI -- assuming that you're right, of course.

Ultimately, your arguments are making me think that you do not, in fact, believe that it is possible to construct an AI that would behave identically to a human being. I know that you've claimed to be agnostic on the subject, but all your talk of idiot savants and qualia points to a strongly negative stance on the subject. As I'd mentioned in my opening statement, dualism and faith are both perfectly valid reasons to deny humanity to Strong AIs; not very convincing, but still valid.

[harvey1]

Ok, harvey1...

You can call me "Harvey." 1 is my last name, and I only use it when asked why I like to be first in line.

Ultimately, your arguments are making me think that you do not, in fact, believe that it is possible to construct an AI that would behave identically to a human being... However, I'd like to point out that your theory of mind sounds a lot like a high-level description of an algorithm. With a bit more work (ok, a lot more work), we could use your design document to construct an AI -- assuming that you're right, of course.

This seems contradictory to me. In the first statement you seem to think that I'm in strong opposition to strong AI, and in the second statement you suggest that it is in the direction toward an AI construction.

I know that you've claimed to be agnostic on the subject, but all your talk of idiot savants and qualia points to a strongly negative stance on the subject. As I'd mentioned in my opening statement, dualism and faith are both perfectly valid reasons to deny humanity to Strong AIs; not very convincing, but still valid.

I'm not taking a strongly negative stance on strong AI. I'm taking a strongly negative stance that qualia are non-existent qualities. In addition, I'm also quite negative that we could obtain the feelings (or qualia) using existing methods of programming logic. As I said a few times, I think strong AI is possible and if I had to guess, I would guess that it was achievable: although it's just a guess and actually I have no idea of the reality of that guess (neither does anyone else IMHO).

the magical emergence is your province, not mine -- remember, I believe that consciousness is purely mechanical (chemical, atomic, quantum, whatever) in nature.

That's why I asked you to show me how you can bring about a function such as feeling pain and I'm still waiting for an algorithm from you that shows this...

I claim that we judge people by their behavior alone; if an entity behaves as though it was human, we would be logically justified in accepting it as human. Thus, a computer that acts human is human. You propose that there are other qualities that make one human -- qualities which cannot, in principle, be observed. Thus, the burden of proof is on you.

Do you feel pain, Bugmaster? How does your data structures operating inside your brain make that happen? Give me the gist of the explanation without relying on explanations that would amount to nothing more than a blinking light or light switch with a dimmer. I suppose that I can't assume that we can agree that others have the feeling of pain (although I don't see why not), but surely you can acknowledge your own feelings of pain, right?

It doesn't matter if Deep Blue passed the Turing Test or not. The point is that we have no reason to believe that there's a function operating that wasn't actually programmed for.

That is probably true as applied to Big Blue, but false as applied to other chess programs, and to my spam filter. My spam filter actually learns on its own, during its "lifetime". That ability to learn was explicitly programmed by somebody, but its actual responses to spam and non-spam were not.

What is the programming that gives the spam filter the feeling that it understands what new spams are trying to do? Can you honestly say with a straight face that your spam filter thinks it understands?

I would say that my spam filter understands "spam vs. non-spam" at least as well as the paramecium understands "too much acid vs. not enough acid". Can my spam filter discuss philosophy with me ? No, it's not complex enough for that.

I posted the entire text because I want to show that the issue isn't whether a spam filter has the same level of functionality of primitive life. I'm quite sure that current AI can already do a convincing job of mimicing behavior of a wide range of life (even pet dogs). The issue, as I see it, is that we have no reason to believe that feelings are explained by mimicry. You have to show this as the case. There's no reason we should assume it is the case.

You need to show how neural firing patterns bring about the actual feeling of horrendous pain versus a red light indicator flashing on your fingernail that means that you should acknowledge a big rock crushing your foot.

I should point out, though, that our modern technology is advanced enough to allow us to flip the "pain=off" switch, for certain kinds of pain. We call it "Advil".

It's not a pain switch that Advil is switching off... That is, medicines aren't sophisticated enough to interfere with the generation of the feeling that occurs from their being inflammation.

I actually don't know how Advil works, so you might be right. Other drugs, however, do interfere wiht the generation of pain directly; morphine is one of them. AFAIK, morphine directly replaces some of the neurotransmitters involved in the generation of pain.

Again, I posted our entire discussion to show the discussion is not about how the brain is physical and how medicines work in the brain. Rather, my original point was that the feeling of pain is real to the individual feeling the pain. Since I'm not certain you acknowledge my headache pain more than a machine replica that could be made which mimics that, let's talk about your headache which I assume you have those from time to time (perhaps I'm giving you one right now...). If the pain wasn't real, the flag being "reset" would be a purely logical operation. However, Advil addresses inflammation. Morphine addresses the biological apparatus of pain. If I were to use an analogy to a computer, Advil would act on the expansion of the material of the circuit boards (e.g., from heat), thereby preventing the circuitry monitoring the boards from seeing an unacceptable expansion of the materials (which would mean that a "pain" register was never flagged in the first place). That analogy doesn't indicate that Advil has played with the "pain" registers in any way. Morphine, by analogy, would act on the circuits and wires to prevent the aparatus from actually putting a "flag" in the "pain" register. Again, the morphine--by analogy--provides no indication that the morphine in the brain acts as a "flag off" switch. In fact, some medical pain is so intense that morphine just doesn't do the job. If morphine really were really acting in the role as a "flag off" switch in the brain, then there would be no level of pain that morphine couldn't control. This just isn't the case.

It is important to realize we are not justified in equating the feeling of pain to mimicry or computer flags. These don't tell us how the feeling of pain is possible inside a machine. If you try and program this, you will fail. That's not to say that our descendants will fail, but I think it is pretty obvious that the problem is a very tough one, and we have no reason to assume that strong AI is going to overcome these problems any time soon.

Why the need for all this mystery ? Neuron firing == pain, suppress the firing and you suppress pain, stimulate the firing and you create pain. I like my worldview better: it's simpler, and it explains just as much as yours.

Pain is a much higher structure than neuron firing. There's lots of neurons firing in the brain, and I'm assuming that not all those firings you believe is the generation of pain. So, you aren't equating all neuron firing with pain, you wish to say that some neuron firing equates to pain. However, when I ask you why it is that neurons can bring about pain, you head off into your mimicry hypothesis. Do you see why I don't see your worldview as having a good explanation? You start off wanting to use neurons as an explanation, but when that fails you fall back to your premise that "neuron firing==pain" without showing how that is possible. You merely state your mimicry hypothesis that pain qua pain is pain as being the mimicing of pain. You never give an explanation on how the real feeling of pain is made possible by the firing of certain neurons in the brain. Your proof relies on a fallacy of bifurcation:

1. Either pain neurons fire and pain (p), or pain neurons do not fire and no pain (q) (i.e., either p or q)
2. If pain neurons fire and pain, then neurons==pain (r) (i.e., if p, then r)
3. If pain neurons do not fire and no pain, then neurons==pain (if q, then r)
4. Therefore, neurons==pain (Therefore, r)

You can see why I am not impressed with this logic.

Since it cannot be shown with any kind of analytic demonstration on how the firing of neurons explain pain from a theoretical point of view...

Whoa there. Remember, I believe that the firing of neurons is pain, so that's not a problem for me. In fact, we are able to suppress certain kinds of pain today, by targeting it with Advil and such.

But, you also said that firing of neurons is everything else (consciousness, beliefs, laughing, etc.). So, you have to show how it is that firing of neurons can bring about different states.

If you saw their code, and you knew for a fact that all the inputted data structures were placed there by someone who knew you pretty well, would you think that they made "you"?

Yeah, I'd say that program was pretty much "me" -- maybe 98.7% "me" -- depending on how closely it duplicated my behavior.

Is it the firing of certain neurons that is you, or is it the outer behavior that is you? Is it possible to have entirely different sequences of the firing of the neurons to bring about duplicate behavior? If you agree, then how can there be identity between "you" and the mimicry of "you" with neurons firing in a completely different pattern and structure?

[QED]

Still mad at me?

On the contrary, I was a little worried about my making this more painful than it need be!

I actually think you're making my point here. The feeling of pain has been evolved. You question the level of intensity, but we know that evolution will make it sufficient to alter the animals behaviour when said animal has any volition in the matter (what a pity nature can't tell the difference between avoidable intrusions vs unavoidable).

Is it your point, though? I thought one of your major points was that qualia don't exist. If pain actually exists, then how is it that you can explain its existence?

The term "pain" has been invented to identify something. That something is just one of the many experiences of being alive. Now it's easy for you to state that pain exists because we know it. But how do we know it? We know it through our reactions to it. This all takes place chemically and as has been discussed already the chemical signalling can be moderated and stimulated artificially. So ultimately it seems as though we are talking about flagbits. If we make a robot and put heat sensors in it's fingers we can write some code to scan the inputs and set flags etc. If the robot

Here's the kind of answer that I seek. I explained to Bugmaster how emergent behavior can explain consciousness and pain by treating these phenomena as attractors. The lower physical layers (e.g., neurons, synapses, etc.) self-organize into "block neuron" behavior, and this block neuron behavior exhibits unique properties that self-organize to a higher layer, and so on. At the higher layers we are talking about meta attractors (e.g., pain, beliefs, awareness, etc.), and those meta attractors interact with other meta attractors and so on. Natural selection can test whether attractors are fit for the environment, so animals possessing an attractor that allows the whole meta-meta-attractor organism to feel pain is more likely to survive and reproduce. Therefore, this particular quale attractor is more likely to be selected for in the gene pool. That is, genetic material that reproduces organisms that produce those quale attractors are more likely to survive, therefore natural selection will select those organisms. The qualia that emerges from all those attractors is real. The functions exist. I am not denying that qualia is real. (That is, unlike you and Bugmaster who need to deny qualia since you have no AI logical approach explanation.)

Now, an important difference between my viewpoint and your viewpoint is that mine is based on metaphysical holism. I don't think you can explain the feeling of pain based on the behavior of neurons, even in principle. In order to explain the feeling of pain, we must explain the phenomena in terms of the "wholes" that emerge as a result of self-organization happening at lower layers. The "wholes" (e.g., the feeling of pain) is only explainable by the events happening at the higher level. So, for example, if someone cuts in front of us in traffic making us angry, then we cannot somehow explain, even in principle, by showing how the neurons were operating at the neuron level. The explanation is to show how we happen to have a personality that is short tempered (or what have you), and how we have built up a habit of letting people affect us in this way. The firing of the brain's neurons are explained by the higher levels. The neurons explain why the higher layers (e.g., meta-attractors) are possible, but they cannot explain why it is that certain attractors are found favorable over others.

So, I understand that you want to say that the feeling of pain evolved from primitive reactions, etc., however that doesn't support your position that all of our mental reactions are explainable in principle at the neuron level. You could never have such an explanation for qualia and consciousness since all you would be looking for is a reason as to how this neuron can produce a quale by the collective action of other neurons. This is exactly what programmers try to do with data structures, and it doesn't produce feelings of anything as witnessed by the lack of algorithms showing how this is possible in principle.

my position is that it is always present in everything by some degree.... Obviously the way I am looking at this there is no actual switch-on point. Indeed I might just as easily declare us all to be dead -- but that would look too repulsive for some so I say that everything is living (to a degree) instead.

I don't see your logic here. We have qualia or not? If so, then how does it come about? I understand that you say it is present in some degree, but that doesn't show how it is a feeling versus a register flag. If you wish to justify it as a feeling, then you must show how it comes about in principle (like I provided to you and Bugmaster).

Clearly then, from my point of view, there is no psuedo code that can show this as there is no algorithm at work. Either you can think of it as the life already being present in the components, or that we are all dead!

It doesn't seem logical to me what you are saying. It seems that you wish to treat qualia as a premise of being a "thing," but do rocks have qaulia? If so, what kind of qualia do you think they experience? If a thermostat has qualia, then how do you differentiate a data structure from a quale? If you don't differentiate it, which seems to be your argument, then why do we have different kinds of qualia? How do you differentiate one quale from another type of quale?

All I have done is followed the logical path through the behaviour of single to multicellular organisms and asked at what point consciousness might kick-in. This is one of those mutations that I can't see happening and so I start wondering if all these nano-engineered robots are somehow experiencing the exact same things that my robot vision system is experiencing.

That doesn't make any sense to me! I'm sorry, I have to be honest. Are you saying that it is impossible for a robot to exist having no qualia--no feelings? Humans can find certain things more painful than other things. How is that the case for a robotic arm that is packing stuff in packages. Does it experience different levels of fatigue as it operates throughout the day? What you are saying is so bizarre that it's hard for me to grasp that it is you saying it. Has someone stolen your login id?

I then take a step back and ask if my own experience as a human might not simply be the way it feels to be a uber sophisticated collection of such subsystems. Thus the realization that the classic distinction between alive and dead might be what's misleading us into looking for some elusive algorithm.

Notice how different this is from the explanation that I provide based on well-known science. There's no mystical robots laughing it up underneath all that electronics. Rocks aren't in misery when a volcano erupts. I know that I'm way over exaggerrating what you are saying, but deep within your argument is this presumption that quale have no explanation other than being some primitive invisible and undetectable property. Sounds to me like a big step back to anyone really trying to understand how the mind works.[/quote]

[Bugmaster]

Ultimately, your arguments are making me think that you do not, in fact, believe that it is possible to construct an AI that would behave identically to a human being... However, I'd like to point out that your theory of mind sounds a lot like a high-level description of an algorithm. With a bit more work (ok, a lot more work), we could use your design document to construct an AI -- assuming that you're right, of course.

This seems contradictory to me. In the first statement you seem to think that I'm in strong opposition to strong AI, and in the second statement you suggest that it is in the direction toward an AI construction.

Yes, that is by design... I actually meant out to point this out as a contradiction in your own post. Sorry, I should've been more explicit.

In addition, I'm also quite negative that we could obtain the feelings (or qualia) using existing methods of programming logic.

Do you believe, then, that we could use some other methods in order to achieve Strong AI ? What might they be ? I personally believe that programmable logic is quite sufficient, of course, but that's because I believe that our brains are nothing more than fancy programmable logic.

That's why I asked you to show me how you can bring about a function such as feeling pain and I'm still waiting for an algorithm from you that shows this...

I think you've actually outlined this very algorithm in one of your posts:

Code: Select all

if(someNerve.stimulation > PAIN_THRESHOLD) {
  painFlag = true;
}

Of course, I have a feeling that what you're really asking is, "show me how to generate the qualia for pain", which I can't do, because I don't believe in qualia, and because I believe that pain, fundamentally, is just a collection of flags (neurochemical or otherwise).

I claim that we judge people by their behavior alone; if an entity behaves as though it was human, we would be logically justified in accepting it as human. Thus, a computer that acts human is human...

Do you feel pain, Bugmaster?

Yes, but how do you know that ? You ask about "data structures operating inside your brain", but that's irrelevant to my argument. How do you know I feel pain ? Can you see the qualia inside my astral head ? Or is it through my behavior (such as screaming "ouch", for example) ? If so, then how will you distinguish me from an AI that acts exactly like me ?

This is the whole point of the Turing Test, and pretty much all of my posts on the subject so far. Thus, I think I've done a pretty good job of answering your challenge, below:

The issue, as I see it, is that we have no reason to believe that feelings are explained by mimicry. You have to show this as the case. There's no reason we should assume it is the case.

As I'd said earlier, the appeal to dualism is a perfectly reasonable justification for disagreeing with Turing; but then you have to justify dualism, and, despite your best efforts, I am not convinced that there's anything other than faith that could justify it.

For the purposes of keeping this thread on topic, I suggest we move our discussions of dualism to our original thread. For the purposes of our discussion here, I'm perfectly willing to accept the argument that "dualism is true, therefore Turing and Bugmaster are wrong".

let's talk about your headache which I assume you have those from time to time... If the pain wasn't real, the flag being "reset" would be a purely logical operation. ... Morphine, by analogy, would act on the circuits and wires to prevent the aparatus from actually putting a "flag" in the "pain" register. Again, the morphine--by analogy--provides no indication that the morphine in the brain acts as a "flag off" switch.

In fact, your description of morphine sounds an awful lot like a logic gate (or a plain old transistor), which can be programmatically controlled. As I see it, your analogy only reinforces my point. I don't see a difference between "a purely logical operation", and any other kind of operation that involves logic gates.

In fact, some medical pain is so intense that morphine just doesn't do the job.

Ok, so pain is not a simple boolean "on/off" signal, but an analog signal, and morphine acts as a filter on it. That's probably a more accurate description, but there's not much practical difference. For the purposes of my argument, "pain=false" is as good as "painLevel -= morphineDampenFactor".

It is important to realize we are not justified in equating the feeling of pain to mimicry or computer flags. These don't tell us how the feeling of pain is possible inside a machine. If you try and program this, you will fail. That's not to say that our descendants will fail, but I think it is pretty obvious that the problem is a very tough one, and we have no reason to assume that strong AI is going to overcome these problems any time soon.

I'm not even sure what you're saying here. Obviously, I believe that there's no dualistic concept of pain that the machine somehow mimics, and that the flags (and the logic that drives them) are the same as our human thoughts... but you know that by now. If you're merely saying that I'm not smart enough to make a Strong AI, then I wholeheartedly agree, but I don't think I ever said that I was that smart to begin with. Sure, Strong AI is a tough problem, but I don't think it's insurmountable.

Is it the firing of certain neurons that is you, or is it the outer behavior that is you? Is it possible to have entirely different sequences of the firing of the neurons to bring about duplicate behavior? If you agree, then how can there be identity between "you" and the mimicry of "you" with neurons firing in a completely different pattern and structure?

I think that what people perceive as "me" is, ultimately, the sum total of my behavior. I'm not sure about neurons, since I don't really know how they work, but I'd say that a computer program that behaves just as the biological "me" does would, indeed, count as "me".

The reason I'm being wishy-washy on the neurons is because I honestly don't know if it's physically possible to produce identical behavior through entirely different sequences of neuron firings -- assuming that the neurons are hooked up in exactly the same way. (i.e., an identical copy of my brain). But if that is possible, then yes, I'd still say that the me-copy is me.

[harvey1]

This seems contradictory to me...

Yes, that is by design... I actually meant out to point this out as a contradiction in your own post. Sorry, I should've been more explicit.

Okay, what is the contradiction?

In addition, I'm also quite negative that we could obtain the feelings (or qualia) using existing methods of programming logic.

Do you believe, then, that we could use some other methods in order to achieve Strong AI ? What might they be ? I personally believe that programmable logic is quite sufficient, of course, but that's because I believe that our brains are nothing more than fancy programmable logic.

As I mentioned, I think it is conceivable that we can utilize dynamical system approaches to bring about emergent behavior. In order for that to work we'd have to have some means to know what dynamical systems brought about certain cognitive emergent traits. Evolution could do this because of the vast timeframes of introducing different basal conditions to introduce the "right" emergent behavior. Unfortunately, we don't have that kind of time, and we lack a comprehensive theory of complexity to make those kind of predictions; so, we are limited to trial and error in terms of our simulations of dynamical behavior. Therefore, it seems like a massive undertaking. Fortunately we have working copies (i.e., many brains in the animal kingdom), so there is some basis to guess which basal properties bring about certain cognitive functions.

As an illustration, let's suppose that we didn't know that ferromagnetism of Ising magnets occurred because of spin alignment of dipoles. Let's suppose that the Ising magnet had the rich complexity of the human brain along with the idea that ferromagnetism was no better observed or understood beyond that of p-consciousness. Just programming for ferromagnetic behavior would not be the way to go to solve this problem since all we could do is duplicate the function of ferromagnets--we couldn't actually bring about ferromagnetism. Solving the actual problem would require knowing how ferromagnetism emerged in nature, and that is not something we have access due to the complexity of the complex magnet structure. We could try and guess how the "magnet" evolved over long stretches of time, but that might be hard to guess since we might miss a key evolutionary moment where a "dipole level" is introduced to the system at a key juncture. We wouldn't know we were heading off in the wrong direction. Meanwhile, you have all those naive folks who think that simulating ferromagnetic functions is the same as bringing about ferromagnetism, who in all likelihood have already started pressing for equal rights.

That's why I asked you to show me how you can bring about a function such as feeling pain and I'm still waiting for an algorithm from you that shows this...

I think you've actually outlined this very algorithm in one of your posts:

Code: Select all

if(someNerve.stimulation > PAIN_THRESHOLD) {painFlag = true;
}[/quote]

I don't recall outlining such kind of an algorithm. What I laid out was emergent features (e.g., ferromagnetism) which is a synthetic feature of the world. What you've provided is not a real feature of the world. You have simply redefined pain as equivalent to how many marbles do you have.

[quote="Bugmaster"]Of course, I have a feeling that what you're [i]really[/i] asking is, "show me how to generate the qualia for pain", which I can't do, because I don't believe in qualia, and because I believe that pain, fundamentally, is just a collection of flags (neurochemical or otherwise).[quote]Do you feel pain, Bugmaster?[/quote]Yes[/quote]

Do you see the contradiction here? You say that you experience pain, but just a paragraph earlier said that pain does not exist. How can you experience a state of being in pain if that state does not really exist?

[quote="Bugmaster"]How do you know I feel pain ? Can you see the qualia inside my astral head ? Or is it through my behavior (such as screaming "ouch", for example) ? If so, then how will you distinguish me from an AI that acts exactly like me ?[/quote]

This is irrelevant. You just said that you agree that you feel real pain. Now I want you to explain how this function is possible if you really feel it. In actuality, I don't have to justify to myself that you feel pain since I feel pain, so I already feel justified in needing an explanation for pain. If I say that my pain is caused by the number of marbles that pounced against some C-fiber in my brain, then how have I shown how pain really occurs?

[quote="Bugmaster"]Thus, I think I've done a pretty good job of answering your challenge[/quote]

You've done a good job at evading the questions. However, you have not (and haven't even tried) explaining why it is that you feel pain when you are hurting. Really, Bugmaster, this fact alone [i]should[/i] cause you to rescind your views on this matter, but yet you persist... 

[quote="Bugmaster"][quote="harvey1"]The issue, as I see it, is that we have no reason to believe that [i]feelings[/i] are explained by mimicry. You have to [i]show[/i] this as the case. There's no reason we should assume it is the case.[/quote]As I'd said earlier, the appeal to dualism is a perfectly reasonable justification for disagreeing with Turing; but then you have to justify dualism, and, despite your best efforts, I am not convinced that there's anything other than faith that could justify it.[/quote]

It might be helpful to you on how I interpret this statement:

[quote]As I'd said earlier, the appeal to [ferromagnetism] is a perfectly reasonable justification for disagreeing with [a computer's simulation of  ferromagnetism [i]is[/i] ferromagetism]; but then you have to justify [ferromagnetism], and, despite your best efforts, I am not convinced that there's anything other than faith that could justify it.[/quote]

This statement strikes me as ludicrous for a few reasons. One, I don't have to justify ferromagnetism since it is an observed property in nature. Two, there is nothing reasonable about equating a computer simulation of ferromagnetism with ferromagnetism--it's not even half-way reasonable. Three, saying the statement: "observation of ferromagnetism in nature is evidence of ferromagnetism" as being equivalent to faith is not even addressable. Faith is the opposite of observation. It is believing in what you don't see. But, we observe consciousness just like we observe ferromagnetism. Ironically, notice what we don't observe: computers being conscious.

[quote="Bugmaster"]For the purposes of our discussion here, I'm perfectly willing to accept the argument that "dualism is true, therefore Turing and Bugmaster are wrong".[/quote]

I thought I already said that bringing up dualism again and again does not address the issues at hand? It is evident that what you mean by dualism is "ghost in the machine," and what I mean by "dualism" may not even be dualism really. Dualism is rejection of physical closure, and I don't reject physical closure. I deny that physicalism is, in the fullest perspective, limited to material substances. I imagine this is why you [i]could[/i] attribute dualism to me. However, this is very misleading since physics does not make a distinction with matter like this view suggests. For example, string theory is working on many "non-physical" states that wouldn't comply in the least with this limited notion of physicalism.

[quote="Bugmaster"]In fact, your description of morphine sounds an awful lot like a logic gate (or a plain old transistor), which can be programmatically controlled. As I see it, your analogy only reinforces my point. I don't see a difference between "a purely logical operation", and any other kind of operation that involves logic gates.[/quote]

Computationalism shouldn't be confused with emergentism. 

[quote="Bugmaster"][quote]In fact, some medical pain is so intense that morphine just doesn't do the job.[/quote]Ok, so pain is not a simple boolean "on/off" signal, but an analog signal, and morphine acts as a filter on it. That's probably a more accurate description, but there's not much practical difference. For the purposes of my argument, "pain=false" is as good as "painLevel -= morphineDampenFactor".[/quote]

The big difference here is that [i]if[/i] pain is a function of some logic gate array inside the brain, then there is no way to show how that function actually causes you the pain that you acknowledge the headache pain that you feel once now and then.

[quote="Bugmaster"]I'd say that a computer program that behaves just as the biological "me" does would, indeed, count as "me".[/quote]

If a computer program were "you," then it would feel pain. However, you [i]feel[/i] pain (as you acknowledged), however the computer didn't have to have this feeling programmed into its instruction set to behave just like you. So, there's still an explanatory gap between who you are and the imitation of you.

[quote="Bugmaster"]The reason I'm being wishy-washy on the neurons is because I honestly don't know if it's physically possible to produce identical behavior through entirely different sequences of neuron firings -- assuming that the neurons are hooked up in exactly the same way. (i.e., an identical copy of my brain). But if that is possible, then yes, I'd still say that the me-copy is me.[/quote]

Assuming it is possible, then you'd have to say that a particular mental process is not identical to a particular physical process. However, before you equated the two as exactly the same (or, actually, there is only physical states). If identity of you and the computer can exist without having the same physical states, then that would mean that you think that mental states (e.g., "you"="computer") is not an identity of physical states (i.e., "physical state inside your brain" not = "physical state inside computer"). It seems you are saying that mental states are identical to physical functions (i.e., functionalism). So, are you saying that beliefs are functions and not physical states?

[QED]

I feel the need to mention, once again, that the experience of pain could indeed be the collective effect of flags. Despite the fact that it provides a visceral sensation, as observers, we are poorly placed to separate this from the mechanism that delivers it. I don't think you would expect us to be able to isolate pain any more than we could isolate ferromagnetism from the ferromagnet.

But I don't see what your analogy does for your argument: "Just programming for ferromagnetic behavior would not be the way to go to solve this problem since all we could do is duplicate the function of ferromagnets--we couldn't actually bring about ferromagnetism". If we duplicate a ferromagnet on an atom by atom basis we get real ferromagnetic behavior don't we?

Funny really, I'm undergoing some minor (outpatient) surgery at the moment and I can get to reflect on this as a form of distraction when the buggers get rough with me Yes it hurts, but I really don't see the need to look further than the nano-engineered bits and pieces getting knocked around. I'm just as happy to extend charity to any similarly complex entity such as myself. I say this because I'm convinced that in a very, very, small way the Parameceum also feels pain when it finds itself in too much acid.

[harvey1]

I'm sorry to hear that you are undergoing some pain there, QED. I hope you get well soon.

I feel the need to mention, once again, that the experience of pain could indeed be the collective effect of flags. Despite the fact that it provides a visceral sensation, as observers, we are poorly placed to separate this from the mechanism that delivers it. I don't think you would expect us to be able to isolate pain any more than we could isolate ferromagnetism from the ferromagnet.

There's a difference, though. We can simulate ferromagnetism in a computer, however inside the computer the phenomena is a set of flags, that's in part why it is a simulation of the behavior of ferromagnetism and not really ferromagnetism. Similarly, no doubt CPU chips can simulate robots having behavior as though they are in pain, but they are not really in pain. Give them logical access to those registers, and they can reset those flags such that their behavior is no longer displaying the actions of those subroutines.

Notice, this is not the case for ferromagnetism. If we give a AI robot software control to its CPU and all registers (i.e., without mechanical access where they can disrupt the atoms of the ferromagnetic material), then the robot cannot stop ferromagnetism inside their mechanical bodies just using software control.

This is a reasonable analogy to pain inside our heads. The processes that create pain are physical processes (e.g., firing of neurons, chemical reactions, etc.), and instead of a ferromagnetic phenomenon emerging inside our brains, we have a pain phenomenon. We cannot shutoff this pain for the simple fact that it is a physical phenomenon (just like consciousness is a physical phenomenon). However, what separates ferromagnetism from pain is that ferromagnetism is brought on by the emergence of electromagnetic waves working in a collective action, whereas pain is probably brought on by the emergence of patterns within neuron firings, chemical processes, etc., working in a collective action. Both are physical phenomena that can be mapped into a geometric system, but pain requires a different conception of what physical is. We can use the concept of a "virtual process" as an anagolous concept, however in this case it applies to the real world.

But I don't see what your analogy does for your argument: "Just programming for ferromagnetic behavior would not be the way to go to solve this problem since all we could do is duplicate the function of ferromagnets--we couldn't actually bring about ferromagnetism". If we duplicate a ferromagnet on an atom by atom basis we get real ferromagnetic behavior don't we?

Yes. And, if we perfectly duplicated the processes and workings of the human brain of someone in pain, then we would duplicate that pain. I'm not so sure if there can be such duplication even in principle (e.g., no cloning theorem), but the point is that if you want to duplicate a physical process (e.g., experiencing pain) then you must duplicate the conditions and states that bring about that process. Simulating the conditions and states are not the same thing since pain (consciousness, awareness, etc.) might be closer to ferromagnetism than virtual worlds that we see displayed on computer monitors.

Funny really, I'm undergoing some minor (outpatient) surgery at the moment and I can get to reflect on this as a form of distraction when the buggers get rough with me Yes it hurts, but I really don't see the need to look further than the nano-engineered bits and pieces getting knocked around. I'm just as happy to extend charity to any similarly complex entity such as myself. I say this because I'm convinced that in a very, very, small way the Parameceum also feels pain when it finds itself in too much acid.

As I alluded to, I think you're confusing micro-cognition as a physical phenomena (which I agree with), and micro-cognition as a computational property of AI. Simulating a brain inside a computer probably would not give you a conscious individual that can experience pain. However, building a brain that can produce brain waves, etc., might succeed if we had the resources to do it along with knowing enough about how such processes occur in nature.

[Bugmaster]

Yeah, I don't get that ferromagnetism analogy, either.

There's a difference, though. We can simulate ferromagnetism in a computer, however inside the computer the phenomena is a set of flags, that's in part why it is a simulation of the behavior of ferromagnetism and not really ferromagnetism.

So it sounds like you're asserting that consciousness is a separate entity, perhaps even a law of nature -- sort of like gravity or ferromagnetism. If that were true, then your ferromagnetism analogy would make sense. However, QED and I explicitly deny your assertion (ok, at least I do, I can't speak for QED); I don't believe that consciousness is an independent entity (and I don't believe that laws of nature are Platonic entities, either, but that's another story). Instead, I believe that consciousness is just computational activity (be it brain-based or computer-based) that leads to a certain set of behaviors. So, your ferromagnetism analogy does not apply to my argument.

Since you're proposing that consciousness is more than just computational activity that leads to certain behaviors, the burden of proof is on you. I've challenged you repeatedly to show me that you can detect my consciousness without relying on observing my behavior; so far, you haven't really come with a good answer. If the existence or absence of consciousness makes no measurable difference, then it becomes an empty concept, and we should focus on behavior in order to determine the subject's humanity.

This is a reasonable analogy to pain inside our heads. The processes that create pain are physical processes (e.g., firing of neurons, chemical reactions, etc.), and instead of a ferromagnetic phenomenon emerging inside our brains, we have a pain phenomenon...

I've said this before, but it bears repeating: I believe that ferromagnetism is fully "reducible", to use your terminology, to the behavior of the individual quantum particles that compose the magnet and the piece of iron (or whatever it is that you're examining).

...ferromagnetism is brought on by the emergence of electromagnetic waves working in a collective action, whereas pain is probably brought on by the emergence of patterns within neuron firings, chemical processes, etc., working in a collective action. Both are physical phenomena that can be mapped into a geometric system, but pain requires a different conception of what physical is.

Er... wouldn't that make it non-physical, then ?

Simulating the conditions and states are not the same thing since pain (consciousness, awareness, etc.) might be closer to ferromagnetism than virtual worlds that we see displayed on computer monitors.

I would go one step further than QED, and say that a 100% accurate computer simulation of the real world is equivalent to the real world. If we were all living in the Matrix, and the Matrix was flawless (unlike the Matrix in the movie), then there would be no way for us to tell whether we live in the Matrix or the real world.

[Bugmaster]

Okay, what is the contradiction?

As I said, first you claim that pain cannot be expressed in an algorithm, and then you propose an algorithm that expresses pain.

Do you feel pain, Bugmaster?

Yes

Do you see the contradiction here? You say that you experience pain, but just a paragraph earlier said that pain does not exist. How can you experience a state of being in pain if that state does not really exist?

I didn't say that pain does not exist, period; I said that pain does not exist as a separate dualistic entity. Rocks do not exist as independent dualistic entities, either -- they're just collections of atoms -- but that doesn't imply that these atoms don't exist. I don't see any contradiction here.

How do you know I feel pain ? Can you see the qualia inside my astral head ? Or is it through my behavior (such as screaming "ouch", for example) ? If so, then how will you distinguish me from an AI that acts exactly like me ?

This is irrelevant. You just said that you agree that you feel real pain. Now I want you to explain how this function is possible if you really feel it. In actuality, I don't have to justify to myself that you feel pain since I feel pain, so I already feel justified in needing an explanation for pain.

Hmm, that sounds a lot like solipsism to me. You don't feel justified in believing that anyone has any pain at all, except for yourself. If you're willing to go that far, we can discuss it further, but I personally think that solipsism is absurd.

If I say that my pain is caused by the number of marbles that pounced against some C-fiber in my brain, then how have I shown how pain really occurs?

If "pain" is a label we give to marble bouncing events, and you've identified the exact marble configuration that leads to pain, then you've clearly shown how pain really occurs. I don't see a problem. Yes, actual pain that occurs in real live humans is a lot more complex than a handful of marbles, and so I can't "explain why it is that I feel pain when I am hurting". However, a modern neurobilogist would be able to do this... You should ask one of them.

As I'd said earlier, the appeal to [ferromagnetism] is a perfectly reasonable justification for disagreeing with [a computer's simulation of ferromagnetism is ferromagetism]; but then you have to justify [ferromagnetism], and, despite your best efforts, I am not convinced that there's anything other than faith that could justify it.

This statement strikes me as ludicrous for a few reasons. One, I don't have to justify ferromagnetism since it is an observed property in nature.

Er, and consciousness is not ? Be careful how you answer. If you say that consciousness is not an observed property in nature, then you make it irrelevant. If you answer that it is indeed an observed property in nature, then you have to tell me how I can go ahead and observe it, and you haven't been able to do that so far.

However, this is very misleading since physics does not make a distinction with matter like this view suggests. For example, string theory is working on many "non-physical" states that wouldn't comply in the least with this limited notion of physicalism.

I actually count strings as being physical as well... why wouldn't they be ?

The big difference here is that if pain is a function of some logic gate array inside the brain, then there is no way to show how that function actually causes you the pain that you acknowledge the headache pain that you feel once now and then.

That sentence is kind of malformed, so I'm not sure what you're saying here. If the algorithm for pain is, "if(nerveSignal > threshold) { ouch(); }", then the opening of an extra logic gate -- the one that controls the high bit of nerveSignal, for example -- can indeed be directly traced to pain. My worldview is internally consistent.

however the computer didn't have to have this feeling programmed into its instruction set to behave just like you.

Why not ? If the computer is a copy of me, then it has the same things "programmed in" that I do, right ?

Assuming it is possible, then you'd have to say that a particular mental process is not identical to a particular physical process. However, before you equated the two as exactly the same (or, actually, there is only physical states).

I think that a "mental process" is just an abstraction we use to explain human behavior. Thus, if we think someone acts human, then we are justified in treating him/her/it as such. When looking at biological humans, we can actually trace their behavior to physical changes in their brains; when looking at electronic humans, we can trace their behavior to physical changes in their circuits. So, yes, their mental processes are identical to their physical processes, but those are all just abstractions we use to describe them.